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Introduction
The Americans and Guerrilla Insurgency
The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of guerrilla insur-
gency.1 The overthrow of the Ethiopian military regime in 1991 un-
derlined the truth of that observation. And since then post-Cold
War guerrilla conflict has flared from the Balkans to the Sudan, from
Mexico to Mindanao.
Many factors account for this continuing and escalating pattern
of internal violence. Most post-Cold War guerrilla conflicts have their
roots in ethnic and religious tensions; the breakup of Cold War align-
ments has permitted many previously suppressed aspirations and
hostilities of various groups to come to the surface. Much of the
former Communist empire, the former "Second World," has been
slipping, or plummeting, into Third World conditions. In most of
those areas, elementary military training is widespread and mod-
ern weapons are abundant. Improved communications help to stir
or reinforce discontent in poor countries or poor areas of countries.
Exploding birthrates, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are produc-
ing disproportionately youthful populations that tend to find frus-
trations intolerable and violence glamorous. The phenomenon of
the "failed state," where a government collapses or disappears, opens
the road to chronic organized violence. And although the USSR and
its satellites are no longer available to supply arms to would-be revo-
lutionaries, profits from the global drug trade buy great quantities
of the newest weapons. Finally, the apparent need of not a few per-
sons to find meaning in life through armed struggle against a per-
ceived or defined evil guarantees that insurgency will always be
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occurring in some quarter, even if the particular socioeconomic prob-
lems there have been "solved."
It is almost certain that the United States will become involved
in some of these guerrilla conflicts. Humanitarian impulses stimu-
lated by sensational television coverage, the recurring American
determination to make the world safe by spreading democracy, the
participation of U.S. forces in UN peacekeeping or peacemaking
missions—all these factors have been setting the stage for American
troops to confront guerrillas. And the occasion may of course again
arise when the United States wishes to assist guerrillas, on the model
of the Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion—perhaps on or within
what China claims to be her borders, for example. Clearly, any deci-
sions for U.S. involvement in a guerrilla conflict ought not to be made
without due consideration of the experiences of the United States
and of other major powers.
Perhaps the most important fact concerning the experiences of
major powers when they have had to deal with guerrilla insurgen-
cies is how very difficult, even dangerous, they found such chal-
lenges to be. Guerrilla warfare played a major role in the ending of
the European colonial empires. Beyond that, in the twentieth cen-
tury all of the great powers met frustration or even humiliation at
the hands of guerrillas: the British in Ireland, the Germans in the
Balkans, the Japanese in China, the Chinese in Tibet, the French and
then the Americans in Vietnam,2 and the Soviets in Afghanistan, and
the Russians in Chechnya, to name only well-known instances.
Confronting guerrillas may present particular perils for the
United States. Its armed forces are not as well prepared as they
might be, psychologically or organizationally, to face guerrilla con-
flicts. Additional grave difficulties may well arise from the fact that
many if not most guerrilla wars will derive from religious move-
ments (notably but not exclusively Islamist) or from quasi-religious
organizations like Peru's Sendero Luminoso. It is not clear that
Americans—not just the armed forces but the political class, the
electorate, and the media—are equipped to deal effectively with
protracted, religiously inspired violence.3 And by its very nature,
guerrilla war is full of ugly incidents—just perfect for the Ameri-
can television industry.
Introduction
The Nature of the Present Study
Dangers lie in the path ahead. To avert or at least prepare for them,
Americans need to deepen and sharpen their understanding of what
guerrilla war has meant and will mean. The principal method—how-
ever inadequate—for achieving this aim is analysis of experience.
We need, of course, to exercise great caution in dealing with "the
lessons of history": the past is littered with disastrous decisions and
policies that were based on what were once considered to be con-
vincing and even compelling analogies to previous situations. The
full consequences of policies are notoriously hard to foresee, and
interpretations of events and ideas change over time, often more
than once.4 The need is not for dogma, certainly not for maxims, but
for insight that arises from careful analysis of each particular case in
its particular context. It is especially important to look at the indi-
vidual guerrilla conflict within its international political environ-
ment.5 Another requirement is humility: the realization that we do
not know all we need to know, and never shall, and that even the
best-conceived and best-intentioned actions may produce conse-
quences that are not only unforeseen but disastrous.
This volume examines nine cases of guerrilla conflict that involved
the United States to a significant degree. Included are two cases in
which the Americans themselves were the guerrillas (the American
Revolution and the U.S. Civil War), three in which U.S. forces system-
atically engaged guerrillas on foreign soil (the post-Spanish War Phil-
ippines, Nicaragua, and Vietnam), three cases in which the United
States assisted a foreign government challenged by guerrillas but did
not deploy combat units (the post-World War II Philippines, Greece,
and El Salvador), and one case in which the U.S. government aided a
guerrilla movement abroad (Afghanistan).6
The number of cases is large enough to avoid the pitfalls await-
ing those who derive conclusions from only one or two instances.
But the number is not too big to prevent that consideration of detail
and nuance that is so often lacking in large quantitative studies. The
diverse settings of these wars, extending from the 1780s to the 1980s
and from the Carolinas to the Philippines, permit comparisons be-
tween success and failure across time and across cultures. References
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to guerrilla conflicts that involved other great powers during and
before the Cold War reinforce the comparative nature of this study.
I examine the configuration of these conflicts: their origins, why
the Americans became involved, how they participated, and what
patterns and deviations emerged from them. Perhaps one of the most
notable aspects of the American involvement in guerrilla war sug-
gested by this study is that the Americans have done well both in
the role of guerrillas and in that of counterguerrillas, and it may be
very useful for policymakers to reflect on that record. The war in
Vietnam, the most distressing foreign conflict the Americans have
ever engaged in, is profoundly atypical of U.S. experience in foreign
guerrilla wars; our examination of events in the post-1898 Philip-
pines and in 1920s Nicaragua underlines this. Of equal importance,
the way the Americans dealt with the 1980s struggle in El Salva-
dor—a reversion to the successful Greek-Philippine model—sug-
gests that they indeed learned a few things from their agony in
Vietnam.
American Guerrillas
The War of Independence
In their very first conflict as an independent people, the Americans
displayed impressive prowess in guerrilla warfare. The contribu-
tion made by American guerrillas to the climactic events of the War
of Independence, especially the bagging of Cornwallis at Yorktown,
was substantial, even essential. Yet for some reason their story re-
mains little known. In addition, the war suggests, across more than
two centuries, certain fundamental difficulties impeding even great
powers when they confront a major guerrilla challenge.
How the War Came About
The American struggle for independence from Britain had its ori-
gins above all in two key factors: the destruction of the French and
Indian menace and the controversy over self-government. Before
1763 hardly a single American colonist would have desired inde-
pendence from the British Empire, if only because of the menace to
New England and other colonies presented by French power in
Canada. The French incited their Indian allies to attack American
farms and settlements. This brutal racial warfare left American colo-
nists little choice but to look to the British army for protection (which
in their view was often inadequate).1
The long struggle for control of North America between France
and England and their respective Indian allies was played out in
several acts: King William's War (1689-1697), Queen Anne's War
(1702-1713), King George's War (1744-1748), and the French and
Indian War (1754—1763), during which the young George Washing-
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ton learned about leading men in combat.2 For the most part these
conflicts had been sideshows in a global struggle for empire among
France, Britain, and Spain. But in the 1750s the great William Pitt
convinced his countrymen that their main objective in this six-de-
cade-old contest should be the final expulsion of French power from
North America. His policy culminated in 1759 in the climactic Brit-
ish victory on the Plains of Abraham, in front of Quebec. By de-
stroying the vast French empire in America—New France (Canada)
and Louisiana (the Mississippi Valley)—the British set the stage for
rebellion in their thirteen American colonies.
From the settlement of Jamestown in 1607 to the fall of Quebec
in 1759, Britain's efforts to regulate life in its American colonies had
been generally light-handed and intermittent. Out of this relative
British neglect and the consequent necessity of self-reliance, a rarely
articulated but constantly increasing sense of separateness had been
developing in America, a growing apart from England in life and
thought. With the final elimination of the French and Indian danger,
American colonists became quite unreceptive to increased supervi-
sion from London.
"British subjects in America," a distinguished scholar wrote in
1965, "were then the freest people in the world, and in many re-
spects were freer than anyone today."3 But exactly at the time when
its American colonists were feeling safe, expansive, and self-reliant,
the government in London undertook to exercise greater control over
them. The struggles in North America had cost the British govern-
ment a lot of money. Since these wars, and especially the last one,
had conferred inestimable benefits on the American colonists, En-
glishmen predictably concluded that the colonists should pay a fair
share of the costs. This entirely comprehensible if lamentably inop-
portune intention to spread around the financial burden of a war
from which all had gained produced in 1765 the notorious Stamp
Act, the first direct internal tax ever laid by Parliament on the colo-
nies. The money raised by the stamp law was earmarked for colo-
nial defense, but it fell mainly on merchants, lawyers, and journalists
and therefore raised a storm of protest. Representatives of nine colo-
nies convened, full of indignation, in New York City for the so-called
Stamp Act Congress. The next year, at the urging of Pitt, Parliament
repealed the offensive legislation.
Reaction to the Stamp Act set loose a series of intertwined dis-
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putes that in a few years led to Lexington and to Yorktown. Where
English politicians saw nothing more than a reasonable effort to ra-
tionalize relations within the empire, American colonists saw noth-
ing less than a major step toward abolishing traditional and
comfortable liberties. The vulgarized economic determinism that has
so long pervaded American culture must not obscure the fact that it
was never some piddling taxes on glass or documents or tea, or any
other mere matter of government finance, that alarmed and mobi-
lized the Americans. Rather it was the specter of Parliament's newly
asserted right to do whatever it saw fit to do in the colonies and all
the implications of that for the liberty of the Americans, their des-
tiny, their self-image, and their self-respect.4 To both the English and
the American mind, property was inextricably intertwined with citi-
zenship; hence questions of taxation—of whom, by whom—touched
the very fabric of the polity. The freeborn English in America, newly
emancipated from the dread vision of French and Indian depreda-
tions, awoke to find themselves confronted, as they thought, by a
Parliament that considered them to be mere counters in a vast impe-
rial game. They declined that role with vehemence. "Many revolu-
tionaries believed that God had chosen America to preserve and to
exemplify self-government for the world." But were the Americans
really free, or were they, after all, pawns of a far-away Parliament,
however enlightened and light-handed? And if one day that enlight-
ened and light-handed Parliament should become benighted and
rapacious—what then? Great principles were at stake. The Ameri-
can Revolution was "above all else an ideological, constitutional,
political struggle."5
Many factors worked to widen the ideological fissures, includ-
ing English domestic party politics. Above all, ignorance of Ameri-
can conditions and sentiments beclouded British policy, ignorance
aggravated by slow and unreliable communications over the dan-
gerous North Atlantic. Every difficulty, every controversy and ru-
mor loomed more distorted and more menacing through an
impenetrable oceanic fog of mutual incomprehension. Edmund
Burke observed, "The Americans have made a discovery, or think
they have made one, that we intend to oppress them; we have made
a discovery, or think we have made one, that they intend to rise in
rebellion against us."6
Even before the Second Continental Congress, with delegates
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from all thirteen colonies, convened in Philadelphia on May 10,1775,
both sides had shed blood, at Lexington and Concord. Fort
Ticonderoga fell to Ethan Allen's Vermonters in May 1775. The next
month saw the sanguinary encounter called Bunker Hill. George
Washington accepted the command of the "Continental Army"
(which did not yet actually exist) in June.7 Benedict Arnold began
his march to Quebec in September.
Then, in a shocking and probably irreparable breach of the so-
cial contract, British authorities stirred up Indian tribes against the
colonists. In January 1776 the cabinet compounded that error by hir-
ing German troops to go to America and kill what in the British
government's own eyes were British subjects on British soil. This
last piece of foolishness simply appalled Americans (as well as many
Englishmen in England); many who had up to then hoped and
worked for reconciliation were pushed onto the side of revolution.
A final rupture seemed inevitable. As the Declaration of Indepen-
dence complained, "He [the King] is at this time transporting large
armies of foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, de-
struction and tyranny already begun." Hessian and other German
troops in North America would eventually number twenty-nine
thousand.8 Armed conflict provoked a declaration of American in-
dependence, not the other way around.
Displaying in the course of these events a decent respect for the
opinions of mankind, the Continental Congress, on July 4,1776, de-
clared the existence of a new nation. With deep misgivings, the Brit-
ish cabinet rejected this declaration, and so the war came.
Where Was the British Victory?
About three million persons lived in the mainly rural American colo-
nies in 1776; of these about six hundred thousand were of African
descent, most of them held in slavery. Large numbers of Americans
were indifferent or actually hostile to the cause of independence.
On the other side, the British were at least three times as numerous
as the Americans, they had emerged from the Seven Years' War ev-
erywhere victorious over the puissant French, and they possessed
both a relatively developed economy and a navy widely believed to
be second to none. Yet these impressive disparities between the con-
testants failed to bring victory to the British. Factors that impeded
10 • America and Guerrilla Warfare
or prevented the anticipated effects of British superiority require a
brief review, both because of the influence they exerted on the over-
all conduct of the war and because of their role in the guerrilla con-
flict that developed in the Carolinas, the conflict that led to Yorktown.
The Disunited Kingdom
The decision to coerce the American colonists aroused misgivings
and even open opposition within British society. After all, the Ameri-
can colonists were not only British subjects but, for the most part,
fellow Englishmen. The Howe brothers (General William and Ad-
miral Richard) were in command of British land and naval forces in
America in 1776; both men sympathized with many of the colonists'
complaints and spoke openly against a policy of severity. Several
prominent army and navy commanders declined to serve against
the Americans. Notable politicians opposed making war upon the
colonists, including Charles James Fox, Edmund Burke, and the
immortal Chatham (now old and quite ill). On hearing the news of
the fighting at Lexington and Concord, Chatham exclaimed, "I re-
joice that America has resisted!" Fox declared as early as November
1777 that America was too big and too far away to be conquered.
The incitement of Indians against the colonists deeply distressed
him; Indians were hard to control as allies and committed atrocities
against civilians that provided excellent propaganda for the rebels.
The cabinet, under Lord North, had the support of only a slender
parliamentary majority, and North was consequently reluctant to
undertake bold initiatives. Above all, the North cabinet was keenly
aware that the British ruling classes had no intention of paying the
financial and political costs of fighting a really serious war in
America.9 Consequently, the government needed to believe that res-
toration of order in the colonies would be relatively easy and cheap,
that the American rebellion was the work of only a small minority
who would soon give up—a belief constantly disappointed but con-
stantly renewed, a belief that made possible the disaster at
Yorktown.10
Strategic America
The war was going to be neither easy nor cheap, however, for rea-
sons that many observers at the time were able to discern. In the
first place, the very extent of the American colonies posed an im-
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pressive challenge to any campaign of coercion. Pennsylvania alone
was nearly the size of England; South Carolina, one of the smaller
colonies, was the size of all Ireland; North Carolina was twice as big
as Belgium and the Netherlands combined. Boston was as far from
Savannah as London was from Budapest, or Warsaw from Istanbul—
and there was no air or rail or even reliable road transportation. A
British attempt to subdue the American colonies would face many
of the same difficulties as the later campaigns of Napoleon in Russia
and the Japanese in China: the occupation of huge sectors of sprawl-
ing territory would greatly tax the resources of the invading power
but would not necessarily bring the end of the war any closer."
The great size of the war theater would not have mattered so
much if the British had been able to seize the brain center of the
American rebellion. But no such place existed. Philadelphia, by far
the largest American city, had 29,000 inhabitants (compared at the
time to 250,000 in Moscow, 350,000 in Naples, 600,000 in Paris and
700,000 in London). The occupation of New York City, which in fact
was in British hands for most of the war, could mean but little to the
homespun frontiersmen of western Pennsylvania or the determined
partisans of the Carolina Swamp Fox. And just as there was no all-
important capital, there were no strategic fortresses whose fall would
signal the eclipse of the rebellion: the British took Ticonderoga, called
for some reason the "Gibraltar of America," with no discernible con-
sequences.12 Clearly, the British would accomplish little by captur-
ing "key points."
Weakness in the Navy
Britain's supreme weapon should have been command of the sea.
The asset of a large and habitually victorious navy should have al-
lowed Britain to transport armies at will, keep those armies sup-
plied, rescue forces that got into trouble, and isolate and bottle up
the Americans. Yet the struggle that began as the American War of
Independence was "the only war of the eighteenth century in which
England failed to win ascendancy at sea."13
This absence of secure maritime supremacy had several sources.
After the victory over the French in 1763, British cabinets had very
shortsightedly allowed the navy to deteriorate. Diseases, especially
scurvy, also weakened British naval power, even though the pre-
ventive for scurvy was generally known and easily available. The
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ravages of disease are almost incredible to us today: of about 171,000
seamen who served in the Royal Navy during the war, less than 1
out of 140 died in combat, but 1 out of 9 died of disease (and 1 out of
4 deserted). There was in addition the problem, always so puzzling
to civilians, of interservice rivalry and even hostility. As long as the
Howe brothers were in command in America, cooperation between
the military and the naval arms was quite adequate. But after Gen.
Sir Henry Clinton took over the army command in the colonies, se-
rious difficulties arose between him and the admirals, and many
others as well. Then French intervention in the war drastically
changed the entire maritime picture. The French navy, though lack-
ing the size, skill, and self-confidence of its British counterpart, was
nonetheless a formidable weapon. In the later years of the war, French
naval power was augmented by the considerable fleets of the Span-
ish and the Dutch. All this caused the British greatly to fear an inva-
sion of the home islands; hence they kept many ships in home waters,
too many to allow them to maintain a constant naval supremacy in
America. (If the British had bottled up the main French fleets at Brest
and Toulon, the number of British vessels available for service in
American waters would have been far fewer, but French soldiers
and supplies would not have reached America; Yorktown would
have been impossible. Nonetheless, such a sustained contest in Eu-
ropean waters against the combined fleets of France and Spain was
beyond the power of the Royal Navy in the 1770s.)14
Weakness in the Army
The principal instrument through which the subordination of vast
America would have to be accomplished was of course the army.
But the army was not in good condition. As an institution it was an
object of distrust, ridicule, or aversion for many Englishmen, even
for the government that maintained it. "Ever since Cromwell's time,
the soldier had been regarded as the natural enemy of the liberties
of the people." Partly because of this dour heritage, the British army
in the eighteenth century had no serious organization above the regi-
mental level; when a large force was required, regiments were sim-
ply thrown together. Of course, no professional staff existed. Army
pay was low. There were no decorations for valor. Predictably, re-
cruiting men to serve in the ranks was difficult. One method of get-
ting men was to pardon criminals who would agree to join the army.
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"In this way every gaol served as a recruiting depot."15 Things were
different, but not necessarily better, in the higher ranks: favoritism,
connections, and money were the most important elements in the
process of distributing commands (this was true in the navy as well).
Thus, the army was an object of distrust and dislike by many
Englishmen of high and low estate, its recruits came too often from
the most depressed social strata, and its leaders were men not nec-
essarily distinguished for brilliance or even competence, hi light of
these distressing circumstances, it comes as no surprise that the army
was also small. In December 1776 the British army counted 55,000
men, of whom some 21,000 were in North America along with Hes-
sian and other German mercenaries. (Eventually almost half the
troops sent to America were from German states. In 1775 the British
government had tried to procure 20,000 Russian mercenaries, but
Catherine the Great turned it down.) Even by September 1781, when
Britain confronted not only the American rebellion but the combined
hostility of the French, the Spanish, and the Dutch as well, the Brit-
ish army had only 149,000 soldiers, of whom 36,000 were militia in
England; in all of North America and the West Indies, there were
only 56,000 British troops. Thus, to the actual fighting in its thirteen
North American colonies, Britain at no time committed as much as
1 percent of its total male population.16
In addition to being distrusted, poorly recruited, and small, the
British army notably lacked anything approaching a decisive edge
over its American opponents in terms of weapons. Eighteenth-cen-
tury military technology was simple, inexpensive, and widely under-
stood. The British had discipline and tradition, but they had no tactical
or strategic airpower, no helicopter gunships, no tanks, no armored
personnel carriers, not even repeating rifles. The principal weapon of
all infantry regiments, even in Europe's most professional armies, was
the musket. Having fired his musket once, the soldier had to reload:
three shots a minute was considered a good rate of fire. (In order to
appreciate the time lapse between shots, the reader is invited to hold
his or her breath for twenty seconds.) The British musket had an opti-
mal range of 40 yards. American guerrillas in Pennsylvania or Caro-
lina often carried rifles, more sophisticated than the musket, with
an effective range of 250 yards. Thus, even the sparse and mainly
rural population of the revolted colonies could produce arms whose
quality overmatched those of the best British regiments. And given
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the weaponry and tactics of the times, even very poor quality troops
could inflict serious casualties on the enemy.17
The Puzzle of Supply
There was also a very serious question of supply. An army, espe-
cially one on campaign, has little or no ability to produce food or
clothing or ammunition, yet it regularly consumes great quantities
of those items, particularly food. Even at the end of the twentieth
century, transporting a major military force across an ocean and sup-
plying it once there is a formidable task. Two hundred years ago it
was nearly impossible. A consideration of the problems involved in
feeding and arming the king's soldiers in America illuminates our
understanding of the British conduct of the war.
The needs of an eighteenth-century army were modest compared
to those of a modern one, but they were still quite large. Every Brit-
ish soldier in America required 700 pounds of food a year, plus the
casks and barrels in which that food was packed. A working horse
needed 29 pounds of hay and oats every single day; the 4,000 British
army horses in America in 1776 therefore required more than 14,000
tons of hay and 6,000 tons of oats annually. Even during the frightful
winter of 1777-1778 at Valley Forge, the hungry little American army
there consumed 2.25 tons of beef and 2.25 tons of flour (plus 15,000
gallons of rum and whiskey, assuredly for medicinal purposes).18
If asked where all these supplies for British forces in America
were supposed to come from, a member of the British cabinet in
1776 would have answered, "from America." The Treasury con-
tracted with London firms to supply the king's forces in America;
these London firms subcontracted with groups in the colonies. But
already in the spring of 1775 the system began to break down. The
population of the colonies was relatively small and scattered, and
much of it was hostile. Thus, the requisite quantities of supplies were
not easy to assemble. And patriot groups in the colonies frequently
prevented the acquisition and delivery of sufficient supplies. When
British troops went out very far beyond the towns in search of sus-
tenance, they often had to contend with bands of guerrillas, who
removed foodstuffs from the path of British foraging parties and
frequently attacked such parties, inflicting irreplaceable casualties
on already inadequate British forces. If a British army controlled a
small territory, it could not extract enough supplies from it; one could
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expand the food supply by expanding the amount of territory occu-
pied, but that would require more soldiers, and more soldiers would
require more supplies: "sufficiency was an ever-receding horizon."19
Most of the food and other supplies for the British forces in America
therefore had to come from England. That seemingly simple sen-
tence actually bristles with unpleasant strategic implications.
The king's forces in America were at the far end of a tenuous
supply lifeline: cumbersome vessels dependent on the wind, slowly
and uncertainly moving across three thousand miles of the never
hospitable and often tempestuous North Atlantic Ocean. Inauspi-
cious winds and bureaucratic sloth usually prevented ships and fleets
from beginning their voyages to America on schedule. Adverse
weather could destroy well-built ships, and even a safe crossing
sometimes required two full months. (News of the tremendously
important battle of Saratoga, concluded by October 17, 1777, did
not reach Benjamin Franklin, American envoy to the French gov-
ernment, until December 4). And because bad winds could easily
blow a fleet far off course, it was not unusual that a ship carrying
vital cargo to Boston would actually come to port at Charleston. Fi-
nally, the foodstuffs carried in these slow and vulnerable vessels
were preserved by methods that had not improved in essentials since
prehistoric times.20 The long and dangerous distances across the
North Atlantic had played their part in bringing on the war; they
now compounded Britain's difficulties in waging that war.
The army's supply system was rife with fraud and embezzle-
ment, a result of the patronage and amateurism of eighteenth-cen-
tury British administration. Politicians who benefited from this
system naturally opposed its reform.21 Besides, any serious sugges-
tion about improving the system of supply to British forces in
America would collide with the myth that America itself would be
able to supply the war (the same fatal myth shows up in British
estimates of the political situation).
The British war effort, therefore, consistently displayed "the in-
ability of the [British] army to obtain any dependable supply of pro-
visions in North America." Serious consequences, both political and
military, flowed from this inability. Poor logistics meant poor disci-
pline. Since few professional British soldiers, and no German troops
at all, were fighting in the colonies from motives of patriotism, the
failure to furnish them adequate supplies encouraged desertion.
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Another result was pillaging: soldiers showed scant respect for the
property of disloyal civilians, but when they were hungry, soldiers
took what they could from hapless farmers, regardless of their poli-
tics. This common practice turned loyal colonials into neutrals and
neutral ones into rebels.22 Moreover, if British forces moved away
from the sea into the large, underdeveloped, and often hostile hin-
terland, they ran the risk of having their overland supply lines cut.
So the king's troops usually stayed prudently close to navigable riv-
ers or occupied port cities. The effective power of the Crown, that is,
did not normally extend much beyond a relatively shallow group of
coastal strongholds. Twice during the war British forces challenged
these geographical realities; both instances ended in disaster, as will
be seen shortly.
The dependence on local sources of supply is above all what
made British forces so vulnerable to guerrilla attack. That depen-
dence derived not only from the manifold difficulties of transatlan-
tic transportation but also from the lamentable inability of the Royal
Navy to maintain consistent control of American waters.
Political disarray inside Britain, the size of the American war
zone and its distance from the mother country, the strategic dilem-
mas presented by an intercontinental naval war (including eventu-
ally the specter of a French invasion of England itself), the inadequate
quantity and quality of troops available, and obstacles to the proper
supply of those troops—all these factors operated powerfully to
hobble the British effort to subdue the Americans, and they opened
the path to American guerrillas.
British Options
The British clearly had impressive obstacles to confront, but they
also had plausible courses of action to consider. First of all, they
might have acquiesced in independence for the Americans, inviting
them to enter into close commercial and military relations, rather
than trying to coerce them into submission. Some sentiment did ex-
ist in governing circles for that course, but it would take another
hundred years to develop the formula—peaceful independence and
intimate links—for a British Commonwealth.
As a second possible course, rejecting American claims to inde-
pendence and deciding to suppress them, the British might have
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concentrated every effort on destroying Washington's army, the
rebellion's "center of gravity." That army numbered about eighteen
thousand in 1776, peaked at twenty thousand in 1778, and then de-
clined.23 Certainly it would have been difficult to trap Washington
in the wide spaces of America, especially since he himself under-
stood the supreme importance of preserving his army no matter
what. Nonetheless, such entrapment was not impossible: armies
could find themselves caught, as Generals Burgoyne and Cornwallis
would eventually come to understand. But instead of a strategy of
destroying or dispersing Washington's army, the British settled on
schemes of territorial conquest (the Saratoga and Carolina cam-
paigns), which ended in disaster for them.
A third choice was to send enough troops to the colonies to over-
whelm the rebellion, that is, to chase Washington's army into some
remote hinterland, occupy the population centers, and hunt down
guerrilla bands. But raising troops sufficient in number to accom-
plish these tasks was not feasible: early in the war it would have
cost more money than the British wished to spend, and later it might
well have precipitated a French invasion of England when it was
denuded of troops. Consequently, British forces in America were
always numerically inadequate; yet at the beginning of the war Gen-
eral Howe was in command on Staten Island of more than thirty
thousand men (including Hessians), possibly the largest European
expeditionary force of the entire eighteenth century.24
A fourth option, since the British did not want to send enough
men of their own, was to get others do their fighting for them. They
could have mobilized the significant elements in the colonies that
desired to remain under the Crown—the loyalists—and provided
them with the necessary training, equipment, and moral support.
This line of action never received sufficiently realistic consideration.
(But under this rubric of get-somebody-else-to-fight, the London
government did adopt a typically disastrous half-measure: hiring
German mercenary troops to fight in America. Of those, there were
not nearly enough to suppress the rebellion, but there were more
than enough to rouse Americans to bellicose indignation.)
Fifth, given their unwillingness to send enough troops to win
the war and Washington's ability to avoid a decisive encounter, the
British might have adopted what would in a later war be called an
"enclave strategy": setting down small forces in the American popu-
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lation centers—the seaports—making them as impregnable as pos-
sible and gradually extending the territory under their control. In
this way, without inflicting or suffering numerous casualties, they
could have convinced the rebels that final victory was unattainable.
A variation would have been to put into real effect Burgoyne's plan
to split the colonies into two parts along New York State's eastern
border (see the next section). Either of these alternatives would have
given time and scope for corrosive quarrels and disintegrative jeal-
ousies among the Americans to have their inevitable effects. And
once the French intervened in the conflict, an enclave strategy seems
at least in hindsight to be the only one with any realistic hope of
success. But a strategy of enclaves enjoyed little articulate support
because it would have required too much time to become effective.
Sixth, the British might have selected some combination of those
options: for instance, holding the larger southern centers with armed
loyalists stiffened by some British regulars and protecting them with
one sizable regular army, probably best based in Charleston. They
approached this strategy in 1780 in South Carolina but soon aban-
doned it in pursuit of larger objectives (which also failed).
Thus, the British never adopted any of those six courses of ac-
tion. In fact, they never developed any realistic or even coherent
overall strategy for dealing with the rebellion.25 With no Chatham to
guide them, no Marlborough, no Wellington, directed (so to speak)
by a cabinet of "mediocrities," the British embarked upon a distant
and difficult conflict, "a war marked by all the folly of a Crusade,
without the piety," stumbling on through one year after another,
from one plan to another, while the number of their enemies in-
creased and the prospects of their final victory diminished. "With
all due credit to the Americans and their French allies, it is not too
much to say that the British government and the British generals
lost the Revolution for England."26
On to New York!
The confrontation at Yorktown had its origins in British plans for
the conquest of the southern colonies. American guerrillas in the
Carolinas played a decisive role in the failure of this British effort, a
failure that led directly to Yorktown and the final triumph of the
American cause. But the genesis of the British campaign in the Caro-
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linas occurred far from those colonies. The invasion of the South
was actually the second great British effort to break the rebellion;
the first took place in New York and ended, as the southern cam-
paign would end, in military disaster. The second (the southern)
campaign would not (and could not) have taken place had it not
been for the failure of the first (the northern) campaign, the culmi-
nation of which has gone into the books as the Battle of Saratoga. To
appreciate not only the Carolina conflict with its climax at Yorktown,
but also the British method of making war in America, we need to
recall the events at Saratoga.
Accurately judging New England to be the heart of the rebel-
lion, the British decided to isolate that region from the rest of the
colonies. The essential plan was to establish a line of strong points
and posts from Lake Champlain down the Hudson River to Albany
and eventually extend it to New York City. This line would prevent
or at least impede overland passage of supplies and troops between
New England and the other colonies. Having geographically divided
the rebels, the British could concentrate on subduing one group of
colonies at a time; thus they would in effect nearly double their avail-
able forces. With one section of rebellious America having been sub-
dued, the other sections would inevitably succumb as well.
John Burgoyne (1722-1792), soldier, parliamentarian, and play-
wright, was the principal author of what became the Saratoga cam-
paign. In 1776 he sent the government his "Thoughts for Conducting
the War from the Side of Canada." Burgoyne proposed to establish
his base in Montreal and thence advance southward. A small diver-
sionary force would march eastward from Oswego (on Lake Ontario)
through the Mohawk River Valley. These moves would be supported
by some sort of activity on the part of Howe's main army in New
York City. All these forces would converge on Albany. But, accord-
ing to most accounts of the campaign, Gen. William Howe, occupy-
ing New York City with a substantial force, was not originally
supposed to march directly to Albany with anything like his whole
army—or if he was, he was not aware of it.27
A noted historian of the Revolution calls the whole enterprise
"stupid" because it diverted many troops away from the pursuit of
Washington's army and because in the original versions Howe was
not clearly responsible for giving support to Burgoyne until the lat-
ter had reached Albany. Moreover, even if Burgoyne's plan had been
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completely successful, the isolation of New England would have
taken a very long time to become really effective. But leading mili-
tary figures in London had for some time held the opinion that di-
viding the colonies in two along some line or other was possible
and indeed would be the key to winning the war.28 It was not unrea-
sonable for them to believe that they could seal the eastern border of
New York with small posts supported here and there by strong gar-
risons. Then New England, already blockaded by the Royal Navy,
might have begun to suffocate.
General Howe, the British commander in New York City, was a
Whig and had publicly opposed the policy of coercing the Ameri-
cans. Nevertheless, he had long meditated on and even written to
London about his plans to attack Philadelphia, the seat of the Conti-
nental Congress. Howe hoped that by threatening Philadelphia he
would force Washington to stand and fight and inevitably be de-
feated. Thus the rebellion would (presumably) end. Howe knew that
Burgoyne's operation was coming down into New York colony from
Montreal, but he believed that Burgoyne could reach Albany with-
out any direct assistance from New York City. So Howe and most of
his army sailed away to the South on July 23. Several weeks before
this, Lord George Germaine, the cabinet minister most directly con-
cerned with American affairs, had concluded that Burgoyne's ef-
forts toward Albany would require some support from Howe's
forces. He therefore wrote Howe a letter directing him to send assis-
tance up the Hudson River to Burgoyne. But it appears that the let-
ter was mislaid; it never reached Howe. The question of the mislaid
letter has always generated a good deal of controversy. In any case,
instead of going up the Hudson to assist Burgoyne, Howe sailed off
to the Chesapeake to trap Washington (who eluded him).29
The Burgoyne plan's other prop was supposed to be the diver-
sionary march from Oswego eastward toward Albany through the
valley of the Mohawk River. On July 26 that started out well enough,
with Col. Barry St. Leger commanding a force of about 850 soldiers
and loyal colonials and about 800 Indian allies. But colonial militia
defeated them near Rome. Then, receiving news that Gen. Benedict
Arnold was approaching, St. Leger's men panicked, for this Arnold
"was feared by the white soldiers and the red warriors alike as was
no other American officer."30 St. Leger therefore retreated to Oswego
and thence to Canada in August. With no support from either south
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or west, Burgoyne found himself and his army alone in the hostile
wilderness. He had set out for Ticonderoga on July 1 with 7,700 troops
and 500 Indians. Two thousand women accompanied his army in
various capacities. After innumerable hardships and miscalculations
and several small but sharp defeats at the hands of swarms of New
England militia, with little food and less prospect of assistance, on
October 17 Burgoyne surrendered his 3,500 men, all that remained
to him, to the American general Horatio Gates near Saratoga.31
Burgoyne and St. Leger had committed the military mortal sin
of despising and therefore underestimating their adversaries. They
were not the first nor the last soldiers to fall into this error and to
pay a high price for it.32
A French Alliance
The chanceries of Europe resounded with the news of Saratoga. Strik-
ing London like a thunderbolt, it shocked the cabinet into agreeing
on a truly remarkable program. The British government now pro-
posed to repeal all offensive legislation since 1763, renounce the right
of Parliament to lay direct taxes on the colonies, recognize the legiti-
macy of the Continental Congress, and discuss the question of Ameri-
can representation in the House of Commons at Westminster. In June
1776 such a package would have stopped the Revolution cold. But
before the plenipotentiaries carrying these offers from London could
arrive in America, the Continental Congress had entered into a treaty
of alliance with France. As the only condition of that alliance, the
French had insisted that the Americans not make peace with En-
gland until the latter recognized their independence.33 The British
offer came too late.
Meanwhile, at Versailles, Louis XVI's foreign minister Charles,
comte de Vergennes, had been carefully guiding his country's policy
toward the American rebellion, biding his time, and arranging for
secret assistance to be given to the rebels. Saratoga changed all this:
it was "the sign for which France had waited."34 On December 6,
1777, Louis XVI recognized the independence of the United States,
and a military alliance soon followed. For the Americans, the French
alliance meant an incalculable accession of strength. France had
twenty-four million people to Britain's nine, a first-class army, and a
considerable navy. True enough, France had suffered a decisive de-
feat by Britain in the Seven Years' War (what the Americans call the
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French and Indian War), but what it had lost most was prestige, and
that would be restored by a suitable humiliation of the English. Hence
Vergennes's desire to assist the Americans. "Saratoga brought France
into the war and thereby established the independence of the United
States. If anyone doubts this and prefers to believe that our ances-
tors could have won through by their own efforts, he has only to
consider the sequel. In the event, even after the intervention not only
of France but later of Spain and Holland, the issue was long in doubt
and Washington more than once feared the worst." Thus there can
be no doubt that "the [British] defeat at Saratoga is the clearest turn-
ing of the war," one of the truly decisive battles in world history.35
The Franco-American combination was an odd one. The Ameri-
cans had recently fought against the French; many Americans hated
them, mainly because of atrocities committed by France's Indian
allies. Influential persons on the French side also found the alliance
unsettling. Although they sorely wished to harm England, were not
the French in fact setting a very bad example in assisting rebels against
a lawful king? Most of all, French help to the Americans and France's
eventual full-scale entry into the war would throw the government's
finances into chaos, a situation that would help lead them, just a few
years after Yorktown, to a supreme crisis; indeed "the price to be paid
for American independence was a French revolution."36
But the advisers of Louis XVI found Saratoga an irresistible temp-
tation. With the British apparently bogged down in a difficult war
in North America, France was free to strike at them when and as it
pleased. Fortunately for the Americans, the French government had
no way of knowing that, the victory at Saratoga notwithstanding, if
General Howe had bestirred himself in the winter of 1777-1778, he
could have destroyed Washington's desperate little army at Valley
Forge.37
Without doubt, the most important consequence of the Ameri-
can victory at Saratoga and France's entry into the war, both imme-
diately and in the long run, was that in the eyes of the London
government, the major theater of combat was no longer in the Ameri-
can colonies. French intervention would mean a naval war for con-
trol of the West Indies and India, but above all it raised the dread
prospect of an invasion of the home islands. France was the domi-
nant power on the continent. Because Britain had no important al-
lies in Europe, the French were free to contemplate a direct attack on
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the British Isles. And the eventual Spanish entry into the war fur-
ther altered its strategic basis. Spain came in reluctantly, disliking
the example a successful revolt by Britain's North American colo-
nies would set for her own vast holdings in the New World. Spanish
intervention in the conflict was therefore not on the side of the Ameri-
cans but on the side of the French, and above all against the English.
No longer a power of the first rank, Spain nevertheless possessed a
sizable navy, a vast and rich colonial empire, and a faded but ser-
viceable prestige. Now, with all her other worries, Britain would
have to deal with a major threat to Gibraltar.
Thus, the consequences of Saratoga dramatically changed the
way in which the British cabinet looked at the American war. First,
as a result of France's entry into the conflict, British attention shifted
from the North American war to the global conflict. Second, British
hopes for the reconquest of America shifted from the Hudson Val-
ley to the Carolinas. Many observers in London now believed that
"the southern colonies were in many ways the soft underbelly of
the rebellion." As 1780 dawned, the American war had been drag-
ging on for almost five years and seemed far from an end. The Brit-
ish really had to try something new. Thus, Lord North's cabinet
moved slowly but inexorably toward a new strategy: the reconquest
of the colonies must begin in the South. The cabinet sent its thoughts
on this grave matter to Howe's successor in America, Gen. Sir Henry
Clinton.38
On to the Carolinas!
Throughout the American Revolution, a significant proportion of
the colonial population remained loyal to the British Crown. The
conflict, therefore, was not only a war of independence but a true
civil war. But no widely recognized leader arose among the loyal-
ists, and many of them fled to Canada during or after the Revolu-
tion. Little sympathy and less study has therefore been expended
on those Americans who opposed the independence struggle. "The
Loyalists in the American Revolution suffered a most abject kind of
political failure, losing not only their argument, their war, and their
place in American society, but even their proper place in history."39
Nevertheless, the American loyalists were to play a signal role in
the final years of the war.
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The Loyalist Mirage
Concentrating resources on a reconquest of the southern colonies
appealed to the British cabinet for several reasons. After Saratoga
the government wanted to accomplish something somewhere. The
southern colonies were supposed to have a beneficial climate and
an abundance of food, and they were far from turbulent New En-
gland. But above all the South, it was widely repeated, was full of
loyal subjects merely awaiting a sign, a rescuing act, by the mother
country. Some in England who had originally opposed the coercion
of the colonies as unjust or stupid underwent a change in their atti-
tude because of their unwillingness to abandon the supposedly large
numbers of suffering loyalists. Furthermore, growing opposition in
Britain to sending any more soldiers to America would eventually
force the recognition of colonial independence, unless troops could
be obtained somewhere else—that is to say, from among loyal
southerners. Therefore numerous southern loyalists must exist. The
mantra of the loyalist hosts just waiting to be organized was the per-
fect answer to many problems. How to reconquer America? Simple:
just get General Howe or somebody to chase away Washington's con-
temptible little army, and then the teeming loyalists would rise up to
impose order on the rebel minority. This reputed abundance of loyal
subjects was the decisive factor in the change in British strategy, be-
cause it would supposedly enable Britain to win the war, at least the
southern war, cheaply.40 (As a matter of fact, probably more New
Yorkers were for the king than for the Continental Congress, but
that had had precious little effect at Saratoga.)
General Cornwallis and other British commanders were always
expecting to find these large numbers of loyalists who would join in
the fight, and they were always disappointed.41 British troops in the
Carolinas did receive assistance from loyalist units, but often they
were groups like the far-wandering New York Volunteers, or the
Volunteers of Ireland, actually recruited in Philadelphia. The local
loyalists were never numerous enough, nor were they employed
with real effect. Where, then, were the great legions of loyal fighting
men who needed just a little encouragement to subdue the small
bands of rebellious malcontents in their midst? A partial answer: in
the minds of British politicians, and nowhere else.
Twentieth-century estimates vary regarding the proportion of
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the American population that was loyalist. Perhaps about 20 per-
cent of the white population in the thirteen colonies remained fun-
damentally attached to the old order, with a higher figure—from a
quarter to close to a third of the population—for South Carolina,
but these are informed guesses only.42 Moreover, changing sides with
the changing tides was not uncommon, especially in the Carolina
partisan struggles. Who were these loyalists, called "Tories" by their
opponents? Predictably, some of them were rich; also predictably,
some were Anglican clergymen. But like support for the Revolu-
tion, support for the Crown cut across class lines. Poor backcountry
farmers in North Carolina were loyalists because for years they had
believed themselves oppressed by the coastal middle class that was
leading the revolutionary cause. Other upcountry Carolina loyalists
were smallholders who were suspicious of Whig (revolutionary)
landowners or who felt the need of the Crown's military protection
against hostile Indians, or both. Relations among these different co-
lonial groups had been very tense since the 1760s.
Ethnicity also played a role in revolutionary politics. The "Scotch
as a race generally remained loyal to the king of England and were
the most important single group in North Carolina to do so."43 In
part the Scottish allegiance to the English monarch stemmed from
religious principles: the Scots had taken an oath of fealty after the
defeat of the Stuart rebellion of 1745. Many of the Scots believed
that the English were invincible. And the Germans of South Caro-
lina, especially in and around Orangeburg, were loyal to King George
"of Hanover." In contrast, the Scotch-Irish who settled in the Caroli-
nas nursed their ancient grudges against the English king and were
therefore usually Whigs. Nevertheless, "the loyalists in the interior
tended to be relatively recent immigrants who had moved into South
Carolina . . . from northern Ireland or Germany, or from other colo-
nies, particularly Virginia. The number of foreign and American loy-
alists with north Irish backgrounds suggests that caution should be
exercised before accepting a simple 'Scotch-Irish' explanation of
backcountry support for independence; it seems more likely that their
relative newness to the areas in which they settled contributed to their
indifference or hostility to the aggressive designs of the [South Caro-
lina] Provincial Congress in 1775."44 Thus, analysis of political dispo-
sition according to ethnic grouping is enlightening but inadequate.
But above all other aspects of the loyalist question, it is essential
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to keep in mind that sentiments of loyalty to the king and the old
flag, however sincere, did not at all necessarily imply a willingness
to bear arms against the Revolution.
So there were far fewer loyalists willing and able to fight than
the king's ministers wished to believe. And besides the relative lack
of numbers, other factors helped to restrain loyalist activism. For
one thing, British commanders were loath to incorporate loyalist
units into their own forces or to grant regular commissions to loyal-
ist officers. For another, British soldiers were often looters—one more
consequence of the supply problem—and were casual about dis-
covering the political allegiances of those among whom they
marched; the German mercenary troops were even worse because
they could not even understand the protestations of their loyalist
victims, assuming for the sake of argument that they would have
paid any attention had such protestations been intelligible. Most of
all, loyalists were reluctant to fight at the side of the British because
they sensed, sometimes perhaps subconsciously, that the British
troops could always decide to abandon them. This fear was well
founded. The British had already undermined the confidence of loy-
alists in other colonies by their practice of occupying an area for a
while, encouraging the local loyalists to publicly display their true
sentiments, and then marching off. That is exactly what would hap-
pen to the loyalists of Georgia in 1780, and the Revolutionary forces
almost always displayed more severity toward loyalists than toward
British troops.45 At a minimum, the British government and military
never developed a clear idea of the place of the loyalists in the pro-
cesses of reconquest and reconciliation. It can then be no surprise
that even after the British victory at Guilford Court House (see the
next section), the numerous loyalist recruits that were expected failed
to turn out.
Despite its disastrous end, the Saratoga campaign had been fun-
damentally a good idea, because the real seat of the war was in the
North. But the British belief in southern loyalism served their amour
propre, justified their niggardliness, and suggested an easy way out
of their several dilemmas. In overestimating the strength of south-
ern loyalism, the British underestimated the weakness of their own
position. And even if the southern colonies had contained great num-
bers of loyalists willing and able to bear arms, their mere mobiliza-
tion would not in itself have ended the war: true peace, lasting peace
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would have required not only arming the loyalists but also reconcil-
ing the rebels.46 In fact those two aims—militarizing the southern
loyalists and pacifying the southern colonies—worked against one
another. Shifting the emphasis to the southern theater was therefore
a sign not of strategic rejuvenation but of strategic bankruptcy. In
any event, the ill-founded and self-serving British belief in a sizable
and available southern loyalism was the primary and decisive fac-
tor in the final and calamitous act.
The Invasion of the Carolinas
Aside from the mistaken expectation of loyalist support, concen-
trating efforts on the southern colonies was not in itself a terrible
idea, if only because it would reduce the area over which the British
had to deploy their less than abundant forces. And the British cam-
paign to subdue the South opened brilliantly enough. There was in
all the Carolinas only one real city, Charleston, the principal port south
of Philadelphia, with a population of 14,000 people, of whom a third
were slaves. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton attacked Charleston in February
1780. Given the population of South Carolina of that time, Clinton's
army of more than 8,000 soldiers was equivalent to an American force
of 400,000 landing in Cuba in 1999. Overconfident because they had
repulsed a British amphibious attack in 1776, the American troops
let themselves be trapped in Charleston, which fell on May 12,1780,
and 5,400 American soldiers became prisoners. It was "the greatest
disaster suffered by the Americans throughout the war." British casu-
alties were amazingly light, perhaps 268 killed and wounded; Ameri-
can casualties were not much higher.47 The British did not leave the
city until December 14,1782, more than a year after Yorktown.
After the occupation of Charleston, Clinton returned to New
York, leaving Gen. Charles Cornwallis in charge of about 8,300 Brit-
ish, Hessian, and loyalist troops.48 In 1780 Cornwallis, at forty-three,
was tall and handsome. He had fought in Europe during the Seven
Years' War, becoming a colonel at age twenty-eight. A civilized man
with the broad vision of a true statesman, while a member of Parlia-
ment he had opposed the tax measures that had helped bring on the
American rebellion. Even as the conflict entered its fifth year,
Cornwallis was convinced that reconciliation with the Americans
was not only possible but imperative. Hence he hoped to win over
the southern colonists, not to beat them, and certainly not to cow
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them into resentful submission. After all, the Americans were all the
king's subjects, and most of them were of British stock, like
Cornwallis himself (and weren't most of them loyalists, at least at
heart?). Understanding Cornwallis's perspective explains a good deal
about his military operations in the Carolinas.
Although they had taken Charleston with ease, the British still
faced the inescapable facts of American geography. North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Virginia together were larger than all Britain
and Ireland combined, larger than post-World War II Poland, three
times the size of the former East Germany. South Carolina alone,
with thirty-one thousand square miles, was larger than Scotland,
twice the size of Switzerland, and three-fifths the size of England
itself. The population of South Carolina in 1780, however, amounted
to only 180,000, and the majority were slaves. Along the coast were
plantations with numerous slaves; in the interior were small farms
worked almost exclusively by free men. It would not be easy for a
substantial British force to find sufficient supplies in such circum-
stances—especially since the area was aswarm with guerrillas. Loy-
alist and patriot bands fought each other with fury: South Carolina
after the British took Charleston was convulsed by "a civil war, and
it was marked by bitterness, violence, and malevolence such as only
a civil war can engender."49
Nevertheless, three months after the capture of Charleston,
Cornwallis marched out of the city into the heart of South Carolina.
At Camden on August 16, 1780, he encountered the army of Gen-
eral Gates, the man who had claimed most of the credit for the vic-
tory at Saratoga. The Battle of Camden turned into "the most
disastrous defeat ever inflicted on an American army." Of the Ameri-
can force of 4,000, only 700 were later able to reassemble. British
casualties totaled a derisory 324, of which 68 were mortal. Leaving
his stricken soldiers behind, General Gates galloped away from the
scene of the debacle and covered 180 miles in three days, surely some-
thing of a record in the annals of equestrian transport.50 Soon there
was not one single organized company of American troops to chal-
lenge the British enemy anywhere in all of South Carolina. Even the
state's American governor had gone away.
Following the victory at Camden, General Clinton urged a con-
servative strategy: Cornwallis would hold South Carolina and Geor-
gia, while Clinton himself continued to occupy New York City and
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its environs, until the rebels wore themselves out. Britain would
thereby preserve some, and perhaps recoup all, of her colonies. In
light of what transpired before and after, Clinton's conception was
sound. But Cornwallis's thoughts had turned toward invading North
Carolina. The smashing defeat of the rebel army at Camden had not
put a lasting stop to resistance in South Carolina; Francis Marion
and Thomas Sumter and other partisan chiefs stubbornly kept the
war going (see the next section). Cornwallis reasoned that these
guerrillas must be getting assistance from North Carolina, and so
there he must go. Even before Camden, Cornwallis had been con-
sidering an invasion of the interior of North Carolina as the cheap-
est way to put an end to the guerrillas in South Carolina, cutting
them off from supplies and recruits. And he would be able to chase
away the little American army under Nathanael Greene, extinguish-
ing the last flickering hope of the local guerrillas for assistance. He
also expected to be able to harass Virginia from a new base in North
Carolina. Inexorably his logic would lead him to conclude that per-
manent victory in North Carolina required the occupation of Vir-
ginia. "The cost of such an invasion he assessed lightly."51 In this
way Cornwallis was unwittingly—and literally—moving toward an
acknowledgment that the true seat of the war did not lie in the south-
ern colonies.
And so a British army embarked on a campaign that would take
it far away from the coast of the Atlantic—the first such campaign
since the disaster at Saratoga. Reaching Charlotte, North Carolina,
early in October, Cornwallis heard the news of the battle at King's
Mountain. There, on October 7,1780, irregular American units had
annihilated a British force of one thousand, mainly loyalists. The
victors were guerillas and hastily summoned militia, and the battle
of King's Mountain was in some senses "a sort of climax of the par-
tisan [i.e., guerrilla] effort." Though an affair of relatively small num-
bers, the American victory "turned the tide of war in the south"
because, filling the patriots of Carolina with fresh hope, it "set ablaze
the back settlements."52 King's Mountain was in effect the Saratoga
of the South. Cornwallis prudently headed his army back to South
Carolina.
Clinton penned a criticism of Cornwallis's return to South Caro-
lina that is remarkably revealing: "The precipitancy with which this
retrograde movement was made contributed, I fear, not a little to
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make the revolt more general and to increase the despondency of
the King's friends, especially in North Carolina, where the loyalists
whom [Cornwallis's] presence had encouraged to show themselves,
being exposed to persecution and ruin by his retreat, threw away for-
ever all their confidence of support from the King's army."33 Once again,
the British had left their loyalist friends alone to face the Revolu-
tionary music.
In any event, having reentered South Carolina, Cornwallis re-
ceived reinforcements from Clinton. He now commanded about four
thousand men, much better trained, armed, and equipped than
Nathanael Greene's army of three thousand "tatterdemalions."
Cornwallis divided his army, detaching a large force under Col.
Banastre Tarleton to drive Gen. Daniel Morgan's Americans away
from his flank while Cornwallis himself marched again into North
Carolina to deal with Greene. Tarleton encountered General Mor-
gan at the Battle of the Cowpens (January 17,1781) and suffered an
overwhelming defeat. The British lost 100 killed and 900 prisoners;
American casualties were 72. It was the clearest American victory
over regular British troops in the entire war. Cornwallis wrote of
Cowpens, "The late affair has almost broke my heart." He then con-
ceived the idea that Gen. Nathanael Greene was the mastermind
behind all his troubles. Determined to pursue and catch Greene,
Cornwallis threw the dice: he burned his own army's baggage train
and, with the most minimal supplies, plunged deep into the Caro-
lina interior to keep his rendezvous with destiny.54
Nathanael Greene, the target of Cornwallis's expedition, was a
forty-year-old former Rhode Islander. The Quakers had expelled him
from their midst because he attended a military parade in 1773. He
was active in Washington's great Christmas Eve coup that netted
numerous Hessian prisoners at Trenton in 1776. As quartermaster
general of the Continental army, he had been "Washington's right
arm," and after Gates's disgrace at Camden, Washington appointed
Greene to command the southern forces. "In the opinion of some
well-qualified judges [Greene] was Washington's superior both as
strategist and as tactician."55 The reconquest of Georgia and South
Carolina in 1780 was the principal British accomplishment of the
entire war; the reversal of the reconquest in 1781 would result from
cooperation between General Greene and the southern guerrillas.
Deliberately leaving his supply train far behind, driving himself
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and his men to the full, Cornwallis caught Greene near Guilford
Court House, North Carolina, on March 15, 1781. For Cornwallis,
the battle of Guilford Court House was a tactical victory but a stra-
tegic defeat. That is, the British were left in possession of the field of
combat while the Americans retreated. Technically Cornwallis had
won a victory. But the American losses were relatively light and eas-
ily replaced, whereas Comwallis's many casualties could not be re-
placed at all: "another such victory would mean the end of his army."
Cornwallis could win at Camden, and again at Guilford Court House,
but to what effect? When beaten, the Americans rose up to renew
the struggle, while Comwallis's own numbers dwindled in a bare
and hostile landscape. "Again and again the Americans came for-
ward to accept defeat. The Continental Army's power of recupera-
tion was astounding, and in defeat it had nothing vital to yield."
General Greene could suffer one tactical defeat after another, and
the war would go on; but let Cornwallis be defeated only once, and
British hopes to suppress the Revolution would be as good as fin-
ished. Greene is a classic example of a general who loses the battles
and wins the war. One eminent authority writes of him, "His keen
insight into the heart of Comwallis's blunders and his skilful use of
his guerrilla troops are the most notable features of his work and he
seems to me to stand little if at all lower than Washington as a gen-
eral in the field." He "remains alone as an American master devel-
oping a strategy of unconventional [i.e., guerrilla] war."56 Greene's
strategic vision—to wear down the British in cooperation with the
guerrillas—was perfect. In the end, what was left of Cornwallis's
army would be trapped and taken at Yorktown.57
But we are running ahead of the story. After his very costly vic-
tory at Guilford Court House, Cornwallis should have once again
hastened back to his base in South Carolina—but he did not. And
now the partisan war emerges into the center of the drama. In the
eighteenth century they called the kind of war that was about to blaze
across the Carolinas la petite guerre. But there was nothing petite about
it in its effects on the outcome of the American Revolution.
Guerrilla War
Reflecting on the most effective way to achieve the pacification of
an occupied country, Machiavelli wrote that "of all the methods that
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can be taken to gain the hearts of a people, none contribute so much
as remarkable examples of continence and justice; such was the ex-
ample of Scipio in Spain when he returned a most beautiful young
lady safe and untouched to her father and her husband; this was a
circumstance that was more conducive to the reduction of Spain than
force of arms could ever have been. Caesar acquired such reputa-
tion for his justice in paying for the wood which he cut down to
make palisades for his camps in Gaul that it greatly facilitated the
conquest of that province." Or, in Shakespeare's words, "when len-
ity and cruelty play for a kingdom, / the gentler gamester is the
soonest winner."58
The policies of the British and their loyalist allies were to di-
verge systematically and decisively from this advice. To begin with,
on the morrow of his reconquest of South Carolina, General Clinton
insisted that everybody come over openly to the loyalist side. This
was a real error. Neutrality was almost as useful as open loyalism
for the British war effort: after all, if every single American declared
his neutrality, there would be no more war. But Clinton's heavy-
handed insistence on forcing a public commitment pushed many
neutrals onto the patriot side. "After the British had taken Charles-
ton, many South Carolinians had sworn loyalty to the king. But when
the British tried to force these people to fight for the king, the South
Carolinians revealed their true loyalties and resisted the British army."59
Forcing all oath-takers to fight for the king or face arrest clearly
made many recruits for the guerrillas.60 But this was only the first
entry in a list of true British blunders. Predictably, one of the major
causes of the guerrilla war that swept across South Carolina after
the battle of Camden (and even before) was the regrettable behav-
ior of the British authorities. The Swamp Fox himself, Francis
Marion, was deeply impressed with the help the British gave him
in this way: "Had the British officers acted as became a wise and
magnanimous enemy," he wrote, "they might easily have recovered
the revolted colonies."61 Consider the case of Andrew Pickens, a
Revolutionary officer who, after the capture of Charleston, had given
his parole to the British that he would fight no more and was living
in peaceful quiet. British troops nonetheless came and burned his
farm. Pickens thereupon publicly declared that this gratuitous out-
rage absolved him of his parole. He became a chief of the guerrillas
and a sore affliction of the British.
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This costly British vindictiveness had one of its main roots in the
ever-present chimera of loyalist power. General Clinton sought to
occupy all of South Carolina and then return to New York. But since
he did not wish to leave behind him enough regular troops to garri-
son the state properly, he placed much of the responsibility for main-
taining royal control in South Carolina in the hands of local loyalists.
This was the Achilles' heel of the British plan to subdue the South
on the cheap: not only were the loyalists much less numerous than
the British had imagined, but also they were often members of mar-
ginal groups in society, and too often they were less interested in
restoring the king's peace than in avenging themselves on their rebel
neighbors. Under the protection of the British occupation, loyalists
plundered the property of the patriots. They also liked to burn down
churches, especially Presbyterian churches; southern loyalists bit-
terly viewed the Presbyterians as irredeemably seditious (it was no
accident that Andrew Pickens was a Presbyterian elder). In imita-
tion of General Clinton, loyalists insisted that there could be no valid
neutrality: one was either openly for the king or else a traitor, to be
dealt with as such.62
"Nowhere else," writes one distinguished student of these af-
fairs, "did this war show its true character as a civil war so plainly."
Indeed, "the bitterness of feeling between the two factions was car-
ried to extremes beyond anything ever experienced in the northern
colonies." When Burgoyne's men surrendered at Saratoga and were
stacking their arms, General Gates would not let his troops look upon
this humiliating act. But southern partisan warfare was a much dif-
ferent matter. "The war that blazed up in the summer of 1780 took
on an aspect of vindictiveness and cruelty that at times appalled
even the participants themselves."63 Looting and destruction were
common, looting by the loyalists from hostility, looting by the patri-
ots from need. Plunder injured the plundering side, because many
men would run straight home with their booty. Both sides carried
off the slaves and horses of real or supposed enemies; loyalists and
British soldiers often shot milk cows and bayoneted sheep.64 When
the revolutionary governor of South Carolina returned from Phila-
delphia, where he had been seeking aid, his first act was to issue a
proclamation against plundering.
Closely following the looting and destruction of private prop-
erty came blood reprisals and counterreprisals, in an endlessly esca-
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lating cycle. There were many cruel murders in the heat of battle
and the chase. At the siege of Fort Balfour, partisans demanded that
the British garrison surrender; the demand was rejected. The parti-
sans thereupon stated that if forced to attack, they would give no quar-
ter; with every reason to believe this threat, the commander and his
ninety men surrendered. In this particular instance the captured men
suffered no reprisals, but there were many other times when no pity
was shown. "In the barbaric civil war in eastern Carolina, quarter
was seldom asked or given."65 The killing of fighting men after they
had surrendered or asked for mercy was not uncommon: this savage
practice was known sarcastically as "Tarleton's Quarter" (that is,
"Tarleton's Mercy"); the British colonel Tarleton was notorious for
ordering or permitting the killing of wounded and surrendered en-
emies. Often defectors were forced to prove their new allegiance by
killing a member of the side from which they had deserted. One high-
ranking British commander even had the corpse of a particular foe
disinterred. Describing conditions in South Carolina in 1781, General
Greene wrote that "the Whigs [patriots] seemed determined to extir-
pate the Tories [loyalists] and the Tories the Whigs If a stop cannot
be put to these massacres the country will be depopulated in a few
months more, as neither Whig nor Tory can live."66
Freebooters added an even more lurid hue to this distressing
picture. These were men with no real political allegiance, who sought
to take what they could in the general disorder. "There came with
the true patriots a host of false friends and plunderers. And this was
true of both sides in this terrible struggle. The outlaw Whig and the
outlaw Tory, or rather the outlaws who were pretended Whigs and
Tories as the occasion served, were laying waste the country almost
as much as those who were fighting for the one side or the other."
Of such freebooters Sumter wrote, "The dissoluteness of our pre-
tended friends and the ravages committed by them are as alarming
and distressing as that of having the enemy among us."67
The principal responsibility to stop all this fighting and
pseudopolitical criminality rested on the British authorities, and from
the beginning they should have exercised much greater control over
the loyalists and their own troops. Had they acted thus, they would
have been wielding a unique, powerful, but inexpensive weapon:
constitutional legitimacy. The British government could claim very
plausibly to be defending legality and order against the rule of force.
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As in so many other cases, moral duty and strategic interest here
coincided: "In the struggle for dominance against the backdrop of
revolution, war becomes politics in that victory will be determined
by the side that convinces people that it can protect lives and prop-
erty. Generals who ignore this iron rule are foredoomed to failure."68
By allowing conditions in South Carolina and elsewhere to de-
scend to an abysmal level, the British profoundly harmed their own
cause, for they made guerrilla warfare inevitable. They trapped them-
selves in their pipe dream that the loyalists would fight and win the
war for them. The loyalists were too few in numbers to carry out
their assigned role and too violent not to provoke guerrilla upris-
ings. But beyond failing to fulfill the responsibilities of a civil gov-
ernment, the British also made their own particular contributions to
the general breakdown of society. Not only had the name of one of
their officers, Col. Banastre Tarleton, become a slang term for the
murder of prisoners; in July 1781, in retribution for patriot plunder-
ing, the British burned down Georgetown, South Carolina. Later a
British commander, a harbinger of Sherman, laid waste "a swathe
fifteen miles wide on the seventy-five mile route from Kingstree to
Cheraw." Many of those who joined the revolutionary partisan bands
were intensely localist, disinclined to obey orders, opposed to long
terms of service, and afraid of British bayonets.69 But almost all Caro-
linians were skilled in the use of arms through the exigencies of ev-
eryday life and were adaptable and self-sufficient in the inhospitable
and mosquito-bitten backcountry where their power lay. The Brit-
ish and their loyalist allies were not prepared for that kind of a con-
flict, and the flames of guerrilla resistance engulfed them. In the end,
British failure to clothe themselves credibly in the robes of civilized
lawfulness contributed as much to their undoing as any French fleet.
The guerrilla war in the Carolinas was fought out in "arduous
campaigns almost unmentioned upon the pages of history." The
battles had names like Nelson's Ferry, Fishdam Ford, Brake of Canes,
Rocky Mount. The guerrillas usually went on horseback, giving them
all-important mobility. But though they were mounted, they were
not true cavalry: they dismounted to fight, often with rifles instead
of muskets, which gave them a big advantage over the musket-car-
rying British infantry. In classic guerrilla style, they "fought only
from cover, and ran away that they might live to fight another day."
They could hide easily in the forested hills of western South Caro-
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lina. "Now they were numbered in hundreds, horse and foot; now,
but a dozen bold and hardy followers, white and black.... at times
they acted in concert with the Continental regulars, at others inde-
pendently. They were always ready to attack a British outpost, cut
off an enemy detachment, a foraging party or wagon train. If de-
feated, they scattered, took refuge in the swamps and forests, only
to reassemble and carry on the fight as occasion served. It was such
men that . . . kept the flame of resistance to tyranny alight in the
South during the darkest days of the Revolution."70 They were al-
ways short of ammunition, but in contrast to the normal condition
in the British camps, the partisans usually had plenty of food: beef,
fresh pork, hominy, corn, potatoes, peas.71
British and loyalist losses to the partisans after the fall of Charles-
ton amounted to three thousand casualties and prisoners; partisan
losses were perhaps one thousand. Eventually "the British conquest
of South Carolina crumbled under the nerve-racking strain of a phan-
tom enemy who lurked in every thicket, who struck communica-
tions, who always reassembled when dispersed, and who always
made necessary the presence of British regulars everywhere at once."
Thanks to the operations of the guerrillas, by the dawn of 1781 Brit-
ish pacification of the South had clearly failed; "it was doubtful that
the British and Tories controlled ground beyond that upon which
they stood."72
The Swamp Fox
Among the guerrilla chieftains who "kept the flame of resistance to
tyranny alight in the South during the darkest days of the Revolu-
tion," the flame that illuminated the road to Yorktown, none is more
deserving of an honored place in his country's history than Francis
Marion, called the Swamp Fox.
Born about 1732, Marion served as an officer in the provincial
forces and was elected to the South Carolina Provincial Congress
late in 1774. In November 1776 he became a colonel of the South
Carolina state troops. When Charleston and its garrison fell to the
British on May 12, 1780, Marion was not present, because he had
broken his ankle; by such brittle bones are the destinies of empires
swayed. More than once Marion's command constituted the only
organized patriot forces in all South Carolina. The British soon
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learned his name well. Right after the disaster at Camden, he and
his men fell upon a detachment of British troops escorting 160 Ameri-
can prisoners to Charleston. Marion freed all the prisoners and made
captives of their guards.
Almost as if born to be a famous guerrilla chieftain, Marion was
"sparing of words, abstemious in his habits, a strict disciplinarian,
ever vigilant and active, fertile of strategems and expedients that
justified his nickname of Swamp Fox, quick in conception and equally-
swift in execution, unrelenting in the pursuit of his purposes, yet
void of ruthlessness or cruelty to his victims." He possessed greater
strategic sense than Thomas Sumter (see the next section) and was
more cooperative toward other guerrilla leaders. Like a true fox of
the Carolina swamps, Marion excelled at stealth; one of his favorite
tactics was to approach the encamped enemy, send a group of his
men to the right and another to the left, and then attack ahead with
the main body. Gen. Henry Lee wrote, "Fertile in strategem, he struck
unperceived; and retiring to those hidden retreats selected by him-
self, in the morasses of the Pedee and Black Rivers, he placed his
corps not only out of the reach of his foe, but often out of the discov-
ery of his friends."73
Revolted by the burning of houses, Marion forbade such activ-
ity to his men. In retaliation for British and loyalist house-burning
and killing of livestock, especially by the notorious Colonel Tarleton,
he permitted his men to kill enemy sentries—an act considered at
the time to be quite barbarous. But Marion was not a cruel man. One
of his own officers, who had broken with him over the explosive
question of rank, nevertheless wrote of him, "He not only prevented
cruelty in his own presence, but strictly forbade it in his absence."74
Marion the warrior had deep religious sentiments and often led his
men to church services.
With the insight of a true leader, he shared, and was seen to share,
in the physical hardships of those in his charge: "since his men had
no tents, he also slept in the open." But most of all, Marion was a
cautious commander, very careful with the lives of his followers,
"that kind of leader who attracts men, not by a convivial personal-
ity or generous nature, but because he wins, and his victories do not
cost needless lives." His biographer wrote, "Marion's men loved
him." Even Gen. Nathanael Greene, never one to exaggerate the value
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of guerrillas, wrote that Marion excelled "in all the qualities which
form the consummate partisan—vigilance, promptitude, activity,
energy, dauntless courage and unshaken self-control."75
But these words were penned after the war. In 1780 neither Gen-
eral Greene nor the Continental Congress nor even the South Caro-
lina legislature appreciated the real worth of the partisans, and they
gave the partisans no aid. The Swamp Fox and his men thus fought
without pay, without recognition, often without ammunition; and
many died for want of the most elementary medical attention.76 Yet
even in conditions of shortage and neglect, Marion's followers would
distribute to needy civilians the precious salt that they had captured
from the British.
Mobility—not for the first or last time—was the foundation of
guerrilla success. Marion's "greatest strength was in keeping his men
well-mounted, thereby frustrating the designs of a superior force to
bring him to decisive action and destroy him." Lord Rawdon wrote
to General Clinton on March 23,1781: "Generals Sumter and Marion,
commanding distinct corps, have made some efforts to excite insur-
rection in this province and to interrupt our supplies from Charles-
ton. As the enemy are all mounted, we have never been able to force
them to a decisive battle."77
Marion's mobility found its perfect foil in Cornwallis's strategy.
In order to maintain at least some minimum of control over large
areas of the South Carolina backcountry, General Cornwallis estab-
lished a line of small forts through the interior of the state. That was
not a bad idea in itself. However, the forts ultimately depended on
Charleston for most of their supplies, and it was against these vital
lines of communication that Marion repeatedly struck. Cornwallis
eventually sent the notorious Colonel Tarleton—burner of homes
and killer of prisoners—after him, but no one could catch the Swamp
Fox. "With a force fluctuating from fifty to two hundred and fifty
men, Marion . . . darted upon the enemy whenever an opportunity
presented itself. He not only kept in check the small parties of the
enemy, whom the want of forage and provisions, or the desire for
plunder, occasionally urged into the region east and south of
Camden, but he often passed the Santee [River], interrupting the
communications with Charleston, and sometimes alarming the small
posts in the vicinity . . . and eluded all the attempts made to entrap
him." After the patriot victory at King's Mountain, Marion tirelessly
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roused South Carolina to revolt; he was close to cutting off commu-
nications between Charleston and Camden. In fact, "by the end of
October [1780] their [the guerrillas'] activities made it impossible
for the British to use the Santee River to transport material from the
coast to the troops in the interior, a serious situation since Cornwallis
was desperately short of wagons and horses." General Cornwallis's
frustration is evident in his message to General Clinton of Decem-
ber 3,1780: "Colonel Marion had so wrought the minds of the people,
partly by the terror of his threats and cruelty of his punishments
and partly by the promise of plunder, that there was scarce an in-
habitant between the Santee and the Pedee that was not in arms
against us. Some parties had even crossed the Santee and carried
terror to the gates of Charleston."78 Thus the Fox penned up the Lion.
In spite of these manifest successes, Marion had to cope with a
frustrating pattern of patriot behavior: once they had subdued or
chased out the local loyalists, many of his men would return to their
homes for indefinite periods. He seldom commanded exactly the
same men for more than two weeks at a time. Worn down by this
indiscipline, as well as by all his other hardships and responsibili-
ties, in May 1781 Marion was ready to lay aside his command. But
General Greene successfully entreated him to carry on. Greene was
setting forth the merest truth in a letter to Marion: "History affords
no instance wherein an officer has kept possession of a country un-
der so many disadvantages as you have. Surrounded on every side
with a superior force, hunted from every quarter by veteran troops,
you have found means to elude all their attempts, and to keep alive
the expiring hopes of an oppressed militia, when all succour seemed
to be cut off. To fight the enemy bravely with a prospect of victory is
nothing; but to fight with intrepidity under the constant impression
of defeat, and inspire irregular troops to do it, is a talent peculiar to
yourself."79
The Gamecock
Another Carolina leader who emblazoned his name across the record
of guerrilla warfare was Thomas Sumter. Born in 1734, near
Charlottesville, Virginia, he received little formal schooling, not un-
usual for that time and place. Nor was it unusual, in speculative
and underpopulated colonial South Carolina, that he did a couple
of stints in jail for debt. Serving in the French and Indian War, he
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went to London in company with some Indian chiefs in 1762. A few
years later he married a much-propertied widow a decade older than
himself. As the American Revolution drew nearer, Sumter was a
small plantation owner; he was also a Baptist—and an Episcopa-
lian. No doubt this ecclesial broad-mindedness helped elect him to
the First and the Second South Carolina Provincial Congresses in
1775 and 1776. Although he held a colonel's commission in the Con-
tinental army, he found his military activities frustrating and in 1778
retired to his plantation. But after the fall of Charleston in 1780, the
British sacked and burned Sumter's house. Like an outraged lion he
roared back into the conflict, to become "the hero who first had
roused the Carolinians after the fall of Charleston."80 The causes and
consequences of Sumter's reentry into the fray, reminiscent of An-
drew Pickens's, are surely unanswerable proofs that when those who
claim lawful authority act in an illegal and vengeful manner, or per-
mit their subordinates so to act, they are guilty of profound folly.
In June 1780 the South Carolina militia elected Sumter to be a
general. The men under his command supposedly were enlisted
"until the war was at an end or until their services were no longer
necessary[;] they were to find their own horses, arms, clothing and
all necessaries. It being absolutely necessary that they should act on
horse back." But spring plowing was a job for men and horses, not
wives and children, and so the partisans would have to go home for
that. Nevertheless, Sumter often led several hundred men at a time
into battle. At Hanging Rock, his men killed or captured more than
200 of the enemy, along with 100 horses and 250 muskets; partisan
losses were but 20 killed and 40 wounded.81
As with the ancient Romans, so with the Carolina guerrillas (and
General Greene, and indeed the American Revolutionaries in gen-
eral), resilience was a major weapon. In August 1780, just days after
the disaster at Camden, the British surprised Sumter in his camp at
Fishing Creek. The Americans lost a stunning 450 casualties and
prisoners. Yet within a week of the debacle, Sumter had reorganized
his forces and was back in the field. He himself suffered wounds,
and he carried a price of five hundred guineas on his head.82
The guerrillas never had enough ammunition. They sometimes
employed squirrel rifles and homemade swords against British regu-
lars. Cannons were usually unobtainable, even for an attack on a
fortified post. Although Sumter was presumably ignorant of Roman
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siege methods, at least once he built a Roman-style tower of wooden
rails, exposing to disconcerting fire British and loyalist troops who
had imagined themselves safe behind the walls of their fort. He even
made his men don wooden armor, which seems at least on occasion
to have protected them from the fire of British and loyalist muskets.
When not actually fighting or preparing to fight, the guerrillas
needed to be kept active or they would drift back home. Rejecting
the nonsense of close-order drilling, Sumter trained his men through
swimming and running, leaping and wrestling.83
Like the Afghan mujahideen two centuries later, Sumter's parti-
sans sometimes distributed food to the destitute civilian popula-
tion. They employed Catawba Indians for the specialized service of
tracking loyalists who lurked in the swamps. Sumter and his men
furnished General Greene with valuable intelligence, priceless sup-
plies, and tactical cover for the movements of his troops. Most of all,
the guerrillas exhausted the British forces with ceaseless alarms and
pursuits and searches. In these ways they made an effective British
concentration against Greene's army nearly impossible. It was thus
for good reason that in August 1780 Clinton received complaints
from Cornwallis about the "indefatigable Sumter."84
The services rendered to the American cause by the Gamecock
(as he came to be known) were significant. But so were his flaws. He
did not submit with grace to authority. He and his men disliked the
command of General Greene, and there was much misunderstand-
ing and friction between regulars and guerrillas. In this Sumter and
his men were not unique: "the Carolina Partisans were patriotic, but
they were also independent, jealous, and self-willed." But there was
more. Sumter paid his followers by taking the slaves from loyalists
("Sumter's Law") and distributing them among the guerrillas ac-
cording to a fixed scale (three and a half for a colonel, one and a half
for a lieutenant, one for a private). Marion the Swamp Fox deplored
this depressing trade in human flesh because it was cruel and also
because it stirred class hatred. Above all, Sumter was, in his
biographer's words, "reckless of his own life and prodigal with the
lives of his men."85 Marion came to be very critical of Sumter's in-
difference to loss of life in his battles and declined ever to serve un-
der his command. After the war Light Horse Harry Lee wrote: "He
was not overly scrupulous as a soldier in his use of means and was
apt to make considerable allowances for a state of war.... enchanted
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with the splendor of victory, he would wade through torrents of
blood to obtain it." So it was that by the summer of 1781, at least in
the eyes of some of his critics, "General Sumter [had] become al-
most universally odious."86
Clearly, Sumter had his share and more of shortcomings and
even sins. But his portrait is in no way complete. There was in him
as well an inclination to mercy toward the vanquished. A prisoner
of his, for example, a wounded British officer, later wrote, "It is but
doing bare justice to General Sumter to declare that the strictest hu-
manity took place . . . [we] were supplied with every comfort in his
power." Another time Sumter discovered that one of his prisoners—
a loyalist officer, no less—was carrying a list of houses he had caused
to be burned. Few would have condemned Sumter if he had handed
this wretched man over to a certain lynching; instead, Sumter threw
the paper into the fire.87 And as the war wound to a close, Sumter
often accepted repentant loyalist soldiers into his own ranks, prob-
ably preserving them from a harsh fate and certainly contributing
to eventual reconciliation after the war.
Symbiotic cooperation between regular forces and guerrillas can
generate tremendous power, and nothing better illustrates this prin-
ciple than the Carolina campaign. Though the Afghan mujahideen
brought their guerrilla war against the Soviet invaders to a success-
ful conclusion without the presence of a friendly regular army, and
Fidel Castro also won without such help, instances of this kind are
rare. On the subject of guerrilla war, Greene wrote truly (if some-
what gracelessly): "The salvation of this country doesn't depend
upon little strokes, nor should the great business of establishing a
permanent army be neglected to pursue them . . . You may strike a
hundred strokes and reap little benefit unless you have a good army to take
advantage of your success." Here is where Greene's regulars come into
the guerrilla picture. In order to pursue and catch the guerrillas,
British forces needed to subdivide themselves into compact, swiftly
moving, long-ranging patrols. But with Greene's American army in
the area, such roving bands of British or loyalist troops could fall
prey to superior numbers. Thus the presence of Greene's forces—of
a friendly regular army—in their vicinity protected the partisans.
But in their turn the guerrillas were of incalculable benefit to Greene:
they wore the enemy out in endless chases, inflicted small but accu-
American Guerrillas • 43
mulating numbers of casualties on them, and most of all prevented
them from gathering sufficient provisions. Greene took a bold gamble
and divided his army into two parts; he knew that Cornwallis, ea-
ger to capture or disperse both wings of the American army, would
do the same. But the division of British forces left each segment more
vulnerable to guerrillas. So wide-ranging were Marion's men that
the mere threat of them became almost as effective as their actual
presence: never able to know where they would most likely strike
next, the British were compelled to detach soldiers from their main
force to strengthen isolated garrisons, provide convoy protection,
or just limit the sweep of Marion's operations.88 The fact is that
"Greene could hardly have kept the field without the aid of Marion,
Sumter, Pickens . . . and the Partisans." The result of this coopera-
tion between Continental regulars and Carolina partisans was that
"the [British] army was a ship; where it moved in power it com-
manded, but around it was the hostile sea, parting in front but clos-
ing in behind, and always probing for signs of weakness Whereas
a defeated American army could melt back into the countryside from
whence it came, a British force so circumscribed was likely to be
totally lost."89
On to Yorktown
To review briefly: after General Clinton captured Charleston in May
1780, he returned to New York, while General Comwallis remained
in command of the southern army, made up of about 8,300 British,
Hessian, and loyalist troops. In the following August these troops
won another notable victory at Camden. But in October the Ameri-
cans scored a resounding success at King's Mountain; then in Janu-
ary 1781 the British suffered another disaster at the Cowpens. In
reaction, later that same month Comwallis burned his supply wag-
ons and set out at the head of a part of his forces in pursuit of Gen-
eral Greene's American army. Greene led Comwallis into North
Carolina and across it, farther and farther away from the
Englishman's base of supply. Comwallis expected (of course) to re-
ceive crucial civilian support in North Carolina and met (of course)
disappointment: the splendid vision of loyalist throngs had drawn
the British first to Charleston and now deep into North Carolina.
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Cornwallis won at Guilford Court House in March 1781, but with
500 British casualties out of an army of 1,900, his victory was again a
Pyrrhic one.90
With his forces so depleted, Cornwallis was too weak to pursue
and finish Greene. Like Hannibal in Italy, Cornwallis could best his
enemies on the field but could not obtain adequate replacements.
Winning battles but losing men, starved of supplies and deprived
of rest by the ever-present partisans, his army was bleeding to death
one drop at a time. "I have experienced the daggers and distresses
of marching some hundreds of miles in a country chiefly hostile,"
he wrote, "without one active or useful friend [note well!], without
intelligence, and without communications with any part of the coun-
try." Sickness and desertion were taking a mounting toll. And so
Cornwallis retreated to the North Carolina coast, seeking refuge at
Wilmington, which his army entered on April 7. The original pur-
pose in invading North Carolina had been to catch Greene and to
cut off assistance to the guerrillas in South Carolina. But in
Wilmington Cornwallis changed his plan. He might have decided
to return to South Carolina to bind up his army's wounds and so-
lidify control of that state. Or he might have decided to stay along
the North Carolina coast, resting his soldiers and building up sup-
plies. Instead he gave up on the Carolinas altogether and marched
into Virginia. Cornwallis's rationale for moving ever northward was
this: Greene's army prevented Cornwallis from dealing effectively
with the Carolina partisans; but Greene's army received supplies
and recruits from Virginia; and so there Cornwallis would go. What
he would do after that he probably had no idea. Abandoning the
Carolinas for Virginia was a far cry from the original plan, by which
he would first reconquer South Carolina and then move systemati-
cally north, to the heartfelt cheers of innumerable and generous loy-
alists, to subdue Virginia. And so "on May 13 [1781] he crossed his
Rubicon, the Roanoke River (the boundary between North Carolina
and Virginia)."91 From there he would eventually march to the fate-
ful precincts of Yorktown.
In leaving North Carolina before it had been pacified, Cornwallis
was also leaving the British forces in South Carolina on their own.
His invasion of Virginia thus doomed British control of South Caro-
lina and of remote Georgia as well. Cornwallis had been relying on
a string of small garrisons to hold South Carolina while he chased
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Greene's army across North Carolina. But once Cornwallis aban-
doned North Carolina for Virginia, there was nothing to stop Greene
from reentering South Carolina and gobbling up the British outposts
there, which is exactly what he did. The British had fallen into the
classic trap of those who would fight guerrillas: they built small
outposts that they could not sustain. The smaller outposts could be
starved out by Marion's partisans or overwhelmed by Greene's regu-
lars. Of course the British were free to consolidate their small posts
into larger ones, but the large garrisons would be neither numerous
enough to prevent the partisans from controlling and organizing
the countryside nor large enough to stand up individually to a de-
termined assault by Greene. Thus, even though British forces in the
province outnumbered his men, Greene was able to roll up their chain
of outposts one link after another, capturing many British troops and
sending the rest scurrying for safety into Charleston. These British
troops had been too few to hold South Carolina, but they would have
been of inestimable use to Cornwallis in North Carolina or Virginia.
In the end "the British were pressed rapidly back until nothing re-
mained of their southern conquests beyond the neighborhoods of
Charleston and Savannah. These they held till the peace."92
Cornwallis had repaired to Yorktown to await succor from the
invincible Royal Navy. Instead, he found himself facing a powerful
French fleet that shut him off from the sea, and two armies, one
French and one American (Washington's), that hemmed him in on
the land side. Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown exactly four years
after Burgoyne had surrendered at Saratoga. A British relief force
did indeed arrive at Yorktown by sea, but on October 24, just days too
late to save Cornwallis. And when after their surrender the British
forces left Virginia behind, they left many loyalists behind as well,
this not for the first time.93 Thus ended the second, and the last, of the
great British campaigns to subdue the rebellious colonies.
The events at Yorktown, even more than those at Saratoga, pro-
duced consternation and exasperation in England. Prime Minister
Lord North took the news "as he would have taken a ball in the
breast."94 The fall of Yorktown in 1781 had an effect similar to that of
the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The British had lost only one of
their three armies in America, and that was the smallest of them.
Even without Cornwallis's seven thousand troops, they still had
thirty thousand soldiers in America, and they held New York, Sa-
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vannah, and Charleston. Moreover, the American forces themselves
faced many serious problems, military, political and financial. But
the shock of Yorktown came after many years of fighting a less than
glorious and less than popular war. And it came at a time when
Fortune had deserted the British in other places: they had tasted
defeat not only in Virginia but also in India and the Caribbean; fur-
thermore, there was the perpetual fear of an invasion of England
itself. England was fighting a world war alone, while the number of
her enemies—the Americans, the French, the Spanish, the Dutch—
was growing. British-American peace negotiations began soon after
Yorktown, producing a preliminary treaty in November 1782 and
the final Treaty of Paris in September 1783.
Yorktown, where Britain's American empire had its end, is about
sixteen miles from Jamestown, where it had had its beginning.
Instead of holding Cornwallis responsible for the debacle at York-
town, after the American war the British twice made him governor
general of India and also viceroy of Ireland. He died in 1805. The
British reluctance to blame their American defeat on a particular
military leader indicates a conclusion on their part that the conflict
had been ill-starred from the beginning.
Gen. Nathanael Greene's untimely death in 1786, before his
forty-fourth birthday, undoubtedly deprived his country of impor-
tant services, including much good advice during the War of 1812.
After the Revolution the South Carolina legislature passed bills
to protect former guerrilla leaders from lawsuits arising out of the
wartime destruction. Francis Marion had emerged from the war in
seriously straitened financial circumstances. He nevertheless refused
to accept this legal protection, declaring that during the conflict he
had acted rightly, and if not, then he must make restitution. Marion
served in the South Carolina constitutional convention of 1790 and
later in the state senate. He died in 1795. South Carolina named a
county in his honor.
As for the Gamecock, after the Revolution Thomas Sumter's
neighbors elected him to the Continental Congress, an honor that
he declined. He later spent several terms in the South Carolina House
of Representatives. And eventually he did go on to the national Con-
gress, serving in the first U.S. House of Representatives in 1789 and
in the U.S. Senate from 1801 to 1810. Afterward he was President
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Madison's ambassador to Brazil. Sumter lived to be almost one hun-
dred years old, surviving the battle of Yorktown by half a century.
He was the last of the Revolutionary commanders to die. Like
Marion, Sumter had a county in South Carolina named after him.
But what most indelibly inscribed Sumter's name on the pages of
American history was a fort in Charleston Harbor.
Reflection
In 1776 the Americans were few in number, scattered along the edges
of an undeveloped continent, and deeply divided on the issue of
independence. For them to win their struggle against the mighty
British empire, many factors clearly had to come together. Any list
of the most crucial of these factors would include disquiet regard-
ing the conflict within England itself; the vast extent of the Ameri-
can colonies; their distance from the mother country in an age of
tenuous communications; the relative technological parity between
the British and Continental armies; and perhaps above all the qual-
ity of American leadership, most especially that of George Wash-
ington: clearsighted in strategy, steadfast in defeat, trusted by all.95
But for the purposes of this study, two other aspects of the con-
flict stand out. The first is foreign assistance to the forces of inde-
pendence. There is probably no more clear-cut example of the
importance of outside help to the success of an insurgency than the
American War of Independence. And there is no better demonstra-
tion of the value of that help than the battle of Yorktown, in which
Cornwallis faced nine thousand American and eight thousand French
troops, while a powerful French fleet under Adm. le comte de Grasse
closed off any possibility of either escape or rescue. The French navy
indeed played a role of greatest significance in the American Revo-
lution. Its vessels carried French troops to America as well as gold,
clothing, and cannons to Washington's army. French warships kept
the specter of invasion luridly before British eyes, and they often
interrupted the already quite tenuous system whereby the British
supplied their forces in America. The unreliability of supply in turn
forced British armies to stay fairly close to the seacoast most of the
time; this did little for their self-confidence, and when the French
navy was in a position to operate in American waters in strength,
the result was disaster for the British. And of course important Brit-
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ish military and naval units were unavailable for service in America
because of hostilities not only with France but also with Spain and
the Netherlands. The Spanish operated against Gibraltar and aug-
mented the French invasion threat against England, and the fiercest
naval battle of the war took place between British and Dutch squad-
rons off the Dogger Bank in 1781.% It is difficult to grasp why the
British cabinet failed to see the inevitability of foreign intervention
and the decisive effects it must have on the course of the American
war, but the British would repay the French a quarter-century later
in Spain.
A second aspect of supreme importance was systematic British
miscalculation about the kind of challenge they were facing in
America. It was clear from the beginning that the British ruling classes
did not want to pay very much for the suppression of the Ameri-
cans; in other words, they did not want to send Clinton and
Cornwallis enough soldiers with which to get on with their tasks.
The defeat at Saratoga sent a clear message to London about the
nature of the war, but the cabinet did not wish to receive it: refusing
to recognize the seriousness of the war, they failed to put up the
money and effort to win it. By 1780 the meaning of the war was
clearer than ever, and the British government should have made
peace either with the Americans or with the French.97 Instead, un-
willing to grapple with grim financial, geographical, and strategic
facts, they sought solace in their mantras about submerged but po-
tent popular support and invaded the Carolinas.
And by this route we come, as Cornwallis did, to the American
guerrillas. Unsung then as now, they nonetheless stand in the center
of the Carolina campaign, which played such a signal role in the
outcome of the war. In the dark night following the American catas-
trophe at Camden, they alone kept the flame of resistance alive. When
General Greene arrived to take command of the small regular Ameri-
can forces in the South, the guerrillas were ready to cooperate with
him. And on notable occasions many guerrillas fought as regular
formations within his army, as at Eutaw Springs, "bloodiest battle
of the southern campaign."98
One cannot sufficiently stress the importance to the final victory
of the symbiotic relationship between Greene's regulars and the
Carolina partisans. The presence of Greene's army prevented the
British from dispersing into small groups to hunt down the guerril-
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las. In turn the guerrillas both cowed the loyalists and buzzed around
the fringes of the British forces, harassing their communications,
inflicting casualties, depriving of them of food and rest, wearing
them down. General Cornwallis identified Greene's little army as
his strategic target, but he lacked sufficient troops to simultaneously
defeat Greene and hold South Carolina against the partisans. In short,
the guerrilla bands both distracted Cornwallis from his main objec-
tive and rendered merely nominal his control of the Carolinas. The
unreliability and inadequacy of supplies and replacements from
England magnified the importance of the guerrillas, who operated
so effectively against the foraging efforts of British troops. It was
primarily the unrelenting guerrilla activity after Camden that con-
vinced Cornwallis to make his fateful incursion into North Caro-
lina, and then the same conditions drew him farther north into
Virginia—into Yorktown."
The guerrillas had "by their own unaided efforts, broken up the
plans of the enemy, and disconcerted their schemes of campaign for
the whole country. The advantages of their uprising had not been
confined to South Carolina or even the South. It is not presumptu-
ous to say that they had done as much to save Washington's army
from destruction in its time of weakness, and to render Yorktown
possible."100 That is the truth, simple and incalculable, about the
Swamp Fox, the Gamecock, and the guerrillas of Carolina.
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Confederate Guerrillas
The War of Secession
On December 3, 1861, President Abraham Lincoln sent his annual
message to Congress, expressing the hope that the war, already nearly
a year old, would not descend into a "violent and remorseless revo-
lutionary struggle." Yet that was exactly the sort of struggle that
would emerge, in the form of Emancipation, Sherman's campaigns
through Georgia and Carolina, and guerrilla warfare.1
Slowly falling back in the face of Union advances, Confederate
forces in the West moved closer to their bases of supply and were in
friendly territory. In contrast, as the Federal armies inexorably ad-
vanced into rebel territory, they moved farther away from their bases.
Thus, the longer the war continued, the longer became the commu-
nications lines of the Union forces. The railways made steady Fed-
eral movement into the South possible, but they were vulnerable to
disruption and destruction by Southern guerrillas. The Confederacy,
with its great spaces, rural society, and rudimentary transportation
system, was close to ideal for guerrillas; their raids against railway
supply lines forced the Federals to use great numbers of troops to
guard their rear areas.2 Guerrilla operations of this type were more
important in Tennessee and adjacent areas than in Virginia because
supply lines for both sides were shorter in Virginia.
On February 17,1863, President Lincoln wrote to Gen. William
Rosecrans, "In no way does the enemy give us so much trouble, at
so little expense to himself, as by the raids of rapidly-moving small
bodies of troops (largely if not wholly mounted) harassing and dis-
couraging loyal residents, supplying themselves with provisions,
clothing, horses and the like, surprising and capturing small detach-
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merits of our forces, and breaking our communications." General
Sherman seconded Lincoln's observation: "Though our armies pass
across and through the land, the war closes in behind and leaves the
same enemy behind."3
Efforts to ward off guerrilla raids caused a tremendous disper-
sion of Federal forces. At the height of the crucial Vicksburg cam-
paign in 1863, General Grant had 60,000 men at the battlefront while
fully an additional 40,000 were employed against guerrillas and raid-
ers. And in the worst days of the counterguerrilla campaign in Mis-
souri (see the section titled "The Engulfing Flames" below), the
activities of 3,000 or 4,000 partisans absorbed the attention of 60,000
Union soldiers.4 Clearly, Confederate guerrilla warfare diverted
many Union soldiers from the principal fronts. Two aspects of this
guerrilla warfare are especially noteworthy: Confederate regulars
employing guerrilla tactics behind Union lines in northern Virginia;
and pro-Confederate civilian insurgents in Kansas and Missouri
engaging in the notorious "border war."
Mosby in Virginia
Among Confederate guerrilla leaders, perhaps the most successful,
and certainly one of the most famous, was John Singleton Mosby.
Born in Powhatan County, Virginia, on December 6,1833, as a youth
he was of very delicate health; many who knew him in his teens
predicted that his life would not be a long one. But near the end of
an exceptionally long life, he wrote triumphantly, "I have outlived
nearly all the contemporaries of my youth."5 Mosby attended the
University of Virginia for a while, where he excelled in languages
and literature but not in mathematics. In the years before the war,
he successfully practiced law in Virginia, despite (or perhaps be-
cause of) having had to serve a term in prison in 1853 for wounding
a local bully.
As the clouds of secession gathered, the young Virginia attorney
strongly supported Stephen Douglas and the Union. A friend once
asked what he would do if South Carolina were to secede: "I told
him I would be on the side of the Union."6 But when Virginia went
out, John Mosby, like Robert E. Lee and so many others, went out
with it, enlisting as a private in the state army. Federal troops took
Mosby prisoner in July 1862; they exchanged him for a Union lieu-
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tenant (who was never heard of again). Surely the freeing of Mosby
must rank not far below the shooting of Stonewall Jackson in the list
of fateful accidents of the war.
Military life agreed with Mosby. Certainly it did not depress his
intellectual appetite: a December 1862 letter to his wife asks her to
send him his copies of Plutarch, Macaulay, Scott, Shakespeare, and
Byron.7
Early in 1863 Gen. Jeb Stuart sent Mosby with 15 men to operate
behind Union lines. From this little band would evolve the Forty-
third Battalion of Virginia Cavalry, soon to be known as Mosby's
Partisan Rangers. During the course of the war, Mosby enrolled a
total of 1,900 men into his Partisan Rangers; when the war finally
ended, he still commanded about 700. Mosby apparently never em-
ployed more than 300 men in a single operation because a larger
movement would have been too easy for the Federals to detect and
intercept.
Mosby's Men
What kind of men were Mosby's Rangers? Mostly they were "farm-
ers, carpenters, livestock breeders, teachers, merchants and business
men." A few, like Mosby himself, were lawyers, and at least one was
a Baptist minister. Most of them were in their teens or early twen-
ties; Mosby observed, "They haven't the sense to know danger when
they see it."8 Mosby operated mainly in Loudon and Fauquier Coun-
ties in northern Virginia, and over 80 percent of his recruits came
from that state. The terrain in that part of the Old Dominion was
well suited to guerrilla operations.
"The military value of a partisan's work," Mosby wrote, "is not
measured by the amount of property destroyed or the number of
men killed or captured, but in the number [of enemy soldiers] he
keeps watching."9 The aim of Mosby's Rangers therefore became
rendering any movement in their area so dangerous that Union
troops would be able to pass through safely only in large numbers.
"In general it was my purpose to threaten and harass the enemy on
the border and in this way compel him to withdraw troops from his
front to guard the lines of the Potomac and Washington. This would
greatly diminish his offensive power." Mosby also liked to derail
and loot trains, even if they carried numerous armed guards. But so
many Union soldiers were deployed to protect Gen. George Meade's
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railway supply line in northern Virginia that Mosby's campaign to
disrupt it was not a success.10
Fame attached to Mosby and his Rangers with the capture of
Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Stoughton in a daring nighttime raid near Fairfax
Courthouse in March 1863. On another occasion he and five of his
men rode right into Union-occupied Alexandria in an attempt to
kidnap the Unionist governor of West Virginia. But the normal war-
fare of the Partisan Rangers consisted of small, sharp actions. For
example, in July 1863 Mosby's men captured 186 Union soldiers,
123 horses and mules, and a great quantity of weapons. On one raid
they grabbed $173,000 cash; they took another $112,000 from a mili-
tary wagon train. Mosby's style was exceedingly aggressive. He once
wrote, "If you are going to fight, then be the attacker."11 Mosby's
men were mounted on good horses. The standard civil war image
of mounted combat calls to mind sabres glistening in the sun, but
the usual armament of the Rangers consisted of two .44 caliber Army
Colt revolvers. Armed with their pistols, Mosby said, "my men were
as little impressed by a body of men charging them with sabres as
though they had been armed with cornstalks." To be effective, Colt
revolvers had to be used at fairly close quarters; in this context it
deserves notice that, unlike other guerrillas, Mosby's rangers never
wore Federal disguise.12
Mosby often violated one of the most sacred of guerrilla prin-
ciples, by leading his men in attacks on Union targets even when
they were outnumbered, relying on surprise or entrapment. For in-
stance, a few of Mosby's men would fire some shots at a group of
Federals, who would then pursue them only to fall into a two-sided
trap. In this way Mosby defeated a superior force of Michigan cav-
alry at Rector's Crossroads in June 1863. In January 1864 he attacked
300 Federals with only 100 of his own men. On that particular occa-
sion, because the winter weather was harsh, the Union soldiers had
posted no outside sentries! This appalling breach of standard proce-
dure and good sense was apparently common on both sides. As late
as January 1865, about 40 Partisans successfully attacked close to
100 Pennsylvania cavalry.13 More than once such habitual bravado
caused Mosby to suffer a serious wound.
Intelligence naturally played a vital role in the guerrilla struggle.
Mosby collected much information from local young women who
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patriotically flirted with Union officers.14 On the other side, Federal
partisan-hunters picked up valuable leads from former Rangers who
had turned against the Confederate cause or nursed some grudge
against Mosby.
Union commanders in northern Virginia never committed
enough men to deal with Mosby; they had bigger fish to fry in front
of Richmond. But inevitably, Mosby's activities brought down re-
taliation by Union troops upon the heads of the local population. In
August 1864 Maj. Gen. Christopher Augur, commander of the Wash-
ington area, told his troops to "destroy, as far as possible, the sources
from which Mosby draws men, horses, and support." The Federals
burned houses known to be used for rendezvous by Mosby's men.
In November 1864 General Sheridan ordered a wide swath of north-
west Virginia cleared of all sustenance. He forbade the burning of
houses or the killing of civilians, but crops and barns were given the
torch. Many who suffered these losses were Unionists or peaceful
Quakers. Mosby's men often shot captured Federal farm-burners
with his approval. Nevertheless, Federal destructiveness caused many
civilians in the area to turn away from Mosby and his men, who even-
tually found themselves without sufficient provisions. As the fright-
fulness of the war inexorably increased, Gen. Henry Halleck gave
approval to the summary execution of captured guerrillas as well as
their known sympathizers.15 Grant told Sheridan, "Wherever any of
Mosby's men are caught, hang them without trial." But Sheridan did
not always follow this order. And in November 1864 Mosby and
Sheridan agreed through correspondence not to kill prisoners.16
Mosby's Confederate Critics
The Confederacy could never finally decide how it felt about its own
guerrillas. In April 1862 the Confederate Congress enacted laws on
the status of partisans. One result was that Mosby's band became a
unit of the Army of Northern Virginia, under Lee's command. In
March 1863 Mosby received the rank of major. From that time he
usually signed his communications to his superiors "Major of Parti-
san Rangers." Nevertheless, the upper ranks of the Confederate of-
ficer corps looked upon guerrillas, including Mosby and his men,
with distaste and even apprehension. In their view guerrillas were
hard to control and did not always share the concepts or aims of
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those supposedly directing them—even on so fundamental a ques-
tion as "who is the enemy." For example, Mosby's men sometimes
fought against other groups of Confederate guerrillas who inhab-
ited the mountainous areas of northwest Virginia and whom the
Rangers looked upon as undisciplined. Regular officers also criti-
cized the Rangers because they believed that the partisans' relaxed
and romantic lifestyle undermined discipline among regular troops.
For instance, Rangers kept a great deal of the plunder from their
raids. Although that was in accordance with Confederate law, some
observers believed the hope of plunder to be "the cohesive force of
the Ranger service."17 When not actually fighting, they were at lei-
sure, which was most of the time. Perhaps most irritating to the regu-
lars, Mosby's men often stayed overnight or longer with civilians in
their homes in northern Virginia. It was particularly in these un-
military circumstances that surprise Union sweeps would capture
groups of Rangers. During one such operation the Federals rounded
up no less than twenty-eight of Mosby's men. In December 1864
Federal searchers surprised Mosby himself in a private home; the
partisan leader narrowly escaped arrest and suffered a gunshot
wound. The Federal unit most successful against Mosby's Rangers
was known as Blazer's Scouts. These guerrilla-chasers acted with
decency toward the civilians of Virginia, who consequently did not
automatically flee when the Scouts approached; thus, Blazer's men
often entered guerrilla areas without a general alarm being raised
and. apprehended quite a few of Mosby's men.18
Some critics of the Rangers maintained that they actually assisted
the Union side because their presence in an area discouraged Yan-
kee soldiers from straggling or deserting. In 1864 Robert E. Lee wrote,
"Experience has convinced me that it is impossible under the best
officers even, to have discipline in these bands of Partisan Rangers,
or to prevent them from becoming an injury instead of a benefit to
the service." In the face of such general disapproval, in February
1864 the Confederate Congress repealed the legal authorization for
partisans. All guerrillas were now to become affiliated with regular
Confederate army units—but not Mosby's Rangers. The Congress
specifically exempted his group, plus one other partisan band.19
The noted Civil War historian Bruce Carton wrote that the guer-
rillas prolonged the war in the eastern theater by eight or nine
months.20 Mosby himself firmly believed that the activities of his
Confederate Guerrillas • 57
unit extended the life of the Confederacy. Some authors dispute these
beliefs. It is perhaps not possible to settle the question of the exact
military value of Confederate guerrillas definitively. On the subject
of their bravery and dash, however, there is much agreement. Even
the skeptical Wert concluded that "John Mosby and the 43d Battal-
ion had no equals as guerrillas during the Civil War."21 And no less
an authority than J.E.B. Stuart wrote of Mosby that "his exploits are
not surpassed in daring and enterprise by those of petite guerre in
any age." Another distinguished student-practitioner of the art of
war wrote that "there were probably but few men in the South who
could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the
rear of an opposing army and so near the border of hostilities, as
long as [Mosby] did without losing his entire command." The writer
was Ulysses Simpson Grant.22
John Mosby never surrendered. Instead, shortly after Appomat-
tox, he simply disbanded his men. On the direct orders of General
Grant, Mosby received a parole in June 1865. He was not yet thirty-
two years old. After the war Mosby told Southerners that they should
have no doubt in their minds that they had suffered a defeat both
decisive and irreversible. The tasks ahead were now to reinsert the
South into the life of the nation and to regain influence in Washing-
ton. For this reason, and because of his personal knowledge that
Grant was a generous foe, Mosby joined the Republican party as a
Grant supporter.23 He served as U.S. Consul in Hong Kong and as
an attorney in the Department of Justice. Mosby outlived the Con-
federacy by more than half a century and died in Washington in
1916. Quite a record for a sickly youth.
Quantrill in Missouri
At the opposite end of the war from Mosby, geographically and
morally, stands another Confederate guerrilla leader, the most noto-
rious of all the bloodstained characters churned up by the dread
struggle: the sociopath William Clarke Quantrill.
Controversy surrounds the details of his early life. He was born
in Ohio in 1837, the son of a schoolteacher who embezzled school
funds and tried to kill one of his accusers. Quantrill himself may
have held several midwestern schoolteacher posts. He went to Kan-
sas Territory in 1857, where he took part in the pre-Civil War fight-
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ing, rustling cattle and killing at least one man: "Quanta-ill's year of
banditry in Kansas was his apprenticeship."24
Early in the war, former Missouri governor Sterling Price orga-
nized a small Confederate army, which Quantrill joined as a private
soldier, but he soon ran off. Marked out to be a leader of guerrillas
by his natural intelligence, his relative education, and his skill with
horse and pistol, he formed his own armed band. Missourians like
Cole Younger and Frank James had authentic grievances against the
Union authorities, but Quantrill "chose to fight for the Confederacy
because it was a chance to hit back at the people of Kansas," who
before the war had issued warrants for his arrest.25 Quantrill's forces
were often quite large—several hundred—and he led them through
subchiefs. His men called themselves "bushwhackers."
Most Union cavalrymen serving on the border carried only
single-shot muzzle loaders, whereas the principal weapon of
Quantrill's men was the Colt revolver. Each guerrilla carried three
or four of these guns, and their wild charges against Union forma-
tions had devastating firepower. In addition, the Union cavalry had
a very difficult time catching Quantrill's men. The nature of the ter-
rain favored guerrilla war, the partisans knew the land thoroughly,
and their mounts were often superior to those of the Federal troops.
Members of Quantrill's original band "came from some of the best
rural families of western Missouri, the majority of them driven to
insurrection by the treatment their people had received from the
Union troops that occupied the area." They thus enjoyed the sym-
pathy of many rural folk. And the guerrillas' awareness that if cap-
tured they were almost certain to be shot concentrated their attention
and sharpened their determination. Nevertheless, during 1862 alone
Quantrill's band was taken by surprise at least three times by Union
attacks; those who escaped were able to do so only because of the
incompetence of their assailants.26
The Lawrence Raid
All of Quantrill's operations were wild and bloody, but it is with the
ferocious events in the town of Lawrence, Kansas, that his name is
forever linked. On August 21,1863, Quantrill led a force of close to
five hundred partisans into the community. He targeted Lawrence
for several reasons. Founded in 1854, the town had been the center
of the Free State Party during the days of Bleeding Kansas;
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"Lawrence, Kansas, epitomized everything the South despised about
the North." But a decisive descent upon the town would also allow
Quantrill an opportunity to take "revenge on individuals who might
know too much of his past."27 Whatever the reasons, Quantrill's raid
on Lawrence would be the culmination, the last dreadful act, of a
decade of Kansas violence.
In the days leading up to the attack, several persons reported
seeing large bands of guerrillas, almost certainly Quantrill's men,
along the eastern fringes of the Kansas border, but nobody imag-
ined they were headed for Lawrence. Quantrill forced ten Kansas
farmers to guide them toward Lawrence and murdered the farmers
when they were no longer needed. Then the hundreds of guerrillas,
including Frank James and Cole Younger, later notorious bank- and
train-robbers, galloped into the unprepared town. There they pro-
ceeded systematically to gun down 180 unarmed men and boys.
U.S. senator Jim Lane of Kansas was in the town when Quantrill
struck, and he escaped capture and certain torture and death only
by luck. The guerrillas also set the torch to most of the buildings.
The terrified Kansans hardly fought back; apparently only one guer-
rilla was killed in the raid, although in subsequent days Union cav-
alry captured several wounded guerrillas.28
Incredibly, not a single woman was killed or even seriously in-
jured during the Lawrence massacre.29 The reluctance to harm
women that characterizes the Kansas-Missouri border war, even
during the slaughter at Lawrence, contrasts dramatically with the
subhuman ferocity against them displayed by troops in the Vendee
and Spain. The guerrilla war could not have continued without the
support of women. "By using women as their final screen, guerril-
las had created a situation in which Union troops would have to
war on women in order to destroy guerrillas." But few Union offic-
ers and men could bring themselves to take reprisals against women.
"At the most women were tormented, arrested, or sent into exile."
Everyone in Missouri knew about the extreme reluctance of Federal
soldiers to punish even those women known to be actively assisting
the guerrillas. This was one more reason why the guerrilla war could
not be ended.30 The partisans, with hardly any exceptions, displayed
the same behavior. "Primary in the code of these guerrillas was an
injunction against harming women and children. Guerrillas were
the protectors not the despoilers of home and family."31
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Nevertheless, the massacre at Lawrence was "the most atrocious
single event of the entire Civil War," "a diabolical, unpardonable
massacre, one which has no parallel in the Civil War." Without doubt
"the butchery of Lawrence shocked the whole nation."32 The Union
response was swift and fearsome: Brig. Gen. Thomas Ewing ordered
that within fifteen days all civilians must evacuate Bates, Cass, and
Jackson counties, plus most of Vernon county, the general area from
which Quantrill had launched his raid. Fully 20,000 Missouri civil-
ians had to leave their homes, most of which were then burned by
Kansas troops. Cass county, which before the war had had 10,000
inhabitants, was soon down to a pitiful 600. These frightful events
provoked a great public outcry: after all, Missouri was a Union state,
not some newly occupied rebel province. The widespread revulsion
at Ewing's ferocity caused the suspension of his order in November,
but many of the banished civilians did not return to their homes
until after the war. The forced depopulation of these Missouri coun-
ties constituted the most drastic action by Union forces against large
numbers of civilians until General Sherman (Ewing's brother-in-law)
went marching through Georgia—which after all was, unlike Mis-
souri, a rebel state.33
Quantrill and the Confederacy
Quantrill liked to show a paper that he claimed was his commission
as a captain in the Confederate forces. After a stormy interview in
Richmond with the Confederate secretary of war, he began to call
himself colonel and was sometimes so addressed by officers of the
regular Confederate army. Yet even before Lawrence, Confederate
military leaders "had rejected the guerrillas themselves for their in-
discipline and brutality." Thomas Reynolds, the "Confederate Gov-
ernor of Missouri in exile," wrote to Confederate military authorities
that he completely opposed guerrilla war.34 Gen. Edmund Kirby
Smith believed that the guerrillas in Missouri caused useless suffer-
ing. The events at Lawrence ruined Quantrill's reputation among the
Confederate forces. Gen. Henry McCulloch wrote to Gen. Kirby Smith
that Quantrill's men were "the wildest savages" and that their bloody
acts "should be disavowed by our [Confederate] Government."35
Not long after the destruction of Lawrence, Quantrill and his
men wiped out the Union garrison at Baxter Springs, Kansas, kill-
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ing seventy-eight Union soldiers and civilian captives with the loss
of only two guerrillas. They then went south to Texas, where they
had some trouble with local Confederate military authorities who
apparently tried to arrest them. Quantrill's band was beginning to
split apart: jealous confrontations broke out over the division of
spoils, as the impending defeat of the South grew ever clearer. And
the atrocities at Lawrence had been distasteful to some of Quantrill's
followers. (The last man killed on the Lawrence raid had been a Mr.
Rothrock, a Dunkard minister. Some of Quantrill's men came up to
his house, ten miles south of Lawrence, and made the women there
cook them breakfast. Upon learning that Rothrock was a minister,
they shot him several times and rode off.) Losing control over his
men and finding critics and enemies everywhere, in June 1864
Quantrill took a few followers and headed for new fields in Ken-
tucky; he was thus unavailable to participate in Price's invasion of
Missouri (see the section titled "Society Disintegrates" in this chap-
ter). Some have expressed the belief that Quantrill's intention was
to go to all the way to Washington and kill President Lincoln. Per-
haps; but in January 1865 Quantrill led a raid on Danville, Kentucky.
Later he joined his men with those of a small Kentucky guerrilla
band. In May 1865 Quantrill, seriously wounded, was taken pris-
oner in Spencer County, Kentucky. He died on June 6,1865. Having
on his deathbed accepted baptism into the Catholic Church, he re-
ceived burial in the Louisville Catholic Cemetery. In his will he be-
queathed to his girlfriend Kate Clarke a sum of money with which
she opened a brothel in Saint Louis.36
The Agony of Missouri
In Virginia, Confederate guerrillas were regular soldiers employing
partisan tactics behind or on the flanks of Union armies in a much-
fought-over battle zone, in support of large conventional armies. In
contrast, guerrillas in Missouri were hardly ever regular soldiers,
they operated over a much larger area, and they played an incom-
parably more visible role, in a state that most of the time was behind
the Union lines. The typical figure of the Virginia guerrilla war was
John Mosby, who, with a few cosmetic touches, could pass for a sort
of latter-day cavalier; the typical figure thrown up by the strife in
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Missouri turned out to be somebody remarkably, frighteningly dif-
ferent, the blood-soaked Quantrill. But there was, sadly, much more
to the story of guerrilla warfare in Missouri than Quantrill alone.
Missouri offers a lurid picture of how guerrilla warfare draws into
itself civilians who wish only to be neutral; events there highlight
the disintegrative effects that prolonged combat of this kind can have
on human society. What happened to the "family-centered, prop-
erty-owning farmers, evangelical Christians, and lovers of law and
order" in Missouri is a truly disturbing page in American history.37
Missouri became American territory in 1803, part of the Louisi-
ana Purchase. It was admitted as the twenty-fourth state in 1821
through the famous Missouri Compromise, that ultimately unsuc-
cessful effort to calm the nation's first major crisis over slavery—a
crisis Jefferson called a "firebell in the night." Missouri entered the
Union as a slave state, and it was such in 1861. Most of its inhabit-
ants, however, were neither slave-owners nor slaves, but small farm-
ers. Many were German immigrants or their immediate descendants;
Saint Louis, with an 1860 population of 167,000, was 60 percent for-
eign born, the largest percentage of any American city. Slave or free,
black persons accounted for less than a tenth of the state's popula-
tion of 1.2 million. In March 1861, in the heat of the secession crisis,
Missouri voters elected delegates to a convention that would decide
the state's future course; Unionist candidates outpolled secessionist
candidates 77 percent to 23 percent. Many Missourians were sym-
pathetic to the perplexities of the white South; almost certainly a
majority of them were troubled by Lincoln's policy of military resis-
tance to secession. Yet, "if they had had a truly free choice, most
Missourians would have remained neutral during the war." Instead,
the unhappy state became the scene of "the worst guerrilla war in
American history."38
"A Nasty War"
The conflict in Missouri "was not a stand-up war with uniformed,
flag-carrying massed troops charging one another in open combat
nor even the confusion of a typically disorganized battlefield; it was
thousands of brutal moments when small groups of men destroyed
homes, food supplies, stray soldiers, and civilian lives and morale."
Missourians were engulfed by a "war of ten thousand nasty inci-
dents." "At the core of the guerrilla war experience for all fighters
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was the deep need for taking blood revenge." In its essence the Mis-
souri struggle became a war of reprisal and counterreprisal. On Oc-
tober 5, 1863, Lincoln described that guerrilla war to a group from
Missouri and Kansas: "Each man feels an impulse to kill his neigh-
bor lest he be first killed by him. . . . Every foul bird comes abroad,
and every dirty reptile rises up. . . . Murders for old grudges, and
murders for pelf, proceed under any cloak that will best cover for
the occasion. These causes amply account for what has occurred in
Missouri."39
The roots of this ugly war lay in the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Sen.
Stephen Douglas of Illinois led the enactment of that law in May
1854. His bill explicitly repealed the Missouri Compromise, under
the provisions of which the Territory40 of Kansas would have auto-
matically been free, that is, closed to slavery. In place of the Com-
promise, Douglas's bill established the principle of "popular
sovereignty," whereby the new settlers of Kansas would themselves
decide whether it would be slave or free.
The repeal of the Missouri Compromise seemed to open up the
entire West to the curse of slavery. It thus produced a terrific uproar
in the Northern states and led to the founding of the Republican
Party. Pro- and antislavery forces all over the country competed with
one another in rushing settlers to what would soon become known
as "Bleeding Kansas." In May 1856 marauders sacked the antisla-
very capital of Lawrence (Quantrill's descent was still to come), and
John Brown, calling himself God's chosen instrument, with the help
of his sons hacked five sleeping proslavery men to pieces with sa-
bres. Missourians, from Washington politicians to "border ruffians,"
played the leading role in the violence that racked Kansas. The
Buchanan administration sanctioned egregious vote frauds so that
Kansas might enter the Union as a slave state; these false elections,
as much as any other single factor, brought about a major split within
the ruling Democratic Party and all the consequences stemming from
that fateful schism. The violence in Kansas was a true dress rehearsal
for the coming War of Secession.41 And the poisonous fruits of the
ugly little war in Kansas would be copiously consumed in western
Missouri.
Long ago a distinguished historian of the Missouri guerrilla con-
flict wrote that "the most direct factor contributing to the great in-
surrection which took place on the western border after 1861 lay in
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the abuses visited upon the civil population by the Union military
forces."42 There is truth in that observation, but not the whole truth,
as will become evident. Many Union soldiers in Missouri, officers
and enlisted, were from out of state. Remembering "Bleeding Kan-
sas," they regarded white Missourians as trash and referred to them
as "pukes." General Halleck, in his General Orders of January 1,
1862, branded all guerrillas as "freebooters and banditti"; when cap-
tured they were to receive no mercy. Apprehended guerrillas or sus-
pects would therefore often suffer execution right on the spot. Of
course the guerrillas often practiced the same policy, and "take no
prisoners" became the cry on both sides.43 But General Halleck went
far beyond that. He declared that "those who are not for us will be
regarded as against us . . . . There can be no individual neutrality in
Missouri." This was a sentence of doom for many helpless civilians.
Acting in the spirit of the theory that any Missourian was a rebel
sympathizer unless proved otherwise, Union general John Pope
declared that local communities were responsible for the safety of
any stretches of railroad in their vicinity. After guerrillas attacked a
train near the town of Palmyra, Pope ordered the townspeople to
pay damages. When the town council imprudently refused, Pope
turned his men loose on the helpless community.44
Soldiers from Kansas, admitted as a free state in 1861, predict-
ably behaved with special harshness in Missouri. Seeking to pay off
old grudges, they tended to treat all Missourians as rebels. U.S. sena-
tor Jim Lane led the Kansas Brigade into the town of Osceola and
plundered it. In the words of one historian, "Most of the troopers of
the Seventh Kansas Cavalry were simply thieves." Gen. Henry
Halleck, commander of the Department of Missouri, wrote to Gen.
George McClellan in December 1861 that "the conduct of the forces
under Lane... has done more for the enemy in this State than could
have been accomplished by 20,000 of his own [the enemy's] army."
Thus, "the population which was to create and support guerrilla
warfare against the Union had grown larger and larger during the
summer and winter of 1861-1862 because of the outrages perpe-
trated against the people of Missouri by occupying Union forces."
But in profound contrast to Mosby's practice in Virginia, Missouri
guerrillas often wore Federal uniforms, an illegal deception that
permitted them to approach the enemy very closely. As a result of
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this practice, Union soldiers understandably became tense, resent-
ful, and trigger-happy.45
The Engulfing Flames
Guerrilla war spread into more and more areas of the state. Moun-
tainous southern Missouri was especially good territory for guerril-
las, but Jackson county, on the Kansas border, the site of Kansas City
and Independence, was the most guerrilla-infested of all. Unlike
Mosby's men in Virginia, Missouri guerrillas hardly ever faced Fed-
eral troops unless they were overwhelmingly strong. Guerrilla bands
composed mainly of quite young men raided towns, attacked wagon
trains and river steamboats, ambushed Federal patrols, burned
Unionist houses, wrecked bridges, and tore up railways and tele-
graph lines. "By the end of June 1864 transportation had become so
hazardous on the Missouri [River] that it was difficult to find pilots
and crews." In July 1864 Union military authorities felt compelled
to halt all river traffic in the state.46 The Kansas City Journal described
the situation in classic terms: "The rebels hold the countryside, while
the loyal people are besieged in the towns."47 Union commanders
therefore tried hard to keep large numbers of soldiers within the
state and away from the big war in Tennessee and Virginia. (But it
was of course in the big war in the East that the fate of Missouri
would ultimately be decided.)
Eccentric and vicious characters always come to the surface in
guerrilla conflicts, and the increasingly barbarous struggle in Mis-
souri facilitated this tendency. Some guerrillas wore human scalps
on their bridles.48 At Centralia, Missouri, in September 1864, having
massacred 150 Union soldiers, the guerrillas sliced off the ears of
some and the genitals of others and mounted several heads on poles.
The commander of the Union garrison at Independence wrote
to headquarters in Saint Louis that nothing could be done about the
situation unless the government dispatched ten soldiers for every
guerrilla. But of course Federal commanders in the state were al-
ways under pressure to send their best men to the "real war" in the
East. Hence, Union troops in Missouri were as a rule second rate,
and there were never enough even of those. Federal authorities there-
fore had to try to meet the guerrilla challenge by using vengeful and
poorly disciplined local militia. As early as July 1862, Gen. John
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Schofield issued General Orders 19: all able-bodied men capable of
bearing arms had to report to the nearest military post, there to be
organized for fighting guerrillas. Many who were subject to the or-
der ran away and joined the rebels, but more came to the Union
ranks: 52,000 by the end of 1862, a number that should have sufficed
to deal with the guerrillas. Eventually there would be perhaps 10,000
Missouri state militia and another 50,000 unpaid local emergency
forces. The system did not work very well. In more than one locale
the militia came to a live-and-let-live understanding with guerril-
las. The so-called Paw-Paw regiments, composed of former Confed-
erate soldiers or sympathizers who had taken a loyalty oath to the
Union, were, with reason, looked upon as unreliable. In July 1864
about 1,500 Paw-Paws defected en masse to the Confederate side.49
Society Disintegrates
The guerrilla war engulfed the civilian population. Guerrillas often
took what they needed or wanted from civilians, or even killed them,
without the merest pretense of trying to discover the political sym-
pathies of their victims. Despite declared policies forbidding repris-
als against civilians, Union forces also became increasingly harsh in
their conduct toward them. The grim conditions of a guerrilla con-
flict within a civil war naturally opened the door for unscrupulous
or demoralized Federal soldiers to intimidate, rob, or even kill civil-
ians on the pretext that they were guerrillas.50 But eventually even
Union soldiers who had been originally well disposed toward civil-
ians came to view them, snug and safe in their houses, as persons
probably aiding the guerrillas and hence their mortal enemies.
Many factors hardened the attitude of Union soldiers toward
the civil population of Missouri. First, there were not enough troops
to properly contain the guerrillas or even adequately defend their
own outposts, and they thus felt insecure and threatened by seen
and unseen enemies. In addition, "the knowledge that their guer-
rilla enemies took no prisoners and warred on civilians all the time
weakened local Union commanders' demands for good conduct from
their subordinates." Another factor that helped undermine official
Union prohibitions against mistreatment of civilians was the man-
ner of recruiting Union soldiers. Many units had been raised within
a specific locale and had elected their own officers, who not only
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knew their men but naturally shared their values and fears. This
made it very difficult for officers to enforce discipline regarding the
treatment of local civilians. "The primary community for soldiers
was their own platoon or company, thirty to ninety men stationed at
a barely secure outpost surrounded by a dangerous countryside
where guerrillas lay in wait to pick them off and where many of
those friendly-acting farmers were agents of the enemy. It is no won-
der that field officers identified with and defended their men against
all outsiders, which tended to mean everyone—the guerrillas, the
Union brass, and all local citizens."51
By adopting the belief that reprisal was the only effective way to
fight guerrillas, the Union forces descended into the worst modes of
partisan warfare. Yet many Union soldiers viewed their actions not
as wanton or unwarranted but rather as an unavoidable and indeed
rational response to what they considered, with good cause, to be
the uncivilized and despicable methods of warfare used by the guer-
rillas. The truth is that "in Missouri-style warfare, the southern guer-
rillas had determined how the Federal troops would fight."52 In the
heartland of Jefferson's republic, the forces defending the constitu-
tional order grew more and more indistinguishable in their behav-
ior from robbers and assassins. Civilization itself was tottering on
the edge of the abyss.
Thus, it was the civilian population of Missouri, much more than
the Federal troops or the guerrillas, that paid the price for the pro-
gressive disintegration of legality and morality. Civilians would
encounter guerrillas dressed in Union uniforms and Union troops
dressed as civilians. Under such circumstances no one knew what
to say or whom to trust. Expecting that Federal troops would pro-
tect them, civilians would often suffer violence at their hands. "Now
civilians were isolated and ravaged from all sides; for them, violent
attacks punctuated endless days and nights of anxiety. What did
loyalty and justice mean to them now? How could they respond to
such chaos? Where could they turn for protection?" Amid these
dreadful conditions and facing the threat of even worse things to
come, large numbers of Missouri folk naturally thought of seeking
safety by fleeing their homes and even their state. But for many,
leaving might be worse than staying. One could not carry away one's
home and fields; but because house-burning by both sides was so
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very common, few wanted to buy any property in Missouri, and
prices were deflated anyway. And one's chances of being robbed or
killed on the way to some other county or state were frighteningly
high. Nevertheless, "eventually most rural Missourians did become refu-
gees;" hundreds of thousands sought to flee the omnipresent, un-
predictable, escalating violence, leaving whole counties desolate.53
Then in September 1864 came Confederate major general Ster-
ling Price's long-awaited invasion of Missouri. From his base in
northern Arkansas, Price led about 12,000 men into the state. Con-
federate leaders hoped that 100,000 Missourians would rise up and
join Price, taking over the state and thus outflanking Kentucky and
Tennessee, a great coup that might reverse the tide of the war. Price
urged Missouri guerrillas to help his invasion by creating havoc north
of the Missouri river, burning bridges and cutting transportation
lines. But the much-anticipated great Missouri uprising never mate-
rialized. Perhaps 5,000 joined in the effort, and most of those de-
serted as soon as they perceived that the invasion would fail.54 Price
himself, after an epic march of two months through Missouri, Kan-
sas, and Oklahoma, ended up back in southern Arkansas, having
lost half of his original invasion force.
Union efforts to rid Missouri of guerrillas continued. In 1864 there
was a new plan: every county seat and large town would have a
permanent garrison; every railroad bridge would have a blockhouse
to defend it; constant patrols would comb the areas between one
post and another. But these Union tactics, along with selective ban-
ishment and executions, "might at best partially contain a guerrilla
war but could never uproot it."55 Meanwhile Union cavalry sweeps
resulted in great destruction but little injury to guerrillas. Because
of the great size of the state, the demands on manpower from more
vital theaters of the war, and the desperation of the guerrillas, who
knew that they might be shot down on the spot if taken, the Union
authorities never came up with a really effective plan of
counterinsurgency. There was no clear-cut defeat of the guerrillas;
the little war in Missouri ended only when the big war in the East
ended. Many guerillas had in fact been killed. Of the survivors, some,
such as the James brothers, became permanent outlaws, but the great
majority returned to civil society. "Most ex-guerrillas . . . went back
to the farm, raised corn and children, and attended the Methodist
Church (Southern) on Sundays."56
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The Absent Guerrilla War
When General Lee surrendered his Army of Northern Virginia at
Appomattox in April 1865, for all practical purposes the American
Civil War came to an end. But why did it end? After the defeat of
their armies by Napoleon's forces, the people of Spain had erupted
into partisan war and inflicted great costs on the invaders. South-
erners had fought with historic effect as guerrillas during the Ameri-
can War of Independence; indeed, Southern guerrillas became
important in that conflict after the regular American forces had suf-
fered catastrophic defeat. Confederate guerrillas had given much
trouble to Union forces in Virginia, Missouri, and elsewhere. At least
one student of the subject has maintained that from the very begin-
ning the South chose the wrong kind of war; the Confederacy should
have opted immediately to wear down the Union forces and public
opinion through guerrilla conflict.57
Abraham Lincoln always feared that the longer the war went on
and the harsher it became, the greater the possibility that when the
rebel armies had been beaten, Southerners would turn to guerrilla
warfare, a massive, remorseless, unending struggle. As the Civil War
neared its end, General Grant had no plans to defeat or even to cope
with a massive guerrilla movement. Later he wrote: "I saw clearly
. .. that Lee must surrender or break and run into the mountains—
break in all directions and leave us a dozen guerrilla bands to fight.
To overcome a truly national, popular resistance in a vast territory
without the employment of truly overwhelming force is probably
impossible." As a matter of fact, guerrilla units were the last Con-
federate forces to lay down their arms. Some Confederates did call
for a massive guerrilla war in 1864-1865; and since there were still
one hundred thousand Confederates under arms after Lee surren-
dered, such an undertaking was certainly possible in theory.58 Yet,
after having raged for four years across a vast landscape, within a
few weeks of Lee's surrender the fighting came to an almost total
halt. Why did a passionate minority of the former Confederate armies
not continue the struggle in which they had fought so long and sac-
rificed so much? Why did the War of Secession not continue after
1865 in an implacable guerrilla struggle?
The short answer, which is true enough, is that the commitment
by Southerners to the cause of an independent Southern nation was
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not strong enough to sustain continued resistance in the face of the
overwhelming Federal victories. Surrender was preferable to fur-
ther struggle. But that is not a sufficient answer. After such frightful
sacrifices, why did Southerners "prefer surrender to struggle?" Af-
ter the war the former Confederate senator Benjamin Hill wrote,
"All physical advantages are insufficient to account for our failure;
the truth is we failed because too many of our people were not de-
termined to win."59 Despite the overstatement, there is truth here;
material factors are not the determining ones in war, as Sun Tzu,
Washington, Napoleon, and Mao Tse-tung have variously attested.
The fact that guerrilla war did not blaze across the South after Lee's
surrender suggests that Confederate defeat was moral as well as
material. Among the factors that helped produce moral defeat were
widespread misgivings within the South over secession, the unex-
pected sufferings of the war, resentment of compulsory military ser-
vice and government requisitions, increasingly embittered
Confederate factionalism, profound uneasiness about the institution
of slavery, and—not nearly least—the adroit policies of President
Lincoln.
Opposition to Secession
A key to understanding why peace returned after April 1865 can be
found in the actual process of secession, well before the first gun
was fired at Fort Sumter. The immediate cause, or excuse, for seces-
sion was of course the election of Abraham Lincoln of Illinois as
president in the autumn of 1860. There had been four major candi-
dates in the campaign: Lincoln, the candidate of the young Republi-
can Party, which was committed to preventing the expansion of slave
territory; Stephen Douglas, also of Illinois, paladin of pro-Union
Democrats; Vice President John Breckinridge of Kentucky, the choice
of the southern wing of the Democratic Party, which would later sup-
port secession (although Breckinridge himself did not advocate se-
cession during the campaign); and John Bell of Tennessee, former
Speaker of the House and a Unionist in the venerable Whig tradition.
Three of the candidates—Lincoln, Douglas, and Bell—were
avowedly Unionists; thus, we may reasonably construe votes for
them as votes unfriendly to secession, at least secession in the fore-
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seeable future. When the ballots had been counted, the three pro-
Union presidential tickets had done very well in what would shortly
become Confederate states: in Georgia, Louisiana, Tennessee, and
Virginia, Bell alone or Bell and Douglas together received over half
of the popular vote; in North Carolina these two pro-Union candi-
dates obtained almost half the votes. Clearly, in broad stretches of
what would soon become the Confederacy, Unionist sentiment was
quite considerable and often dominant.
After Lincoln's victory in the presidential contest, most of the
future Confederate states held conventions to determine their rela-
tionship with the Union. Almost invariably the turnout in these state
elections was lower than in the presidential contest, and the method
of selection of delegates was usually weighted in favor of large
slaveholders. The cause of secession, moreover—this is a crucial
point—received much impetus from the widely propagated belief
that the process would be peaceful: that is, that the Federal govern-
ment would not attempt to use coercion to preserve the Union.60
The Buchanan administration held that secession was unlawful but
so was Federal resistance to it. And even if the Lincoln Republican
administration, blinded by passion or hysteria, should attempt to
coerce the South, surely the contest would quickly end in the com-
plete military humiliation of the Federal side. In a word, secession
would cost little fighting, probably none at all.
Nevertheless, in many Southern states the process of secession
was slow and faced determined and often ardent resistance, espe-
cially by nonslaveholders. Consider this sequence of events. South
Carolina declared its secession on December 20,1860; several other
Deep South states followed shortly; Jefferson Davis of Mississippi
was chosen Provisional President of the Confederate government
in early February 1861; Fort Sumter came under attack on April 12,
and three days later President Lincoln called on the nation to provide
seventy-five thousand volunteers to preserve the Union. Yet, despite
all these dramatic events, North Carolina did not finally secede un-
til May 21, Virginia until May 23, and Tennessee until June 8. North
Carolina's governor, Zebulon Vance, resisted secession right up un-
til Lincoln's call for volunteers to invade the South. The Virginia
convention voted to leave the Union by only eighty-eight votes to
fifty-three, and that was after actual fighting had begun. Robert E.
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Lee resigned from the Federal army only because Virginia seceded.
Later he wrote that "the act of Virginia in withdrawing herself from
the United States carried me along as a citizen of Virginia."61
Virginia's secession immediately provoked a countermovement
in its western counties, where pro-Union citizens began organizing
what eventually emerged as the state of West Virginia. By June 1863,
over 11,000 West Virginia volunteers were in the Union Army, more
than the number from several individual Northern states, including
Connecticut. Union soldiers from West Virginia number 32,000 by
war's end. Had Federal troops been within striking distance, the
eastern counties of Tennessee might well have imitated the western
counties of Virginia and withdrawn from their state in order to re-
main in the Union. Tennessee senator Andrew Johnson refused to
recognize the secession of his state and retained his seat until he
was appointed military governor of Tennessee by President Lincoln
in March 1862. And fully 30,000 East Tennesseans eventually volun-
teered for service in the Union armies, a larger force than Lee com-
manded at the time of his surrender at Appomattox.62 In all perhaps
100,000 white Southerners served under the Union flag, a number
that must be subtracted from the potential ranks of the Confederacy,
thus making a difference of 200,000 men between the two sides.
The Unexpected War
Many who had supported or accepted secession had done so in the
belief that it would cost nothing, that the Federal government would
not be able to resist, and that if resistance occurred it would end in a
brilliant Southern victory. "It is doubtful that any people ever went
to war with greater enthusiasm than did Confederates in 1861." Some
who did foresee a serious conflict could not possibly have calcu-
lated just how protracted and terrible the struggle would be or how
every passing year would make clearer the coming Union triumph.
So eager were the Confederates to have some sort of battle, some
sort of glory, before the war came to its speedy and predetermined
end, that they fired on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor even though
the commander there had said he would surrender in two days. All
the fashionable of Charleston watched the assault as if it were a fire-
works display. Then the first big battle of the war, at Bull Run in July
1861, was a deceptively easy Confederate victory, confirming to
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Southerners, as if confirmation were needed, that they were all brave,
that Northerners were all poltroons, and that the war was going to
be short and even exciting.63
Soon, however, these Southern delusions began to explode like
artillery shells. Fort Sumter indeed fell easily to the dashing Con-
federates, but the attack shocked and enraged Northern opinion,
and Bull Run gave Unionists a much more realistic grasp of the grim
task before them. Then in February 1862 really ominous news be-
gan to roll in: Nashville became the first Confederate state capital to
be occupied by Union forces. New Orleans, the largest city and the
chief port of the Confederacy, fell to the enemy the following April,
Baton Rouge (another state capital) in May, and Memphis in June.
Psychological depression was already setting in. One historian sees
the reverses of early 1862 as the real crisis, even worse than the one
that followed the defeats of the summer of 1863.64 Whatever the
merits of that view, Southerners were convinced that the Confed-
eracy had done its very best in the invasion of Pennsylvania, only to
suffer a stunning repulse at Gettysburg, while the Union had stood
firm, able to call on vast resources yet untapped.
From the shattered belief in a short and glorious war would stem
all the other internal afflictions of the Confederacy.
What is the explanation for the widespread belief in the South
that the Federal government would not be able to thwart secession?
That belief seems especially bizarre in academic discussions of the
American Civil War, which revolve around statistics establishing the
inferiority of the Confederacy to the Union both in population and
in economic strength. Once this relationship has been established,
the obvious conclusion is supposed to emerge: disparities in wealth
and population between the two sides made the defeat of the Con-
federacy "inevitable."
Yet all sorts of questions arise from such a mechanistic analysis.
First of all, if the hopelessness of their cause is so easily established,
why did the Southern leaders go ahead with secession? Were they
ignorant of such readily available comparative statistics, or were they
crazed fanatics impervious to logical argument, or were they merely
stupid? To assume a necessary Federal triumph is also to insult the
most sophisticated political leaders of Europe, almost all of whom
expected (and desired) a Confederate victory. And there were many
dark days, many dark months, when to the eyes of President
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Abraham Lincoln, his cabinet, and his supporters, a final triumph
for the Union appeared to be anything but inevitable. Surely, reflect-
ing on their Vietnam experience, Americans should be skeptical of
any insistence that one side must prevail over the other because it is
larger and richer.
Union Resources
True, the Union enjoyed certain superiorities that were impressive
on paper. The population of the loyal states was 23 million, as against
only 9 million in the Confederate states, and fully 3.5 million of the
latter were slaves. But the Union figure includes the 3 million inhab-
itants of the border states: Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Dela-
ware. In all four of those states, slavery was legal. Few of their
inhabitants had voted for Lincoln in the 1860 presidential contest.
Few were enthusiastic for a Federal war of conquest, and many thou-
sands from these border states would serve in the armies of the Con-
federacy (although a substantial majority of border state white men
who fought in the war fought for the Union side).65 Moreover, Lin-
coln faced an obstreperous Democratic Party that had exercised a
nearly exclusive hold on power at the national level between 1800
and 1860. It contained numerous elements that were fully prepared
to resist any provocative measures taken by the Republican presi-
dent. Even among Lincoln's own followers, there was widespread
uneasiness over waging an aggressive war against fellow Ameri-
cans who had assumed a defensive posture. When on April 12,1861,
the Confederates committed the incalculable blunder of firing on
the American flag flying over Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor, they
united most of the public opinion in the Northern states behind
Lincoln's policy of military coercion for the time being.
Further, the dramatically different strategic tasks facing the two
sides had a very important bearing on the apparent disparity in
numbers. In order to win its objective, the Confederacy needed not
to defeat the Union but only to survive. In contrast, the goal of the
Lincoln administration—preservation of the Union—meant the com-
plete political reincorporation of the seceded states. That objective
would require not merely a victory here or there, however spectacu-
lar, nor even a string of such victories (which were close to impos-
sible anyway; battles of annihilation were rare because the defeated
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army was almost always able to retreat). No, complete restoration
of the seceded states to the Union required the total military con-
quest and occupation of the territory of the Confederacy, a sprawl-
ing empire without an adequate railway network or even a reliable
highway system that conquering armies could use.
The army that would be called upon to accomplish this tremen-
dous agenda was at the time of secession quite small, even before
Southern officers and men withdrew from it. In addition, the Ameri-
cans had no experience of a really long and sanguinary war, cer-
tainly not the Americans of 1861. Their experience of conventional
war was the Battle of New Orleans in 1815 or the Battle of Buena
Vista in 1847: one brave fight and the issue was decided.66 True to
this tradition of the decisive battle, in the spring of 1861 President
Lincoln federalized seventy-five thousand militia for ninety days ser-
vice. Clearly, the Unionists as well as the Confederates had little idea
of what lay in store for them.
To return to the question of Union superiority: the Confederacy
mobilized a much greater proportion of its military-age males than
the Union did. Hence, at their peak, the Union armies mustered one
million men; the highest figure for the Confederacy was around six
hundred thousand. The ratio in favor of the Union was thus only five
to three, a thoroughly inadequate superiority if the Union was going
to have to assume and remain on the strategic offensive throughout
the war.67 This inadequacy of the Union advantage in numbers is
heavily underlined when one contemplates the vast size of the Con-
federacy. It is farther from Dallas to Atlanta than from Berlin to Rome,
farther from Richmond to New Orleans than from Warsaw to
Istanbul, farther from El Paso to Charleston than from Paris to Ath-
ens or Lhasa to Bangkok. The state of Georgia alone is as large as
England and Wales; Arkansas is as large as present-day Greece. The
Confederacy of 1861 was larger than the 1999 combined areas of
France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and Switzerland.
Fighting across this extensive Southern empire, moving ever far-
ther from their bases in the North, the Union armies would need
very long logistical tails: they eventually had to devote a great deal
of their energy and personnel to the delivery and safeguarding of
supplies. Considerable numbers of troops had to be peeled off at
intervals to garrison occupied territory and to guard vital railways
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against guerrilla raids, tasks from which by and large the Confeder-
ates were free. The various Federal armies were often widely sepa-
rated from each other, with no telephones or radios. Real coordination
among them remained only an aspiration until the beginning of the
fourth year of the war, when President Lincoln entrusted command
of all the national armies to Gen. Ulysses Grant.68
But the Lincoln administration faced a task that was yet more
gargantuan than this discussion suggests. The Federal armies had
to subjugate the South not only completely but also quickly, for at
least two reasons. First, if public support in the Union states should
weaken or evaporate before the final conquest, all might be forever
lost. Second, if the fighting was too protracted, even if the Federal
armies were completely victorious, the conflict might leave vast strata
of Southern society so alienated, so irreconcilable, that reunion would
become nominal at best. Embittered Confederates might bide their
time until an opportunity arose to renew the war; the Union victory
would be worse than hollow. Or the conventional war might end
only to be succeeded by a desperate guerrilla resistance as impla-
cable as it was destructive.69
Apparent Southern Advantages
The leaders of the Confederacy certainly did not believe that their
defeat was inevitable; on the contrary they had high hopes for suc-
cess. It was not at all clear, at least not before Fort Sumter, that public
opinion in the North would endorse, much less sustain, a war of con-
quest of the South. Even if the Lincoln administration did organize
substantial forces for an invasion of the Confederacy, the waterways
and rail lines along which such armies would most likely move were
so obvious that it would be easy for the Confederates to block them.
After all, the officer corps of both armies had been trained at the same
military academy and tested in the same Mexican War. The Confed-
eracy would assume the strategic defensive: that is, in order to win
the war, the Union armies would have to invade, conquer, and hold
the sprawling territories of the South, every single state. In contrast,
for the Confederacy to win, it needed only to survive, just hanging
on until Northern public opinion turned against the costs of the
struggle. The Union had to win, and win utterly; the Confederacy
had merely not to lose. And the weapons technology of the 1860s
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definitely favored tactics of defense: during the war the majority of
the battles were won by the force that was on the defensive.70
Furthermore, Confederate leaders had high expectations that
Europe, especially Britain and France, would recognize Southern
independence and intervene together decisively to end the fighting.
Europe had to have the Southern cotton crop. After all, was not cot-
ton king? This dramatic overestimation of European dependence
on Southern cotton was indeed one of the most serious delusions on
either side. Nevertheless, powerful political forces in Europe did
hope to see the American republic ripped in two, and they watched
for their opportunity. Thus, the Confederacy could have fought a
defensive war, preserving its manpower, exhausting Unionist pa-
tience, and working for foreign intervention.71
Contrasting Strategies
Aware of these dangers, Gen. Winfield Scott, the commander of
Union forces at the outbreak of the fighting, presented to President
Lincoln a strategy for restoring the Union by emphasizing the long-
term superiority of Federal resources, a strategy that came to be called
(usually in derision) the Anaconda Plan. Scott proposed to develop
a tight blockade by land and sea to squeeze the economic life of the
Confederacy; meanwhile the Federal government would build and
train powerful armies that would eventually advance systematically
by means of river routes and occupy the South one section at a time.
This was a sound plan, but it would require a long time—perhaps
two full years—to implement. It therefore ran immediately afoul of
that Northern popular impatience that led to the disaster of Bull
Run. But after 1861—after Northern "On to Richmond" illusions had
been shattered—the fundamental Union strategy evolved into a
variation of Scott's Anaconda: shut the Southern ports, pin Lee down
in Virginia, wage offensive war in the West.
The strategic conceptions of Gen. Robert E. Lee, the premier pala-
din of the Southern cause, appeared able to counter the Yankee Ana-
conda. Lee believed that if the Confederacy remained on the strategic
defensive, the numerically superior Union armies, backed by the
agriculture and industrial resources of the Northern states, would
be able to nibble the Confederacy away, state by state. The Confed-
eracy could not pursue a strategy similar to that of the Russians in
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1812 and retreat ever deeper into their vast territory; the most pro-
ductive and populous areas of the Confederacy were Virginia and
Tennessee, directly subject to Union invasion. In Lee's view, to de-
feat the enemy's strategy of strangulation and amputation, the South
must, while most of its territory still remained unoccupied, break
the commitment of the Unionists to persist in the war. He inexora-
bly concluded that in order to shatter the Northern will and sustain
the Southern faith, he must concentrate all available forces in one
place against one opponent and achieve some major victory on
Northern soil, a Napoleonic victory of annihilation, followed per-
haps by the occupation or destruction of Philadelphia or some other
principal Northern city.72
Such an offensive posture was questionable strategy. The Con-
federates did not have to win great victories (or any victories at all)
in order to achieve their aims. Moreover, during the Civil War, battles
of annihilation were nearly impossible because of the tactical ad-
vantages of the defensive army, as well as the ability of the defeated
army to retreat (both truths were made painfully clear to Lee at
Gettysburg). Above all, Lee's concepts meant that the Confederacy
would pursue a strategy inappropriate to it as the side weaker in
manpower. Nevertheless, Lee's Napoleonic vision prevailed. Out of
it arose his invasion of Maryland in 1862 and Pennsylvania in 1863.
Each ended badly. His retreat from Anteitam both forestalled Brit-
ish recognition of the Confederacy and provided Lincoln the oppor-
tunity he needed to issue the Emancipation Proclamation; Gettysburg
broke the spiritual heart of the South. But these costly eastern fail-
ures were not the whole price of Lee's offensive vision: his belief in
the principle of concentration, and his Virginia parochialism, led him
to virtually ignore Union military progress in the western parts of
the Confederacy, and it was there—at Nashville, New Orleans,
Vicksburg, Chattanooga—that the Union won the war. And even if
Lee had had his battle of annihilation, his Cannae, what then? Stra-
tegically, the shattering of one army would not have much impaired
the North's ability to wage war, just as Napoleon's stupendous vic-
tories did not in the end save him from Saint Helena. We cannot
know what the moral effect on Northern opinion would have been
if Lee had smashed a Federal army in a Northern state and had gone
on to partially or completely destroy some great Northern city. But
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just as Hannibal's crushing triumph at Cannae did not break the
Roman will, neither did the enormous Union casualties at
Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville destroy Unionist sentiment.
And there is this also: between September 1862 and July 1863, as
Lee pursued his vision of the great decisive battle from Antietam
through Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville to Gettysburg, his
Army of Northern Virginia suffered the loss of sixty thousand in
casualties and personnel missing; these lost soldiers alone would
have constituted an army considerably larger than that which Lee
had actually commanded at Antietam. Thus, Lee rejected the plau-
sible hopes of a strategy of defense without being able to replace
them with tangible gains from a strategy of offense.73
Meanwhile, determined to derive advantage from such numeri-
cal superiority as the Union possessed, Lincoln wished to press all
along the boundaries of the Confederacy until a breakthrough was
made somewhere. By increasing Union pressure in the West (Ten-
nessee and Mississippi) he was concentrating against the enemy's
weakness and reinforcing Union success. The ever-more-effective
Union blockade complemented that strategy. But Lincoln's gener-
als, schooled in the teachings of Jomini, dismissed these ideas as
ignorant; like Lee, they believed in placing overwhelming numbers
of troops at the crucial point, which they considered to be northern
Virginia.74 Thus for years they played to Lee's strengths, and the
terrible war ground on. Lincoln's grasp of strategy was much supe-
rior to that of his generals, until he finally found Grant.
Conscription
In its previous nineteenth-century conflicts (the War of 1812 and the
Mexican War), the United States had relied upon volunteers to fill
the ranks of its armed forces. But in the Civil War, volunteering soon
proved to be an inadequate source of manpower. Accordingly, on
March 3, 1863, Congress passed the Enrollment Act. This law was
hardly a dragnet. It permitted drafted men to avoid service by pay-
ing a "commutation" of three hundred dollars or by providing a
substitute, a person who was not subject to the draft (less than twenty
years old, for example, or an alien).75 The real intention behind Fed-
eral conscription was to spur men to volunteer and thus avoid the
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stigma of the draft (which it did). With the options of commutation,
substitution, and volunteering, only a very small proportion of draft-
able men in Union states were actually conscripted.
In the beginning the Confederacy also relied on volunteers, but
"the unexpected length and magnitude of the struggle"—a telling
phrase—soon rendered that source inadequate.76 So the Confeder-
ates resorted to a draft law in April 1862, a year before the Union
draft. In the Confederate states as in the Union, the principal effect
of conscription was to drive up voluntary enlistments; during the
Civil War conscription per se produced very little new manpower
for the armies.
But within the Confederacy the price paid for conscription was
especially high. Its draft laws exempted large social categories. State
and national officials were immune, as were members of numerous
skilled vocations; almost immediately men flocked to join those ex-
empt vocations, and large numbers secured enrollment in them by
bribing officials (who were also draft exempt). Because one could be
drafted only in his state of domicile, many men simply began to
roam across the South. But most notably exempted from conscrip-
tion were otherwise draftable persons who owned twenty slaves.
Predictably, this provision caused profound bitterness. Many were
the soldiers "who openly complain[ed] that they [were] torn from
their homes, and their families consigned to starvation, solely in order
that they may protect the property of slaveholders [who stayed
home] in quiet enjoyment of luxuriant ease." And even when mem-
bers of the planter class did serve in the armies, and many did, they
often refused to accept discipline from or show deference to officers
of higher military rank but lower social status.77
Vice President Alexander Stephens and other powerful Confed-
erate politicians openly and bitterly opposed the draft; to them con-
scription seemed to conflict with the whole states' rights philosophy,
which for them legitimated the war. Angry arguments over the draft
repeatedly broke out between the central government and state of-
ficials, especially in North Carolina. "Conscription was the most
unpopular act of the Confederate government. Yeoman farmers who
could not buy their way out of the army voted with their feet and
escaped to the woods or swamps. Enrollment officers met bitter re-
sistance in the upcountry and in other regions of lukewarm or non-
existent commitment to the Confederacy."78 Many Southern
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Unionists drafted into the Confederate ranks deserted to the Fed-
eral side when the opportunity arose.
Requisitions
Soon the Confederate government began to take things as well as
men. As the needs of the fighting forces increased, the availability of
key commodities decreased. Thus the government at Richmond
found itself forced to resort to requisitions among the civil popula-
tion. In many instances palpable injustice and even brutality were
involved; Confederate agents, unsupervised, often subject to bribes
and pressures, seized grain at below market value. "No other one
thing, not even conscription, caused so much discontent and pro-
duced so much resentment toward the Confederacy." As early as
August 1862 this chilling observation appeared in the Richmond
Enquirer: "We often hear persons say, 'The Yankees cannot do to us
any more harm than our own soldiers have done.'"79 Indeed, with
the government forcibly confiscating goods, property, and later
slaves, the Confederacy "was becoming, in large areas, a police state."
Understandably, ominously, "the universal hatred of impressment
[requisitions] became comingled with the widespread hostility to
President Davis."80
The Union blockade aggravated the growing economic misery.
The American maritime tradition, experience, and manpower were
located in the East, not the South, a fact that would become increas-
ingly important in the conflict. The Confederacy had three thou-
sand miles of coastline, with innumerable inlets. Yet there were few
important ports, and of those only six, including New Orleans,
Mobile, and Charleston, had interstate rail connections. The major
ports that the Union armies could not occupy the Union navy effec-
tively shut down. By the end of 1862 the blockade was no longer a
"paper" one, but quite real. In 1861 Southern port cities had shipped
3.5 million cotton bales to Europe; in 1863 the number was down to
168,000. hi an effort to break the suffocating blockade, the Confed-
erates developed their ironclad warships, beginning with the famous
Virginia (originally the Merrimac). The effort failed resoundingly.
Many daring blockade runners, specially built craft, slim and swift,
darted through the Union stranglehold; their captains and crews
wrote an impressive record of romantic daring and also amassed
82 • America and Guerrilla Warfare
great profits. Too often, however, their cargoes consisted of luxury
goods instead of the weapons and medicines for which there was
more need but less profit.81
Another serious effect of the blockade was a drastically increas-
ing inflation. By December 1864 in Charleston, it took forty-two
Confederate dollars to buy one dollar in gold. The unexpectedly
long war also produced the unforeseen problem of refugees. The
movement of these unfortunate people from one state to another
increased the pressure on dwindling supplies of food and housing.
As early as the spring of 1863, a violent bread riot broke out in Rich-
mond itself and was only partially calmed when President Davis
himself addressed the turbulent citizenry.82
The inexorable approach of Federal armies, the tightening block-
ade, the requisitions and the conscription, the absence of the men
from so many rural families, all resulted in serious deprivation for
ordinary people, and especially for the poor, in terms of food and
basic household needs. The well-known sufferings of soldiers' fami-
lies increased the incidence of desertion; Gen. Joseph Johnston stated
that he did not blame his men for deserting, when letters from home
were telling the soldiers that their families were destitute because of
the omnivorous Confederate requisitions agents. More gall was
poured into the Confederate cup by the widespread belief that the
rich were not bearing their fair burden of the draft, the length and
the condition of military service, or physical deprivation. Predict-
ably, the autumn 1863 elections saw the defeat of several fire-eating
secessionist congressmen and their replacement by former Whigs
and conciliationists. This phenomenon was especially notable in
North Carolina, where a largely Democratic House delegation was
replaced with one that was almost completely Whig. After the 1863
elections, the pro-Davis majority in the Confederate House of Rep-
resentatives was sustained by the votes of members "representing"
Missouri and Kentucky, which had never seceded, and districts in
Tennessee and Louisiana under Union occupation.83
No doubt Southerners could have more cheerfully borne their
sufferings if they had had some real conviction that they would
not eventually turn out to have been in vain. But the resounding
reelection victory of Lincoln in November 1864 destroyed hopes
for a negotiated peace; the hope for a military victory had long
since turned cold.84
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Desertion
Many in the South realized that Gettysburg and Vicksburg spelled
the doom of their independence: those twin disasters of July 1863
produced "an epidemic of desertion." A few weeks after Gettysburg,
General Lee wrote President Davis that unless the number of deser-
tions could be reduced or made up, "I fear success in the field will
be seriously endangered."85 The Confederate Congress passed am-
nesty measures for draft dodgers on three separate occasions, with
little result.
Consider the case of North Carolina. That state seceded on May
21,1861, a full five months after South Carolina and three months
after the presidential inauguration of Jefferson Davis; it was nearly
the last state to enter the Confederacy. With only one-ninth of the
total Confederate population, North Carolina furnished one-sixth
of the entire Confederate army, and one-fourth of all Confederate
battle fatalities were troops from North Carolina. Twenty thousand
of its soldiers died as a result of combat and another twenty thou-
sand of disease; it had the highest death total of any Confederate
state. These figures might seem to indicate that North Carolinians
gave the last full measure of devotion to the Confederate cause, but
that is far from the truth. Unionist sentiment in North Carolina was
widespread; nearly half its voters in the presidential contest of 1860
had opted for pro-Union candidates. The state's western counties
were especially unsympathetic to secession. Such feelings received
great stimulation in April 1862 with the passage of the Confederate
draft law, from which Confederate and state officials received exemp-
tions (of course). In the lower house of the Confederate Congress in
Richmond, the only two votes cast against the draft law came from
western North Carolina. Soon thereafter the Chief Justice of North
Carolina pronounced the Conscription Acts unconstitutional.86
During the war North Carolina had by far the largest number of
deserters from the Confederate armies, almost twenty-four thou-
sand, twice the number of the next highest state, Tennessee (which
also had strong Union attachments). In the spring of 1863—before
Gettysburg—the number of desertions from North Carolina regi-
ments had alarmed General Lee. The state home guards were quite
unreliable, and deserters and draft refusers swarmed among the
western mountains. "By 1864 there were so many deserters in West
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North Carolina that there was no stigma attached to desertion; and
because of the warm welcome accorded them and the safety assured
them, deserters not only from North Carolina but from practically
every state in the Confederacy lurked in the mountains and plun-
dered, murdered, or drove out the loyal citizens as they pleased."
Confederate troops hunting for deserters and guerrillas in western
North Carolina burned homes, slaughtered livestock, and arrested
the families of suspects, promising the release of the latter if the
wanted men turned themselves in. They beat mountain women and
sometimes hanged them—not quite to the point of death—to force
them to give information against relatives and neighbors.87
Desertion rates in the Union forces were high as well. The larg-
est battle ever fought on the North American continent took place at
Gettysburg. When on the eve of that battle General Meade arrived
to take over the command of the Union's chief force, the Army of
the Potomac, he expected to find 160,000 men. He found instead
only 75,000; the other 85,000 were absent without leave.88 Yet the
comparison of Union and Confederate desertion rates is mislead-
ing. It was not the Northern states that were being invaded, and it
was not their soldiers, their people, who might face severe punish-
ment as a consequence of defeat.
Confederate Disunity
The citizens of the seceded states were decisively a minority of the
American population. Any contest, political or military, with the rest
of the nation would demand of Southerners that they display mono-
lithic unity, at least for a while. Yet secession had enjoyed nothing
approaching unanimous support. And after the war had begun, pro-
found disquiet over secession was followed by deep division over
numerous other issues.
The many heavy burdens that Southerners carried through the
struggle, which eventually crushed them, would doubtless have been
borne more easily and perhaps more successfully if the burdens had
been counterbalanced by a feeling among Southerners that the Con-
federacy was their true nation. Certainly such a feeling would have
been essential to any effort to continue the struggle after Appomattox.
But how to turn what had always before been a geographical ex-
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pression ("The South"), or a section of a nation, into a nation? Clearly,
to emerge successful from a long war, the secessionist effort would
require a sustaining ideology. Just as clearly, the defense of the insti-
tution of slavery would not satisfy that requirement.
President Davis's first ideological pronouncements derived from
his view of the Confederacy as the last true resting place of Ameri-
can liberty and independence. But by emphasizing and idealizing
particularism, such a view actually worked against the emergence
of a Southern nationalism. Similarly, there was at least an embry-
onic secessionist ideology available in the doctrine of states' rights,
but that doctrine itself undermined any nascent Confederate nation-
alism. Many Southerners chastised Davis for daring to use the ex-
pression "southern nation." Nor was this concept likely to stir the
blood of ordinary yeomen-turned-soldiers. There was true Union
nationalism, mainly (but not exclusively) in the Northern states, and
there was state patriotism, especially in the South, but it seems to be
almost incontestable that there was no effective Confederate nation-
alism. The Confederacy was not a nation, not a patria, but only a
constitutional arrangement, without the legitimacy of age, without
the catalyst of a foreign foe, and without the support of a unified
population. The very name Confederate States reveals—empha-
sizes—its nature as an alliance of disparate elements.89
The emergence of Confederate nationalism confronted impres-
sive obstacles: persisting Unionist sentiment in many of the seceded
states, increasing physical hardship, combustible class resentments,
the concept of state sovereignty itself, and above all the spreading
conviction after mid-1863 that the war was lost. And supporters of
the Confederacy knew that under Lincoln's amnesty proclamations
they could return, almost at will, to their membership in what had
been until recently—and all their lives—their true national home.90
From the start, the absence of a pervasive conviction of Confed-
erate nationalism showed itself in the conflict between the central
government and the states. That conflict grew more intense as the
condition of the Confederacy grew more desperate. The Confed-
eracy was fighting for survival itself; logic and experience demanded
a greater concentration of power in the center, and in the center a
greater concentration in the executive, at least for the duration of
the emergency. This did not happen; on the contrary, the "Confed-
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eracy tried to operate on the basis of eleven separate conflicts in-
stead of merging its resources into one great centrally-directed war."91
For example, Governor Vance of North Carolina hoarded ninety-
two thousand uniforms and countless blankets while Lee's soldiers
went ragged. Sen. George Davis of North Carolina wrote in April
1863, "I have for a long time been very indignant at the appoint-
ment of persons from other states to command North Carolina
troops."92 The governors of Mississippi and Georgia enrolled state
militias that they forbade to the Confederate authorities; these thou-
sands of men were thus useless to the defense of the South. (If one
adds the members of these sacrosanct state militias to the Southern-
ers serving in the Union armies and deserters from the Confederate
ranks, the loss of manpower to the Southern cause is remarkable.)
Lincoln found himself bedeviled by both abolitionists and cop-
perheads, but his domestic political troubles were not comparable
to the divisiveness that was disintegrating the Confederacy. Con-
flicts among its leaders grew hotter even as the war turned against
them: conflicts between President Davis and Vice President Stephens,
between Davis and Congress (many Confederate congressmen pur-
sued a real vendetta against him), between Davis and his generals
(most notably Beauregard and Johnston), between Davis and state
governors, between governors and generals, and on and on. Al-
though leading what was in fact a revolution, Jefferson Davis was
no Cromwell, certainly no Robespierre, but in truth a conservative.
He did not know how to rally the Southern people. Had Davis pos-
sessed true political insight, he would have offered Lincoln a cease-
fire between the 1864 Democratic Convention and the fall of Atlanta,
in order to discuss peace; if the guns had once been quieted, it is
questionable that Northern opinion could have again been rallied.
Yet in his experience, his integrity, and his devotion to Southern in-
dependence, Davis was almost certainly the best of the Southern
statesmen. It is not at all clear that anyone from the ranks of those
who sought to displace him would have done a better or even a
comparable job (a consideration with many implications).93
Nevertheless, Davis increasingly became the object of the most
intense vituperation by his enemies in Congress and in the press.
He "did not know how to deal with the politicians." Consequently,
"his path became stony with needless quarrels," resulting, for ex-
ample, in his appointing no less than six successive secretaries of
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war in four years. Throughout the entire war, Lincoln vetoed ex-
actly three bills; Davis vetoed thirty-eight—and the Confederate
Congress overrode his vetoes on all of them but one. More and more
of Davis's opponents accused him of dictatorship. Congressman
William Boyce of South Carolina wrote to Davis in October 1864,
"Suppose there were no States, only provinces... what greater power
would you exercise than you do now?... Our government exercises
the powers of a central despotism." Vice President Stephens was
such an implacable critic of Davis that General Sherman actually
approached him and Governor Brown with the proposition that
Georgia secede from the Confederacy.94 "One who delves deeply
into the literature of the period may easily conclude that Southern-
ers hated each other more than they did the Yankees." These divi-
sions and hatreds "sapped the South's vitality and hastened Northern
victory."95
This destructive internecine fighting of course reflected the ap-
proach of defeat. But it also reveals the unimpressive quality of the
political (as distinguished from the military) leadership of the Con-
federacy in all branches and at all levels. The Confederate Congress
was "far inferior in brains and character to its counterpart in Wash-
ington, and far less effective in supporting the Executive." Most
Confederate leaders had spent their entire adult lives as opposition-
ists; by 1861 it was too late to acquire the habits of government. Be-
sides that, they had been educated in a political culture that tended
to identify political criticism as willful malice and indeed as a reflec-
tion upon the intelligence or even the integrity of the one criticized.96
It must be kept in mind that, as far as the leaders of the Confed-
eracy knew, there was always more than a theoretical possibility
that if they lost the war they would all be hanged. Nevertheless, as
the tide of war clearly turned against them, the political infighting
at all levels in the Confederacy grew ever more bitter and personal.
Does not this bizarre contentiousness, this remarkable inability to
submerge provincial agendas, individual ambitions, and personal
rivalries in the interest of pure survival—especially when viewed in
conjunction with the truculent recklessness displayed at Fort
Sumter—turn a most revealing light on the inner reality of the se-
cession movement, indeed on the entire "states' rights and South-
ern liberties" issue that led to war itself?97
The disparity in the quality of political talent available to the
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Union and to the Confederacy was actually a major factor in the
war's outcome, a factor for some reason usually neglected. Certainly
it is no accident that the supreme embodiment of the Confederacy
has always been the soldier Robert E. Lee, whereas the supreme em-
bodiment of the Union cause has always been the politician Abraham
Lincoln.98 At any rate, the divisive and vituperative style of Confeder-
ate politics manifested itself even in the question of slavery.
Slavery: From Cornerstone to Millstone
The causes of the American Civil War are numerous and compli-
cated, as are the causes of Union victory and Confederate defeat.
But one cause stands out above all others for both Southern seces-
sion and Southern defeat: the institution of slavery. "Nobody who
has read the letters, state papers, newspapers, and other surviving
literature of the generation before 1861," writes Samuel Eliot Morison,
"can honestly deny that the one main, fundamental reason for se-
cession in the original states which formed the Southern Confed-
eracy was to protect, expand and perpetuate the slavery of the Negro
race." Lincoln said in his second Inaugural address: "Slavery con-
stituted the peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this inter-
est was, somehow, the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate
and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would
rend the Union, even by war." And R.M.T. Hunter of Virginia, Con-
federate secretary of state and former Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives, exclaimed, "What did we secede for if not to save
our slaves?"99
One often reads that secession occurred because the Republican
victory in 1860 threatened the safety of the institution of slavery
within the Southern states. But that is misleading. Secessionist threats
had resounded in the South for more than two decades before the
founding of the Republican party. As early as 1832, President An-
drew Jackson, himself a Tennessee slaveholder, had threatened to
hang South Carolina fire-eaters. The 1860 Republican platform
pledged to respect slavery in those states where it existed by vote of
the legislature; Lincoln had for years made abundantly clear his view
that the Constitution did not allow Congress to interfere with sla-
very in a state. More to the point, after the 1860 elections the Repub-
licans were a minority in both houses of the Congress (and on the
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Supreme Court as well). Advocates of secession were alarmed not
because of anything the Republican platform said or Lincoln did,
but because of what could eventually happen after two or three more
Republican administrations: the slow, gradual, legal erosion of sla-
very to the point of extinction, first in the border states and then
ultimately in the Deep South.100
The more exuberant apologists for slavery found such a pros-
pect or even possibility intolerable. During the 1850s they began to
expound the argument that slavery, far from being a necessary or
inescapable evil, was in fact a positive good, a good that required
not merely protection but propagation. It was this increasingly ag-
gressive determination not only to preserve but also to extend sla-
very that led to demands for the reopening of the slave trade
(specifically prohibited by the Constitution), the spectacle of Bleed-
ing Kansas, the Dred Scott fiasco, and the deliberate shattering of
the Democratic Party. To advanced proponents of slavery, it was clear
that the Southern states must free themselves from the menacing
incubus of the increasingly democratic and industrializing Federal
Union; then they would become the nucleus of a great tropical slave
empire eventually embracing Mexico and the entire Caribbean. It is
undeniable that the ardent proslavery men, the fire-eaters, plunged
their country and their section into disunion and invited civil war
before any overt act of hostility toward slavery by the Lincoln ad-
ministration, indeed even before Lincoln had been inaugurated.
Slavery created the Confederacy. Could slavery then sustain it?
Could slavery justify all the sacrifices that would be imposed upon
the whites of the seceded states, even though only about 6 percent
of them were slave-owners?
The True Price of Slavery
From the first, the hopes of secession were pinned on foreign inter-
vention. Of course, effective British recognition would have involved
a confrontation with the growing Union navy. But slavery as well as
American maritime power restrained the British government. Will-
iam Gladstone at first portrayed the embattled Southerners as merely
one more oppressed people valiantly struggling for independence,
for freedom. However, the Emancipation Proclamation, issued in
September 1862 after Lee's reverse at Anteitam, made it impossible
to sustain such a view any longer. Just as Lincoln had intended and
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foreseen, the proclamation fused the cause of preserving the Union
with the cause of extending human liberty. Henceforth the victory
of the Confederacy must mean a victory for human slavery. Nearly
all reformist opinion in England rallied against intervention. John
Bright declared that "the Confederates were the worst foes of free-
dom that the world has ever seen." John Stuart Mill believed that
the breakup of the Union "would be a victory of the powers of evil
which would give courage to the enemies of progress and damp the
spirits of its friends all over the civilized world." The first Confeder-
ate commissioners sent to Britain to negotiate recognition wrote home
to say that slavery was very unpopular in Britain; "the sincerity and
universality of this feeling embarrass the Government in dealing
with the question of our recognition."101
Slavery was a problem inside the Confederate house as well.
Committing a propaganda disaster incredible but not unique, Con-
federate vice president Alexander Stephens defiantly proclaimed that
"this stone [slavery] which was rejected by the first builders, is be-
come the chief stone of the corner of our new edifice." In fact Stephens
was saying more than he perhaps realized.102 The stone of slavery
had indeed been rejected by the "first builders," the men of the Phila-
delphia Constitutional Convention, prominent among whom were
many Southerners. In the springtime of the republic, almost every-
one, slaveholders included, viewed slavery as either a great evil or a
great misfortune. The founding fathers hoped that it was on the way
to extinction. That is why the words "slave" and "slavery" do not
appear in the original Constitution, so that they—artifacts of a be-
nighted era—would not be found there after slavery had become
extinct; the Constitutional circumlocution for slaves was "all other
persons." Why would Southerners have submitted to a Constitu-
tion that made participation in the slave trade a felony if they be-
lieved slavery was anything other than an unfortunate and hopefully
temporary condition?
And before the Constitution, when the American states governed
themselves under the old Articles of Confederation, the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, based on proposals of the Virginian Thomas
Jefferson, proclaimed the vast empire between the Ohio River and
the Great Lakes closed to slavery. Jefferson also advanced plans for
the gradual emancipation of the slaves, to be followed by their train-
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ing in useful crafts at public expense. His Notes on the State of Vir-
ginia depicts slavery as degrading to slave and master alike. An-
other Virginian, James Madison, the "Father of the Constitution"
and the fourth president of the United States, hoped that by destroy-
ing the slave trade the Americans "might save themselves from re-
proaches and our posterity from the imbecility ever attendant on a
country filled with slaves." George Washington attributed the al-
leged inferiority of blacks not to their genes but to their chains. He
freed his own slaves, saying, "I can clearly foresee that nothing but
the rooting out of slavery can perpetuate the existence of our union,
by consolidating it in a common bond of principle."103
Sixty years after Washington's pronouncement, on the outbreak
of the Civil War, Robert E. Lee told Gen. Winfield Scott that if he
owned every slave in the South, he would gladly free them all to
ensure peace. And in 1856 Lee had written: "There are few, I believe,
in this enlightened age, who will not acknowledge that slavery as
an institution is a moral and political evil a greater evil to the white
than to the colored race." All educated southerners (at least) were un-
comfortably aware that slavery carried the condemnation of the
whole Christian world. Indeed, the Constitution of the Confederacy
itself prohibited the international slave trade. And many in the South
would interpret the military defeat of the Confederacy as God's judg-
ment on the sin of slavery.104
To achieve their ends, the leaders of secession would have to
destroy the Union that Washington and Madison and Jefferson—all
Southerners—had so mightily labored to build. They would also
destroy the lives of scores of thousands of fine young men from ev-
ery state of that Union. But why must the Confederacy pursue this
bloody destruction? Southern apologists said they were fighting for
liberty. But it was not the liberty their fathers had fought for, the
liberty to govern themselves as free men. It was not the liberty the
Vendeans had fought for, liberty to worship God. It was not the lib-
erty the Spaniards had fought for, liberty from a cruel foreign over-
lord. What was it, then? Confederate liberty meant this: the liberty
of a small minority within the South to hold millions of men, women,
and children in perpetual slavery. Here was the unspoken paradox,
the key contradiction, of the Confederate position—fundamental,
inescapable, corrosive, and fatal.105
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An Army of Slaves
Of all the manifestations of the general uneasiness among the Con-
federates about this paradox of slavery, the most intriguing and re-
vealing was the issue of saving the rebellion by arming the slaves.
The inexorable advance of Union armies into Confederate terri-
tory, the unabating stubbornness and tactical genius of Robert E.
Lee, and the wide-ranging activities of Confederate guerrillas all
combined to create a critical demand for more Federal manpower.
The urgency of the need helped lead Lincoln to approve the forma-
tion of military units composed of black men, including former
slaves. Properly trained, such units could take over the troop-con-
suming tasks of holding forts and guarding junctions behind the
lines, freeing experienced white soldiers for combat, including guer-
rilla-hunting. Lincoln of course had to move cautiously in this mat-
ter, an exceedingly sensitive one in Union slaveholding states like
Kentucky, even though black troops were deployed against guerril-
las in Missouri as early as October 1862.106
The formation of black Federal units created consternation
among the Confederates. They threatened to execute any captured
white officer who had been in command of black troops "for incit-
ing servile insurrection." President Lincoln knew how to deal with
that kind of threat: in July 1863 he announced that for every Union
officer-prisoner illegally executed by the Confederacy, he would hang
one Confederate officer.107 In all, about 180,000 blacks served with
the Union forces, approximately one out of every ten men who
donned the uniform of the United States during the war.
For decades before the war, thousands of free persons of color
had lived in the South. But the conditions of these persons were in
many areas so bad that they often petitioned the courts to be al-
lowed to return themselves to slavery under a master of their own
choosing. Nevertheless, companies of free black soldiers had orga-
nized in New Orleans as early as 1861. Apparently their services
were not accepted. But the unexpectedly long and costly war, which
like every major war was also a social revolution, was already caus-
ing Confederates to tamper with that institution in the name of whose
inviolability they had plunged a nation into civil carnage. Missis-
sippi passed legislation freeing any slave who defended white
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women or helped his master who was wounded in battle.108 And,
more pertinently in view of what was eventually to come, the Con-
federate government had from the first days of the war hired slaves
from their masters and set them to erecting fortifications and other
war-related work. It is notable that the Confederacy felt able to con-
script the services of free white men, but not unfree black men, who
constituted 40 percent of the Southern labor force and were largely
left to the disposition of their owners.
"If Slaves Make Good Soldiers"
As defeat for the Confederate cause undeniably loomed, demands
arose for desperate measures to stave off that dread outcome. The
South must cast everything into the fire to keep the engine of war
going—everything including slavery itself. Gov. Henry Allen of Loui-
siana declared his belief that the Confederacy should arm every
Negro male, put him in the army, and then emancipate him after
final victory had been achieved.109 By late 1864 Robert E. Lee and
even Jefferson Davis had expressed themselves in favor of arming
and freeing at least some slaves. Lee had apparently been in favor of
arming slaves since Gettysburg.
Even to talk about arming and freeing Negro slaves shook South-
ern morale to its foundations. Such proposals of course provoked
ferocious opposition. If the Confederacy were to arm its slaves, then
what in heaven's name was the war all about? In January 1865 the
legislature of South Carolina vigorously condemned any arming of
slaves. Senator Hunter of Virginia pointed out with unsettling logic,
"If we are right in passing this measure [to arm slaves and promise
them freedom] we were wrong in denying to the old [Federal] gov-
ernment the right to interfere with the institution of slavery and to
emancipate slaves." Or more succinctly, in the words of Maj. Gen.
Howell Cobb, a former U.S. congressman: "If slaves make good sol-
diers, then our whole theory of slavery is wrong."110 Indeed.
But, as Robert E. Lee rightly observed, slavery would surely be
extinguished, if not by the Confederacy then by the Union. The only
real question was, Who would get the benefit of arming the blacks?
Lee wanted black troops. "My own opinion," he wrote, "is that we
should employ them without delay. I believe that with proper regu-
lations they can be made efficient soldiers." Lee advocated emanci-
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pation for any slave who joined the army, and emancipation for his
family if the black soldier did his duty. If the Confederacy did not
arm the slaves, everything would be lost; if it did arm them, some-
thing (not least the property and the personal freedom of the lead-
ers of rebellion) might be saved.111
Accordingly, in March 1865 (five minutes to midnight on history's
clock), the Confederate Congress, by a vote of 9 to 8 in the Senate
and 40 to 37 in the House of Representatives, passed a bill calling
for the creation of slave military formations (to enroll up to three
hundred thousand men!).112 In 1861 the seceded states had begun
the war in order to continue slavery; by 1865 they would end sla-
very in order to continue the war. Truly, war is revolution.
Marching through Georgia
A strategy of attrition is an effort to defeat the enemy by inflicting
unacceptably high numbers of casualties on them; a strategy of ex-
haustion is an effort to defeat the enemy by depriving them of the
means to continue the struggle. An example of President Lincoln's
strategy of exhaustion is the Union blockade. Other instances are
the occupation by Federal troops of ever-larger chunks of the Con-
federacy, the emancipation of slaves in rebellious areas, and the
induction of former slaves into the Union armies. General
Sherman's deliberately destructive march through Georgia and
South Carolina is a further instance of this strategy and suggests
the concept of political exhaustion: making it plain to Southerners
that the Confederacy could no longer protect anybody anywhere.
Sherman's march was aimed at Confederate morale. Lincoln also
sought to employ political exhaustion against the rebels, and he did
so with great effect, as will be seen.
The notoriety of General Sherman's march "from Atlanta to the
sea" is deserved, but his continuance of the campaign into South
Carolina was even more devastating than the better-known Geor-
gia episode. House-burning was much more common in the South
Carolina campaign; many Union officers and soldiers wrote home
that they found it supremely fitting to visit destruction upon the
state that had been the first to secede and the first to fire on the
American flag. Columbia, the handsome state capital, suffered se-
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verely from several major fires. General Sherman always denied,
with vehemence, that these fires resulted from his orders, and the
evidence sustains his denial.113
The unprecedented path of desolation Sherman was cutting
through the Southern heartland caused some desertions from Lee's
army in Virginia by men anxious to go home and safeguard their
families. In fact, Confederate soldiers from regions occupied by
Union troops had been leaving the army to care for their families
long before Sherman ever saw Georgia. The campaign also brought
home to large strata of the civil population just how far the
Confederacy's military position had deteriorated, how utterly un-
able their government was to protect them: "Sherman's march to
Savannah had shown the Confederate defenses to be an eggshell."
Yet, the devastation of Southern agricultural capacity, a main justifi-
cation of the march, seems to have had little effect on Lee's army,
which lacked not foodstuffs but the means to transport them. Lee's
men were hungry at Appomattox, and Grant fed them, but this had
little to do with Sherman.114
The deliberate destructiveness of Sherman's troops caused de-
spair in the South. It also engendered a profound and lasting bitter-
ness against the Union, against Northerners in general, a bitterness
that delayed postwar reconciliation by decades and distorted the
political and social development of the Southern states for a cen-
tury. Sherman argued, in the manner of Julius Caesar, that his policy
of destruction in fact saved lives and suffering because it shortened
. the war. In this and other ways his march foreshadowed Allied stra-
tegic bombing of German and Japanese cities during World War II.
It is interesting that William Sherman's detractors heap execration
upon him for destroying property, as if that were unquestionably
worse than destroying lives. His men committed little rape and less
murder. One finds nothing, absolutely nothing, in Sherman's march
to compare to the systematic atrocities in the Vendee or in Bonapartist
Spain. That he bore no personal hatred toward Southerners in gen-
eral is shown by his exceedingly generous surrender terms to the
army of General Johnston. During the negotiations for that surren-
der, Sherman offered Confederate general John Breckinridge a ship
to carry the fugitive Jefferson Davis and his family to safety outside
the United States. And in the period of Reconstruction, Sherman
96 • America and Guerrilla Warfare
repeatedly expressed his distaste for punitive measures against his
ex-Confederate foes. For Sherman, total war and total forgiveness
were different sides of one coin.115
With Malice toward None:
Lincoln and the Politics of Victory
Whatever one's opinion of Sherman, his ruthless pursuit of the strat-
egy of exhaustion provided a dramatic backdrop for President
Lincoln's policy of clemency toward repentant Confederates and the
smooth reincorporation of seceded states into the Union. Halfway
through 1864 at the latest, most Confederates knew that they faced
a clear choice: continue to suffer in a losing war, or find shelter in a
forgiving peace.
The powerful military weapons of the Lincoln government in-
cluded an increasingly effective blockade; notable improvements in
Union army leadership, discipline, and armament; and the steady
transfer of manpower from the Confederate to the Union side
through the flight of slaves to the Union lines and the creation of
black military units. Lincoln augmented this impressive armory with
potent political weapons. One was the Emancipation Proclamation,
which destroyed any chance of European intervention on behalf of
the South. Another was the constant promise of a moderate peace,
which fanned the already-bright flames of division among the foe.
It was no accident that Lincoln's running mate in 1864 was the Ten-
nessean Andrew Johnson.
At the end of 1863 President Lincoln issued a Proclamation of
Amnesty and Reconstruction. It was "a device to shorten the war
and solidify white support for emancipation." Under this procla-
mation any Confederate, with the exception of certain high political
and military officers, who agreed to take an oath of renewed alle-
giance to the United States and pledged to accept the end of slavery
would receive full restoration of rights. When the number of such
oath-takers in any formerly seceded state equaled 10 percent of the
vote cast in the election of 1860, they could reorganize their state
government and receive the recognition of the Federal administra-
tion. Even before Appomattox, such governments were functioning
in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana. And in February 1863 the
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House of Representatives seated two newly elected members from
Louisiana.116
The attitudes of Grant and Sherman toward their defeated op-
ponents reflected Lincoln's leniency. Grant's generosity to Lee and
his soldiers unquestionably helped prevent an outbreak of serious
guerrilla fighting. A week and a half after Lee surrendered at
Appomattox, with the Confederacy clearly drawing its last painful
breath and only a few days after Lincoln had been murdered, Sherman
offered very moderate terms to Joseph Johnston's army in North
Carolina, in part because he did not want that army to scatter and
turn to guerrilla war. Similarly, Union military authorities "granted
truly generous terms, in view of their bloody record" to Missouri
partisans.117
The Prospects for Guerrilla Resistance
What if, in spite of the ever-tightening blockade, the inexorable ad-
vance of the Union armies, the utter extinction of the hope of foreign
intervention, the crushing fatigue produced by years of sacrifice, the
grotesque inadequacy of slavery as a rallying symbol, the complete
absence of any other sustaining ideology, and the easy peace prof-
fered by Lincoln—what if in spite of all this, large numbers of Con-
federates were in the spring of 1865 actually giving serious thought to
continuing the fight by turning to guerrilla tactics? Surely they would
have had to confront the following disheartening considerations.
First, the efforts of Confederate guerrillas, however chivalrous
or sanguinary, had not been decisive when those guerrillas had had
the support of large armies fighting in the field. How then could
one rationally hope for a more favorable outcome after those field
armies had been defeated and dispersed?
Second, nearly every single successful guerrilla movement in
history has received assistance from the outside. French help was of
incalculable importance to the American Revolution; Wellington
brought essential support to the Spanish guerrillas.118 But to whom
could Confederate guerrillas look for assistance in 1865? The Great
Powers had declined to recognize the Confederacy in its full flower;
would they then risk the wrath of a triumphant and puissant Union
by aiding the guerrilla remnant of a thoroughly defeated cause—
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assuming for the moment that any substantial amount of aid would
get through the Union blockade?
Third, a protracted Confederate guerrilla resistance rooted in
popular support would need a proper enemy. But such an enemy
was absent. For Southerners to undertake and to sustain a bloody
guerrilla resistance, in defiance of all arguments and handicaps, it
would surely have required the most powerful consciousness of
national identity—an inescapable conviction of the foreignness of
the foe, his manifest, irredeemable, repellant otherness. The great
guerrilla wars of history have burst forth against foreign invaders
who were wantonly murderous (China, Yugoslavia), racially alien
(Vietnam, Tibet), or religiously obnoxious (Spain, Afghanistan).
Merely to mention such cases is to underline their profound and
unbridgeable contrasts with the American conflict. The relationship
of Pennsylvanians to Virginians was not even remotely comparable
to that of German to Serb. On the contrary, Pennsylvanians and Vir-
ginians shared ethnicity, language, religion, historical experience,
patriotic symbols, and political convictions. Sherman and Sheridan
did not preside over systematic sacrilege and wholesale executions
as their Napoleonic counterparts in Spain did; even the mentally
unbalanced Quantrill never descended to the mass rapes and mur-
ders of women and children that befouled the revolutionary troops
in the Vendee.119 To say the least, Southern separatists lacked a satis-
factorily alien foe against whom to define themselves.
To the degree that a Southern patriotism existed at all, it was
rooted in the fact of slavery. Slavery was at the very heart of the war.
But slavery, which had created the Confederacy, could not sustain
it. Even in 1861 "Long live slavery!" would have been a public rela-
tions disaster. With slavery clearly doomed by 1865, why should the
war continue? And if, nevertheless, large segments of the white South
had undertaken guerrilla war after 1865, almost certainly Union
forces in the South would have increasingly come to consist of black
soldiers, with the effect that Southern blacks would have become
not only emancipated legally but also dominant militarily and thus
politically.
If, instead, Confederates bowed to the surrender of General Lee,
if they admitted the failure of the cause, what fate awaited them?
Did they face sweeping confiscations, mass deportations, countless
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hangings, Vendean drownings, the Gulag Archipelago, the Katyn
Forest? No. This alone awaited them: they would enter into civil
relations with the administration of Abraham Lincoln, the legitimate
government of the United States, put in office by a free election in
which Confederates themselves had participated hardly fifty months
before. And they could participate in similar elections if they would
accept amnesty and help to bind up the nation's wounds.
Confederate leaders were familiar with the dread consequences
of the Spanish guerrilla resistance against Napoleon. More to the
point, they had before them the grim example of Missouri. The South
proved to be no Spain. The leaders of the Confederacy—almost all
of them, with the notable exception of President Davis himself—
urged their followers to take the path of peace. In his last wartime
message to President Davis, April 20,1865, General Lee wrote: "As
far as I know the condition of affairs, the country east of the Missis-
sippi is morally and physically unable to maintain the contest un-
aided with any hope of ultimate success. A partisan war may be
continued, and hostilities protracted, causing individual suffering and the
devastation of the country, but I see no prospect by that means of achieving
a separate independence To save useless effusion of blood, I would
recommend measures be taken for suspension of hostilities and the
restoration of peace."120
The Weariness of the South
During the American Revolution, southern guerrillas arose and flour-
ished in those darkest hours after the British had shattered the regu-
lar American army in the area and when prospects of immediate
assistance were remote. Spain erupted into guerrilla resistance after
the armies of Napoleon had swept aside its regular forces. These
guerrilla wars followed upon a period of conventional armed con-
flict that was relatively brief. The case of the Confederacy was much
different.
The soldiers of the Confederacy had been told at the beginning
that secession would be peaceful. That expectation proving naive,
they were then told that the war would be short and victorious. All
too soon the whole idea of peaceful or easy secession was exposed
as foolishness. The proportion of casualties to total population in
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the Civil War was higher than in Britain or France during World
War I. In addition, the fundamental Confederate strategy of avoid-
ing defeat had turned the South into the theater of the war, with all
its attendant calamities. As early Confederate victories evaporated
under a waxing Unionist sun, enthusiasm for an independent South-
ern commonwealth based on slavery began to evaporate with them,
while internecine hatreds boiled over in frightening implacability.
For at least two years before Appomattox, and especially after the
summer of 1863, Southerners experienced a growing, dreadful con-
viction that the frightful slaughter of their young men and their deep
and increasing material privations were after all to be in vain. After
the reelection of President Lincoln, desertions from the Confederate
armies increased dramatically.121 Even in Lee's Army of Northern
Virginia, the embodiment of heroic and effective resistance, deser-
tion became very serious during 1864 and reached crisis propor-
tions by March 1865.
The Confederacy's thorough, undeniable defeat after almost four
years of bloody combat had understandably deprived it of the spiri-
tual as well as physical stamina to carry on the conventional war,
much less to undertake a massive guerrilla struggle. An exhausted
South, facing on the one hand certain defeat (made more terrible by
Sherman's calculated destructiveness) and on the other hand
Lincoln's sincere stance of malice toward none and charity for all—
how could this South possibly have fought on? A few handfuls of
Confederates who would not accept surrender went by way of Texas
into Mexico and the army of the emperor Maximilian (another lost
cause); some other irreconcilables found their way to Brazil. It is
emblematic of the unwillingness of Confederate leaders to continue
the war after Appomattox that John Mosby, the most famous of the
guerrilla leaders, not only advocated reconciliation with the victori-
ous Union but embraced the Republican Party of General Grant.122
Reflection
It was an incalculable blessing upon everyone that a massive guer-
rilla war did not break out across the post-Appomattox South. The
containment of fifty thousand Confederate guerrillas would have
required the protracted occupation of the South by a half million
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Union soldiers: the Missouri horrors multiplied by eleven. How, af-
ter such a conflict, reunification of the country in any meaningful
sense could have been effected in less than a century, if ever, is diffi-
cult to imagine. But following the formal surrenders of Generals Lee
and Johnston, there was peace, a lasting peace.123 No Southern guer-
rilla movement could be sustained in the face of the undeniable de-
feat of the Confederate armies and the generous peace terms of
President Lincoln and Generals Grant and Sherman.
Six hundred thousand American combatants perished in the War
of Secession—more than in World War I, World War II, and Korea
combined. The billions of dollars spent by the Federal government
would have been more than enough to peacefully purchase the free-
dom of every single slave. So all-consuming, so revolutionary did
the conflict become that toward the end the Confederates were pre-
pared to cast the edifice of slavery into the furnace of war. And on
the same day that the American flag was once again raised over Fort
Sumter, the war claimed the life of Abraham Lincoln. But the repub-
lic had safely passed through its fiery trial.
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The Philippine War
Forgotten Victory
In the twenty-first century the Filipinos and the Americans continue
to be, as they long have been, old friends, trading partners, and mili-
tary allies. Their intimate links include memories of a gratifyingly
victorious struggle against a common foe during World War II. The
Constitution of the United States provided the model for that of the
Philippines, and most Filipinos speak the language their ancestors
learned from the Americans. And for students of insurgency, twen-
tieth-century Philippine history provides two instructive examples
of how to defeat a guerrilla movement, one with direct and the other
with indirect American participation. We consider the former case
here and the latter in chapter 6.
The Archipelago
The Philippine archipelago comprises more than seven thousand
islands; only three thousand of them have names. They stretch from
north to south for almost a thousand miles, the distance from Madrid
to Vienna or from Seattle to Los Angeles. The 116,000-square-mile
area of the country equals that of Arizona or Italy. The largest of the
islands is Luzon, about the size of Kentucky or the former East Ger-
many. Damp and warm, the Philippines produce rice, hemp, coco-
nuts, and sugarcane.
The archipelago has been conquered in turn by the Spanish, the
Americans, the Japanese, and the Americans again. Magellan, the
circumnavigator, arrived in the islands as early as 1521, to meet his
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death. The Philippines received their name in 1542, in honor of the
prince who as Philip II would one day rule an immense empire and
launch the ill-named Invincible Armada. But effective Spanish oc-
cupation of the islands did not begin until the 1560s, and Manila
was not founded until 1571.
Spanish rule united the islands for the first time in their history;
today's Filipino nation took its shape from yesterday's Spanish
colony.1 The Spanish conquest of the Philippines was relatively blood-
less, because of the dispersion of the population, the absence of strong
native states, and linguistic differences among the islands. But the
Spaniards had not thoroughly subdued the large southern island of
Mindanao even by 1898.
Along with administrative unity, the Spanish imposed their eco-
nomic system, including large estates owned by religious orders.
But what most profoundly and permanently shaped the culture of
the Filipinos was the propagation of Catholic Christianity in its Ibe-
rian Reconquista version. "A striking feature of Spanish imperial-
ism was the inseparable union of the Church and the state." Bringing
the true religion to the benighted islanders was the main justifica-
tion for imperialism, an effective answer even to those churchmen
who questioned the Tightness of conquering the Philippines: "Spain's
mission was to forge the spiritual unity of all mankind by. . . spread-
ing the gospel among the infidels of America and Asia." Aside from
missionaries, relatively few Spaniards came to settle in the islands,
and as late as 1898 only one in ten among the native population
spoke Spanish. Thus, "the Spaniards put a heavy emphasis on
Christianization as the most effective means of incorporating the Fili-
pinos into Spanish culture, and the Filipinos themselves responded
enthusiastically to the multiform appeal of the new religion." Conse-
quently, "Catholicism provided the cement of social unity."2
The evangelization of the Philippines was no small task. The
population was geographically dispersed and spoke a bewildering
variety of languages utterly unknown to Europeans. Before 1700
there were few missionary priests in the islands, mostly members of
the great orders: Jesuits, Dominicans, Franciscans, Augustinians.
Nevertheless, the ceaseless efforts to spread the Christian religion
achieved successes that were great and lasting. Spanish priests also
relentlessly attacked the native practice of ritual drunkenness, the
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eradication of which contributed to the sobriety that characterizes
the Filipinos to this day.
Christianity brought the Philippines into the orbit of Western
civilization, where they have remained ever since. Today the Re-
public of the Philippines is the only Christian nation in all of East
Asia; "the Filipinos are [also] unique for being the only oriental
people profoundly and consistently influenced by Occidental cul-
ture for the last four centuries."3
However one may evaluate the cultural effects of Spanish rule,
it promoted neither economic development nor self-government. By
the dawn of the nineteenth century, Filipinos of education and promi-
nence, called ilustrados, were chafing under the discrimination
against them by Spaniards with regard to appointments in church
and state. The Spanish were pursuing similar policies in their Latin
American domains, setting Creoles against peninsulares. Resentment
was also high against the enormous financial and political power of
the monastic orders. Late in the nineteenth century some ilustrados
founded the Katipunan, a secret society whose purpose was to work
toward the overthrow of Spanish power. Emilio Aguinaldo, born in
1869, became head of the Katipunan in Cavite (on Luzon) and even-
tually throughout all of the islands.4
The Americans Arrive
In the summer of 1896, the Katipunan launched a major rebellion. It
lasted only about a year, because Aguinaldo and several other promi-
nent rebel leaders agreed to go into exile in Hong Kong in return for
the promise of a substantial payment to them by the royal govern-
ment. Underlying discontents, however, were not addressed, and
so rebellion broke out again in March 1898. But within a few weeks,
Spain and the United States were at war.5
Affairs in the Philippines had very little to do with the outbreak
of the Spanish-American War, but the effects of that war on the is-
lands would be profound indeed. The U.S. Asiatic Squadron, under
Como. George Dewey on his flagship the Olympia, sailed from
Nagasaki to Manila Bay. There, on May 1, Dewey won his total vic-
tory against the Spanish fleet under Adm. Patricio Montojo. And on
May 19 Dewey had Aguinaldo brought back to the islands (to Cavite).
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A few days later Aguinaldo proclaimed himself dictator of the pro-
visional government of an independent Philippine Republic. By the
end of June, most of the key island of Luzon (but not Manila) was in
the hands of his adherents, and Aguinaldo apparently believed that
Washington would recognize his government.6
Dewey's naval triumph did not mean that the fighting in the
islands was over. The first units of the U.S. Army began arriving on
June 30, 1898; Manila fell to the Americans on August 13. These
American troops were ten thousand miles from Washington, D.C.
They were deploying in an archipelago made up of thousands of
islands with perhaps ten million inhabitants7 (nobody knew for sure)
who displayed a vast cultural diversity, from Hispanicized Manilans
at one extreme to the pagan tribes of the Luzon mountains at the
other. Because no one in the Philippines knew what President
McKinley's policy toward the islands was or would be, the U.S. Army
leaders on the scene refused to allow Aguinaldo's forces to enter
Manila in strength. Nevertheless, the army stood by while many
small Spanish garrisons and outposts outside Manila, cut off from
supplies and instructions from Madrid, surrendered to Aguinaldo's
men. Had they been able to look into the near future, the Americans
would have wanted to capture those posts themselves.
Although the United States had gone to war with Spain over
Cuba, Dewey's unexpectedly lopsided victory in Manila Bay meant
that the American government now had to decide the fate of the
Philippines. At the beginning of the war, President McKinley had
nothing remotely approximating a policy for the islands. For the
Americans to return control of the Philippines to the Spanish after
having conquered them seemed dishonorable, as well as cruel to
the Filipinos, who would pay a dread price for their rebellion. But
many in Washington (and elsewhere) believed that the islands were
not ready to govern themselves. Philippine independence would
most probably dissolve into civil war and anarchy. Such conditions
would tempt other powers with imperial holdings in the Western
Pacific (such as Japan or Germany)8 to occupy the islands. Consid-
erations like these began to move McKinley's advisers toward the
idea of a temporary American possession of the whole archipelago.
The predictable end of the Spanish-American war came on De-
cember 10,1898, with the signing of the Treaty of Paris. Among other
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provisions, Spain sold the Philippine Islands to the United States
for twenty million dollars. By that time the American government
had adopted the position that the Filipinos could not protect their
own independence. Washington hoped that the promise of benevo-
lent and efficient administration at the hands of Americans, plus a
definite guarantee of independence at some future date, would calm
and even placate most of the inhabitants of the archipelago.9
Insurgency
In February 1899 about fifteen thousand American troops held Ma-
nila, under the command of Gen. Elwell S. Otis. These men were
mostly volunteers; a few months previously they had been civil-
ians. At various points around the capital were about thirty thou-
sand soldiers more or less loyal to Aguinaldo. Relations between
the two forces were rapidly deteriorating. Actual fighting between
the U.S. Army in Manila and Aguinaldo's troops began on Febru-
ary 4,1899.10
A month later a presidential commission arrived in the islands.
Jacob Gould Schurman, president of Cornell University, headed the
commission, which also included Dean C. Worcester, a University
of Michigan sociologist and veteran of several scientific expeditions
to the islands. The commissioners published a proclamation to the
Filipinos setting forth the benevolent intentions of the U.S. govern-
ment. The document pledged that government to protect the Filipi-
nos "in their just privileges and immunities," to "accustom them to
free self-government in an ever-increasing measure," and to "en-
courage them in. . . democratic aspirations, sentiments, and ideals."
Some members of Aguinaldo's self-proclaimed government wished
to accept the terms of this April proclamation; they were stopped
only by the vigorous intervention of his troops.11 The American forces
were perplexed to find that even by the end of the year, many Filipi-
nos had not even heard of the April proclamation. Nevertheless, re-
spected Filipinos who had been members of the insurgent congress
went over to the American side, and Filipinos had begun to join
American-sponsored police units on Luzon and Negros Islands and
to act as scouts and interpreters for the U.S. Army.
In command of the only organized armed force that operated
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throughout the length of the islands, Aguinaldo also possessed in
the Katipunan an infrastructure that could provide his troops with
information and money, distribute propaganda among the civilian
population, and punish defectors. Aguinaldo's movement received
vital support as well from elements of the native Catholic clergy. Yet
it would be anachronistic to assume that Aguinaldo was the leader
of a movement of full-fledged Filipino nationalism. In the first place,
he had achieved supreme leadership over the insurgency only after
his followers had executed Andres Bonifacio, founder of the
Katipunan. This act disillusioned many who might otherwise have
rallied around a nationalist banner. Furthermore, many of the social
elite of the islands were reluctant to assist the rebellion. But of su-
preme importance in limiting support for the insurgents were the
ethnic divisions within Philippine society. The center of the revolt
was in the Tagalog-speaking regions around Manila. Aguinaldo and
a disproportionately large number of the other principal leaders of
the insurgency were Tagalog. But Gen. Antonio Luna, perhaps the
best officer in the nationalist army, was an Ilocano. The murder of
Luna at Aguinaldo's headquarters under very suspicious circum-
stances exacerbated ethnic tensions throughout the islands. Aguinal-
do's soldiers engaged in a lot of indiscriminate pillaging, but
probably no group suffered more from this sort of activity than the
numerous Chinese minority. The Americans soon learned to take
advantage of these conditions by employing non-Tagalog Filipinos
in their paramilitary forces.
A Guerrilla Conflict
The Americans sought to involve key elements of the population in
their own defense, and they set up civil administrations to incorpo-
rate prominent local citizens into the American scheme. These
projects were sometimes successful. But more than occasionally, the
guerrillas killed persons who worked with the Americans, and there
were instances in which Filipinos outwardly cooperated with the
Americans but secretly aided the guerrillas. As with every other as-
pect of the Philippine struggle, the situation varied greatly from one
region to another. Nevertheless, it was not uncommon that "while
American troops were occupying towns and establishing municipal
governments with the natives holding offices, the Insurgents arranged
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a parallel organization, in many cases employing the same natives
who held office under the Americans. The towns were taxed, contri-
butions and supplies collected, and recruits for the guerrilla forces
enlisted right under the noses of the unsuspecting Americans."12
For much of the time, the American effort amounted to a war of
attrition: they killed a few guerrillas here, captured some rifles there,
destroyed a food dump someplace else. Frequent patrols and rapid
response to any guerrilla action began to exhaust the insurgents.
Because of the nature of the terrain and the state of communica-
tions—many islands, many villages, no radio, no helicopters—it
became possible, indeed imperative, for local U.S. commanders to
adjust their tactics to the local situation. In addition, particular units
tended to remain in the same area for extended periods. Such de-
centralization in the counterinsurgency effort—local tactics adapted
to local conditions—eventually paid great dividends.13
As the 2000s dawn, U.S. forces seem to have become reluctant,
in the view of a noted authority on the Philippine insurgency, to
mount operations against guerrillas during a rainy season, because
airpower then becomes less reliable. But the evidence from the Phil-
ippine conflict strongly suggests that rainy seasons are at least as
hard on poorly equipped and supplied guerrillas as on regular
troops. The Americans built all-weather roads in the Philippines,
increasing their mobility without appreciably helping the guerril-
las.14 In any event, the United States won its complete victory over
the guerrillas without any air force at all, rainy season or no.
Intelligence became an ever-sharper weapon in American hands.
When U.S. Army units remained in an area for an extended period,
they were often able, through close observation, to identify and ar-
rest supporters of the insurgency. Bribery helped too: several local
commanders paid handsome rewards to Filipinos who would fur-
nish information about the rebel organization in a village or town.
Guerrillas who took advantage of amnesties often provided much
interesting information; prisoners obtained their freedom if they
agreed to identify former comrades or lead U.S. solders to their hid-
ing places.15 And of course the army recruited a growing number of
Filipino scouts from ethnic groups opposed to the Tagalog-domi-
nated guerrillas, men familiar with the countryside and the sympa-
thies of its inhabitants.
Next to the guerrillas, the most important quarry for American
110 • America and Guerrilla Warfare
troops was rifles: finding, capturing, or buying them from the lo-
cals. Rifles were relatively scarce among the guerrillas to begin with,
and of course no fresh supplies were coming in from outside. The
Americans paid good money to anyone turning in a rifle, with no
questions asked. And in lieu of cash, any Filipino who turned in a
rifle or any other serious weapon at an army base could secure the
release of a prisoner of war. Gen. Arthur MacArthur (who succeeded
Otis as commander in the Philippines) called this prisoners-for-rifles
trade one of his "most important policies."16 The resulting constant
loss of firearms, through battle, discovery, or cash rewards, gravely
undermined the ability of the guerrillas to carry on their struggle.
In the later stages of the conflict, food became as problematical
for the insurgents as rifles. The Americans devoted increasingly suc-
cessful efforts to cutting off food supplies to the guerrillas, scouring
a given territory for hidden fields and storehouses. Constant Ameri-
can patrolling kept the guerrillas on the move and uncovered many
food caches. Men had to shift their attention and activity from fight-
ing the Americans to getting or growing or stealing food. The Ameri-
can food-denial campaign seriously hurt both the guerrillas' morale
and their health; guerrilla life in any country and any conflict is of-
ten filled with, hardships; for the Philippine insurgents, the lack of
medical facilities and the decreasing food supplies meant increas-
ing illness.
The food-denial campaign inevitably led the Americans to de-
velop plans for concentrating the rural population. The idea for con-
centration arose late in the conflict in those areas where the remaining
guerrilla groups seemed determined to fight on indefinitely, even
though it had become perfectly clear to all observers that they could
not possibly be victorious over the Americans, and despite repeated
American requests that they accept honorable surrender. Something
drastic had to be done.
Concentration worked generally in this way: the civil popula-
tion of a given region received instructions to move into a desig-
nated town by a particular date, bringing all family members,
animals, and foodstuffs with them. After that date any goods or ani-
mals found outside the town were liable to confiscation, and men
were liable to arrest on suspicion of being guerrillas. Food shipments
between towns were subject to very strict controls. (Almost fifty years
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later the British would impose similar policies in their conflict with
Communist guerrillas in Malaya.) The U.S. Army carried out large
numbers of vaccinations, sought to ensure adequate food supplies
for the concentration areas, and tried to provide adequate jobs for
civilians on public works projects. Nevertheless, hardships, injus-
tices, and suffering were inevitable. Proper sanitation became a se-
rious problem, with the consequent health dangers. Perhaps eleven
thousand Filipinos died as result of poor conditions in the concen-
tration areas. At almost exactly the same time, the very large-scale
British efforts to concentrate the Boer civilian population in the South
African War was resulting in a much higher loss of life, mainly from
typhoid fever.17
War Crimes
The image of the American army in the Philippines as composed
mainly of brutal racists wading through a swamp of atrocities has
found its way into some of the books, and even to a degree into the
collective memory of the U.S. Army itself. Such an image does not
fit comfortably with the available evidence.18
Most American soldiers in the Philippines were very young,
under twenty-five; most had never been away from home, or at least
away from their native states, before. Hardly a single one arrived
with even a rudimentary knowledge of Tagalog, not to mention the
languages spoken by remote minorities. They were fighting an un-
seen enemy in a unhealthful climate that many found maddeningly
oppressive. And it is the very essence of guerrilla war that occupa-
tion troops often find it nearly impossible to distinguish friend or
neutral from enemy; when soldiers and civilians are racially alien to
one another, the situation becomes even more explosive. Thus the
stage was lavishly set for a volcanic eruption of abuses and crimes.
During the first year of the conflict, the Americans usually re-
leased prisoners once they had been disarmed. As a rule they did
not punish villagers even when there was evidence that they had
cooperated with the insurgents. The Americans offered the Filipi-
nos many inducements to support American rule but exacted few
real penalties for opposing it. All this was in accordance with the
aim of eventual reconciliation. After the middle of 1900, however,
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ideas began to change. Many Americans had come to believe that
the policy of benevolence toward the guerrillas and their sympa-
thizers had produced a situation in which the population feared the
rebels much more than they feared the Americans.19 The opinion
was widespread that even those Filipinos who were well disposed
toward the Americans viewed the policy of restraint as proof of an
essential lack of seriousness. Reprisals, by demonstrating the pro-
hibitive costs of further resistance, would shorten the war and save
lives, both American and Filipino. Hence a new attitude appeared
among the Americans: benevolence to those who were peaceable
but severity to those who persisted in obviously useless violence.
Believing that time was clearly on the side of the Americans,
General MacArthur resisted pressures from below for a harsher
policy. There had previously been instances of misbehavior by Ameri-
can soldiers in certain areas, even the looting of some churches; Gen-
eral Otis and his subcommanders sought to punish those who
committed such acts. Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell actually forbade his
troops to enter civilian houses, and he insisted that all supplies,
whatever their source or quantity, be paid for. Nevertheless, by the
summer of 1900, some American units were burning down any bar-
rio within whose precincts an ambush or an act of terror or sabotage
had occurred. The "water cure," getting information from a cap-
tured guerrilla by forcing him to drink water through a tube until
he gave in, was becoming a common practice.20 There is no doubt
that during the year 1900 abuses by American forces increased; rebel
propaganda efforts were unsparing in their depiction of the Ameri-
cans as steeped in atrocities, and some of this propaganda reached
the United States.
Evidence exists of an inverse relationship between breaches com-
mitted by American troops and the length of time those troops had
spent in a given area. Gen. Frederick Funston, the captor (later) of
Aguinaldo, believed it was essential to maintain troops at the com-
pany level in the same place for a long time, in order to learn both
the terrain and the people. In the key province of Batangas, in south-
ern Luzon, American troops were mainly volunteers, many of them
only in their teens and most of the rest in their twenties; they were
white, single, and had little formal education and often less than six
weeks of military training. This was a perfect setup for real trouble;
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nevertheless, soldiers in the town garrisons were involved in many
fewer incidents with civilians or prisoners than soldiers on field
duty.21
Many insurgents also committed crimes. During 1899 numer-
ous peasants leveled accusations of robbery, rape, and murder against
the forces of Aguinaldo. Sometimes these incidents reflected the eth-
nic divisions of the islands, a predictable situation since Aguinaldo
and most other leaders of the rebellion were Tagalogs from central
Luzon. Sometimes guerrillas struck at those who had been their
personal enemies before the war. Later in the struggle, Aguinaldo's
followers sought to impose discipline on the civilian population
through such acts as setting whole villages on fire. Occasionally this
sort of behavior was effective, but often it backfired, creating much
hostility toward the insurgents.22
As 1900 wore on, the tide was obviously turning decisively
against the insurgents; the Americans were on the move, and great
numbers of guerrillas, including officers, were defecting. Desperate
to reinstill discipline into their supporters, the guerrillas resorted
more frequently to terrorist acts; killings of the officials of Ameri-
can-established municipal governments increased, and guerrilla
units even threatened that any town that cooperated with the Ameri-
cans would be burned down and all its male inhabitants put to the
sword. American forces thereafter intensified their efforts to protect
villagers from guerrilla reprisals. Quite understandably, the local
population often turned against the guerrillas, either because they
resented guerrilla terrorism or because they did not want guerrillas
to draw American troops into their districts.23
Whatever may be the exact balance with regard to violations of
the laws of war or of humanity, it is clear that after the conflict was
over—and indeed while it was at its height—good relations between
Filipinos and Americans flourished. Even Emilio Aguinaldo, who
had lost more as a result of the conflict than perhaps anyone else, in
later years wrote many admiring words about his former American
foes. Most notably, he pronounced it a good thing that the United
States had established its rule over the Philippines, because other-
wise the islands probably would have been partitioned among sev-
eral foreign powers and thus almost certainly would never have
become united.24
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The Americans Attract Support
Many American officers in the Philippines were of the same Pro-
gressive persuasion as their relatives back home in the States: they
believed in honest government, fair taxes, free education, and pub-
lic health measures, and they believed in the power and the duty of
enlightened government to uplift those in its care. They soon showed
that they grasped the connection between the present conduct of
the army and the future reconciliation between Americans and Fili-
pinos. One American general said, "We have got to live among these
people, we have got to govern them. Government by force alone
cannot be satisfactory to Americans." General Otis, in command of
American ground forces, "for all his faults as a troop commander,
recognized that the problem facing the Americans in the Philippines
was in reality a political one."25 That is, Otis understood that his
task was not only to defeat the rebels but also to set the stage for
pacification and reconciliation.
Quite aside from waging war against the insurgents, the U.S.
Army faced a daunting task in the Manila of 1899. The city, which
with its immediate environs was home to four hundred thousand
persons, was woefully overcrowded. Schools were closed, the port
was not operating, rubbish and garbage went uncollected in the
streets, and the Aguinaldo forces had cut off the water supply. The
city was on the verge of epidemic and anarchy. The Americans be-
gan by cleaning up the filth in the streets. They then appointed mu-
nicipal health officials and offered free medical care to the many
indigent inhabitants of the capital. Launching a campaign to vacci-
nate thousands first in Manila and then in the countryside, the army
eventually reduced smallpox from a scourge to a problem. As the
American forces moved out from the capital, they distributed food,
set up municipal governments, and attacked the deplorable sani-
tary conditions. They reformed the prison system, releasing many
who had languished untried in jail for years. They built or rebuilt
schools, often with soldiers as instructors, and taught many chil-
dren; this was one of the most popular American programs among
a population hungry for education. The Americans also gave the
same care to wounded Filipino prisoners as to their own wounded.
The undeniable and growing success of this American "policy of
attraction" deeply disconcerted the insurgent leaders.
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The Presidential Election of 1900
Aguinaldo's fundamental plan was to protract the conflict until
American troops began to break down from disease and exhaustion
or until opinion in the United States turned against the war, or both.
A guerrilla pamphlet declared, "We repeat that we must not give or
accept combat with such a powerful foe if we have not the greatest
chance of success.... Let us wait for the deadly climate to decimate
his [ranks] and never forget that our object is only to protract the
state of war."26 Aguinaldo and his lieutenants concocted a strategy
against the Americans that North Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen
Giap would employ seven decades later (with immeasurably more
success).
Although the U.S. Senate passed the treaty with Spain provid-
ing for the annexation of the Philippines, agitation against the war
continued in certain American circles. U.S. soldiers in the islands
believed that the guerrilla resistance took courage from the speeches
of members of so-called anti- imperialist leagues, and also from the
correspondence between such persons and Philippine guerrilla
chiefs. Activists in the United States even sent propaganda to Ameri-
can soldiers in the islands, urging them to abandon this brutal im-
perialistic war. The announced object of the guerrilla leadership—to
tire the Americans by making their occupation of the islands as costly
as possible—was thus more than a mere pipe dream. Meanwhile
both Filipino guerrillas and American anti-imperialists looked for-
ward eagerly to the victory in the approaching presidential election
of William Jennings Bryan.27
Former "Boy Orator of the River Platte," evangelist, prohibition-
ist, future crusader against Darwinism in the famous Scopes "Mon-
key" trial, in 1900 William Jennings Bryan was indeed the Democratic
presidential standard-bearer (for the second but not the last time),
running on an "anti-imperialist" platform. The specter of a Bryan
victory seriously hobbled American efforts in the Philippines: fear-
ing that a Bryan presidency would mean an immediate pullout of
U.S. forces from the islands, many Filipinos shied away from coop-
erating with the Americans.
Even though Aguinaldo desperately needed a Bryan victory, the
Philippine insurgent later described the American politician as "near-
sighted, selfish and unstatesmanlike." Aguinaldo was well aware
116 • America and Guerrilla Warfare
that Bryan wanted the United States to annex the Philippines so that
there would be a war that he could blame on McKinley. Bryan did in
fact go to Washington and ordered Democratic senators to vote for
McKinley's annexation treaty, which he later denounced during the
campaign.28
But this Machiavellian medicine show was all in vain: Bryan
suffered a rebuff from the American electorate even more decisive
than that of 1896. The effects of his defeat reverberated across the
Pacific. Many Filipinos had wished to make peace with the Ameri-
cans but had hung back from fear of guerrilla reprisals if the Ameri-
cans abandoned the islands. The reelection of McKinley destroyed
this possibility, and large numbers of Filipinos rallied to the Ameri-
can side and to the newly formed pro-American Federal Party. The
election certainly wounded the morale of the Aguinaldo support-
ers, sustained as they had been by the mirage of a coming Bryan
triumph; the amount of money and food turned over to the guerril-
las declined sharply. Nevertheless, the massive postelection surren-
ders that American forces had been hoping for did not materialize.29
At the same time, it was becoming apparent that General Otis, a
conscientious and hardworking officer, was not cut out to fight guer-
rillas in the jungle. He relied on sweeps and other time-wasting tac-
tics. Over and over his forces would occupy a village for a time and
then withdraw, allowing the guerrillas to reenter the place. Otis him-
self was not unaware that he was making little progress, and he asked
to be relieved. In May 1900 Gen. Arthur MacArthur took over as
commander of the U.S. Army in the Philippines. Within a month
MacArthur issued a proclamation of amnesty for guerrillas. Mean-
while he developed plans for an offensive against remaining insur-
gent forces. McKinley's decisive defeat of Bryan was the signal to
go ahead. MacArthur launched the offensive in December, involv-
ing the majority of his seventy thousand troops. The Americans ini-
tiated many small-scale clashes, increased the number of towns with
permanent garrisons, and began to gather into those towns the out-
lying population in areas where guerrillas were active.
The End in Sight
After the presidential election of 1900, General MacArthur responded
to growing demands for a more vigorously punitive policy toward
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guerrilla sympathizers. Henceforth even those men who were only
part-time insurgents would receive harsh treatment when captured.
The army would no longer accept compulsion or intimidation as
excuses for acts in support of the rebels. The Americans also stopped
releasing prisoners and began instead to send captured guerrillas to
detention on Guam.
The Americans had not been idle with regard to improving their
intelligence activities against the insurgents. Between late 1900 and
early 1901, they made a serious and fairly successful effort to break
up the revolutionary organization in Manila. Then, on March 23,1901,
a week after Aguinaldo's second in command had surrendered, the
Americans achieved the greatest intelligence coup of the war: Ameri-
can army officer Frederick Funston captured Aguinaldo himself.30 A
few weeks later that guerrilla leader swore an oath of allegiance to
the United States and urged his followers to lay down their arms.
The insurgents were really becoming desperate now; during 1901
the number of whole barrios put to the torch by guerrillas greatly
increased. Predictably, many Filipinos responded to such acts by
joining in active cooperation with the Americans. By mid-1901 more
than fifty-four hundred were serving as army scouts or police (nota-
bly, almost all were non-Tagalog).
The founding of the Filipino Federal Party at the end of 1900
was another response to insurgent terrorism. The party sought to
rally their countrymen around a program of conciliation with the
Americans and eventual independence. Some supported the Fed-
eral Party because they believed that what the Philippines needed
was not independence but modernization, and a period of rule by
the United States would bring exactly that. Immediately recogniz-
ing that the Federal Party's peaceful road toward independence was
a major threat to them, the insurgents vowed to execute party mem-
bers without trial.31
It was clear that the insurgency could not last much longer.
American "propaganda of the deed" such as the schools program,
the increasing number of permanently garrisoned towns, the ag-
gressive actions by army units that gave the rebels no respite, the
growing involvement of Filipinos in peacekeeping activities (such
as the Philippine Constabulary, a mobile force of three thousand,
mainly under American officers), the efforts of the Federal Party, the
capture of Aguinaldo, all resulted in the surrender of larger and larger
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numbers of guerrillas. In March and April 1901 alone, surrenders
totaled thirteen thousand.
In the spring of 1901, Secretary of War Elihu Root became con-
vinced that the fighting was nearly finished. Wishing to establish
closer civilian control over the U.S. Army in the Philippines, and
believing he would have an easier time of it with a commander who
had not exercised the vast powers of MacArthur, Root replaced him
with Brig. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, who came to the Philippines after
seeing action against the Boxer Rebellion.
By summer of the same year, southern Luzon Island remained
the area of highest guerrilla activity. The population was quite dense,
the terrain was ideal for guerrillas, and diseases were rampant. The
people were mostly Tagalog; hence U.S. forces found few members
of minority ethnic groups to recruit as scouts and informants. The
guerrillas in the area were under the command of thirty-six-year-
old Maj. Gen. Miguel Malvar: "charismatic, a dedicated patriot, and
an able organizer, he was probably the most capable adversary the
Americans faced in the Philippine war."32 In June, however, the able
Gen. Juan Cailles surrendered to the Americans, bringing with him
about 100 officers, 500 men, 140 civilian officials, and 400 invaluable
rifles. This major haul of prisoners and weapons began the death
knell of organized rebellion on Luzon.
At the same time, U.S. casualty rates went steadily downward.33
And on the Fourth of July, William Howard Taft, future president
and future chief justice of the United States, took the oath as civil
governor of the Philippines.
As the summer of 1901 drew to a close, everything seemed to be
going in the Americans' favor. But toward the end of September, an
event occurred that seemed likely to undo much of the Americans'
success in winning over the Filipinos. Samar was a jungle-covered
island with a population of only 250,000, plus a small number of
American troops, hi the town of Balangiga, insurgents succeeded
through treachery in massacring and mutilating a company of the
U.S. Ninth Infantry. Because the guerrillas had executed this grisly
butchery at a stage in the conflict when it was obvious that their
cause could not possibly be victorious, it provoked a furious reac-
tion among American troops on Samar. To them it seemed not a jus-
tifiable act of war but plain murder. Brig. Gen. Jacob Smith, in charge
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of pacification of the island, vowed to turn the interior of Samar into
"a howling wilderness."34 Smith's punitive campaign on the island
involved many violations of the general U.S. policy of benevolence
that had seemed to be working so well after three years.
While Smith carried out his drastic campaign against the guer-
rillas on Samar, Gen. Franklin Bell captured the last insurgent strong-
hold on southern Luzon, in Batangas province. Bell then ordered
his subordinate commanders to establish security perimeters around
the numerous towns and bring all the inhabitants of the area to live
inside these perimeters. Soldiers confiscated any food found out-
side the lines. Eventually more than three hundred thousand people
were gathered inside the designated boundaries. To further isolate
the guerrillas, Bell instituted a pass system for civilians. By the spring
of 1902 Batangas was calm.
On the Fourth of July 1902 the Americans offered another am-
nesty for all remaining guerrillas except for a few accused felons. By
year's end the number of U.S. Army troops in the islands was down
to fifteen thousand. Though not happy about the American occupa-
tion, most politically concerned Filipinos appeared ready to submit
to U.S. administration and work peacefully toward independence.
An Authentic Victory over Guerrillas
Aguinaldo's followers were fighting in their home territory, on ter-
rain favorable to guerrilla tactics, under the banner of national inde-
pendence and defense of religion. This has been the classic formula
for a powerful and persisting guerrilla movement through the ages
and across the continents.
On the other side, the Americans were a truly foreign force in
every way: racially, culturally, linguistically, and religiously. They
had no familiarity with the peoples among whom they were fight-
ing or the places where the fighting occurred, no long colonial expe-
rience to guide them, and no adequate defense against many of the
maladies to which the climate of the Philippines exposed them. Far
from home, the Americans were also few in number: with the task
of pacifying a vast archipelago with 10 million inhabitants, the Ameri-
can forces totaled 20,000 early in 1899, peaked at 70,000 late in 1900,
then quickly declined to 42,000 by mid-190135 and sank to a mere
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15,000 by the end of 1902. And of course these troops completely
lacked that airpower which Americans have come to regard as the
indispensable key to victory in all circumstances. Looking back at
the Philippine struggle from the vantage point of a hundred years,
therefore, it approaches understatement to observe that the situa-
tion overflowed with possibilities for disaster.
In the end the Philippine insurrection cost the Americans more
casualties (4,200 killed, 2,800 wounded) than the war with Spain
and, when it came to dollars, several times the original price paid to
Spain for the islands.36 Even so, for the three and a half years of the
conflict, the number of American fatalities averaged only about 100
per month. The Americans won a clear-cut and relatively bloodless
victory in a short period of time and in a manner that laid the foun-
dation for a close future friendship between two peoples on oppo-
site sides of the vast Pacific.
How did they accomplish all this?
A decisive feature of the Philippine insurgency was that the guer-
rillas received no assistance from outside. Hence, they started out
poorly armed and stayed that way. At one point Aguinaldo said he
hoped for help from "perhaps Germany." Maybe he thought the
Germans would help him for nothing, or that the Philippines would
be better off under Wilhelm II. More importantly, members of the
Japanese army officer corps wished to assist Aguinaldo: "Asia for
the Asians!" Some Japanese officers did manage to get to Luzon to
offer their services, and there was at least one unsuccessful attempt
to send the insurgents a shipload of weapons and ammunition from
Japan.37 But the Imperial Foreign Ministry was opposed to such po-
tentially explosive actions and was able to enforce its will, more or
less. Moreover, any serious outside intervention would have to con-
front the U.S. Navy. As it turned out, not a single foreign state granted
recognition to Aguinaldo's self-proclaimed government.
This isolation of the battlefield was clearly very important; it
helped set certain limits to the entire scope of the war. But other
elements played their powerful roles as well. Above all, the Ameri-
can victory in the Philippines illuminates with perfect clarity the
decisive influence of political factors on the outcome of this type of
struggle. Consider first that, as the leader of resistance to a foreign
occupation, Aguinaldo had in his favor—at least in theory—the
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mighty weapon of nationalism, of hatred for the alien invader. But
he was never able to wield this weapon effectively. A broad Philip-
pine national consciousness did not exist. Most of the inhabitants of
the islands were simple peasants who concerned themselves with
family, village, and church, not with political abstractions. Besides
that, there were many ethnic tensions and rivalries within Filipino
society, which the insurgency aggravated rather than suppressed,
and which the Americans were quick to perceive and exploit.
The support of the landowning notables could have been invalu-
able to Aguinaldo, because they exerted great influence over their
numerous tenants and servants. But Aguinaldo's social conserva-
tism did not win him the reliable support of these traditional elites.
Most of them seem to have grasped very early that Aguinaldo could
not defeat the Americans; consequently, they feared that if they
openly supported Aguinaldo, the Americans might confiscate their
property or hand the running of the country over to some other group
lower down on the social scale. Such fears had solid foundation.
The U.S. Army arrested notables who supported Aguinaldo and
seized their estates; in some areas Filipinos friendly to the Ameri-
cans were permitted to harvest the crops of known supporters of
the insurgency. Thus, the upper classes, with whatever reluctance,
turned away from Aguinaldo.
Aguinaldo might then have looked for help in the opposite di-
rection, seeking to arouse the peasantry by waving the banner of
social revolution. But he was much too conservative to unleash such
an appeal, with all its consequences, foreseeable and otherwise.
Aguinaldo's insurgency never was and never could have been a
Maoist "people's war." But if—or rather, since—the victory of a guer-
rilla movement friendly to the upper classes offered little promise
of improvement in the lives of ordinary peasants, why should they
endanger themselves for the cause? And almost as if they wished to
make all these facts perfectly clear to the peasantry, the guerrillas
practiced impressment, taking young men by compulsion into their
ranks, unless their parents or an employer were willing and able to
secure their release for a substantial cash payment.38
Instead of social revolution, Aguinaldo offered the Filipinos po-
litical aims that were cloudy at best. At one point during the con-
flict, he declared that he wanted the Philippines to be a U.S.
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protectorate while developing into a free republic—but that was
exactly what the U.S. government had promised. He wrote that he
and his followers "neither hoped for victory over the Americans
nor hated them. But we wanted to gain their respect," and "it was
our hope that, if we should perish . . . we would at least earn the
respect... of the Americans."39 Reviewing these pronouncements,
Aguinaldo later wrote, "I must admit that there was some ambigu-
ity and perhaps even inconsistency in our position." Years later,
Aguinaldo ran for the presidency of the Philippine Commonwealth
against Manuel Quezon. He was badly beaten.
Aguinaldo and his followers faced daunting obstacles in their
efforts to rally the inhabitants of the Philippines around them. And
in the light of the actual historical record, it would be all too easy to
assume that American victory was demanded, so to speak, by the
circumstances, all too easy to forget that the American forces might
have done Aguinaldo's job for him: that is, they might have con-
ducted themselves in such a manner as to provoke a furious na-
tional resistance, forcing the Filipinos to overcome their ethnic and
social divisions, at least for the time being, and unite against the
foreigner. But in fact the Americans behaved, for the most part, in
ways that did not arouse the rage or desperation of the Filipinos
and make recruits for Aguinaldo.
Winning the Peace
Foreign conquerors though they surely were, the Americans were
not easy to hate. Aguinaldo had warned his countrymen that the
Americans had come to enslave the Filipinos and abolish Catholi-
cism. That kind of propaganda backfired badly. It soon became clear
that the Americans had not come to uproot religion and trample the
defenseless. At the rninimum, with their schools and sanitation pro-
grams and free inoculations, the Americans were undeniably a tre-
mendous improvement over the Spanish. Revolutionaries often
promise, and sometimes provide, literacy and health care to the lower
classes; in the Philippines the Americans did both. In a real sense
they were the revolutionaries, not Aguinaldo.
And even on the issue of Philippine independence, what the
Americans and the insurgents disputed was not the right to inde-
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pendence but merely the timing of it. If one's understanding of the
term colony derives from Vietnam or Algeria under the French, or
Ireland or India under the British, then the Americans never intended
the Philippines to be a colony. From almost the earliest days of Ameri-
can rule, plans were set in motion for self-government, resulting in
an elected legislature in 1907, the very first in Southeast Asia. In
1934, hardly three decades after the Americans had taken control of
the islands, the U.S. Congress established that Philippine indepen-
dence should occur one decade later. And having early made clear
their commitment to self-government, the Americans did not debar
former guerrillas from participation in public life; this decision not
to look closely into the wartime activities of former insurgents helped
greatly in the general reconciliation after 1902.40 Some ex-revolution-
ary leaders actually received posts in the American civil govern-
ment after their surrender, and the first president of the Philippine
Commonwealth was the former insurgent Maj. Manuel Quezon.
The unmistakable steps taken by the Americans to improve the
lives and prepare for the independence of the Filipinos found their
all-important counterpoint in the American style of fighting the guer-
rillas. There were no screaming jets accidentally bombing helpless
villages, no B-52s, no napalm, no routine artillery barrages, no "col-
lateral damage." Instead, the Americans conducted a decentralized
war of small mobile units armed mainly with rifles and aided by na-
tive Filipinos, hunting guerrillas who were increasingly isolated both
by the indifference or hostility of much of the population and by the
concentration of scattered peasant groups into larger settlements.
Ethnic tensions within the archipelago, along with the social
conservatism of the insurgents and their uninspiring political aims,
severely limited their domestic support, and they could find no sus-
tenance from overseas. These grave weaknesses had their effects
multiplied by the American policy of rectitude and reconciliation.
For most Filipinos, the Americans were, at the very minimum, not
irritating enough to justify fighting them.
Out of his long experience in dealing with guerrillas, the noted
French colonial commander Louis Lyautey developed a general strat-
egy of counterinsurgency that emphasized limiting damage to the
civilian economy and winning over the local population through
minimal force and good administration. The key concept of this strat-
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egy was to hold territory rather than to kill guerrillas. In their con-
flict with the Philippine insurgency, the Americans came to many of
the same conclusions as Lyautey about how to fight guerrillas; con-
sequently, "after 1900 the American stress on the isolation of the
guerrilla and the protection of townspeople from terrorism and in-
timidation was an important element in the success of pacification
operations."41
Perhaps the major lesson of the Philippine war is that a com-
plete and lasting American victory derived from the combination of
increasingly effective counterguerrilla tactics with an intelligent pro-
gram of improving society and reconciling opponents. One element
without the other would surely not have worked as well, and might
not have worked at all.42
The Moro War
In addition to the followers of Aguinaldo, U.S. forces in the Philip-
pines had other opponents to contend with. These were the Moros,
concentrated on Mindanao and a few other islands. The conflict with
the Moros was distinct from the struggle against Aguinaldo in a
number of ways. The areas where most of the Moros lived were far
from the centers of Aguinaldo's main support. Although racially
indistinguishable from other Filipinos, the Moros' adherence to Is-
lam had long before consolidated them into a separate element, hos-
tile to the Christian Filipino majority in general and to Aguinaldo's
movement in particular. Mainly for the latter reason, the American
authorities did not turn their attention to affairs in the Moro territo-
ries until Aguinaldo's followers had ceased their resistance. Yet, when
fighting broke out between American forces and the Moros, it con-
tinued for almost a decade.
The Moros were "a society based on war." Indeed, war, slave-
holding, and piracy shaped Moro society as much as Islam did. As
late as 1908, after a decade of U.S. occupation, the straits of Basilan
were known to be full of pirates. And even in 1936 (if not later),
women could still be openly bought and sold in Mindanao and
Sulu.43
For centuries the Moros fought outsiders: the Spanish, the Chris-
tian Filipinos, the Americans, the Japanese, the Philippine republic.
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In contrast to the dispersed organization elsewhere in the pre-Span-
ish Philippines, the Moros had imported an Islamic state system;
this, along with their religion, was the basis of their resistance to
Spain. The first Muslim missionaries arrived in the southern islands
around 1380, and the first sultan of Sulu established his capital at
Jolo in 1450. Spanish forces had arrived in the Philippines shortly
after their last great victory over the forces of Iberian Islam, at
Granada, at the very time when Islamic missionaries were making
great strides in the archipelago. "Spanish expansion overseas re-
tained many of the characteristics of the centuries long reconquista
of Spain from the Moors,"44 and the Philippines provided the set-
ting for the last major encounter between the Reconquista and Is-
lam. The Spanish called the Muslims of the Philippines Moros
("moors"), after the Saracens who invaded Spain from northern Af-
rica in the eighth century.
The Spanish found perhaps 250,000 Moros on Mindanao. Under
their sultans, and in the name of the true religion, the Moros re-
sisted Spanish incursions with ferocity and success. They raided and
destroyed Christian Filipino settlements adjacent to Mindanao; over
the decades they took uncounted thousands of Christian Filipinos
as their slaves. Moro hostility and depredations kindled and strength-
ened the loyalty of the non-Islamic Filipino majority to Spain; for
centuries, the Spanish army recruited Christian Filipino troops, es-
pecially from Pampanga.45 The conflict with the Moros never expe-
rienced a decisive moment, in large part because the numerically
inadequate Spanish forces on Mindanao usually waged war in de-
fensive style, from inside small forts, in which the garrisons were
often decimated by malaria and malnutrition. Even as late as the
outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the authority of Spain over
much of the Moro territories remained purely nominal.
In the summer of 1898 the Moro population approximated four
hundred thousand, spread over Mindanao, Sula, Basilan, and
Palawan. The island of Mindanao itself, thirty-six thousand square
miles, is the size of Portugal or Indiana. The Moro leaders challenged
the right of the United States to receive title to the Philippines from
Spain; in their eyes the extinction of Spanish rule meant the inde-
pendence of the islands, or at least of the Moros. Nevertheless, on
August 20, 1899, Gen. John C. Bates signed an agreement with the
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sultan of Sulu, whereby the latter acknowledged U.S. sovereignty,
in return for an American subsidy and guarantees of the sultan's
religious primacy and trade rights. The so-called Bates Agreement
recognized the sultan of Sulu as the religious, not the political, leader
of the Moros.46
Almost unanimously, the Moro leaders on Mindanao hated the
Filipino nationalist movement. They offered their cooperation to
American forces in eliminating armed bands of Aguinaldo's follow-
ers. As late as 1902 and 1903, relations between the Moros and U.S.
troops were mostly friendly; American officers made several visits to
and explorations of Moro country either alone or with small escorts.47
Things began to change dramatically with the arrival of Maj.
Gen. Leonard Wood, newly appointed governor of the vast Moro
Province (Mindanao plus Basilan, Palawan, and the Sulu Archi-
pelago). Wood established himself in his provincial capital of
Zamboanga in August 1903. He was dismayed at conditions in Moro
society, where slavery, polygamy, and tribal warfare were openly
practiced and where murders were punished with a trifling mon-
etary fine. Despite the implicit promises in the Bates Agreement,
Wood refused to recognize slavery in his province, and the Moros
would not accept any interference with that practice. Consequently,
during the thirty-two months Wood served as governor, American
troops and Moro warriors fought many engagements against each
other; usually it was guerrilla combat, but sometimes pitched battles
involving hundreds of Moros. The Americans benefited from the as-
sistance of the Muslim Provincial Constabulary; established by Wood
in September 1903, its membership rendered valuable services.48
As they searched for Moro rebels on Mindanao, American de-
tachments made nightly camps, in the fashion of Roman legions on
campaign. The camps usually measured forty by twenty yards; be-
fore nightfall, the soldiers would clear the surrounding underbrush
for fifty yards around and pile up the brush around the perimeter of
the camp as a protective screen. During these months the U.S. Army
replaced the .38 caliber pistol with the .45, because the former weapon
could not stop the juramentados, individual warriors who were sworn
to give their lives in exchange for the lives of Christians (which all
Americans were in Moro eyes). Often one or two enraged
juramentados would attack a small party of American soldiers and
trade lives.
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General Wood thought that the Moros, although undeniably
brave, were no real threat to American control of the islands. When
confronted by U.S. regulars, a common tactic of the Moros was to
withdraw into their fortified houses, where they were completely
vulnerable to artillery.49 This method of warfare necessarily involved
the death of women and children because when locked up inside
their fortress-houses, the Moros refused to surrender; furthermore,
the women often fought beside their men.
The Americans finally defeated the Moros, but they were able to
maintain fairly good relations with their former enemies because they
acted as a barrier between the Muslims and the encroaching Chris-
tian majority. A notable advantage the Americans had in dealing with
the Moros that the former Spanish overlords had lacked was the sin-
cere promise of religious freedom. During the fighting, the young John
J. Pershing worked hard to win Moro friendship by stressing that the
Americans would not try to impose Christianity on them.50
Afterward
The Moros preferred being ruled by Americans to being ruled by
Christian Filipinos. Nevertheless, most Moros refused to learn En-
glish and shunned American public schools as being "Christian."
Hence the Moros remained isolated and backward, while civil ser-
vice positions necessarily went to educated Christian Filipinos from
outside of Mindanao.
After the establishment of the Philippine Republic in 1946, out-
breaks of Moro resistance occurred sporadically. A serious rebellion
broke out in 1971, under the general leadership of the Moro Na-
tional Liberation Front (MNLF), which aimed ultimately to estab-
lish an independent Muslim state on Mindanao. To counter Moro
charges that his government was committing genocide against the
Muslim population, Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos allowed
teams of Islamic ambassadors, foreign ministers, and other high dig-
nitaries to tour Mindanao in 1973 and 1974. Their reports consis-
tently discounted charges of religious persecution, attributing the
conflict between the Moros and the Manila government to socioeco-
nomic and leadership problems, not to religion per se. Accordingly,
the 1974 Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Kuala Lumpur
refused to admit the MNLF even as observers.51 Potentially sympa-
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thetic Arab countries such as Libya were far away, and furthermore
the Manila government often earned the gratitude of the Arab bloc
by supporting it on international questions.
Cut off from any prospect of obtaining serious aid from Middle
Eastern states, the rebellion also suffered from grave divisions within
Moro society. Some prominent leaders of the MNLF espoused Marx-
ist doctrines, thus alienating the more traditional sectors of the Moro
population. But even if they were unanimous in their views and
actions, the Moros would still constitute only a small minority, less
than one-third, of the population of Mindanao, which much of the
world assumes to be the stronghold of Philippine Islam.
Yet the principal obstacle confronting armed Moro rebellion
against Manila is not isolation from outside help nor numerical in-
feriority nor internal divisions. Beyond all these weaknesses, devas-
tating as they are, any Moro independence movement contains
within itself a fundamental strategic weakness that is permanent
and fatal. Whatever its institutional origins or political coloration,
no Philippine government can possibly countenance partition of the
country—especially a partition that would abandon millions of non-
Muslim Filipinos to a Moro regime. Therefore the MNLF cannot
achieve its aims by relying on a war of exhaustion (a strategy that
always has double effects anyway): the government will not, be-
cause it cannot, grow tired of a war to preserve the territorial integ-
rity of the country. To win independence, therefore, the Moros would
have to carry the war directly and successfully into the heavily popu-
lated areas of Luzon. But for the MNLF to wage effective guerrilla
war outside of predominantly Muslim areas is impossible.52 By its
very self-definition, a Moro insurgency can seek support only among
a well-defined constituency which is concentrated far from the seat
of national power in a limited geographical area, and even in that
area it is a minority of the population. The Moros cannot win. Nev-
ertheless, bloody attacks on local authorities, kidnappings of for-
eigners, and murders of Catholic church workers by Moro guerrillas
continued through the 1990s.
A final note: those Japanese military and naval officers who
wished in 1899 to go to the Philippines and fight the Americans saw
their desires frustrated, but not permanently. By occupying the Phil-
ippines, the Americans had placed themselves athwart the high road
The Philippine War • 129
to the Imperial vision of a Japan- dominated Southeast Asia. Four
decades later, this awkward juxtaposition would lead to Pearl Har-
bor, the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, and the islands' even-
tual liberation (by another General Mac Arthur). Three years of
Japanese rule sharpened the insights of many Filipinos into the es-
sential nature of American administration.
Central America, 1929.
Nicaragua
A Training Ground
To many observers, the republics of Central America might seem to
constitute a fairly homogeneous entity. Their people speak a com-
mon language and profess a common religion. They all experienced
centuries of Spanish administration, and they began their careers as
independent states at the same time. Together they form a relatively
compact isthmus of 188,000 square miles, somewhat bigger than the
state of California.
Nevertheless, the appearance of Central American homogene-
ity can be deceptive. After winning independence from Spain and
deciding not to throw in their lot with Mexico, the original five Cen-
tral American republics—Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nica-
ragua, and Costa Rica (Panama remained a province of Colombia
until 1903)—attempted to form a federation. That experiment in
union lasted from 1825 to 1838. It broke apart amid discord and vio-
lence for several reasons, including disparity in the size of the con-
stituent republics' populations, diversity in their racial composition,
incompatibility among their economies, controversy within the
Catholic Church regarding the desirability of union, hostility between
the various Conservative and Liberal parties as well as between ri-
val political personalities, and the reluctance of the Costa Ricans to
link their future to societies they looked upon as less stable and less
civilized.1 After the collapse of federation, several efforts followed
to restore it by force; all were unsuccessful and served only to in-
crease suspicions and hostilities in the Central American region.
In the particular case of Nicaragua, its achievement of indepen-
dence from Spain removed such restraints as had previously existed
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on domestic violence and external intervention. For the first hun-
dred years of statehood, Nicaragua was the scene of endemic civil
conflict, usually in the form of warfare between the Liberal and the
Conservative Parties, which was often a cover for rivalry between
the leading cities of Leon and Managua. Nicaraguan society was so
invertebrate and its government so weak that in 1855 a North Ameri-
can adventurer named William Walker could land in the country in
command of a force of fifty-seven men and, in alliance with some
prominent leaders of the Liberal Party, make himself president and
remain in office until his regime collapsed in 1857.2
The United States and Nicaragua
In 1912 Nicaraguan president Adolfo Diaz, faced with yet another
of his country's innumerable rebellions, asked the United States to
help restore order. In the summer two thousand U.S. sailors and
Marines landed in Nicaragua. They established a semblance of peace
at the cost of thirty-seven Marine casualties. The Marines were to
remain in Nicaragua most of the time until 1925, although after 1912
the American presence usually consisted of no more than a one-hun-
dred-man detachment guarding the U.S. legation in Managua. This
was indeed a minuscule force to "occupy" a country whose popula-
tion approached seven hundred thousand, in an area of almost forty-
six thousand square miles, the size of Pennsylvania. The purpose of
this Marine legation guard was to serve as a warning that renewed
revolution or civil war could prompt another American interven-
tion; nevertheless, a few weeks after the withdrawal of the main
body of Marines in 1912, widespread civil violence again wracked
Nicaragua. In 1923 the U.S. Department of State announced that the
legation guard in Managua would be removed following the 1924
elections, which the Liberal Party had implored the Americans to
supervise. Thus the United States innocently and ominously ad-
vanced more deeply into "the arcane and unpredictable world of
isthmian politics." hi 1924 the Liberals emerged victorious in "the
most nearly honest elections in the history of the country." In
Washington's view, the few-score Marine presence should now be
brought home; "peaceful habits seemed so well established that in
1925 [President] Coolidge deemed it safe to remove this symbol of
American power."3 The last Marines left Nicaragua that summer.
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The following year, Conservative Party leader Emiliano Cha-
morro seized the government and the Liberals revolted. Another
Nicaraguan-style civil war—violence between powerful families
assisted by client systems dignified by the name of parties—
blazed across the country. The Mexican government sent weap-
ons and volunteers to help the Liberals. And U.S. Marines again
landed in the tormented country to protect the lives and prop-
erty of Americans and other foreigners, since nobody in Nicara-
gua could guarantee their safety. The problem facing the U.S.
government was stark and simple: if the Americans refused to
maintain order and supervise elections, the incumbents would rig
the balloting and the losers would take up arms; the resulting civil
war could well spill over into neighboring countries, including stra-
tegic Panama. President Coolidge placed the Nicaraguan nettle in
the hands of Henry L. Stimson, who was "determined that the
United States see to it that the election of 1928 be completely free."4
Under American supervision, the elections produced another easy
Liberal victory.
Why, beginning with the administration of President Taft and
continuing through the administrations of Presidents Wilson,
Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, were U.S. troops—however few in
number—stationed in Nicaragua? The least important reason was
to protect American investments there, which were very small. Of
more importance was a (naive) belief that a period of American oc-
cupation would help stabilize Nicaraguan political life. The deci-
sive reasons, however, were two. First, the United States wished to
provide security for the Panama Canal Zone; violence within Nica-
ragua or any other Central American state had a tendency to spill
across borders. In addition, strife in Nicaragua might invite Euro-
pean or Mexican intervention. Second, the Americans were deter-
mined to prevent the construction of any future interoceanic canal
in Nicaragua from falling to a German or a Japanese firm. The Bryan-
Chamorro Treaty, signed in August 1914 and proclaimed in June
1916, granted the United States the perpetual and exclusive right to
construct an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua, along with the right to
build a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, in return for the payment
of $3 million. Washington further sought to increase stability within
Central America by convincing the Mexican government to join in
guaranteeing the neutrality of Honduras.5
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The Guardia
In spite of these plausible justifications, any U.S. military presence
in Nicaragua provoked much adverse criticism at home. Thus, the
Coolidge administration faced a real problem in January 1925 when
newly inaugurated Nicaraguan president Carlos Solorzano asked
the State Department to keep U.S. troops in his country. Washington
found an apparent solution by undertaking to train a group of Nica-
raguans and form them into a nonpartisan, professional constabu-
lary that would maintain the peace in Nicaragua and perhaps serve
as a model for other countries in the Caribbean area.
The State Department submitted to the Nicaraguan government
a plan (which was accepted) for a force of 410 men, with retired U.S.
Army major Calvin Carter, who had helped train soldiers in the
Philippines, as commander. All recruits were to be volunteers. They
would wear uniforms and receive regular pay, training, and disci-
pline. Most of all, they were to be above politics, loyal not to this or
that regional caudillo but to the nation. But no party or faction in
Nicaragua, then or thereafter, ever really accepted the nonpartisan
nature and purpose of the constabulary, and that is the essential rea-
son why things went fundamentally wrong. Indeed, by 1926 the U.S.
minister in Managua reported that the new constabulary, the Guardia
Nacional, was disintegrating into a partisan force in the service of
Conservative president Emiliano Chamorro. The Guardia was there-
upon disbanded. Nevertheless, pressure to develop a reliable force
continued both in Nicaragua and in Washington, and fresh recruit-
ing for a new Guardia began in May 1927 under the supervision of
Marine colonel Robert Rhea.6
The U.S. government assumed the responsibility for building
up a new Guardia Nacional for two main reasons. First, it wished—
against all local tradition—"to transform Nicaragua's armed forces
into a nonpolitical force, dedicated to defending constitutional or-
der and guaranteeing free elections."7 Second, it wanted a body of
men capable of restoring order in the northern countryside by de-
feating the Liberal Party insurgent leader Augusto Sandino (of
whom, more is to come).
The Americans soon found it necessary to send several specially
trained medical personnel to help with the Guardia. Syphilis and
malaria were rampant in the country. Recruits often suffered simul-
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taneously from several venereal diseases, whose symptoms they sto-
ically accepted as an unavoidable part of life. Neither lectures nor
U.S. Marine Corps prophylactics were able to accomplish great
changes in this department. The Marines were far more successful
in their national campaign against smallpox and typhoid.8
Originally all recruits for the Guardia had to be at least eighteen
years old and literate. This second requirement had to be dropped
in order to obtain enough men to maintain order in the 1928 presi-
dential election. (U.S. supervision of that election took place at the
request of the opposition Liberal Party, several elements of which
had openly rebelled against the Conservative regime of Emiliano
Chamorro.)
In the early years of the Guardia Nacional, almost all the officers
were U.S. Marines. The author of the major study of the Guardia
(and a relentless critic of U.S. policy in Nicaragua) wrote, "The ma-
rines did surprisingly well, transforming their raw recruits within a
few months into the best trained, disciplined and equipped force in
Nicaraguan history."9 Life in the Guardia was no bed of roses for the
enlisted men, but the regular pay, uniforms, food, and medical treat-
ment, together with the respect for Nicaraguan fighting qualities
that many Marine officers developed, made conditions highly ac-
ceptable for most recruits.
In the late 1920s the Guardia under its Marine officers found it
necessary to take over many police duties, especially in the city of
Managua. They acted with great efficiency in making arrests and in
collecting fines. Undoubtedly, the Managua municipal treasury ben-
efited from their actions, and street crime was kept to a minimum,
but the Guardia's efficiency probably did not endear it to every ele-
ment of the population.
By the time the 1928 elections rolled around, Guardia strength
was at eighteen hundred officers and soldiers; most of the Ameri-
can officers in the Guardia were Marine noncommissioned officers.
Guardia supervision of the presidential election of 1928 seems to
have been nearly impeccable. To prevent multiple voting, the fin-
gers of voters were dipped in Mercurochrome; the followers of
Sandino (who, in contrast to most of the other Liberals, did not ac-
cept U.S. supervision of the election) told the people that the
Mercurochrome was poison. Ninety percent of the eligible voters
went to the polls anyway, and Liberal candidate Gen. Jose Maria
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Moncada won a clear victory. Even the Conservatives acknowledged
that they had been defeated fairly. For the first time in Nicaraguan
history, the ruling party had lost an election. At the insistence of the
Conservative Party, the United States oversaw the elections of 1930
and 1932 as well. The fairness of the Marine supervision of each of
these elections receives important confirmation from the fact that
they were all won by the Liberal Party, traditionally the anti-U.S.
and pro-Mexican faction in Nicaragua. In spite of all this, the revolt
of Sandino and his band continued.10 Following the 1928 elections,
the Marines reduced their activities in the northern provinces, where
Sandino was active, and returned to mainly garrison duties in the
large towns, although skirmishes between Marine-led Guardia pa-
trols and Sandino bands occurred through 1932.
Despite their good work against disease and election disorders,
the mere presence of Americans in Nicaragua was being denounced
throughout Latin America and in the United States as well. In the
Senate the attack on American involvement was led by the country's
leading isolationist, William E. Borah of Idaho. Another isolationist,
Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, advised his fellow senators that if
the Marines were going to be used to fight bandits, they should be
sent not to Managua but to Chicago. Increasing pressure on the
United States for the Marines to withdraw would eventually force
the Guardia into combat on its own before it was ready; the Marines
simply had not had time to train enough officer replacements. Thus,
the door was left wide open for the politicization of the Guardia
once the Marines left. This outcome was made almost inevitable by
the quixotic crusade of the renegade Liberal politico and warlord
Augusto Sandino.
Sandino
Born in 1895, Augusto Sandino was the son of a local landowner
and an Indian woman. As a young man he had had to flee the coun-
try after wounding someone in a brawl. He went to Mexico, and
while there became a member of the fiercely anti-Catholic Freema-
sons. He affected the middle name of Cesar. Sandino's father was a
member of the Liberal Party, and so young Augusto decided to be a
Liberal as well. Returning to Nicaragua in 1926 and joining the re-
bellion of the Liberals against President Chamorro, Sandino soon
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achieved a position of leadership and assumed the rank of general
in the Liberal army under General Moncada in 1927.
By the Peace of Tipitapa, arranged by Henry Stimson and signed
in May 1927, the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative Parties agreed
to stop the fighting. Fully thirteen Liberal generals signed the agree-
ment, but not Sandino. He apparently wanted U.S. supervision of the
1928 elections but did not like the arrangements under which it was
to be carried out. According to some sources, Sandino declared him-
self ready to lay down his arms if the United States agreed to estab-
lish a military government that would ensure free elections.11
Within two months of the Peace of Tipitapa, the Marine pres-
ence had been reduced from 3,300 men to 1,500. Then, on July 16,
1927, Sandino sent his followers to attack the Guardia Nacional post
and Marine barracks at Ocotal. The town was infiltrated by six hun-
dred of Sandino's men at dawn. The thirty-nine Marines and forty-
seven Guardia members succeeded in repulsing the onslaught after
hard fighting, hi what may have been the first dive-bombing action
in history, five Marine aircraft strafed and bombed the Sandino forces.
When the besieged Marines and National Guards sortied from their
barracks, the attackers withdrew. The defenders had suffered one
dead and five wounded.12
After his defeat at Ocotal, Sandino realized that the only way he
and his followers could keep fighting was to take the path of guer-
rilla war. So began the five-year conflict that was to shape so much
of Nicaraguan politics for the next six decades.
There is merit in the idea that "Sandino was one of the precur-
sors of modern revolutionary guerrilla warfare—the process used
to seize political control of an entire country by guerrilla action, with-
out resort to conventional military operations except perhaps in the
final stage of the struggle when the guerrilla army has acquired many
of the characteristics of a regular army." This approach to power is
certainly not that of Marx or Lenin; neither is it that of Mao or Giap.
hi any event, although Augusto Sandino can perhaps be classified
(with generosity) as a nationalist, he was certainly no Communist.
On the contrary, he boasted of how he frustrated the efforts of
Farabundo Marti to take over his movement "for the Comintern."
He stated, "There is no need for the class struggle in Nicaragua be-
cause here the worker lives well; he struggles only against the Ameri-
can intervention."13
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And the struggle went on. Beginning in December 1927, two
hundred Marines and National Guards found and attacked Sandino's
headquarters at El Chipote and pursued its occupants, but most of
the Sandino forces escaped. Between the attack on Ocotal and the
spring of 1929, Guardia patrols made at least thirteen contacts with
Sandino bands, mixed Marine-Guardia patrols thirty-two contacts,
and solely Marine patrols another fifty-nine, more than one hun-
dred encounters in all. During that two-year period the Marines
suffered seventy casualties.14
Sandino had gone to Mexico by way of Honduras in 1929. Re-
turning the following year, he divided his army into eight columns
of seventy-five to one hundred men. In response, the Marines trained
an elite Guardia battalion whose elements would carry out extended
patrols and persistent hunts for the guerrillas; such tactics fright-
ened Sandino, but they were not enough to overcome guerrilla ad-
vantages and Marine handicaps. Sandino's men, with rifles and
machine guns, were as well armed as the Marines. They could es-
cape the Marines in the northern wilds, where the population was
friendly to them, or slip across the Honduran border.
As for the Marines and the Guardia, they lacked sufficient num-
bers to hold fixed posts and at the same time hunt the guerrillas
effectively; there was too much territory to patrol. Their food and
equipment, as well as fodder for their horses, had to be carried on
mule-back, for the countryside was too poor for foraging. True
enough, the Marines were better trained and better marksmen than
the guerrillas. They also had the advantage of aircraft, which could
provide them with close combat support, emergency supplies, and
medical evacuation. Aircraft also helped the small groups of Ma-
rines in the field to stay in contact with their headquarters. But air-
craft over a given area also alerted the guerrillas to the possible
presence of Marines. Moreover, the Sandino soldiers learned how to
negate Marine air support at least to a substantial degree, by re-
stricting daylight movements, refraining from firing at airplanes,
and camouflaging their camps.
Sandino also benefited from his international connections. Some
of Sandino's followers said that the Mexican government was con-
sidering a treaty with Sandino for the building of an interoceanic
canal in which the Imperial Japanese Government would have the
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major share; Mexican officers would take over the training of a new
Nicaraguan army.15
Casualties during the conflict were not numerous, but encoun-
ters between the two sides were often grisly. The Sandino bands not
only executed prisoners but did it in notably cruel ways, with the
approval of their leader. The official seal of the Sandino forces pic-
tured a guerrilla with a machete beheading a prostrate Marine.16
On June 18,1930, Sandino led four hundred men in an attack on
Jinotega; this was the "most formidable guerrilla force assembled in
Nicaragua up to that time." On the last day of the year, guerrillas
ambushed a party of ten Marines repairing telephone lines and killed
all but two of them, an event that caused a sensation in Congress.
And perhaps a new plateau in the conflict was reached in April 1931,
when Sandino forces seized the headquarters of the Bragman's Bluff
Lumber Company, "massacring the American and British [civilian]
employees and sacking the company town."17
By the end of 1930, the Guardia numbered 160 officers and 1,650
men. Because of the Sandino revolt, the Guardia had become larger
and more militarized than was originally planned.18 At the same time,
domestic pressure inside the United States to withdraw the Marines
meant that the Guardia did not receive sufficient training and indoc-
trination to ensure that it would remain truly neutral politically.
As 1932 dawned, leaders of both Nicaraguan parties had ex-
pressed their desire that U.S. Marines remain in the country. In al-
most everyone's eyes, "the marines . . .  symbolized order in a
disorderly society." Nevertheless, President Hoover was eager to
wind up the Nicaraguan involvement. Congressional criticism of
the intervention was growing ever more strident; Hoover and his
advisers were well aware that a complete and final U.S. military
victory in Nicaragua would not be possible unless several thousand
troops were sent there; and finally, Secretary of State Stimson be-
lieved (illogically, perhaps) that he could not effectively criticize the
Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria while U.S. Marines
remained in Nicaragua. Stimson accordingly announced that all
parties had agreed that the last Marines would leave after
Nicaragua's 1932 elections. (Both the Liberals and the Conservatives
had requested U.S. electoral supervision for one last time).19 Once
again, in honest elections, the Liberals won a clear victory.
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Having handed over command of the Guardia to their Nicara-
guan successors on January 1,1933, the last Marines left Nicaragua
from the port of Corinto the following day. During more than five
years, seventy-five Nicaraguan National Guards and forty-seven
Marines had lost their lives in or as a result of combat. Another eighty-
nine from both groups had died of disease, accident, or suicide. Ten
mutinies among Guardia units had resulted in the deaths of seven
Marine officers. If figures from Haiti and the Dominican Republic
are added in, the Marines had suffered a total loss of seventy-nine
officers and men killed in action or dead of wounds in the entire
Caribbean area.20
Lessons
Before, during, and after the decade of the twenties, significant ele-
ments in Nicaragua desired and requested a U.S. military presence
in their country. These elements notably included most of the lead-
ership, civilian and military, of both the Conservative and the tradi-
tionally anti-U.S. Liberal Party, the party to which Augusto Sandino
had always belonged. In his long rebellion against the American
presence in his country, Sandino received the support of only a mi-
nority of his countrymen; despite the fact that his men were well
armed, Sandino's guerrilla "revolution" was never able to deploy
even as many as one out of a thousand Nicaraguans. How, then,
could the Sandino insurgency survive? When hard pressed,
Sandino's bands were able to escape across the Honduran border,
and they also obtained valuable aid and advice from Mexican dicta-
tor Plutarco Calles and his handpicked successors. Clearly these were
major assets. But by far the principal reason Sandino was able to
stay in the field so long against his foes was not some widespread
nationalist revulsion against American imperialism but rather the
inadequate numbers of the Marines and National Guards who had
the responsibility of controlling him. In December 1929, for example,
the U.S. military presence in Nicaragua was only eighteen hundred
men, a figure derisively below the ten-to-one ratio of soldiers to
guerrillas called for in most studies of counterinsurgency.21
Nevertheless, despite their scant numbers—or perhaps because
of them—service in Nicaragua taught or retaught the U.S. Marines
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many interesting lessons about how to combat guerrillas. First and
most obvious was the absolute necessity for constant training. But
the Marines also proved to themselves that large search-and-destroy
sweeping movements were generally useless. Sustained patrolling
was much more effective against the guerrillas. Under most circum-
stances, the best tactics consisted of small independent patrols that
went out on extended hunts for guerrillas: twenty men, sacrificing
everything to speed and therefore carrying very little with them,
could cover up to thirty miles a day. "Nothing upsets a guerrilla band
more than to be chased by a compact, fast-moving patrol of soldiers
who are familiar with the people and terrain of the area of operations,
and are willing to stay in the field until decisive contact is made."22
The Marines were quick to take advantage of the Indian dislike
of ethnic Nicaraguans, especially on the part of the Miskito tribe.
They also discovered the benefits of mixed-nationality combined units,
in which Nicaraguans of the Guardia received on-the-job training from
the Marines while the latter obtained valuable instruction in the na-
ture of the countryside and its inhabitants. "American officers shared
with Nicaraguan enlisted men the hardships and dangers of life on
the trail, and more often than not formed bonds of comradeship with
the native soldiers. Together they trudged through sweltering val-
leys, endured torrential downpours, forded swirling rivers, inched
their way up precipitous mountainsides, and shivered through the
night in rain- or sweat-soaked clothing—lying in hammocks rocked
by tropical breezes that could seem as cold as an arctic blast."23
Often subjected to enemy ambushes, the Marines eventually
concluded that the most effective response in such situations was to
return a great volume of automatic-weapon fire. They also confirmed
the value of close air support: indeed, "Marine aviation came of age
in its support of ground troops in Nicaragua." Above all, perhaps,
the Marine commanders of the Guardia Nacional "learned that a
successful operation was one in which the enemy suffered casual-
ties and they had none."24
Out of their experiences in Nicaragua and other countries of the
Caribbean, the U.S. Marines distilled some principles of
counterinsurgency that appeared in their Small Wars Manual of 1940.
Examples of these principles, striking for their simplicity and in-
sight, deserve quotation here:
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The occupying force must be strong enough to hold all the strategical
points of the country, protect its communications, and at the same
time furnish an operating force sufficient to overcome the opposition
wherever it appears. . . . While curbing the passions of the people,
courtesy, friendliness, justice, and firmness should be exhibited.25
When the patrol leader demands information, the peasant should
not be misjudged for failure to comply with the request, when by
doing so, he is signing his own death warrant.26
In small wars, caution must be exercised, and instead of striving to
generate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to
gain decisive results with the least application of force and the conse-
quent minimum loss of life.27
Members of the United States forces should avoid any attitude that
tends to indicate criticism or lack of respect for the religious beliefs
and practices observed by the native inhabitants.28
In small wars, tolerance, sympathy and kindliness should be the
keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population.29
At least one further general observation needs to be made in
this context. While they were active in Nicaragua, the U.S. Marines
controlled virtually the whole armed effort against the guerrillas,
training and leading the Guardia units until enough Nicaraguan
officers became available. This state of affairs contrasts dramatically
with the situation American forces faced in South Vietnam more than
thirty years later.
Afterword
Following the 1932 presidential election victory of the Liberals, the
leaders of the two parties entered into a fateful agreement: once the
Marines were gone, officerships in the Guardia were to be divided
equally between the parties. This decision was absolutely contrary
to the aims of the American advisers, which had been to produce
not a bipartisan but a nonpartisan constabulary.30 Anastasio Somoza
Garcia, a leading Liberal, a general in the old army, and a protege of
the outgoing Liberal president, Moncada, was designated as com-
mander-in-chief of the Guardia Nacional.
As soon as the Marines had left Nicaragua, negotiations began
in earnest between the Managua government and Sandino, who
came to the capital city by plane early in February 1933. A signed
agreement provided for a cease-fire, amnesty for Sandino's men,
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and the handing over by them of a certain number of their arms. In
addition, Sandino retained the right to keep a force of one hundred
armed men in his base along the northern border, these men to be
paid by the government. Sandino publicly embraced Guardia com-
mander Somoza.31
Yet all was not well. It soon became clear that Sandino's follow-
ers were not handing over arms as had been promised in the agree-
ment; Sandino also began speaking of the Guardia Nacional as an
unconstitutional body. When the treaty was nearing its expiration
date (February 1934) General Somoza declared that the Sandino
bands must give up all their arms, after which many of them would
be incorporated, if they wished, into the Guardia as regular mem-
bers; then everybody would live in peace, presumably. Sandino ig-
nored these proposals.
The Liberal president, Juan Sacasa, invited Sandino to come again
to the capital and discuss matters. Sandino arrived there on Febru-
ary 16,1934, without incident, and remained in the city for several
days. But on February 21, members of the Guardia removed Sandino
and some of his aides from the car in which they were traveling;
they were then driven to the airfield and killed. Apparently, some
bitterly anti-Sandino officers had forced Somoza to consent to these
murders, which were publicly denounced by the U.S. ambassador.
At the same time, the Sandino camp at Wiwili was surrounded, and
the troops there were disarmed. In 1936 General Somoza ran suc-
cessfully for the presidency with Guardia backing. He thus com-
bined the presidential office with the command of the Guardia, and
the Somoza family dictatorship began. Many must have believed at
the time that the Sandino episode was over, but in fact "Sandino's
ghost. . . haunted the Somozas ever [after]."32
Reflecting on these events, Undersecretary of State Sumner
Welles commented, "Over twenty years of attempted assistance [by
the American government]... had brought benefits neither to Nica-
ragua nor to the United States."33
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Greece
Civil War into Cold War
Greece provided the stage for the first armed conflict of the Cold
War. Thus, the forty-year contest that would strain the power and
wisdom of the democracies to their limits found its first battleground
in the very birthplace of democracy.1 In fact the beginnings of the
Greek struggle antedated the coining of the term Cold War. This first
military confrontation between the Communist East and the demo-
cratic West provoked the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and
served as a major catalyst of the Containment Policy.
Greece had for long ages been too poor to support all her nu-
merous progeny but the Greek conflict was not a conflict of classes;
both sides drew supporters from all social strata. The war was above
all an ideological struggle, a symbol and a microcosm of the great
global confrontation that, from the mountains of Greece to the moun-
tains of Afghanistan, from Berlin and Budapest to Seoul and Saigon,
would overshadow the human race for forty years.2
Covered by rugged mountains, lacking a modern road network,
Greece seemed to be a perfect setting for waging guerrilla war. Nev-
ertheless, by 1949 a well-armed Communist guerrilla movement had
suffered an unequivocal defeat at the hands of the Greek govern-
ment, sustained by American and British assistance. But the simul-
taneous victory of Mao Tse-tung halfway around the globe
completely stole the attention of Washington away from these aus-
picious Hellenic events. And soon another, more dramatic conflict
was raging in Korea. So the Americans never had the chance to ab-
sorb lessons from the Greek conflict that could have saved blood,
tears, and treasure a decade and a half later in Vietnam.
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A Poor and Turbulent Land
Today Greece comprises about fifty-one thousand square miles, the
size of Virginia and Maryland combined. Much of this territory has
been Greek only since the end of the Second Balkan War in 1913. In
her great days Greece wrote a record of incomparable glory. But since
well before the Christian era and until the early nineteenth century
Greece had been merely a part of another empire: first the Roman,
then the Byzantine,3 then the Turkish. Their Turkish overlords al-
lowed the Greeks a measure of religious freedom, but otherwise their
rule was oppressive and obscurantist, and Greece sank slowly and
deeply into economic and cultural depression. Many viewed the civil
war of the 1940s as an effort to make Greece a province of yet an-
other empire, Stalin's.
The French Revolution, the sympathy of the Russian Crown for
Greek aspirations, and Russia's victories over the Turks all greatly
stimulated Greek nationalism. A guerrilla war of independence
against the Turks began in 1821. The Greeks enjoyed the moral sup-
port of all Europe; volunteers came to fight for free Greece, includ-
ing George Gordon, Lord Byron, who died there. In 1828 Russia
declared war against Turkey. The following year the Turks recog-
nized the independence of the Peloponnesus and the southern main-
land.4 Thus, when the Greek Communists began their attempt at
armed conquest, Greece had been an independent state for only a
little more than a century.
Greece's victories in the Balkan Wars of 1912 (against Turkey)
and 1913 (against Bulgaria) had more than doubled its territory. By
revealing the true weakness of Germany's protege Turkey, these
Balkan clashes helped provoke World War I. In 1917 Greece entered
that conflict on the side of the Allies under Prime Minister Eleutherios
Venizelos, after the pro-German King Constantine had been forced
to abdicate in favor of his son.5 With the end of World War I, Greece
obtained most of Thrace (including Bulgaria's southern coastline).
Claiming a substantial area in Asia Minor, the Greeks invaded the
Turkish mainland, but Turkish forces under the celebrated Kemal
Ataturk bloodily repulsed them in 1922. Greece was saddled with
the repatriation of 1.5 million Greeks from Turkish territory. Virtual
civil war followed this double catastrophe; in 1924 republican forces
exiled King George and proclaimed a republic. After many convul-
Greece • 147
sions, the monarchy returned in 1935. None of these turbulent events
strengthened the prestige of parliamentary institutions.
The Communist Party
In its early years, the Greek Communist Party (KKE) was a mar-
ginal element in the national life. It seemed to many Greeks the agent
of a foreign power; its advocacy of independence for Greek
Macedonia, so recently acquired in the Balkan Wars, further dam-
aged its electoral prospects. Following World War I and the calami-
tous defeat at the hands of the Turks in 1922, economic conditions in
the country were terrible. Nonetheless, membership in the party in
the 1920s never exceeded 2,500.6 In 1930 there were only about 1,700
Greek Communists, with fewer than 200 in Athens, the country's
only large city.
Gen. Ioannis Metaxas, a staunch monarchist and an enemy of
Venizelos, exercised dictatorial powers under King George II from
1936 to 1941. Metaxas nearly extinguished the Greek Communist
Party. He offered amnesty to party members who would publicly
testify about their subversive activities. In response to lurid revela-
tions, other members also recanted their errors. The government then
organized its "own" Communist Party; the resulting confusion and
dissension wreaked havoc in what was left of Greek Communism.7
Because Hitler and Stalin were partners in 1940, the party was about
to administer the coup de grace to itself by stupidly choosing to
collaborate with the Italian and German invaders of Greece. Hitler
saved the Communists (and not only in Greece) from that miserable
fate by attacking Stalin's Russia on June 22,1941. The German inva-
sion of Greece and the Soviet Union transformed the numerically
tiny, intellectually sterile, and morally bankrupt Greek Communist
Party into an organization capable of attempting to impose itself on
the nation by force of arms.
The National Liberation Front
Greece was an important conduit of supplies from Germany to Field
Marshal Erwin Rommel's army in North Africa. To protect these
supply routes, and because Hitler was sure that Greece, and not Italy,
would be the scene of the Allied invasion of southern Europe, the
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Germans maintained substantial forces in the country. By 1944,
180,000 Axis troops occupied Greece, 100,000 of them German and
the rest mainly Bulgarian and Italian.8
The Communists took the lead in organizing the anti-Axis Na-
tional Liberation Front (EAM) in September 1941. "Fronts"—broad
coalitions under attractive slogans—were a standard Communist
tactic all over the world, devices by which Communists could orga-
nize and manipulate people who would not otherwise have joined
any group known to be under the domination of Communists. The
EAM platform therefore said nothing about any proletarian revolu-
tion or dictatorship; its purpose, according to its leaders, was strictly
and simply to organize the population for resistance to the Axis oc-
cupation. In the face of the German invasion, the king and his cabi-
net had retreated to the island of Crete, and then to Egypt, under
British protection. So the EAM came into existence during a national
leadership vacuum. Avoiding any allusions to class struggle, the
EAM became for many a beacon of leadership at a time of deep na-
tional suffering. It also exposed numerous republican and socialist
elements in the country to Communist infiltration.9
For a long time, the EAM did not create a serious fighting force.
Not until December 1942 did its leaders announce the formation of
the National Liberation Army, ELAS (similar to "Hellas," the na-
tional name for Greece).10 When during the Russian Civil War Leon
Trotsky built the first Red Army, he imposed on every unit a double-
headed command structure: the orders of the military commander
were subject to veto by the political officer representing the Com-
munist leadership. ELAS units adopted the same structure.
Procuring weapons was not a difficult task for ELAS. Before it
disintegrated in the face of the Nazi invasion in 1941, the Greek Army
had hidden stocks of small arms, many of which were revealed to
ELAS. With little attention to possible postwar consequences, the
British also began to supply weapons to the various guerrilla for-
mations, including ELAS. In fact, the British insistence that all guer-
rilla forces unite under a single overarching command often meant
that noncommunist and anticommunist guerrilla bands had to sub-
ordinate themselves to regional ELAS forces or even accept amal-
gamation with them.
When the Italian government surrendered to the Allies in Sep-
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tember 1943, ELAS persuaded the British to order Italian forces in
Greece to break up into small units, which ELAS then disarmed. In
this way ELAS came into possession of many heavy and light weap-
ons, becoming independent of its British suppliers. And when in
1944 the German Army decided to abandon Greece, it left behind
great stores of weapons and ammunition, doubtless in the hope that
ELAS would one day use them to resist the returning British.11
"Topographically, [Greece] provides almost optimum conditions
for waging guerrilla warfare."12 The most attractive and important
target for guerrilla forces in a poor country is almost always the trans-
portation system, because any disruption in it is a major one. With
few paved roads and only one main railroad line, the Greek com-
munications network was totally vulnerable to guerrilla action, and
so were the Germans who used it.
By January 1944 ELAS counted almost 25,000 full-time fighters
with perhaps another 40,000 reserves. Nevertheless, ELAS accom-
plished little: its most spectacular action was the blowing up (under
British supervision) of the Gorgopotamos railway viaduct. It was
not the conflict at hand but rather the power vacuum that would
surely come into existence at war's end that preoccupied the Com-
munist leaders. The expansion of ELAS and the elimination of rival
resistance groups were the main objectives; fighting the Axis came
third on their list of priorities. Consequently, "only a small fraction
of the armed manpower of ELAS was ever in action against the Ger-
mans. The rest were reserved for purposes of political control." ELAS
units confined themselves largely to the mountains. The Germans
employed with some success specially trained guerrilla-hunting units
that operated in guerrilla dress. But their principal tactic against
guerrillas was wide encirclement, an operation requiring secrecy and
a great deal of time and manpower to make sure there were no gaps
in the circle. Despite careful planning, breakthroughs almost always
occur during such operations. Furthermore, the Germans cared less
about guerrillas in the mountains than transit through the valleys;
German troops in Greece therefore did not pursue ELAS units with
much energy.13 They turned their energy elsewhere.
The suffering of Greece during World War II was greater than
that of most European nations. Deaths alone amounted to 8 percent
of the population; the destruction of the already quite limited mate-
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rial wealth of the country was hard to calculate. Much of that de-
struction was the result of German policy. The Germans did not com-
mit enough strength in Greece to pursue guerrillas systematically,
so they resorted to reprisals against civilians as their main
counterguerrilla method (as the Soviets would do forty years later
in Afghanistan). ELAS units would carry out an operation in full
knowledge that the German authorities would hold responsible the
entire community in whose neighborhood the act occurred. The
Germans destroyed more than two thousand villages in whole or in
part. They machine-gunned civilian prisoners by the hundreds. In
July 1944 they locked hundreds of women and children of one un-
fortunate town in a building and then set it on fire. The savagery of
their reprisals, the indiscriminate killing of civilians and burning of
dwellings, turned men loose from their destroyed villages to be-
come new recruits for ELAS. In areas where guerrillas operated, the
German refusal to distinguish between pro- and antiguerrilla Greeks
meant that it was actually safer to be a guerrilla than a peaceful ci-
vilian. But many who suffered loss of family or property, or both,
from German reprisals blamed their losses on ELAS policies.14
The peasants had to endure not only reprisals by the Germans
but depredations by ELAS. The guerrillas forcibly requisitioned food
from the barely surviving villagers and compelled boys and girls to
join their ranks. Throughout the war ELAS employed terror tactics
against its Greek opponents or suspected sympathizers of their op-
ponents. ELAS did not have a monopoly on anti-German resistance;
notable among the non-ELAS guerrilla forces was EDES, the Greek
National Republican League, led by the dashing Col. Napoleon
Zervas. The Communists feared and hated EDES. In the autumn of
1943, with the war in Europe reaching a crescendo, ELAS chose to
launch major attacks against EDES and other nonsubmissive guer-
rilla forces.15 This campaign to destroy EDES was the real beginning
of the civil war.
This growing Communist-dominated armed force, so circum-
spect toward the Germans and so violent toward fellow country-
men, filled many Greeks with dismay. They feared that the clearly
doomed Hitlerite occupation would give way to a permanent
Stalinist dictatorship before Allied troops were able to arrive in num-
bers. In the midst of these lawless and violent conditions, armed
citizens' units called Security Battalions appeared in the summer of
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1943. The main function of these units was to try to maintain order
in their local areas with the acquiescence of German military au-
thorities. The Security Battalions never enrolled many more than
perhaps fifteen thousand men. Some joined in reaction to depreda-
tions by ELAS. Other recruits were former members of EDES and
similar guerrilla organizations that ELAS had attacked and dis-
persed. Still others joined out of fear of or sympathy for the Ger-
mans. For large numbers of Greeks, whether one joined ELAS or
EDES or a Security Battalion largely depended on the accident of
who was in control of the area in which one happened to live.16 And
for some, joining a Security Battalion was a conscious decision about
what kind of Greece should emerge from the war. Before the middle
of 1943, Germany was clearly headed for defeat; many Greeks there-
fore preferred temporary collaboration with the Germans to perma-
nent subordination to the EAM and its foreign masters.
Of course, in the view of the EAM, Security Battalion members
and their families were nothing but collaborators and fascists, and
hence legitimate targets for assassination. When German troops be-
gan their pullout from the Peloponnesus, ELAS units there mur-
dered many civilians.17 Soon ferocious encounters between
Communists and noncommunists blazed all over the country.
The Battle for Athens
In order to avoid being cut off by military developments elsewhere
in Europe, German and other Axis forces withdrew from Greece in
October 1944. In other words, Greece was evacuated, not "liberated."
This opened the way for the return of the royal government from
Cairo to Athens. Throughout the war Communist agents had stirred
up dissent and mutinies inside the armed forces of the Greek gov-
ernment-in-exile. Their agitation was so successful that the British
authorities in Egypt were forced to disband most of the units of the
Royal Greek Army, so that by April 1944 "the Greek armed forces in
the Middle East were a thing of the past." The Communist plan was
simple: at the end of the war, with the Germans gone, rival guerrilla
forces destroyed, and the exile government lacking prestige and
military resources, ELAS would face no serious rivals for power.
When the royal government landed at Athens on October 18,1944
(without the king, George II, who said he would return if a plebi-
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scite called him), it brought with it only about three thousand troops,
a large proportion of them officers. At that point ELAS already con-
trolled three-quarters of the territory and about one-third of the popu-
lation of Greece. A few weeks later a brigade of soldiers of the royal
government marched through Athens. They received a tumultuous
welcome, attributed to widespread popular fear of ELAS. These
Greek soldiers were eventually reinforced by some British units, but
only a small proportion of the latter were combat troops.18
When the first small detachments of British troops landed near
Athens in the autumn of 1944, ELAS offered no resistance. This may
have been the major mistake of the entire civil war; anticommunist
forces would never again be so weak as they were in those days.
The EAM nevertheless went ahead with preparations for an upris-
ing. It ordered general strikes throughout the country to prevent
distribution of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis-
tration (UNRRA) supplies and thus increase the level of economic
misery. ELAS units converged toward the capital.19
In the first days of December, the Communists made their grab
for power. They lost the conflict from the very first day. Instead of
storming central Athens, they contented themselves with numer-
ous minor successes in outlying areas, overcoming police posts or
annihilating surviving pockets of EDES supporters in Epirus.20 Dur-
ing most of the fighting, major ELAS forces were in Thessaly, sev-
eral days' march away from Athens. Thus, the British were granted
precious time in which to reinforce the capital. Moreover, the very
concept of confronting the British was a flawed one. ELAS was in
essence a hit-and-run guerrilla force that had seen little action against
regular troops in its two years of existence. By ordering the upris-
ing, the Communist leadership was in effect demanding that ELAS
turn itself overnight into a regular combat force, prepared to take
and hold territory and expel British and Greek national forces from
Athens and Salonika. And this was not to be the last fateful error
made by the Communist leaders.
After fighting had raged for a week, Field Marshal Harold
Alexander, supreme Allied commander in the Mediterranean The-
ater, came to Athens to observe the situation. A few days later ELAS
mounted new attacks on the city. The British repulsed these assaults,
even though ELAS managed to overrun a Royal Air Force detach-
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ment outside the main British defense perimeter. On Christmas Day
Prime Minister Winston Churchill himself arrived in beleaguered
Athens. Churchill met with leaders of the Greek government and of
ELAS, but the fighting went on. There were by then 60,000 British
troops in the Athens area, rising eventually to 75,000, of whom 2,100
became casualties. By mid-January ELAS was in full retreat and
agreed to a truce starting January 15. Meanwhile, ELAS units in other
parts of Greece were busy attacking rival guerrilla bands. EDES suf-
fered a severe shortage of ammunition; ELAS destroyed it as a fight-
ing force.21
During the battle for Athens, ELAS had rounded up thousands
of hostages. Before abandoning the outskirts of the city, ELAS began
killing these captives; British forces found many mutilated bodies,
victims of Communist "People's Courts." Much of the deep popu-
lar animosity toward ELAS, especially in the Athens area, home in
those days to one Greek in every seven, dates from these savage
events. Among those killed by ELAS were noncommunist trade
union leaders; their murders caused prominent Socialist politicians
to abandon the EAM. Sympathy for the EAM also precipitously de-
creased in British left-wing circles. The hostage killings caused nu-
merous middle-class Greeks to seek insurance against a Communist
victory through cash payments and other services to the guerrillas.
In later years the Athens Communist Party organization admitted
that killing the hostages had been a devastating error.22
In February 1945 the Varkiza Agreement brought the fighting to
a halt. The Greek Communist Party was recognized as a legal entity
and allowed to publish newspapers freely and continue to operate
EAM. In return, ELAS agreed to hand over a large quantity of arms
and did so. However, most of the weapons it surrendered were old
Italian pieces; ELAS kept hidden the good weapons that the evacu-
ating Germans had left behind.
Until the secret records of the Kremlin have been thoroughly
searched, no one can be sure of the level of Soviet involvement in
the EAM uprising. It nevertheless seems doubtful that Stalin, who
neither knew nor cared very much about Greece, instigated these
events. A small Soviet military mission had parachuted into ELAS
headquarters in midsummer 1944; it was apparently unimpressed
with ELAS, because no aid was forthcoming from Stalin. At the
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Tehran Conference in November 1943, Churchill, Roosevelt, and
Stalin had decided against any large-scale operations in the Balkans.
In October 1944, with tacit American approval, the British and the
Soviets had divided up that area: Rumania and Bulgaria were to fall
under Soviet control, while Greece remained under British influ-
ence. Even after the EAM's open rebellion, Stalin sent and main-
tained an ambassador to the royal government in Athens, thus
explicitly recognizing its legitimacy and also signaling less than to-
tal confidence in the Greek Communist insurgency.23
The Parliamentary Setting
National elections took place for a new Parliament in March 1946.
The Communists boycotted these elections, despite the desperate
problems of postwar adjustment and despite (or because of) the pres-
ence of hundreds of election observers from France, Britain, and else-
where. (There were no observers from the Soviet Union; Moscow
wanted no precedent for outside observers of elections in its newly
acquired Central European empire.) The Communists abstained from
the elections for two reasons. First, the KKE did not wish to reveal
to the world how low its electoral appeal actually was.24 Second, the
Communists had decided to try again to come to power by force. To
this end, the KKE had already established a guerrilla training base
at Bulkes, northwest of Belgrade in Tito's Yugoslavia, at that time
the Communist satellite most vocally loyal to Stalin. It was also count-
ing on support from Communist regimes in neighboring Albania
and Bulgaria. Thus, just as conservative and moderate parties were
winning an overwhelming victory at the polls, Communist forces
attacked the village of Litokhoron, on the slope of Mount Olympus,
an assault generally considered the beginning of the second phase
of the war.
The Athens government held very few good cards. The anticom-
munist side suffered not only from grave military weaknesses but
also from deep political fissures. Students of revolution from Plato
to Brinton have pointed to divisions within the governing class as a
prime condition for revolution. Bitterness between monarchists and
republicans had been poisoning Greek political life for more than a
generation before the German invasion. After World War II, in the
midst of devastation and insurgency, this hostility reasserted itself
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as if nothing had changed. With at least one eye on electoral consid-
erations, many leftist and liberal politicians in Greece were more
susceptible to offers of compromise from the EAM than to exhorta-
tions to pursue victory over the Communist-led insurrection. On
the other side, elements on the extreme right of the majority Popu-
list (monarchist) Party had discredited themselves by committing
atrocities against Communists and other enemies. Dwight Griswold,
the Nebraska Republican who headed the U.S. aid mission to Greece,
told Washington: "You cannot build a government on the rightist
parties and [expect to] establish peace and quiet in Greece. There is
too much of a tendency in those groups to carry on a blood feud
against all Greeks who do not agree with them politically."25 The
partisanship, selfishness, nepotism, and "inveterate pettiness" of
Greek politicians discredited the parliamentary system, increased
the attractiveness of the insurgency, exasperated the Americans, and
hampered a successful anticommunist effort.26
Renewed War
The Communist guerrilla campaign began with the murders of lo-
cal officials and civilians known to be friendly to the government.
Then came attacks on small police stations; to avoid the loss of such
vulnerable outposts, the government began consolidating them into
larger and fewer positions. The guerrillas would then raid the vil-
lages where the police posts had just been abandoned, seeking sup-
plies and recruits. Finally came attacks on larger police posts (thirty
to forty men), forcing them also to be consolidated. By the late au-
tumn of 1946, only the large towns, as a rule, were under govern-
ment control; vast areas of the countryside were wide open to
guerrilla activities. When finally the National Army was called in,
the guerrillas employed the same general tactics against it: they at-
tacked small army posts along the frontier with Yugoslavia and Al-
bania, which the army leadership then consolidated into ever-larger,
ever-fewer positions, leaving wide gaps along the borders through
which the guerrillas freely passed back and forth. On October 28,
1946, Markos Vafiades, the principal leader of the Communist armed
forces, announced the new name of the insurgents: the Democratic
Army. Its slogan was "By Fire and Axe."27
Commentators on guerrilla warfare often observe that the thor-
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ough defeat of an insurgency requires a ten-to-one ratio of govern-
ment troops to guerrillas. At the beginning of 1947, the guerrillas
had 13,000 members operating inside Greece, with another 12,000
across the three borders. Against them the National Army could
muster 90,000, with the national police (gendarmerie) adding an-
other 30,000. By the autumn of 1947, the National Army had grown
to about 135,000 men, while the Democratic Army counted perhaps
23,000, not including reserves across the frontiers. Clearly the num-
bers of the government forces were inadequate, especially to im-
pede the passage of guerrilla units across Greece's more than six
hundred miles of frontier with her Communist neighbors. The moun-
tains along these northern borders were main areas of guerrilla op-
erations for more than the obvious strategic reasons; farther south,
in Athens and the Peleponnesus, most of the people feared and hated
the guerrillas because of ELAS provocations and atrocities during
the German occupation and above all because of the killing of hos-
tages in the Athens area from December 1944 to January 1945.28
Who Were the Insurgents?
For its war against the parliamentary government in Athens, the
Democratic Army (that is, the Communist-led guerrillas) gathered
its members from four principal sources. First among them were
members of the KKE—the Greek Communist Party—and their sym-
pathizers. Most of these were city dwellers with above-average edu-
cation, often fanatically devoted to the party's vision of a New Greece,
which they of course would rule.
Former members of ELAS were a second key group in the Demo-
cratic Army. Greece had too many people; for large numbers of
Greeks, the main aspects of village life were omnipresent poverty,
class tensions, and a bleak future.29 Many villagers, therefore, had
seen the wartime resistance experience as both a welcome escape
from an unrewarding existence and an opportunity to display hero-
ism, all under the rubric of struggling for justice and a better life.
For such individuals the end of World War II had been a letdown, a
return to an uneventful, unrewarding routine. When in the spring
of 1946 the Communists began widespread recruiting of guerrillas,
many former resistance fighters welcomed the chance to turn back
the clock to more fulfilling days.
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Macedonian separatists made up another major constituent. The
Turks had misruled Macedonia until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.
When the civil war broke out, Greece possessed 13,000 square miles
of Macedonia, while Bulgaria and Yugoslavia divided another 12,000.
The KKE pledged that after a Communist military victory, Greek
Macedonia would be allowed to go its separate way, presumably to
become the nucleus of an independent Macedonian state that would
include territories in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Only a minority of
the Macedonians in the Democratic Army appear to have been con-
vinced Communists.30
Forced recruits and abductees, often teenagers (of both sexes),
composed the fourth and largest element of the guerrilla ranks. As
the conflict ground on, the Communists relied more and more on
compulsory recruitment and kidnappings. After the insurgency had
been defeated, the principal military leader of the Democratic Army
wrote that from the middle of 1947, almost all new guerrillas had
been brought into the ranks by compulsion. The reader may imme-
diately suspect that forced recruits would make poor fighters. Some-
times that was the case. But the usual way the Democratic Army
obtained the services of such persons was to threaten them and their
family members with death if they refused to serve or tried to desert;
these forced recruits were always well aware of how vulnerable they
and their families were to reprisals. In addition, the dangerous life
of the guerrillas often forced them, especially very young ones who
had never lived outside their parents' houses before, to turn to each
other for support and loyalty. Finally, the KKE placed great stress on
the political indoctrination of all Democratic Army members, not
without effect. All these powerful pressures produced military units
that, from conviction or desperation, often fought well enough.31
Though increasingly unable to attract volunteers, the Democratic
Army nevertheless found many factors operating in its favor. A tra-
dition of guerrilla warfare went far back into Greek history, into the
long night of Turkish occupation. The general poverty of the rural
areas and the great devastation wrought by World War II had cre-
ated a population capable of withstanding the physical hardships
of guerrilla life. The EAM still basked in the afterglow of the resis-
tance to the detested Germans, whereas in contrast the royal gov-
ernment had spent most of those bitter years outside the country.
The National Army had superior equipment, but the country's dif-
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ficult terrain and primitive transportation system favored the lightly
armed and tactically flexible guerrillas. The guerrillas had no re-
sponsibility for holding or defending particular territory. If pressed
by government troops, even if surrounded, they simply broke up
into smaller units and (usually) escaped their enemies. The classic
guerrilla tactic of mining roads was especially suited to Greece; by
1947 mines had become "the most effective single weapon in the
guerrilla arsenal."32 They greatly hampered the movement of the
National Army but had little effect on the guerrillas, who possessed
no tanks and few trucks.
Another source of Communist strength was the Communist vi-
sion of a Bright New Greece in which everyone's desires would find
fulfillment. In contrast, the government seemed able to offer noth-
ing more than a dreary status quo. No charismatic hero arose to pro-
pound a shining vision of a noncommunist Greece; in fact, the
government seemed unable to deal with even the most pressing and
mundane economic and social problems—problems greatly aggra-
vated by the fighting in the mountains that produced a flood of seven
hundred thousand refugees, one Greek in ten, pouring into the cit-
ies and exhausting the government's scant resources.33
The contrast between the bleak today offered by the government
and the bright tomorrow offered by the Communists and their fel-
low travelers was able to win for the latter, at least in the early stages
of the civil war, the support of roughly a fifth of the population. In
most parts of Greece, the KKE was able to operate a well-articulated
underground organization called the Yiafaka, built upon the infra-
structure the EAM had created in many parts of the country during
the German occupation. Yiafaka had perhaps fifty thousand active
members by 1947. This network of agents and sympathizers helped
provide food for the guerrillas. Above all, Yiafaka supplied intelli-
gence, having infiltrated both the National Army and the civil ser-
vice. The Democratic Army therefore often had a good idea of the
plans of its enemies.34
In addition, Greece's Communist neighbors had been quite
openly providing help to the guerrillas since July 1946. During 1947
the guerrillas greatly benefited from the arrival of men trained in
military institutions in Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The
Yugoslavs sent a great quantity of weapons; they also attached a
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general and a small staff to the headquarters of the Democratic Army.
Even the skeptical Soviets eventually sent some 105 mm howitzers.35
National Army efforts to intercept supplies for the insurgents com-
ing from the northern neighbors were only partly effective.
Without doubt, these sanctuaries across the rugged frontiers were
the most serious tactical challenge confronting the national govern-
ment and army. Time after time, the National Army would corner
insurgent units in the North, only to watch in frustration as they
escaped over the border into a Communist state. For example, the
guerrillas maintained a major stronghold in the Grammos Moun-
tain area, along the Greek-Albanian border. In June 1948 the Greek
National Army launched the biggest operation of the entire war
against this Grammos base. After a tremendous battle, in which even-
tually perhaps half of the total number of guerrillas in the entire
country participated (around 12,000), the National Army was able
to occupy Mount Grammos. Guerrilla losses were severe: those killed
or captured amounted to almost 4,000.36 However, most of the guer-
rilla forces on Grammos retreated into Albania, and after a march
through southern Yugoslavia, they appeared again on Greek soil in
Macedonia. This proximity to any Democratic Army unit of sanctu-
ary inside one of the three Communist neighbor states meant that
for the most part the guerrillas were free to fight only when and
where they chose. The Greek government made constant appeals to
the United Nations to remedy the constant violation of its borders;
little resulted other than the usual waterfall of words. No wonder
that the morale of the National Army was sinking.
The Greek Army
When the Communists began the major phase of the civil war in
1946, the Greek National Army (GNA) was in real trouble. During
the Axis occupation (1941-1944) the army, except for some units in
Egypt, did not exist. Soldiers and officers alike lost their skills and
their traditions. The new army that came into existence after 1945
was poorly trained. There was little time for training in the midst of
civil war, and so basic deficiencies in operations remained uncor-
rected almost until the end. The equipment of the GNA was inad-
equate, with a pronounced shortage of mountain artillery. The Royal
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Hellenic Air Force monopolized the skies of Greece, but in the early
years of the civil war that was of little benefit to the government
because there were so few planes and trained pilots.
In war, the proportion of morale factors to material factors, ac-
cording to Napoleon, is three to one. In the GNA of 1947, if equip-
ment was poor and training was sketchy, morale was nearly
disastrous. This dangerous situation arose from problems in the of-
ficer corps, inattention to the requirements of enlisted men, and faulty
disposition of military resources. First and foremost, the GNA faced
an acute shortage of good-quality officers. The German conquest of
Greece, the government's flight into exile, and the political divisions
within the army had demoralized and disintegrated the officer corps.
In the reconstituted army, professional training was low. For attract-
ing the attention of one's superiors and obtaining promotion, skill
or bravery counted less than political connections. Political interfer-
ence led to the promotion of unsuitable officers and encouraged in-
subordination. Incompetence or fear of making mistakes inhibited
the aggressiveness of many officers toward the enemy. Yet it was ex-
tremely difficult to remove poor or insubordinate officers because of
the same plague of political interference with army personnel mat-
ters that had led to their promotion in the first place. Not surprisingly,
the army had three different chiefs of staff during 1947 alone. Never-
theless, only a very small number of GNA officers defected to the
Democratic Army—perhaps no more than twenty-seven.37
Poor morale among the enlisted men derived from the percep-
tion of multiple inequities. The first classes of draftees into the new
National Army were veterans of the Albanian War of 1940; they could
not understand why they were called to the colors while younger
men were left at home. Most of these draftees were family men, and
army pay was so low and government services so poor that their
families were often in a state of real want. The rich and the politi-
cally well connected were able to obtain exemptions from military
service. Those few high-ranking officers who bothered to listen to
the problems of their men knew that poor morale also resulted from
too few decorations for bravery, an inadequate promotion policy,
haphazard punishment for those who avoided military service, and
the government's failure to arm loyal but defenseless villagers.38
The GNA style of warfare did nothing for morale either. Greece's
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frontiers with her Communist neighbors extended for several hun-
dred miles, very long borders in comparison to the total area of the
country. Under the best of circumstances, the GNA would have found
it extremely difficult to control the length of the borders as well as to
protect major urban centers, patrol important highways, guard es-
sential crops, guarantee public services, and pursue guerrilla bands.
What rendered the satisfactory performance of these tasks quite
impossible was that influential politicians demanded the stationing
of troops in their constituencies.39 The GNA responded to these many
pressures by adopting a posture of static defense: an attempt to oc-
cupy every place of any potential value to the government or to the
insurgents. This was the worst possible approach to fighting guer-
rillas, because it permitted the guerrillas, by assembling units from
several different districts, to attain numerical superiority over the
government troops at a particular point of attack. Meanwhile, the
GNA could not take the offensive because it lacked the manpower
to protect every sensitive point in the country and still maintain
mobile attack units.
The GNA temporarily broke out of its defensive posture in April
1947 and attempted a major cleanup of Central Greece, with the idea
of pushing guerrilla units toward the northern frontiers. The cam-
paign failed for several revealing reasons. First was the insufficiency
of competent officers. Another was the self-imposed time limit on
these clearing operations. There were not enough troops to garrison
all sensitive places, including important politicians' bailiwicks, and
at the same time carry out aggressive mobile clearing operations.
Hence, only a limited amount of time—a few weeks or a few days,
depending on its size—was allocated to the "cleaning" of any par-
ticular area. When the allocated time had expired, army units in that
area moved on to some other designated place, even if all the guer-
rillas in the first area had not been driven out.40
The guerrillas killed local officials and unfriendly civilians, both
in the mountains and in the larger towns. This practice undercut
their support; so did the kidnapping of thousands of children to be
sent to Soviet satellites, there to be trained as good citizens of a new,
Communist Europe.41 But these were weaknesses of the insurgency
rather than strengths of the government, and they paled when com-
pared to the advantages enjoyed by the guerrillas. During 1946 and
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1947, therefore, the Communists were making significant tactical and
psychological gains; in contrast, belief in the victory—even the sur-
vival—of the government was evaporating.
During the first year and a half of the conflict, although there
was never a real danger that Democratic Army forces would suc-
cessfully attack Athens, the government's inability to defeat the guer-
rillas meant that time was working against it. Without some
unforeseeable, drastic alteration in the struggle, a Communist vic-
tory, and consequently the Stalinization of Greece, seemed inevi-
table to many. Yet as 1947 drew to a close, the beleaguered
government in Athens was about to see the scales of war tip
undramatically but unmistakably in its favor. A new national de-
fense corps was taking form, whose mission was to prevent the
reinfiltration of areas that had been cleared of guerrillas. And the
morale of both the government and the GNA rose with the arrival
of the first group of officers from the U.S. Army.42
The Truman Doctrine
Between the battle for Athens and the renewal of the civil war, the
British Labour Government under Clement Attlee undertook to train
the new Greek National Army. Including national guard units, the
GNA grew from 30,000 in February 1945 to 75,000 by the end of the
year. Until the spring of 1947, Britain also maintained 143,000 of its
own troops in Greece, not counting the 1,400 officers and enlisted
men involved in training the GNA. On February 21,1947, however,
the Attlee government informed the Truman administration that
Britain could no longer afford to support her clients in Greece, nor
in Turkey either. This information reached Washington at a crucial
point in the reassessment of U.S. foreign policy that had been under
way since the surrender of Japan. The administration had been fairly
well informed about events in Greece during World War II, but Sec-
retary of State Cordell Hull and his successor, E.R. Stettinius Jr., had
no wish to become embroiled in what they judged to be unpalatable
controversies of old-world imperialist politics. Thus, up to the very
eve of the Cold War, the U.S. government did not develop a real
policy regarding Greece.43
Nevertheless, late in February 1947, Gen. George Marshall gave
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President Truman a blunt message: although no one could guaran-
tee that with U.S. aid Greece would be definitely saved, he could
guarantee that without U.S. aid Greece would be definitely lost. At
the same time, Dean Acheson stated his belief that the loss of Greece
would eventually result in the Communization of all of the Balkans
and most of the Middle East and North Africa as well. Reflecting on
the fermentation of thought in that crucial late winter and early
spring of 1947, George Kennan wrote: "People in Western Europe
did not, by and large, want Communist control. But this did not
mean that they would not trim their sails and even abet its coming if
they gained the impression that it was inevitable. This was why the
shock of a Communist success in Greece could not be risked."44
The Truman administration became interested in Greece mainly
because of its belief that the Soviets were involved in the insurgency.
The exact degree of such involvement may never be known.45 Nor is
it necessary to thrash out here the question of whether Soviet for-
eign policy was prompted by a desire for expansion or a quest for
security: from Stalin through Brezhnev the results were the same. A
distinguished historian of U.S. foreign policy has elaborated and
summarized the view from Washington: "The United States had no
choice but to act in this situation. The results of inaction were only
too clear: the collapse of Europe's flank in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, establishment of Communist dominance in the Middle East,
and a Soviet breakthrough into South Asia and North Africa. The
psychological impact upon Europe of such a tremendous Soviet vic-
tory over the West would have been disastrous. For Europeans al-
ready psychologically demoralized by their sufferings and fall from
power and prestige, this would have been the final blow. In short,
what was at stake in Greece was America's survival itself."46
In Washington there was considerable opposition to any overt
U.S. participation in Greek affairs. Many felt that such an involve-
ment would mean "pulling British chestnuts out of the fire."47 Nev-
ertheless, three weeks after being informed by the British that they
could not sustain their commitments in Greece, President Truman
went before a joint session of Congress and delivered one of the
most important speeches in the history of the United States, an ad-
dress that laid the foundations of American foreign policy for what
would become known ever after as the Cold War: "I believe," Truman
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said, "that it must be the policy of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minori-
ties or by outside pressures.
"I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own
destinies in their own way.
"I believe that our help should be primarily through economic
and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and or-
derly political processes.... Should we fail to aid Greece and Tur-
key in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as
well as to the East."
Some weeks later, the terse presidential sentences, soon to be
known as the Truman Doctrine, were effectively elaborated in an
article by George Kennan in the influential journal Foreign Affairs.
Kennan saw Soviet policy as "a fluid stream which moves constantly,
wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main con-
cern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny avail-
able to it in the basin of world power." He therefore recommended
to the American people "a policy of firm containment, designed to
confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point
where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peace-
ful and stable world." This containment policy would both defend
the territory of the West and "promote tendencies which must even-
tually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellow-
ing of Soviet power."48
Secretary of State Marshall identified U.S. objectives in Greece
more specifically. American assistance must aim at maintaining the
independence and territorial integrity of that nation; to that end it
was necessary to develop the Greek economy, raise the general liv-
ing standard, distribute the tax burden more equitably, and elimi-
nate corruption as far as possible.49
American Aid
When the austere cadences of President Truman's March address to
Congress had died away, Americans began to confront the implica-
tions of the task they had undertaken. In his report to the National
Security Council in January 1948, former Director of Central Intelli-
gence Sidney Souers stated: "The Greek government rests on a weak
foundation and Greece is in a deplorable economic state. There are
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general fear and a feeling of insecurity among the people, friction
among short-sighted political factions, selfishness and corruption
in government, and a dearth of effective leaders. The Armed Forces
of Greece are hampered in their efforts to eliminate Communist guer-
rillas by lack of offensive spirit, by political interference, by disposi-
tion of units as static forces and by poor leadership." Nevertheless,
the report continued, the United States had to make the effort. "The
defeat of Soviet efforts to destroy the political independence and
territorial integrity of Greece is necessary in order to preserve the
security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, which
is vital to the security of the United States."50
At the same time, the director of the State Department's Office
of Near Eastern and African Affairs warned that the Kremlin un-
doubtedly planned to wear down U.S. willpower in Greece: "If it
should be decided that we are not capable as a country of dogged
determination we should review our whole foreign policy in order
to make sure that, in view of our inherent psychological weakness,
it might be better for us to return to isolationism and abandon a
policy in world affairs which we are not capable of carrying on."51
The urgency of Greek affairs was heavily underlined shortly af-
ter the Souers report when Communists in Czechoslovakia brutally
destroyed that country's democratic institutions. And soon after that
the Soviets imposed the Berlin Blockade. Now the Cold War was
really on, and Greece was emerging as a major battleground. Secre-
tary of State Marshall rightly observed that the reestablishment of
order in Greece did not require the destruction of all the guerrillas,
which in any case might be impossible.52 It required instead a well-
led, aggressive army capable of pushing the guerrillas back from
the centers of Greek life and keeping them away—quite an order.
Toward the end of 1947, the United States had shipped 174,000
tons of military supplies to Greece. Soon the United States was spend-
ing about ten thousand dollars to eliminate one guerrilla. The guer-
rilla movement, however, was not suffering visible defeat; on the
contrary, the overextended GNA, penetrated by Communist agents,
was effectively in control of only about a fifth of the territory of the
country. American military leaders such as Maj. Gen. Stephen
Chamberlin, director of army intelligence, believed that the prob-
lem with the GNA was not its size but its leadership and tactics. The
Americans asked the British to provide direct operational guidance
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to Greek units; the British were unwilling to comply, suggesting that
the Americans take on the task.53
Washington then established the Joint U.S. Military Advisory
and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) to assist the GNA with planning
and leadership development. Marshall chose Gen. James Van Fleet
to direct this group. No desk-bound commander, Van Fleet was of-
ten on the front lines observing the good and bad features of the
GNA's antiguerrilla campaigns. He also kept up a constant barrage
of requests for more American help for the Greek Army. About a
year after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, there were 250
U.S. officers in Greece with JUSMAPG; some of them participated
in a joint Greek-U.S. staff formed to plan and supply combat opera-
tions. The joint staff had a bracing effect on the Greek army: because
the Americans were less knowledgeable of and less sensitive to the
nuances of Greek politics, they were able to bring more strictly mili-
tary considerations to bear on operational planning than Greek of-
ficers had been accustomed to.
Greek Politics as Usual
Certainly those Americans who opposed, for whatever reasons, the
effort to defeat the Greek Communist insurgency could find plenty
of opportunities to criticize the government in Athens, particularly
regarding the rivalry and hostility between the major Greek politi-
cal parties. High American officials in Greece especially disliked the
leader of the conservative Populists, Constantine Tsaldaris. They
wanted to avoid making the United States too dependent on his
party even though it had won a majority of parliamentary seats in
the 1946 elections. Also, in order to gather as much support as pos-
sible for the anticommunist effort, Secretary of State Marshall from
the beginning wanted Greece to be governed by a broad coalition.54
Such a coalition proved difficult both to construct and to pre-
serve. Greek politicians felt that they could continue in their old
partisan ways, scheming in the corridors and cafes of Athens while
an armed revolutionary challenge crackled all around them, because
U.S. assistance guaranteed ultimate victory. Hence they seem to have
felt absolved from having to mute their internal squabbles and give
serious and sustained attention to painful decisions about reform-
ing the government and the economy. Indeed, many Greeks, not
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just politicians but citizens and soldiers as well, were apathetic in
the face of the mortal challenges facing them, believing that outside
factors in the civil war were so massive that their own efforts were
puny and inconsequential in comparison.55
Within the Truman administration, impatience with the short-
comings of the Athens politicians was rising. In November 1948 a
Policy Planning Staff report suggested that the Secretary of State
make it clear that there were limits to U.S. aid, and if the Greek gov-
ernment was not willing to implement certain economic and mili-
tary changes, the United States might conclude that it had better
places to spend its money. The U.S. Embassy in Athens pointed out,
however, that the Greek government was being severely damaged
by propaganda emanating from the Soviet Union and eagerly re-
peated by Communist and sympathizer elements in the United States
and Western Europe, propaganda magnifying Greece's admittedly
serious problems and the shortcomings of the government. Further-
more, many of these problems and shortcomings stemmed from the
existence of foreign-fueled civil war.56
Nonetheless, the grave crisis confronting Greece clearly meant
that "a parochial, narrow-minded leadership, with anti-Communism
its only credential, [could] not possibly provide the required foun-
dations for a successful war against a Communist guerrilla offen-
sive." Seeming to realize this, many national party leaders did
eventually manage to put aside the worst of their partisan belliger-
ence. The old Venezelist warhorse Themistocles Sophoulis, leader
of the minority Liberal Party, agreed to preside over a coalition cabi-
net consisting mainly of his perennial foes, the Populists. Constantine
Tsaldaris was the leader of the majority party and therefore the par-
liamentarian with the most right to be prime minister; he neverthe-
less agreed to accept a subordinate post in the Sophoulis cabinet.
This coalition guided the nation through the worst days of the civil
war to victory, from September 1947 to June 1949, when Sophoulis,
close to ninety, passed away.57
American Troops to Greece?
The Truman administration emphasized from the start that any U.S.
military personnel sent to Greece would have solely an advisory,
not a combat, role. Nevertheless, from the very beginning of open
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U.S. involvement in the conflict, pressures began to build toward
commitment of American ground combat forces. An internal State
Department memorandum noted that "Greek officials are obsessed
with the idea of getting the United States so deeply committed in
Greece that it will be unable to withdraw if the Greeks themselves
lie down on the job." Constantine Tsaldaris suggested throughout
1947 that the U.S. send a small number of combat troops to bolster
the morale of the GNA.58
The situation in Greece looked very dark in the winter of 1947-
1948, and the administration contemplated an expansion of the
American military role. In December 1947 the State Department's
Loy Henderson expressed his belief that if Greece's Communist
neighbors recognized a guerrilla counterstate within Greece and sent
assistance to it, or if they introduced their own troops into the fight-
ing, then the United States should at least call on the United Nations
to authorize the dispatch of armed forces to assist the legitimate
government. In a top-secret memorandum, Maj. Gen. A.V. Arnold
declared that sending two American army divisions to Thrace could
make a vital contribution to ending the war. Arnold and the State
Department's Robert Lovett discussed this possibility with George
Kennan. Kennan appeared not to oppose the idea of U.S. troops as
part of a United Nations force to seal the northern borders, but he
thought that if American soldiers went to Greece to fight, the
Peloponnesus might be an easier place to defend.59 (This conversa-
tion is not found in Kennan's memoirs.)
Nevertheless, such powerful opposition arose to any proposal
for sending U.S. ground combat units to Greece that a real debate
never developed. In August 1947 John Foster Dulles, the principal
Republican spokesman on foreign affairs, opposed deploying U.S.
combat troops for the purpose of closing the northern frontiers
(which of course would have been, next to preventing the fall of
Athens itself, the most serious justification for the insertion of Ameri-
can troops). U.S. ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh, described by Dean
Acheson as "wise and first-rate," believed that the GNA could
achieve control of the situation with better tactics and leadership.
And Dwight Griswold also came out vigorously against the use of
U.S. combat units. "Defeat of Communism," he wrote, "is not solely
a question of military action as demonstrated in Germany, France
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and elsewhere. In Greece, the military and economic fronts are of
equal importance." Therefore he "would oppose the use of even a
single American officer or soldier against the Greek bandits [guer-
rillas]." In the autumn of 1948 the National Security Council received
a draft report from the Department of State warning that the intro-
duction of American combat units might serve the Kremlin as an
excuse to send Soviet forces into formerly subservient and now re-
bellious Yugoslavia. During the winter of 1948-1949, when many in
Washington were gloomy about the course of the war, General
Marshall flew to Athens to get a better grasp of the situation. He
returned home sharing the view of the U.S. ambassador that it was
not the size of the Greek Army but its effectiveness that needed to
be increased.60
Some of the most telling opposition to deploying American com-
bat troops in Greece came from the U.S. military. In September 1947
Undersecretary of War Kenneth Royall told Marshall that the intro-
duction of such units would be "disturbing and provocative." About
a month later, Maj. Gen. Stephen Chamberlin, who had headed a
special military mission to Greece, expressed his conviction that the
Greek Army should be able to cope with the guerrillas, provided
there was no overt intervention from the north. General Marshall
feared that the dispatch of combat troops to Greece would result in
a buildup of forces there larger than the United States should com-
mit to one place or that it might lead to their withdrawal under un-
propitious and unheroic circumstances. Maj. Gen. A.M. Harper
described sending American troops to Greece as putting them in a
strategic "mousetrap." Any sizable commitment of U.S. ground
troops to Greece would mean stripping American forces from other
places; even then, such forces would be numerically inferior not only
to those the Soviets could potentially commit but even to the forces
of Greece's immediate Communist neighbors. The Joint Chiefs went
on record against such a deployment unless it was preceded by na-
tional mobilization. That was hardly likely in 1947 with the vast
postwar demobilization still going on. In mid-1945, the U.S. armed
forces totaled 12 million men and women; by mid-1947 they were
less than 1.6 million. The number of U.S. Army combat personnel
would not be sufficient to repel a large-scale invasion of Greece by
her northern neighbors.61 Tensions with the Soviet Union were ris-
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ing, and in the spring of 1948 the Americans would have to deal
with the Berlin Blockade. And the signing of the NATO Treaty was
coming up, vastly extending American military commitments.
Almost unanimously, high-ranking military leaders who pub-
licly expressed views on this question opposed assigning U.S. com-
bat forces to Greece. They believed the Greek Army was big enough
to do the job, that there were other important demands on the slen-
der U.S. forces, and that American troops would find themselves in
an untenable position in the event of a Soviet invasion of Greece.
Finally, the British informed Washington in early 1948 that they
would continue to keep a considerable number of their troops in
Greece, thus allowing the United States to concentrate on economic
aid and military supplies.
Reflecting these points of view, Souers told the National Secu-
rity Council in May 1948 that "the United States should not now
send armed forces to Greece as token forces or for military opera-
tions." Consequently, a year and a half after the enunciation of the
Truman Doctrine, there were no more than 450 U.S. military person-
nel in Greece providing operational advice, and this at the division
level. (Of those, three American officers were to lose their lives.)62
Maj. Gen. James Van Fleet became commander of JUSMAPG in Feb-
ruary 1948; he and the head of the British Military Mission acted as
advisers to the Greek National Defence Council.
The Growth of the National Army
As 1948 wore on, neither the Greek nor the American government
suspected the gravity of the problems confronting the insurgents.
On the contrary, a feeling of despondency began to envelop the Greek
government and army and their supporters in Washington. In a major
change of tactics, the GNA had launched massive assaults against
guerrilla base areas on Grammos and Vitsi Mountains, cutting off
insurgent supply routes. The attacks were costly, and in the end the
guerrillas escaped into Albania and eventually returned to Grammos.
The GNA was suffering eighteen hundred casualties a month, yet
nothing much seemed to be getting accomplished: "two years of
hard and bloody effort seemed to have ended in failure." In General
Marshall's view, the Greek Army was worn out from fighting, it had
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no time to train its soldiers adequately and there was no end in
sight as long as the guerrillas could escape over the frontiers. In
November 1948 the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department
produced an analysis of the military situation in Greece along the
same lines. The inefficiency of the Greek National Army, it stated,
was partly the result of physical and mental exhaustion. Conven-
tional combat, military occupation, and insurgency had been bat-
tering Greece ever since 1940. For the GNA soldier, the fighting
seemed to stretch on endlessly, because the enemy had the ability to
escape across the borders. The guerrillas, in contrast, could find rest
and supplies on non-Greek territory whenever necessary. In addi-
tion, the proportion of guerrilla troops who were in combat units
was very high compared to that of the GNA, because medical care,
supply and training facilities, and personnel were to a large degree
furnished to the guerrillas by the neighboring Soviet satellites. The
report emphasized the need to get rid of incompetent GNA officers
and improve training.63
Henry F. Grady, U.S. ambassador in Athens, also contributed
some trenchant observations on the disappointing course of the con-
flict. He disagreed strongly with General Van Fleet's requests for
more men, more money, and more arms for the GNA. To Grady the
real solution lay elsewhere. He pointed out that "the bandit [Demo-
cratic] land army is not backed by a single airplane, heavy gun [sic],
or naval vessel." In his view the GNA was already too big, draining
the economy of manpower and money. Greece required not a bigger
and bigger army, but a stronger, more united, and more efficient
government in Athens. Victory demanded "spirit and leadership,"
and the Americans could not provide these things to the Greeks. An
army smaller in size but better trained, better fed, stripped of its old
worn-out soldiers and political officers could wage a more aggres-
sive campaign against the guerrillas, especially in winter, which in a
country like Greece could actually be an ally of the government.
Grady had put his finger on a number of important, if sensitive,
spots. The leaders of the GNA were slow to grasp the fact that one of
their allies was the weather. Most guerrillas operated in the moun-
tain areas. During the winter they suffered from cold and lack of
supplies. Many died of exposure. And the guerrillas could be tracked
in the snow. The winter also impeded the GNA's use of trucks and
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heavy equipment, but with its regular supply lines and relatively
unlimited food and medicine, the individual GNA soldier suffered
much less than the guerrillas. In countries with harsh winters, gov-
ernments need to grasp the potential payoffs of winter operations.64
Substantial changes did occur in the organization and tactics of
the Greek National Army during 1948. The government began de-
ploying the National Defense Corps, civilians organized into one
hundred battalions of five hundred men each. The original plan was
for these battalions to act as minutemen in support of the GNA, but
eventually they were turned into full-time soldiers. In addition, with
U.S. aid the army established commando units specially trained for
difficult operations.65 The government also abandoned the policy of
inducting only politically reliable young men into the ranks of the
GNA. The policy of selective recruitment had left politically disloyal
elements free to engage in subversion or even to join the guerrillas.
Under the new system, all eligible males were drafted, with the less
reliable stationed in the less vital posts. The worst cases were sent to
the island of Makronisos for political education.
The GNA also began the practice of removing civilians from the
vicinity of insurgent strongholds targeted for attack. This imposed
a temporary hardship on the villagers involved, but it also deprived
the Communists of intelligence and food. One keen student of the
war has identified the removal of the population from around guer-
rilla-controlled areas as a secret of the success of the Greek govern-
ment. Of equal importance, the GNA became more attentive to the
fact that it was not enough simply to chase armed guerrillas out of
an area; the civilian infrastructure also had to be uprooted if gov-
ernment success was to be lasting.66 Thanks to improved intelligence,
the government found it easier to infiltrate its agents into the Yiafaka
organization.
All these changes, along with American assistance, were bring-
ing the GNA into good material and moral shape. From mid-1948,
therefore, the GNA's real need was not to increase its numbers and
equipment but rather to use them with greater efficiency and deter-
mination. Above all, the GNA required skilled and aggressive lead-
ership: "all depended on leadership and morale."67 And in that
crucial sphere, improvement was on the way: in January 1949 the
king appointed Gen. Alexander Papagos as commander in chief of
the Greek armed forces.
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Papagos, a successful commander in the Albanian war of 1940,
had sufficient seniority and prestige to overcome the habitual indis-
cipline among high Greek Army officers. He had refused to accept
appointment as commander in chief unless he was given supreme
power to remove incompetent or disobedient officers. His self-con-
fidence and spirit of aggressiveness, his attention to detail and de-
termination to have his orders strictly complied with gave army
operations the unity and vigor they had previously lacked.68
The systematic clearing out of both the guerrillas and the Yiafaka
infrastructure from southern and central Greece was a high priority
for Papagos. This was strategically a sound choice, owing to that
region's distance from the Communist borders and its conservative
sympathies. Once the GNA had chased out the guerrillas and bro-
ken the Yiafaka in the south, Papagos repeated the operation in other
regions. His intention was to pin the Democratic Army against the
northern borders while depriving it of its network of civilian sym-
pathizers and agents, so that it would become like a great tree with
withered roots. Meanwhile, the British and American military mis-
sions gave Papagos good advice, partly because they could speak to
him not from the point of view of domestic Greek politics (the plague
of the GNA), but as detached professionals. In essence, though, Gen-
eral (later Field Marshal) Papagos simply forced the GNA to do what
it had the capability to do, and that turned out to be enough.69 His
task was made very much easier by the mistakes of his opponents
on both sides of the border.
As 1949 dawned, although no one in Athens or Washington knew
it for sure, the Democratic Army was on the verge of defeat.70 U.S.
assistance, increased unity among the noncommunist political forces,
and the leadership of General Papagos were all playing essential
roles in bringing it to this point. Even more important, however,
were two crucial decisions of the insurgent leadership: to terrorize
the peasantry and to conventionalize their tactics.
The Communists and the People
Relations between the guerrillas and the peasantry underwent a
profound change between the end of the German occupation and
the height of the insurgency. ELAS had stressed united resistance to
the Germans. Many peasants had responded, providing food, shel-
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ter, and information. But during the civil war, the Democratic Army
was getting supplies from across the frontiers and thus felt itself less
dependent on peasant goodwill. At the same time, peasants who
had been willing to give some help against the Germans were reluc-
tant to participate in an uprising against a Greek government.
Under these circumstances, the fact that most of the leadership
of the Democratic Army was made up of Communists became cru-
cial. The segment of the population that was attracted into the Com-
munist Party was not only numerically slender but also sociologically
unrepresentative. The leadership was drawn from lower-middle-
class intellectuals; most of the members either came from areas only
recently acquired by Greece or were students, tobacco workers, or
seamen, socially marginal groups in a predominantly peasant coun-
try. As the conflict wore on, Communist behavior toward the peas-
ants deteriorated. Supplied with information about the identities of
nationalist sympathizers and the location of their homes, Democratic
Army units would swoop down upon a village or small town and
kill those suspects and their families. Then they would carry off scarce
foodstuffs, forced recruits, and hostages. Further, the insurgents of-
ten deliberately destroyed whole villages for no other purpose than
to create hungry refugees that the government would be hard pressed
to feed and house. Sometimes they committed atrocities with no
discernible explanation at all. In addition, children were taken from
their homes and sent to be trained as guerrillas or Communist func-
tionaries in Eastern Europe. Of the twenty-eight thousand children
thus removed from Greece, only about half were ever repatriated.71
Later efforts of the International Red Cross to obtain information on
the missing children had little success.
The guerrillas, by thus antagonizing the mountain people, un-
dercut themselves in their own immediate theater of operations,
destroying their last chance to build up a reliable base populated
with supportive civilians. By mid-1948 at the latest, it had become
evident that the insurgency had few followers in the cities; in Ath-
ens, the scene of many grisly hostage murders in 1945, even the small
proletariat was apathetic. The purging of the entire Communist lead-
ership group in the capital city produced no beneficial change. And
in the Peloponnesus, guerrilla activity had never been very success-
ful, because of both the relatively adequate transportation system
and the conservative sentiment of the region.
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The principal objectives of the KKE and the Democratic Army
had been to bring the economy crashing down and to break the GNA.
American assistance removed any serious chance of attaining either
of these objectives; moreover, Communist economic warfare had
alienated large numbers of originally neutral civilians and filled all
Greece with fear of a Communist victory.72 One ominous consequence
of these serious and self-inflicted political wounds was that help
from the neighboring Communist regimes was becoming ever more
crucial to the insurgents.
Adopting Conventional Tactics
Sometime in early 1947, the Communist leadership decided to erect
a counterstate, a "Free Greece." A state needs a permanent territory
and a capital city to receive accredited foreign diplomats; hence, in
late May 1947 the Democratic Army sought to capture and hold the
town of Fiorina, near the Albanian border. After severe fighting the
insurgents withdrew, defeated. Nevertheless, the desire to set up a
counterstate endured, and the insurgents actually proclaimed its
birth on December 24,1947. That was a mistake; when neither the
Soviets nor any satellite state recognized the existence of Free Greece,
the project suffered a grave moral setback. And to get themselves a
capital, the insurgents again decided to abandon their largely suc-
cessful guerrilla tactics and launch a major conventional attack on a
suitably sized town. They chose Konitsa, only five miles from the
Albanian border. On December 25,1947, about 5,000 insurgents vig-
orously attacked the town and its 1,300 GNA defenders. Konitsa
was soon surrounded, and Greek aircraft had to drop supplies into
it. The government placed tremendous importance on this battle:
Queen Frederika herself flew into the besieged town to hearten the
defenders. On January 4 the attack was broken off, with Konitsa still
in national hands. Soon thereafter Parliament outlawed the Com-
munist Party.73
The best commander in the Democratic Army was Markos
Vafiades. Usually called simply Markos, he had come to Greece from
his birthplace in Anatolia as a teenager in 1923 and shortly thereaf-
ter joined the KKE. It was mainly because of his leadership that the
insurgents had been able to take control of so much Greek territory
and avoid costly confrontations with major elements of the GNA.
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Markos had objected to the assault on Konitsa; after the defeat there
in January 1948, he wanted to return to guerrilla tactics. Communist
Party boss Nikos Zachariades, however, opposed such a return. He
instead pressed more and more insistently for a permanent switch
to conventional war in order to break the GNA and open the road to
Athens. A schoolteacher, born like Markos in Anatolia, Zachariades
had gone to Moscow for training in the arts of Communist subver-
sion. He installed himself, on Kremlin orders, as secretary general of
the Greek Communist Party in 1931. He spent most of World War II
in the infamous Nazi concentration camp at Dachau; bom inside
and outside the party, questions arose as to exactly how he had man-
aged to emerge alive from that hellhole.74
Following the GNA assault on Mount Grammos in June 1948,
Markos had extricated his followers from their precarious position
and led them into Albania. But Zachariades continued to demand
that the Democratic Army adopt conventional tactics, that is, seiz-
ing and holding territory even in the face of GNA counterattacks. In
November 1948 Zachariades finally succeeded in ousting Markos
from command of the Democratic Army and also from his seat on
the KKE Central Committee. (Zachariades told Markos: "You will
become a worm and crawl before me.")75 Retaining his direction of
the KKE, he now exercised control over the Democratic Army as
well. Zachariades used his dictatorial power to turn the Democratic
Army away from guerrilla warfare, which had brought it control of
most of the territory of the country, to conventional warfare, which
would throw it directly against the numerically superior and better-
equipped Greek National Army.
Many students of the Greek civil war maintain that the insur-
gents turned to conventional warfare too early. One could argue,
however, that the switch was made much too late. Whatever one's
opinion on that score, by the second half of 1948, defeat for the in-
surgency was already looming. But when the insurgents, who lacked
an air force among other things, engaged in positional warfare with
a Greek Army that was improving every month in training, tactics,
numbers, equipment, and morale, their defeat became inevitable.
Why Zachariades made this fateful decision is not entirely clear.
True, he was unfamiliar with the nature of guerrilla warfare, having
been in prison during the ELAS period. And he was not well in-
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formed about the improvement in training and morale that the GNA
had been experiencing during 1948. Other possible explanations in-
clude his evaluation of the current strategic situation faced by the
Democratic Army. The main object of the guerrillas had been to dis-
rupt the Greek economy to the breaking point; but the inflow of
economic aid from the United States had short-circuited that strate-
gic aim. The increasingly bitter dispute between Tito and Stalin (the
Cominform expelled Tito on June 28, 1948) and the decision by
Zachariades that the Greek Communists would support Stalin meant
that the loss of the Yugoslav sanctuary was only a matter of time.
Clearly, the sands of the insurgency were running out. Perhaps jeal-
ousy of the heroic and popular figure of Markos also motivated
Zachariades. He saw to it that no one from the ranks of ELAS was
ever again allowed to attain an important post within the party. Later
on, he would personally engineer the expulsion from the party of
all the most successful guerrilla leaders.76
Whatever caused Zachariades to fire his best military commander
and impose conventional warfare tactics on the Democratic Army,
the result was disaster. It ranks with the terrorism against the rural
population as an explanation of the ultimate defeat of the Commu-
nist insurgency.
Under the new policy of Zachariades, in December 1948 and
January 1949 the Democratic Army mounted several major conven-
tional attacks on sizable villages and towns, seizing a lot of food
and taking many young men and women as hostages. Such assaults
made it necessary for the guerrillas to assemble in large columns, a
procedure that of course rendered them vulnerable to attacks by the
ever-improving Royal Greek Air Force and to encircling movements
by the GNA. In February 1949 Zachariades directed a renewed at-
tack against Fiorina, in which the Democratic Army employed heavy
artillery on a large scale. Nevertheless, the attack failed, and the in-
surgents suffered numerous casualties, perhaps as many as half their
forces. By this time two-thirds of the Democratic Army was com-
posed of Macedonians.77
Morale within the Democratic Army began to sink. One reason
for this, of course, was the very high rate of casualties resulting from
the change to conventional warfare. Another was that in the late win-
ter of 1948 the Cominform, under Stalin's orders, proclaimed its sup-
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port for an independent Macedonia. This announcement caused con-
sternation within Greece and within the Greek Communist Party as
well. The hostile reaction only increased, if possible, when Zachariades
forced the politburo of the KKE to endorse the Moscow line.
Intended to hurt Yugoslavia's Tito, Moscow's Macedonian ma-
neuver undermined what little prestige remained to the Democratic
Army, and desertions from it accelerated. The Democratic Army was
more and more composed of forced recruits. Macedonians were the
other major component, in part because an increasingly better-trained
GNA, employing steadily improving tactics, was destroying or oth-
erwise eliminating guerrilla units in southern Greece. The Demo-
cratic Army still had about 25,000 men and women by the end of
1948; by mid-1949 that number was down to around 20,000, of whom
seven in ten were Macedonians. Most of the time only about half of
the insurgents were inside Greece.78
At the same time, the national armed forces were growing ever
stronger. They now included 150,000 regular troops, plus 50,000
members of the National Defense Corps (whose main function was
to take over positions of static defense in order to release GNA troops
for active combat), along with 25,000 in the paramilitary gendar-
merie. The unified command under Papagos, the gradual weeding
out of incompetent officers, the spreading effects of American aid,
and, not least, the deepening conviction that its members were fight-
ing not only about forms of government but for the very territorial
integrity of the motherland (i.e., to keep Macedonia Greek)—all these
factors helped to solidify the Greek armed forces into a power that
the physically and morally diminishing Democratic Army had little
hope of withstanding. But perhaps nothing raised the morale of the
government side and withered that of the insurgents more than the
disappearance of the Yugoslav sanctuary.
Tito Closes the Border
For months, the Yugoslav dictator Tito had been imposing more and
more restrictions on the movements of the insurgents. Finally, in
July 1949, he closed the border to the guerrillas.79 Tito's move against
the Democratic Army and the KKE behind it, as well as his break
with Stalin, would hardly have been possible if Britain and America
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had not assisted the Greek national government. If the Democratic
Army had won in Greece, Tito would have found himself almost
completely surrounded by Moscow's satellites, an untenable posi-
tion from which to defy the Kremlin.
Closing the border to the guerrillas hurt them in several ways.
In the first place, the guerrillas in most of northern Greece no longer
had shelter from pursuing GNA troops. From now on, guerrillas
who found themselves pressed against the Yugoslav frontier would
face either capture or death. GNA operations, so frustrated for years
by the open border, would now almost always bear fruit.
A second consequence was that ending the free passage of armed
units from Yugoslavia to Greece and back again in effect sealed sev-
eral thousand Greek guerrillas inside Yugoslavia, where they could
render no assistance at all to the Democratic Army in Greece itself.
Third, that part of Greece lying between the Yugoslav border
and the Aegean Sea was under the fairly firm control of the GNA.
Hence, guerrilla units in Thrace (the area of Greece closest to Bul-
garia) were now cut off from the rest of Greece. The GNA could
destroy them or drive them into Bulgaria at leisure. The isolation of
the guerrillas inside Yugoslavia and in Thrace reduced for practical
purposes the number of the Democratic Army's fighting personnel
by almost a third.80
Fourth, and certainly not least, Tito's move had shut down a
major lifeline, cutting off most supplies to the Democratic Army that
had come not only from Yugoslavia but also from Albania. Albanian
territory was still available as a sanctuary, but most of the supplies
that had flowed across the Greek-Albanian border had had their
origin in Yugoslavia, or at least had passed through that country.
This compounded the disaster for the Democratic Army, because at
least three-quarters of its weapons and all of its heavy equipment
(mortars, antitank guns, and so on) came from across the borders.
With the Yugoslav frontier closed, the sealing of the Albanian bor-
der became the primary strategic objective of the GNA. It was all
over but the last act.
Some students of the war have maintained that although the
Democratic Army would probably have given up the struggle long
before it did had there been no open frontiers, closing the Yugoslav
border in 1949 was not as decisive as is sometimes thought, because
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the Democratic Army had clearly lost the war before the closing oc-
curred.81 Perhaps; nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to believe that
if the frontiers had remained open to the insurgents and they had
persisted in guerrilla tactics, the conflict could have gone on for a
much longer time.82
Finale
Still insisting that the Communists must abandon guerrilla tactics
for conventional combat, Zachariades erected another "impregnable"
bastion in the Grammos Mountain area. There he conveniently as-
sembled 12,000 insurgents for the GNA to attack. The final GNA
offensive against the Grammos stronghold began in August 1949,
with the assistance of 50 ex-U.S. Navy Helldiver aircraft. The Demo-
cratic Army lost more than 2,000 killed, captured, or surrendered.
On August 31, for the last time, sizable guerrilla units scuttled back
across the Albanian frontier. The Albanian government announced
that they would be disarmed and detained.83
And in those same days, Zachariades accused high-ranking lead-
ers of the KKE of being lifelong traitors and agents of the hated Brit-
ish. Zachariades knew that Marxism-Leninism could never be wrong;
nor could those who opposed Greek Communism possibly have been
popular and strong. He therefore looked elsewhere for the explana-
tion of Communist defeat. He believed (or at least proclaimed) that
he found it in a colossal conspiracy of false Communists to betray
the revolution.84
Radio Free Greece, the voice of the Communist insurgents, an-
nounced on October 16, 1949, that military operations were being
suspended. And on November 28 President Truman informed Con-
gress that the Greek government had emerged victorious from the
civil war.
Casualty figures vary from source to source. A reasonable esti-
mate of casualties for Greek national forces, including the gendar-
merie, would be 17,000 dead and 40,000 wounded or unaccounted
for. The guerrillas executed more than 4,000 civilians and burned
twelve thousand homes and ninety-eight railroad stations.85 Greek
government forces killed at least 37,000 guerrillas and captured an-
other 20,000.
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Learning from the Greek War
On the one hand, even before the outbreak of the civil war, the Greek
economy, underdeveloped to begin with, had been ravaged by years
of foreign war and occupation. Defeat and exile had disintegrated
the old army. The new army, badly equipped and poorly trained,
seethed with political intrigues and personal rivalries. Disputes be-
tween monarchists and republicans bitterly divided the political lead-
ership. On the other hand, with its rugged topography, primitive
communications, and guerrilla tradition, Greece was a country emi-
nently fitted for insurgency. Several years of struggle against the
Germans and EDES had helped the insurgents to develop and per-
fect their organization and tactics. And they possessed sanctuaries
across the border that were not only places of safety and sources of
supply; they were also the outward sign of their alliance with inter-
national Communism, a political force that seemed to many in those
days to be the wave of the future. With all these advantages, how
did the insurgency fail?
Although it was not at all clear at the time, the Greek civil war
turned out to be "a textbook case of everything that can go wrong in
an insurgency."86 Some of the problems of the insurgents arose un-
controllably from their environment, others were of their own mak-
ing, and certain of their weaknesses had at first been mistaken for
strengths. Although students of the war dispute their relative weight,
probably all would agree that a list of major causes of the insurgency's
defeat must include two external factors—foreign assistance to the
Greek government and the closing of the Yugoslav border—and two
self-destructive errors by the KKE: the badly timed adoption of con-
ventional warfare and the alienation of the Greek people.
Foreign Help for the Greek Government
After World War II, guerrilla movements, or revolutionary armies
founded on guerrilla movements, came to power in Yugoslavia,
China, and Vietnam. In those countries the authority of the previ-
ous government had been destroyed by foreign invaders, and then
those invaders were themselves defeated by other foreign states,
leaving a power vacuum for the insurgents to fill. Greece escaped
that pattern. Outside intervention foiled the Communist takeover
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of Greece not once but twice: intervention by the British in 1944—
1945 and by the Americans after 1947.
The Royal Greek Government's dependence on foreign advice
and support apparently did its cause no harm. That was so for two
reasons. First, Britain had long been the patron and protector of
Greek independence and territorial aspirations, and the United
States was a land to which many Greeks had emigrated and from
which the emigres kept in close contact with relatives and friends
left behind in the mother country. A second reason was of course
that the public associated the Greek Communists with the Soviet
Union. The Greek Communist Party profited little from this iden-
tification. Stalin in effect left the Greek Communists to fend for
themselves when the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine made
it clear that if the war continued, U.S. involvement in the Balkans
would deepen and thus complicate Soviet relations with other
Communist states in that region. And Stalin did not even think it
worthwhile to invite the KKE to the 1947 founding meeting of the
Cominform.87
But quite beyond the Soviet question, many ordinary Greeks
identified the insurgents, and especially their leadership, with the
country's national enemies, notably Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. How-
ever convenient the foreign sanctuaries were to the insurgents, their
open dependence on Greece's northern neighbors must in the final
analysis be accounted a net loss for them. It was especially damag-
ing when the Soviet Union began trumpeting the idea of detaching
Macedonia from Greece and as Macedonians increasingly predomi-
nated in the ranks of the insurgent forces. That the KKE endorsed
(with reluctance) the Soviet policy of a "free" Macedonia only un-
derlined the connections between the insurgents and foreign pow-
ers who wished Greece little good.
The United States gave substantial help to the Athens govern-
ment; in fact, more American aid went to Greece per capita than to
any other country.88 One distinguished Greek student of the con-
flict maintains that American material help arrived too late to be a
major reason for the guerrillas' defeat. But a widespread view, es-
pecially among Western analysts, is that "it was above all America's
dispatch of military advisers, its reorganization of the Greek army,
its donation of enormous military supplies, its granting of economic
Greece • 183
aid, and even its intervention in internal political affairs, that kept
this key position on the southern flank of Europe out of Russian
control."89
Economic and military aid from the United States allowed the
Greeks to increase the size of their army and upgrade its equipment
without greatly disrupting the nation's economy. The United States
provided both the pressure and the means for the GNA to improve
its operations. And as the conflict developed, American aid to the
government increased while Communist help to the guerrillas de-
clined (precisely the reverse of what would happen in South Viet-
nam twenty-five years later).
It is nevertheless worthwhile to reflect that in important ways
Greece was a nearly ideal setting for a major U.S. effort to stop Com-
munist subversion. The Greek government was highly receptive to
American advice as well as aid, and the large majority of Greeks were
anticommunist, or at least not procommunist. American assistance
would certainly have had little effect if substantial segments of the
Greek population had not been resolved to resist the insurgents.90
Abandoning Guerrilla Tactics
Guerrilla warfare is the strategy of the weaker side, of those who
cannot openly confront the superior numbers, training, and equip-
ment of the opponent's regular armed forces. According to the clas-
sic Maoist formulation, the destiny of guerrillas is to grow in strength
until they can wage conventional war, that is, assemble in large num-
bers to occupy and hold specific territory against whatever attack
the enemy forces may mount, and then seek out those enemy forces
and bring them to battle. When guerrilla forces adopt conventional
tactics, by definition they throw away their great advantages of
mobility and surprise and give the regular army time to bring its
(presumably superior) numbers and equipment to bear. Clearly, then,
the switch from guerrilla to conventional war ought to occur only
when (and if) the insurgents are gaining physical and moral strength
and the government forces are losing both. The Democratic Army
had experimented with conventional tactics in the assaults on Fiorina
and Konitsa in 1947. Even though at that time the Greek National
Army was perhaps in its worst condition, the results had been bad
for the insurgents. To confront the GNA directly in the winter of
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1948-1949, with American help coming into play and the insurgency
clearly in decline, was a most egregious error.
Losing the Yugoslav Sanctuary
In the age of aircraft, Greece was arguably too small for classical guer-
rilla warfare. Sanctuary in the Communist states to the north, there-
fore, provided the insurgents with that space without which they
probably would not have been able to function for long. Certainly the
ability of the insurgents, when pressed by the GNA, to retreat across
friendly borders and receive shelter, training, and medical attention
was a major factor in sustaining the insurgency, despite its more subtle
negative aspects. One may perhaps better appreciate the importance
of the Yugoslav border closing by trying to imagine the consequences
in South Vietnam if the borders of Laos had been closed to the move-
ment of troops and supplies from North Vietnam.
The history of guerrilla conflict suggests the general rule that
guerrillas ought wherever possible to operate close to international
borders. Nevertheless, the Greek case proves that the possession of
sanctuaries may not always be an unmixed blessing. Dependence
on Greece's Communist neighbors identified the guerrillas in the
minds of many as an antinationalist element, and nowhere have
Communist insurgents come to power without having first suc-
ceeded in wrapping themselves, however uncomfortably, incongru-
ously, and impermanently, in the banners of nationalism.91 In Greece
nationalism clearly worked against the Communist side. Moreover,
the availability of escape across friendly borders caused the Greek
guerrillas to develop a particular mode of fighting; even when it
had become apparent that the Yugoslav frontier would soon be closed
to them, they were unable to adapt. And lastly, secure in their pos-
session of across-border sanctuaries, many guerrillas no doubt felt
freer than they otherwise might have to express their profound hos-
tility toward their peasant countrymen. Thus in the end sanctuaries,
much to be desired in theory, helped to undermine the guerrillas.
Alienating the Peasantry
Yet, in spite of all these errors and setbacks, could the Democratic
Army not have recommitted itself to guerrilla tactics, learned to live
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without its Yugoslav sanctuary, and thus hung on until the Ameri-
cans lost interest in Greece—until, for example, the outbreak of the
Korean War? The answer is Possibly—if the insurgents retained or
developed the support of a substantial share of the population.
Such support, however, did not exist, certainly not by 1949. Af-
ter the fighting had abated, elections in 1949 and 1950 showed the
Communists with about 10 percent of the electorate, a sufficient pool
from which to have drawn guerrillas but not nearly enough to have
overthrown even the wobbly Greek state. That is why the Commu-
nist Party's repeated calls for an uprising of the urban masses never
produced a response. Confronted by this uncanny, un-Marxist in-
difference to the cause of revolution shown by the citizens of Ath-
ens, the party fired the whole leadership in that city. The great
majority of the population declined to answer the repeated sum-
mons to revolution for at least two good reasons. First, although
from a military point of view Greece was a nearly ideal locus for a
guerrilla-based revolutionary effort, from a political standpoint it
was much less than that. Some observers believe that democratic
governments, at least in the short term, are not very efficient at cop-
ing with insurgency. That may be true. But it is certainly true that to
overthrow by internal rebellion a government based on popular con-
sent, or even with the trappings of such consent, is very difficult.
That is because many who might long for profound changes in the
life of the society cannot be mobilized for armed struggle and fratri-
cidal destruction if there exists, or seems to exist, a nonviolent path
to the desired changes.92 Parliamentary government provides such
a path, and Greece possessed a parliamentary government, how-
ever threadbare.
But surely, in a country like postwar Greece, with so much pov-
erty and so many tensions, the existence of a parliamentary govern-
ment did not have to be an insuperable handicap. The Communists
should have been able to build outward from their hard core, gath-
ering support with a program of radical redistribution. At the very
least they could have amassed a large following among the peas-
ants in the mountainous districts that the insurgents controlled most
of the time. But that did not happen. And here we have the second
reason why the revolutionary appeals of the KKE fell on barren soil,
indeed the key to the defeat of the insurgents: "The rebels failed
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because the mass of the people was against them."93 As the conflict
went on, support for the Democratic Army and the KKE behind it
withered, especially in the villages.
How did the withering occur? After the end of the civil war, a
member of the KKE Politburo provided an explanation: the defeat
of the Communists was the bitter fruit of "the policy of devastation
of the countryside." And how to account for this "policy of devasta-
tion?" The guerrillas had safe supply sources over the frontiers and
thus were relatively independent of the peasantry. But clearly not
all guerrilla movements that have enjoyed sanctuaries (such as the
Afghan mujahideen) have antagonized the civilians among whom
they operated. The answer lies in the character of the driving force
behind the insurgency in Greece: the Communist Party. The party's
hard core was not merely unrepresentative of the majority of Greeks;
it was profoundly hostile to them. Communist activists were contemp-
tuous and ashamed of the mass of the peasantry, whom they viewed
as ignorant, superstitious, and irredeemably petit-bourgeois. Here
lies the root of the conscious and unconscious policy of trying to
elicit cooperation or passivity in the villages through terror.94
The years of the German occupation witnessed the beginnings
of this epiphany of hostility: ELAS guerrillas deliberately brought
down the Nazi wrath upon helpless villagers. The fratricidal pro-
pensities of ELAS were even more strikingly revealed during the
1944 fighting in Athens, when "the Communists, whose many atroci-
ties were perpetrated mostly upon innocent and defenseless hos-
tages, came to be hated with a passion rare in the nation's history."
Finally, the hostility of the KKE toward the common folk attained its
full dimensions during the civil war in the policy of gaining power
by destroying the economic life of the nation at whatever cost to the
peasants. In a Brave New Stalinist Greece, the fate of the peasants
was to be not liberation but liquidation. Thus the Communists, by
their brutality against the peasants, poisoned the waters in which
they had to swim.93
American assistance enabled the Greek Army to hold together
and grow stronger. Closing the Yugoslav frontier shortened the con-
flict. But the insurgents themselves violated the two must funda-
mental rules of guerrilla warfare: make friends with the civilians
among whom you must exist, and never fight unless you are certain
Greece • 187
to win. In these ways they became the principal architects of their
own defeat.
Under unpropitious circumstances, in a poor and devastated land
hedged by Soviet satellite states and within striking distance of the
Soviet Army, the United States helped to achieve the total defeat of
a major Communist insurgency without committing its own com-
bat troops. The outcome of the Greek conflict must be accounted a
major triumph of U.S. policy.
Yet, suppose the leadership of the Greek Communist party had
been a bit more sagacious. Specifically, what if it had had the simple
common sense not to terrorize the peasantry among whom it had to
operate? And suppose further that a better-directed Communist in-
surgency had manifested itself at a time when American political
leaders believed (as they did not in 1947) that the United States pos-
sessed sufficient armed forces to sustain a significant intervention
on the ground? What would have happened then?
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Back to the Philippines
The Huks
A traumatic Japanese occupation of the Philippines during World
War II provided the opportunity for a Communist-organized attempt
to take over political power in that country by force of arms. The
attempt ended in frustration, in part because of American policies.
The Philippines became the first republic in Asia to defeat a Com-
munist insurgency.
The Japanese Occupation
The Republic of the Philippines celebrated its first Independence
Day on July 4,1946. On that day Manuel Roxas was sworn in as the
new republic's first president. The country over which he presided
had a population of about 20 million.
It was less than a year since World War II had ended, and the
Philippine republic was celebrating its birthday amid great devas-
tation. In the eyes of many Japanese, the Pacific War had been the
latest and greatest episode in the epic confrontation between the
European and the Asian races. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-
1905, for the first time in modern history an oriental nation dealt a
decisive defeat to a major occidental power. That conflict had pro-
vided compelling evidence to Japanese expansionists that it was their
nation's destiny to put an end one day to white domination over
Asia. From Shanghai to Sumatra, Imperial Japan must destroy Cau-
casian colonialism and gather all the teeming lands of the East into
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Nevertheless, in their
three-and-a-half-year occupation of the Philippines, the Japanese
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committed appalling atrocities against its Asian inhabitants. Carlos
P. Romulo, who after the war became foreign minister of the Philip-
pines, wrote that the brutal behavior of the Japanese arose from the
frustration and outrage they felt when so many Filipinos openly
sided with the Americans, the white enemy.1 Besides experiencing
an exceedingly cruel occupation, the Philippines saw some of the
hardest fighting in all of World War II, including the Battle of Leyte
Gulf, the largest naval engagement in the history of the planet. At
the war's end, widespread social disorganization and serious eco-
nomic hardship confronted the fledgling republic, and 70 percent of
Manila lay destroyed.
Many Filipinos had organized to resist the Japanese occupation.
In March 1942 a mainly Communist group founded the People's
Army Against Japan. The Tagalog acronym of this group was
Hukbalahap, hence the nickname Huks. By late 1943 there were per-
haps ten thousand Huks. At the end of the war they were well
equipped with Japanese or American weapons. As in German-oc-
cupied Greece, the Communist-directed guerrilla bands in the Phil-
ippines looked to the postwar period; they fought not only the
Japanese but also guerrilla units loyal to the United States. With the
end of the war, the Japanese departed, but the Huks did not lay
down their arms. Tensions increased between the Huks and the au-
thorities of the new Philippine republic. The U.S. Army was reluc-
tant to confer any legal status on the Huks or to pay them for their
alleged wartime services. Furthermore, the Huks wanted severe
punishment for all Filipinos who had collaborated with the Japa-
nese occupation; the American policy, in contrast, was to draw a
curtain over the activities of those difficult occupation days; that
policy would permit former collaborators eventually to reassume
positions of influence. For example, Manuel Roxas, born in 1892,
had served in the pro-Japanese Laurel government during World
War II but had been saved from prosecution by the intervention of
Douglas Mac Arthur.2 He then achieved election as the first president
of the republic with the support of the venerable and dominant
Nacionalista Party's liberal wing, which set itself up as the Liberal
Party. When President Roxas ordered a crackdown on disorders in
the countryside, the Huks entered into open armed rebellion.
The main island of the archipelago is Luzon, with an area of
forty thousand square miles, the size of Kentucky. The focus of Huk
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activity was there. Central Luzon had long been an area of wide-
spread absentee landlordism, one of the greatest curses that can be-
fall an agricultural community. Violent agrarian unrest had been the
main theme of the history of this part of the Philippines from time
immemorial. Serious social ills went unheeded by a mainly Filipino
administration out of touch with the common people and rife with
corruption. Officials high and low exploited the peasantry in a vari-
ety of ways.
The widespread and sometimes quite open collaboration by
Luzon landlords with the wartime Japanese occupation scandalized
a growing number of peasants already exasperated with the diffi-
culties of their lives. Luis Taruc, who emerged as the principal Huk
military leader, wrote: "When we dealt with [the landlords] harshly,
it was because they were betraying our country to the Japanese and
oppressing the common people. This knowledge of the period is
essential to an understanding of Huk activities." The Huk conflict
with the Japanese had been partly a response to the oppressive na-
ture of the occupation. It was also, however, an expression of the
deep anxieties produced by the breakdown of traditional patron-
client relationships in the countryside, a breakdown stimulated by
overpopulation. Carlos P. Romulo noted that "the majority of Huk
complaints came out of injustices concerning the land." Years after
the rebellion was over, Taruc wrote: "It must be fully understood
that one cannot separate the problem of rebellion from that of the
peasantry. It is most important to recognize that this is an urgent
problem—perhaps the most urgent of our day—in every one of the
newly developed [sic] countries." Gen. Douglas MacArthur, whose
name is inextricably linked with the history of the Philippines, once
tartly observed, "If I worked in those sugarfields, I'd probably be a
Huk myself."3
The Huks Gain Ground
The Huks employed against the Philippine republic the classic meth-
ods of guerrilla warfare so familiar to the islands. They were espe-
cially efficient at robbing payroll offices, trains, and cargo trucks in
central Luzon.4 Their success in such operations no doubt owed a
great deal to the presence among their recruits of groups that can
correctly be labeled common criminals.
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The paramilitary Philippine Constabulary was the government's
main instrument for dealing with this challenge. The constabulary
was not well prepared for this sort of warfare, or for any other. The
United States had handed over to the new Philippine republic sur-
plus war equipment worth billions of dollars in the money of the
early 2000s. Little found its way into the hands of the armed forces;
much of it was simply stolen. The constabulary's tactical response
to the Huks was unimaginative and largely useless. Edward
Lansdale, the Air Force major general who served as an intimate
security adviser to the presidents of both the Philippines and South
Vietnam, wrote critically of the usually futile and often destructive
encirclement tactics used by government forces.5
Inadequate equipment and poor tactics were not the total of the
constabulary's shortcomings. The treatment of the peasants of Luzon
at the hands of both the constabulary and civil officials fueled the
Huk revolt. The propensity of soldiers to help themselves to the
possessions of the peasants and to commit even worse offenses
against these humble citizens of the republic whom they were sup-
posed to be serving and protecting produced many recruits and sup-
porters for the Huks, especially between 1948 and 1950. Soldiers led
by good officers do not systematically abuse civilians, especially
those of their own nationality. The oppressive behavior of Filipino
troops reflected in large part the influence of political interference
within the officer corps that corrupted the soul of the armed forces
and reduced their antiguerrilla efforts to worse than nothing. Years
later, Luis Taruc consistently maintained that the true regenerative
source of the Huk rebellion was government provocation and ter-
rorism against the hapless civilians.6 Without abuses of this kind,
the Huk rebellion might never have assumed the serious propor-
tions it eventually attained.
On the death of President Manuel Roxas in 1948, Vice President
Elpidio Quirino (born 1890) succeeded to the presidency. The Huks
believed that Quirino's continuation in the Malacanan Palace would
prolong and aggravate the corruption and inefficiency of the na-
tional government and thus smooth their path to power. They there-
fore cynically supported his reelection efforts as much as they could.
But Quirino did not need the help of the Huks. He held onto the
office by vote buying, vote stealing, and voter intimidation on a
massive scale. The "dirty election of 1949" was a boon to the Huks:
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by undermining the faith of both intellectuals and common citizens
in the processes of democracy, it seemed to close off the path to peace-
ful change.7 If there was no hope of removing an oppressive and
corrupt government through the ballot box, then all disaffected ele-
ments of the population would eventually have to turn to armed
rebellion under the leadership of the Huks. Taruc maintains that
several members of the wartime Huk movement who had been
elected to Congress in 1947 were illegally deprived of their seats
and became convinced thereby that armed revolt was the only valid
option. The perversion of the electoral process in the Philippines
was thus worth thousands of fighters to the Huk cause.
Ramon Magsaysay Defeats the Huks
Less than four years after the end of World War II, while civil war
continued in Greece, the long struggle in China neared its fateful
climax, and Ho Chi Mirth's forces struggled on in French Vietnam,
the Communist-led rebellion in the Philippines increased in strength.
The Huks had between 11,000 and 15,000 fighters. Opposing them
were somewhere around 25,000 members of the constabulary. At
the end of 1949, Mao proclaimed the establishment of the Chinese
People's Republic; in imitation of their victorious ideological broth-
ers in China, the Philippine Communists changed the name of their
armed forces to the People's Liberation Army. By June 1950, when
the North Koreans invaded the South, the Huks were able to deploy
around 20,000 guerrillas. Although the guerrilla leader Luis Taruc
wrote afterward that there was never any real danger that Manila
would fall to the Huks, during 1950 the rebellion was obviously
reaching a new and dangerous level. In March and again in August
1950, the Huks carried out some spectacular raids in the Manila area.
The boldness and magnitude of these operations shocked the Quirino
administration into realizing that the war was going badly: some-
thing drastically different had to be done. President Quirino called
in the army to assist the out-classed constabulary. And in Septem-
ber 1950 he appointed as secretary of defense, to be directly in charge
of fighting the Huks, Ramon Magsaysay.8
Of pure Malay stock, unlike much of the Philippine elite,
Magsaysay had been born in 1907, the son of a high school carpen-
try teacher. He was a bus company manager before World War II
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and served as a Liberal Party congressman from 1946 to 1950, be-
coming chairman of the House National Defense Committee. But to
the Quirino administration, Magsaysay's primary credential was that
he had fought as a guerrilla against the Japanese occupation and
therefore presumably would know how to fight the Huks. This ex-
pectation proved to be exceedingly well founded.
For Magsaysay the first order of business was clearly to improve
relations between his troops and the peasantry; it is a sound prin-
ciple that when "competing with a vigorous rebellion, a precarious
authority should be concerned with respect for the people's dignity
at least as much as with the level of their income." Ex-guerrilla
Magsaysay knew from experience that big sweeps by government
military units were hardly ever effective. Even if the rebels have not
been previously tipped off by informants, guerrillas can hardly help
but hear the movement of large numbers of troops from very far
away.9 But worse than that, sweeps provide too many occasions for
the abuse of civilians: tired soldiers, unable to catch their ever-elu-
sive enemies, will often vent their frustrations on the civilians at
hand. Magsaysay therefore instructed his commanders that troops
should never enter a village in an attitude of hostility unless they
were sure it contained active guerrillas. Instead, soldiers should
approach peasants as if they were, or were soon to become, allies.
Remembering the American GIs of World War II, Magsaysay sup-
plied candy for his soldiers to hand out to village children. He also
saw to it that the army provided medical help to peasants who
needed it. In a really brilliant move, Magsaysay had army lawyers
represent poor peasants in land cases against wealthy landlords, and
peasant litigants actually won many of these cases. Within a matter
of months, Magsaysay's reforms began to improve the image of the
armed forces and undermine the hopes of the Huks.10
As a cause of Huk success, the armed forces' poor military tac-
tics had ranked second to their poor relations with villagers. (These
two deficiencies—bad field tactics and bad civil relations—seem al-
most always to go together.) Demanding more aggressiveness from
his soldiers, Magsaysay sent Battalion Combat Teams to enter areas
where the armed forces had not gone before. Feeling safe in these
unvisited areas, the Huks had been using them to improve their liv-
ing standards by growing food in fields they had laboriously cleared.
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The discovery of the food-growing areas by government forces meant
serious hardships for many Huks. Interference with their food sup-
plies can have an even more disruptive effect on guerrillas than in-
terference with their weapons supplies. Eventually, the troops
learned not to move in until just before the crops were ready for
harvesting. Toward the end of 1951, aggressive tactics on the part of
Magsaysay's troops forced the remaining Huks to retreat into
swamps and other undesirable areas; there they were cut off from
contact with civilians, unable to obtain sufficient food, and exposed
to numerous illnesses.11
Magsaysay understood what happened to reforms when their
instigator simply issues instructions and then sits in his office, ex-
pecting them to be carried out. To ensure compliance with his direc-
tives to military commanders concerning correct treatment of
civilians and aggressive tactics against guerrillas, he made numer-
ous unexpected visits, usually by plane, to military forces even in
remote areas. Edward Lansdale, a close adviser to Magsaysay, has
recorded how the defense secretary's unscheduled descents from
on high to bestow medals and praise or to remove on the spot lazy
and incompetent commanders electrified the military into confor-
mity with his wishes.12 Magsaysay introduced a special telegraph
service to his headquarters; for a nominal fee, any citizen in the coun-
try could send the secretary of defense a message about abuses or
problems. He also placed the constabulary under military (that is,
under his) control. He fired all the incompetents and criminals he could
find (alas, there were more than a few) and also those who had estab-
lished comfortable or lucrative relationships with the guerrillas.
Magsaysay singled out the leaders of the insurgency for special
attention. He offered what to ordinary Filipinos were fabulous re-
wards for the arrest of individual Huk leaders, identified by name—
not as rebels but as felons, wanted for a particular criminal act, such
as murder, rape, or arson, at a particular time and place. Magsaysay
widely publicized the names of Huk leaders captured in this way.
These procedures helped reduce the image of the Huks from Robin
Hoods to common criminals. They also sowed dissension between
Huk leaders and their followers: no insurgent commander could be
sure whether or for how long his comrades would be able to resist
the allure of sudden wealth. Another special weapon against the
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Huks consisted of small ranger units whose unique function was to
track down and kill notorious Huk leaders.13 Predictably, leadership
roles among the Huks rapidly lost their former attractiveness.
No weapon against guerrillas is more effective than a good in-
telligence organization. The intelligence available to the armed forces
greatly improved under Magsaysay, partly because the image of the
soldiers benefited from their new respect for civilian dignity partly
because Magsaysay offered big rewards for information leading to
the capture of guerrillas or the discovery of arms caches, and partly
because of the universal rule that intelligence flows more freely to
the side that is perceived to be winning. Intercepted couriers often
provided valuable information. As in other insurgencies, captured
guerrillas, when treated well, often changed sides and offered their
captors all kinds of interesting intelligence. Through such sources
Magsaysay was able to bag most of the members of the politburo of
the Philippine Communist Party, along with literally truckloads of
documents that provided him and his military commanders with
much fascinating reading.14
But the easiest and cheapest solution to guerrilla war is to over-
come the guerrillas' will to fight and induce them to surrender. The
increased pressure on the Huks was having that effect, but
Magsaysay went further. He knew that many who fought with the
Huks were neither convinced Communists nor hardened criminals;
he could win them over with the right approach. So Magsaysay de-
veloped his amnesty policy. The announcements of amnesty care-
fully avoided the word "surrender," using in its place euphemisms
such as "coming in." The amnesty policy also excluded real crimi-
nals, thus further sowing discord within rebel ranks.15 (Government
forces should take great care to rigidly segregate guerrillas who have
surrendered from those who have been captured.)
Many of the Huks, however, could not simply "come in." Some
Filipinos had joined the Huks when they were mere boys; for them
and for others the movement had been home and family for a de-
cade. If they left the guerrilla organization, they would have no place
to go. It was therefore necessary to provide these unfortunates with
a new life. Magsaysay's wise solution to this problem was to open
up virgin lands on southern islands far from Luzon to provide a
homestead to any surrendered guerrilla who wanted one. A former
Huk normally received twenty acres; he also got help from the army
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to build a little house, a small loan to tide him over until the first
crop, and maybe a work animal or two. Those who accepted this
amnesty-with-a-farm changed overnight from threats to the consti-
tutional order into productive and eventually taxpaying citizens.
The final payoff, once the land-to-surrendered-Huks policy was seen
to be working, was that popular opinion began to turn against those
Huks who continued fighting: since the war was obviously lost, was
it perhaps that these holdout guerrillas did not want to give up be-
cause they did not wish to work on the land like peasants?16
A house, some cash, and a little land: so simple a concept, so
inexpensive a program, so effective a weapon against the guerrillas.
Naturally, these methods did not work with the ideologically moti-
vated intellectuals who composed the hard core of the insurgency,
but Magsaysay's progressive isolation of those individuals from their
peasant base reduced them to the status of fish out of water.
The 1951 congressional elections were approaching. Eager to
avoid a repetition of the travesties of 1949, some members of the
Commission on Elections requested the assistance of the secretary
of defense. With the help of a civic action group called the National
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), which is still in exist-
ence today, Magsaysay deployed the army to ensure relatively peace-
ful balloting and an honest count. Compared to the 1949 presidential
contest, the 1951 elections were a model of orderliness and probity;
in fact, the opposition Nacionalista Party won every single senate
seat up for election that year. By demonstrating that there was in-
deed a realistic alternative to violence for the adjustment of griev-
ances, the elections dealt a major blow to the insurgency: "to all
intents and purposes, the 1951 elections sounded the death knell of
the Hukbalahap movement."17
Magsaysay Becomes President
Ramon Magsaysay improved military tactics against the Huks, cut
down military abuse of the civilian population, and ensured clean
congressional elections in 1951. He employed the same combina-
tion of tactics against the Huks that the Americans had used a half-
century before against Aguinaldo's followers: unrelenting military
pressure plus the mitigation of serious irritants. As a result thou-
sands of Huks were captured or killed, gave themselves up, or just
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melted away from the movement. Yet as secretary of defense, sub-
ordinate to President Quirino, Magsaysay lacked the full power to
uproot the political and economic abuses that contributed to the Huk
rebellion. "Good troops employing proper tactics cannot make up
for an unsound government and political base." Therefore, in March
1953 Magsaysay resigned his defense post to seek the presidential
nomination of the opposition Nacionalista Party. As the Magsaysay
campaign unfolded, Filipinos saw for the first time a major presi-
dential candidate leave the comfortable and predictable route of the
large cities to seek votes and speak to the people in the villages and
the remote islands.18 (In contrast, Quirino was recovering from seri-
ous surgery and took a relatively less visible part in the campaign.)
Another Quirino cabinet member was also seeking election to
the highest office. Carlos P. Romulo, born in 1899 under the U.S.
flag, had been Philippine ambassador to the United States and to
the United Nations, president of the UN General Assembly, and sec-
retary of foreign affairs under President Quirino. Like Magsaysay,
Romulo had concluded that the Huks would never be thoroughly
defeated while Quirino and men like him ruled the country.
A very great deal indeed was riding on this election. Luis Taruc
urged his followers to support Quirino (as they had in 1949). In
Washington, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles agreed with Ed-
ward Lansdale that the presidential contest had to be free and hon-
est if the Huks were to be finally overcome. Besides issuing verbal
warnings, the United States took several measures to prevent Quirino
from using the tactics of 1949 against Magsaysay in 1953. The State
Department made sure that numerous American reporters went to
the Philippines to cover the election; U.S. government funds dis-
creetly bolstered the Magsaysay campaign. Magsaysay had of course
resigned as secretary of defense and thus no longer had control of
the military, but U.S. army officers urged their friends in the Philip-
pine Army to guard the honesty of the balloting. President Quirino,
aware that he was in trouble, tried to stir up anti-Americanism over
U.S. interference in the campaign but without success (having expe-
rienced the Japanese occupation, Filipinos found anti-Americanism
to be very weak tea.) Magsaysay received the vital support of
NAMFREL (whose establishment in 1951 had been facilitated by
CIA funds), and the Filipino press was much more vigilant than in
1949. Impressed with the clear evidence of Magsaysay's popularity
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and fearful of splitting the anti-Quirino vote, Romulo withdrew from
the race and asked his supporters to vote for Magsaysay. Finally, the
leaders of the powerful Roman Catholic Church forcefully reminded
their adherents of their duty not only to go to the polls but to vote to
prevent the triumph of corrupt men.19
In the end it was an overwhelming victory for Magsaysay: 2.4
million votes for him, 1.15 million votes for Quirino.20 (In 1949 the
announced results gave 1.6 million votes to Quirino and 1.5 million
to his opponents, principally Jose Laurel, who had served the Japa-
nese occupation as "President of the Philippine Republic" from 1943
to 1945 and had been pardoned for that by Quirino in 1948.)
With the immensely popular Magsaysay in the Malacanan Pal-
ace, completely in control of the armed forces and fully in position
to expand his land-to-surrendered-Huks program, the end of the
struggle was clearly in sight. In May 1954 Luis Taruc himself came
out of the jungle to surrender; that is the conventional date for the
end of the Huk insurgency. When Taruc gave himself up (to receive
a twelve-year prison sentence), some in the government said that he
was merely a Trojan horse, that this move was just some Commu-
nist deception. They were wrong. A few Huk units went on fighting,
but they were composed mainly of hard-core Communists or real
criminals (or both), and they never posed a threat to Manila or any
other sizable town. Perhaps 12,000 Huks lost their lives between 1946
and 1954; 4,000 were captured, and another 16,000 surrendered.21
A Closer Look at the Huks
In the early days of World War II, Communist leaders of the Huk
guerrillas had no serious plans beyond resistance to the Japanese oc-
cupation; at least that was the view of Luis Taruc, and it may be accu-
rate.22 It was inevitable, however, that the Communists would soon
turn their thoughts to postwar conditions and would consider the
probabilities of a "proletarian" revolution led by the "vanguard" party.
(We should try to keep in mind that in those days [1943-1946] the
complete Maoist model of revolution that would so dominate global
political thought during the 1960s and 1970s was not yet available.)
Although many Communists were sympathetic to the peasants,
they did not share their goals nor really understand them. The lead-
ers of the Philippine Communist Party were mostly urban, and many
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of them were well educated. Their chief was Vicente Lava, who had
obtained a Ph.D. from Columbia University and was a professor of
chemistry at the University of the Philippines. Luis Taruc, who would
become the major hero of the Huk movement, was born not far from
Manila in Pampanga province; he had studied medicine for years at
the University of Manila but had had to withdraw in 1934 for lack of
funds. Elected to Congress in 1946, he was not permitted to retain
his seat because of accusations that he and others associated with
him had used terrorism to gain election. By the spring of 1947, he
had gone back to the mountains and to the guerrilla life. Of the peas-
ants who bore arms as Huks, the majority apparently wanted merely
the return of the system of stable tenant farming with its traditional
patron-client relationships as it had existed before the 1930s. The Com-
munists, in contrast, wanted a real social and political revolution, based
on the urban masses, pursuing a Stalinist policy of forced industrial-
ization and efforts to uproot the traditional family structure.23
As the tactics of the government forces under Magsaysay im-
proved, the tactics of the Huks under their Communist leadership
deteriorated. The Communists needed to expand their base from
central Luzon, but they were reluctant to reach out to other opposi-
tion groups to form the classic Leninist broad front. Instead the Huks
tried to spread their rebellion into adjacent areas by sending small
detachments of guerrillas into them. Usually such efforts were not
successful. Many Huk leaders wore better clothes and smoked better
cigarettes than the peasants whose acceptance they sought as their
liberators. Often the men sent into a new district to start up a rebel
movement were criminals or men who acted like criminals. By 1951
the Huk rebellion was clearly sinking into an irreversible decline.24
Confronted with the mounting evidence of their inevitable de-
feat, the Communists began to turn their frustration and anger
against members of the Huk movement. They executed young fight-
ers and sympathizers for such infractions as sleeping while on duty
or asking leave to go home, behaviors the Communists viewed as
preludes to surrender. If a Huk's relatives asked him to give up, the
Communists would tell him that the only way he could prove his
continuing loyalty to the movement was to kill those relatives. Sense-
less acts of destruction and cruelty, such as the murder of the widow
of President Manuel Quezon and her daughter in August 1949, hurt
the Huk cause both inside and outside the movement. Taruc bitterly
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criticized the Communist Party leadership for insisting on prolong-
ing the fighting after 1950, when it had become clear that the struggle
was lost.25
The Question of American Troops
hi 1950 the Philippine republic had been independent for less than
five years. For fifty years before that, Americans in large numbers,
civilian as well as military, were present in the islands and involved
with Philippine affairs in the most intimate ways, hi 1907, only a
few years after the Aguinaldo insurgency had come to an end, the
Americans set up the first popularly elected legislature in the his-
tory of Southeast Asia. By 1916 all literate Filipino males had the
right of suffrage. The Americans fostered labor unions, pressed for
the limitation of absentee landlordism, and constructed a well-paid
civil service staffed more and more by Filipinos. American English
was in wide use, and many Filipinos felt admiration, or at least
amused affection, for Americans. All of this elicited one day an ex-
asperated sigh from Nationalist Party leader Manuel Quezon: "Damn
the Americans, why don't they tyrannize us more?" Entering the
post-World War II period, Washington wanted the Philippines to
become the showcase of democracy in East Asia. Thus, the United
States had a tremendous emotional and ideological stake in the Phil-
ippines. President Quirino was eager to have American troops, in
some capacity at least, in the Philippines.26 The Truman administra-
tion had sent some U.S. military personnel to help train the Philip-
pine armed forces. And of course in the Philippines there was no
danger that American troops might have to confront Soviet satellite
forces, or even the Soviet Army itself, as there had been in Greece, or
Chinese troops, as in Korea. The introduction of U.S. ground com-
bat forces into the struggle against the Huks was therefore not so
unthinkable as a later generation of Americans (or Filipinos) might
imagine.
No one in Washington seems to have given serious consider-
ation to a possible large-scale commitment of U.S. troops at least
until 1950, because until then American political and military lead-
ers did not see a Huk victory as a real possibility. Besides that, the
United States was preoccupied with the conflicts in China and Greece
and the construction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In
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April 1950 the charge d'affaires at the U.S. embassy in Manila, Vinton
Chapin, cabled his superiors in Washington that the Philippine armed
forces were not doing very well because of their passive tactics and
their mistreatment of the peasantry. This latter failure was aggra-
vated by the tendency of the Philippine troops to rely too much on
artillery, a tool that obliterates the distinction between guerrillas and
civilians. At that time the U.S. military mission to the Philippines
consisted of officers who were unskilled in counterguerrilla opera-
tions. Moreover, the Huk rebellion, in Chapin's view, had grown
out of the need for agrarian reform. In addition, the Huks were able
to point to Quirino's fraudulent election and also liked to brand him
a tool of "American imperialists." Thus, though sending American
ground forces would shift the balance of power against the Huks,
nevertheless Chapin recommended that "the employment of United
States troops against Filipinos outside our bases should probably be
considered only as a last resort. Such action would provide our en-
emies all over Asia with valuable propaganda and might be expected
to cause many Filipinos to regard us as invaders and to join forces
with the Huks." The Americans would probably be better off doing
in the Philippines what they had done in Greece, sending better-
prepared U.S. advisers in larger numbers.27
Nevertheless, in early 1950 the deteriorating Philippine situa-
tion alarmed the Truman administration. The president wrote to his
secretary of state that "failure of the Philippines experiment which
all Asia watches as evidence of American intentions and abilities
could only have the most unfortunate repercussions for the United
States both abroad and at home." Shortly after this presidential an-
nouncement, North Korean troops stormed across the thirty-eighth
parallel; soon U.S. forces were in Korea literally fighting for their
lives around Pusan. Later that year the Chinese Communists inter-
vened massively in the conflict. At the same time, Washington was
assuming a greater and greater responsibility for the supply of French
and Vietnamese forces fighting the Vietminh in Indochina. Yet, even
in those desperate circumstances, U.S. Ambassador to Manila Myron
Cowen stated his belief (September 29,1950) that the United States
should at least consider sending a reinforced division to the Philip-
pines. And a "top secret" draft paper by the deputy director of the
Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, dated January 19,
1951, reads in part as follows: "It is assumed that the United States
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is determined, regardless of the cost and despite any eventualities,
as part of its Pacific policy to retain the Philippines within the orbit
of the democratic powers and to deny it to the Soviet orbit. This is
the irreducible minimum of American security and interests in the
Pacific and the Far East." To achieve that minimum, the author of
the secret document approved the idea of sending two American
divisions to the Philippines.28
In contrast, a National Security Council Staff Study had concluded
in November 1950 that at that time Philippine armed forces, if well
trained and adequately equipped, ought to be able to defeat the Huks,
provided that the Huks received no important outside aid.29
American analysis usually emphasized the dual need for good
leadership and land reforms. A Department of State paper prepared
in June 1950 for the staff of the National Security Council stated in
part: "Since the tragic death of President Roxas in 1948, Philippine
leadership has been discouragingly weak and short-sighted." A
National Security Council Staff Study noted that "leadership of the
Philippine Government has been largely in the hands of a small
group of individuals representing the wealthy propertied classes
who, except in isolated instances, have failed to appreciate the need
for reform and the pressures generated among the less prosperous
and more numerous groups of the population." Secretary of State
Dean Acheson had a particularly unfavorable opinion of the ethics
and abilities of President Quirino and was annoyed by the latter's
"overweening vanity and arrogance."30 Washington policymakers
were also aware that the fraud and violence of the 1949 presidential
election had seriously undermined public trust in the government,
thereby playing into the hands of the Huks.31
In line with these views, on February 15, 1951, Ambassador
Cowen advised the State Department that the Communists auto-
matically placed outside the law any peasant to whom they gave
land. The United States and the Philippines must therefore defeat
the Huks by carrying out effective land reform programs, including
resettlement of landless peasants on desirable lands. Cowen also
reminded Washington that everyone who was killed by U.S.-sup-
plied arms had relatives who might thereafter support the Commu-
nists, making necessary new expenditures for arms. The secretary
of state reflected this general stance. "We strongly believe," he wrote,
"that the only way to beat the Communists is to show our ability to
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carry out under democratic processes those reforms they advocate
which are worthwhile. Land redistribution is one such reform."32
In another message to the president, Acheson said, "If there is
one lesson to be learned from the China debacle it is that if we are
confronted with an inadequate vehicle it should be discarded or
immobilized in favor of a more propitious one." However, if the
U.S. government encouraged the removal of President Quirino, it
would become known and would resound all over Asia, presum-
ably to the detriment of American foreign policy on that continent.33
Gen. George Marshall told Romulo that he "did not wish to have
the same experience that he had in China in supplying arms to an
Army which was guided by political interests."34
In light of such advice, the Truman administration moved to-
ward the position of making assistance to Manila contingent on in-
ternal political, military, and economic reforms. Unfortunately,
however, the Philippine leaders felt that they could do whatever
they wanted and ignore the need for reform, since they could in the
last analysis count on the United States to save them.35
Of all the reasons why the Americans did not send combat units
to the Philippines, one of the most decisive was that among the least
eager to get involved in the fighting were the leaders of the U.S.
armed forces. On September 6,1950 (a few days after the appoint-
ment of Magsaysay as defense secretary and at a time when the
Korean War was going very badly for the Americans), a memoran-
dum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Louis A.
Johnson noted that the possibility was definitely developing that a
militant minority organized by the Huks would overthrow a cor-
rupt and discredited regime. The United States had guaranteed the
security of the Philippines by the agreement of March 14,1947; but
"such intervention would require, in light of the present world situ-
ation [the fighting in Korea and the building up of NATO] a consid-
erable increase in the extent of mobilization currently envisaged."
But it was above all the Joint Chiefs' belief that the roots of the Phil-
ippine rebellion were primarily political that caused them to have
serious doubts about the advisability of widening American partici-
pation in the conflict. In the same memorandum, the Joint Chiefs
said, "The basic problem [in the Philippines] is primarily political
and economic. Military action should not be an alternative for a stable
and efficient government based on sound economic and social foun-
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dations." It was inequities in land ownership that constituted the
roots of the Huk rebellion, as well as the preference for guerrilla life
that some men had acquired during the Japanese occupation. There-
fore, "direct United States military intervention in the Philippines
would be justifiable, from a strategic point of view, only if there re-
mained no other means of preventing Communist seizure of the is-
lands." The memorandum concluded that present conditions in the
islands did not warrant the sending of U.S. combat forces. Instead
the United States should increase shipments of military materiel to
the Philippines, augment the number of security personnel on U.S.
installations there, and raise the American military mission to Ma-
nila, the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), to a strength
of thirty-two officers and twenty-six enlisted persons. JUSMAG it-
self opposed the direct assignment of American officers to Philip-
pine combat units.36 Before the end of 1951, however, any prospects
for a Huk victory had clearly evaporated; so had any prospect of
deploying U.S. combat forces.
Reflection
A guerrilla insurgency has the best chance to succeed when it is di-
rected against the occupation of a country by a foreign power. But
the mere foreignness of the opponent is no magic formula for insur-
gents; the foreigners must cooperate by being hateful as well. More
than forty years before the Huks, the efforts of the Aguinaldo forces
to rally support by an appeal to anti-Yankeeism and national inde-
pendence had crashed upon this rock. Rather than invading a previ-
ously independent country, the Americans were only superseding a
Spanish colonial regime compared to which they were manifestly a
great improvement. Moreover, they provided written promises of
eventual independence.
The Huks were of course even less able to use national indepen-
dence as an issue, fighting as they were against a republican gov-
ernment of their own people. Communist efforts to rally the nation
against "American imperialism"—especially in the aftermath of the
Japanese occupation—were simply not relevant or even credible to
the peasantry or, ultimately, to most of those in the guerrilla bands.
Unable to assume the mantle of outraged nationalism, the Huks
found themselves increasingly deprived of domestic issues as well.
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This had a profoundly important effect on the insurgents, because
compared to their Communist leaders, most rank-and-file Huks were
fighting for very limited goals. When Magsaysay restored elections
as an alternative to the violent path to change and began making
obvious efforts to mitigate the worst social irritations fueling the
rebellion, the peasant foot soldiers of revolution abandoned the
struggle in large numbers.37
Military pressure on the Huks increased at the same time.
Magsaysay accomplished this without relying on the highly destruc-
tive weapons of jet aircraft and long-range artillery that aroused such
controversy when used in Vietnam. He put more vigorous command-
ers in the field, who moved into those areas the guerrillas had come
to rely on for rest and food. He sowed discord within the Huk ranks
by offering rewards for the capture of specific individuals. He pro-
vided ordinary guerrillas with a way out through amnesty and re-
settlement.38 But of all Magsaysay's military measures, the most
important, the one that most effectively undercut the insurgency, was
his successful insistence that military abuse of civilians come to a halt.
Two additional facts invite our consideration. From 1951 to 1954
the United States provided the Philippines with $95 million in non-
military economic aid, enabling Magsaysay to spend more money
than he otherwise would have on social improvements. Simulta-
neously, the severe limitations on both the number of American mili-
tary personnel in the Philippines and their activities there
allowed—required—the Philippine armed forces to solve their own
problems and develop their own methods.39
The Huks therefore found themselves confronting an indigenous
reformist government defended by increasingly effective armed
forces and backed by the resources of the United States. In such cir-
cumstances, the only hope of the insurgents would have been assis-
tance from outside. Here the geography of the Philippines exerted
its decisive influence: for the Huks, as for Aguinaldo, there could be
no sanctuary, no possibility to obtain any systematic aid from out-
side. In this vital matter the contrast between the Philippine case on
the one hand and those of South Vietnam and Afghanistan on the
other is as broad as the South China Sea.
Like the American government in its fight against Aguinaldo,
the Magsaysay administration in its fight against the Huks linked
good military tactics and effective political programs that doomed
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the geographically isolated guerrillas. These two cases suggest that
there may be something like a law of successful counterinsurgency,
namely that governments enlightened enough to pursue a sound
political strategy will also adopt sound military tactics. They fur-
ther suggest that those who seek to defeat the insurgencies of to-
morrow would do well to study the insurgencies of yesterday.
Reflection on these Philippine experiences could yield generous re-
wards. Yet it is not clear that the U.S. Army or civilian policymakers
learned very much from them.40
Indochina, post-1954.
Vietnam
A Case of Multiple Pathologies
Involvement in the Vietnam conflict divided American society more
deeply than any other event since the Civil War. That Southeast Asian
struggle ended decades ago but continues to affect U.S. society and
foreign policy today.
Many helpful studies are available regarding the origins of U.S.
involvement in Vietnam and precise aspects of U.S. military opera-
tions there.11 am therefore not concerned here with the continuing
debate on the wisdom of U.S. entry into the struggle, nor with a
detailed review of the combat record. Instead, I focus on certain as-
pects of the struggle that may help place the American experience
in context, including the nature of the Communist enemy; the South
Vietnamese allies, especially the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, the armed
forces of South Vietnam, and indigenous anticommunist elements;
and some fundamental flaws in the American approach to the con-
flict. I also suggest an alternative strategy for preserving a South
Vietnamese state.
The Enemy
In Vietnam the Americans encountered an enemy whom they called
the Vietcong. Organized and directed by the Hanoi Politburo, the
Vietcong would increasingly be superseded by the North Vietnam-
ese Army. Their roots were located in the long struggle between
French colonialism and Vietnamese Communism.
The French sought to justify their occupation of Vietnam by pro-
claiming their devotion to their mission civilisatrice, even though at
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the end of World War II 80 percent of the native population was
illiterate.2 Nevertheless, Vietnamese with modern education were
not lacking. The French had created a native intelligentsia, produced
by French schools in both Vietnam and France. But when members
of this elite sought positions commensurate with their education,
either in the government or in the private sector, they were often
disappointed. Even when such persons obtained white-collar employ-
ment, they would likely find themselves subordinate to Frenchmen
with educational attainments notably inferior to theirs. The thousands
of Vietnamese who had served in Europe with the armies of France
during World War I, and had learned much about the great world,
returned to their native land to find conditions deeply disillusioning.
The French administration was completely unwilling to make
any concessions even to moderate Vietnamese advocates of reform.
Criticism of the colonial status of Vietnam was illegal. Vietnamese
returning to their own country found that they had no political rights,
in jarring contrast to the freedoms they had enjoyed in France. It is
then no great mystery that French policies of race-based social ex-
clusion eventually produced the conviction among many educated
Vietnamese that they would never be able to achieve their aspira-
tions unless French control of Vietnam came to an end. In other
words, French policies in large part produced the modern national-
ist movement in Vietnam. Because the contemporary era has been
obsessed with economics and fixated on the class struggle, not a
few have missed the extent to which political conflict in this century
was fueled by the desire of the intelligentsia to get into positions of
authority. Nevertheless, the underemployment and lack of status of
educated Vietnamese, and the roadblocks to positions of power and
dignity for them, are at the heart of the Vietnamese revolution.3
But even so, why and how did this emergent nationalist ten-
dency among the educated native elite turn into a mass movement
with wide peasant support? And why and how did this nationalist
movement come to be dominated by Communists, in contrast to the
nationalist movements in India, Burma, Indonesia, and Algeria? A
satisfactory answer to these questions would have to include the
following elements: mistakes and weaknesses of the noncommu-
nist nationalists in Vietnam; vital outside assistance to the Commu-
nists; a Communist strategy well adapted to their circumstances;
and the physical elimination by the Communists of their rivals.
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The leaders and members of the various noncommunist nation-
alist parties, of which the most prominent was the VNQDD, came
mainly from the educated urban elites; they tried without success to
establish a constituency among the rural majority. In 1930 they
launched an entirely premature and badly coordinated armed up-
rising against the French, as a result of which they were almost en-
tirely eliminated from the scene. Later, their collaboration with the
Japanese occupation discredited them.
The Communists were also hard hit by the suppression follow-
ing the 1930 rising. But they received training and sustenance from
the Soviet Union and were able slowly to rebuild and even expand
their organization. When the Communist-supported Popular Front
government came to power in France in 1936, Vietnamese Commu-
nists were released from prison. The illegality of political opposi-
tion to French rule within Vietnam, vigorously enforced by the secret
police, severely hobbled the reappearance of the noncommunist
nationalists. Repression was much less effective against the Com-
munists, trained abroad in the arts of clandestine operations.
The Japanese Contribution
In June 1940 France fell before the Nazi blitzkrieg; two months later
the Imperial Japanese Government forced the French authorities in
Vietnam to grant them effective control of that country under a flimsy
veil of continued French sovereignty. It would be impossible to over-
emphasize the effect the Japanese invasions had on the future of
East, South, and Southeast Asia. Surrounded by an aura of omni-
competence and invincibility, for many decades the Europeans had
been able to hold their vast imperial territories with remarkably small
armed forces. Their defeat and humiliation at the hands of Asians
stripped them of their prestige and signaled that they had at last
lost the Mandate of Heaven. By breaking the mythic power of the
Europeans, the Japanese paved the way for postwar revolution in
the East and thus for Ho Chi Minh and his Communists.
During the Japanese occupation, almost all surviving Vietnam-
ese nationalist leaders remained outside the country, mainly in
Chiang's China. But the well-organized Communists for the most
part stayed inside Tonkin (the northern part of Vietnam), in touch
with local realities and possibilities. There they organized a front
group called (in short form) the Vietminh, containing elements of
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several noncommunist parties but safely under Communist direc-
tion. Early in 1945 the Japanese dispensed with the last vestiges of
French rule in Vietnam. Without an effective intelligence organiza-
tion or sufficient numbers of troops, the Japanese occupation was
neither able nor concerned to root out or even harass the Vietminh.
So during the last months of World War II, the Vietminh were free to
organize and expand almost at will. By the time of the Japanese sur-
render, the Vietminh had built up a sturdy little armed force of about
five thousand, under the command of a former high school history
teacher named Vo Nguyen Giap. They told the Allies that this was
an anti-Japanese army and received advice and supplies from the
OSS.4 Yet in fact "the Viet Minh never dreamed of sacrificing its pre-
cious troops in the hopeless and ultimately unnecessary task of fight-
ing the Japanese."5
Besides disrupting the anticommunist activities of the French,
the Japanese made other contributions to Vietminh growth. During
the war the Japanese shipped a lot of rice out of Vietnam; they also
forced many peasants to abandon rice cultivation and grow jute in-
stead. At the same time Allied bombings damaged transportation
lines from the rice-rich South to Tonkin. Thus, in the winter of 1944—
1945, a serious famine struck northern Vietnam; perhaps as many as
two million people died. Seizing on a popular issue, the Commu-
nists led demonstrations demanding the opening of government
granaries. This was "a key to the development of the movement in
rural areas throughout the north."6
Suddenly and unexpectedly, in mid-August 1945 the empire of
Japan surrendered to the Allies. With French forces either scattered
or imprisoned and the thirty thousand Japanese troops in Vietnam
interested only in returning home as soon as possible, there was no
one to stop Giap's carefully husbanded little Vietminh army from
marching out of the wilds of Tonkin into Hanoi. There Ho Chi Minh
proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with himself as its
head—these events being known thereafter as the "August Revolu-
tion." The fact that Ho was in control of the capital city, however
briefly, with an armed force and a functioning administration, and
apparently with the blessing of the United States, attracted to the
Vietminh many noncommunists who in the last analysis preferred
Ho to a return of the French. Thus Ho's regime was able to present
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itself to the outside world as a national coalition, rather than the
Communist-dominated front that it was.7
It was the defeat of the Japanese, not the popularity of the
Vietminh, that made possible the August Revolution. Without the
acquiescence, indeed the benevolence, of the Japanese forces, the
Vietminh could never have pulled off their spectacular coup of pro-
claiming independence from the center of Hanoi. More than that,
elements in the Japanese army were determined that the defeat of
their own country would not mean the end of resistance to the West-
ern Allies: in the confused days after the surrender, the Japanese de-
livered money, tanks, artillery, and more than thirty-one thousand
rifles to Giap's forces. Several hundred Japanese soldiers (at least) chose
not to return home but to join the ranks of the Vietminh outright.8
Thus, by remaining inside Vietnam during the Japanese occupa-
tion and taking quick advantage of the chaos following Japan's sur-
render, the Communists established their superiority over the
nationalists. The Communists had also been developing an effec-
tive political program based on an insightful analysis of conditions
in Vietnam: they had always understood that there could be no Com-
munist regime in Vietnam without national independence, but they
now arrived at two additional and powerful truths: that there could
be no national independence without peasant support for an anti-
French struggle, and that there would be no peasant support with-
out the promise of a social revolution, that is, a pledge to distribute
among the peasantry the lands and possessions of the French and
their Vietnamese followers. By presenting a program of land reform,
the Communists were able to break out of the urban ghetto of mod-
ern Vietnamese nationalism and organize the mass base without
which no revolution against the restored French would have been
possible.
The Politics of Murder
Now comes perhaps the most important part of the answer to the
question of how the Vietnamese Communists were able to domi-
nate the nationalist movement. A crucial point is that the Commu-
nists did not want an independent Vietnam unless it was completely
controlled by them. They did not want to be one element in a Viet-
namese nationalist movement and government; they wanted total
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domination. "Indeed, the fight for independence was for them only
a vehicle for the conquest of power." To attain that end they em-
barked on a vast campaign to assassinate their noncommunist ri-
vals. "The elimination of their opponents was one of the most
common means the Communists used to establish Vietminh control
over the entire nationalist movement."9
The policy of dominance through murder was all too successful.
"The Stalinists [Vietminh] saw to it that those whose brilliance might
have dimmed their own luster were buried in good time." Not only
were the Vietminh able thus to establish their control of the anti-
French movement, but they also severely weakened the future state
of South Vietnam. This "Communist policy of killing all true na-
tionalist opponents of the Viet Minh" deprived that future state of
the services of many who might have given it vigor and safety.10 The
Vietminh also sought through assassination to decapitate the indig-
enous religious sects, and for good measure they killed every
Trotskyite they could locate.
After the North-South partition of Vietnam in 1954, the Com-
munists continued to wield their very effective weapon of assassi-
nation. By 1960 Communist terrorists in South Vietnam had
murdered 1,400 local officials, including about 20 percent of the vil-
lage chiefs as well as many schoolteachers, who were a special tar-
get. By 1965 the Vietcong had killed or abducted about 25,000
civilians. The effects of this vast terror campaign, both on the mo-
rale of the civilian population and on the ability of the government
in Saigon to administer the country, was quite devastating.11
The French War
Stretching north to south about a thousand miles, the distance from
Rome to Copenhagen, Vietnam is roughly the size of Finland, or of
Illinois and Missouri combined. In essence the country is made up
of two great deltas, those of the Red River and the Mekong, linked
by a narrow coastal plain that tapers down to fifty miles at the waist.
During the war between the French and the Vietminh (1946-
1954)—the prelude to the U.S. involvement—most of the fighting
took place in Tonkin, the area Americans would come to know as
North Vietnam. A brief review of the most salient aspects of that
Vietnam • 215
conflict may illuminate the situation into which the Americans en-
tered soon after.
France was the first of the Western powers to confront a Maoist
people's war and also perhaps the least ready for such a confron-
tation. The defeat and occupation of France by the Nazis, followed
by the Allied invasions and the consequent large-scale fighting
across northern France, had deeply demoralized and exhausted
the French. To these conditions one must add the stunning frivol-
ity of the politicians of the post-1945 Fourth Republic. Not only
did they forbid the use of draftees in Vietnam; in addition, during
the eight-year conflict they threw up and pulled down no fewer
than sixteen cabinets and sent seven different military command-
ers to Vietnam. And however many and serious were the short-
comings of the Vietminh, French forces in Vietnam were fighting
an essentially anachronistic war to hold on to a nineteenth-cen-
tury empire, an enterprise that to many Europeans no longer made
any sense either economically or ethically. Nevertheless, the sup-
port of the French cause by Emperor Bao Dai's army and the pow-
erful southern religious sects12 made the conflict a true civil war;
the involvement of the Soviet bloc and the Americans made it an
international war as well.
By 1953 the Vietminh military leader, General Giap, had com-
mand of about 300,000 fighters of various grades. According to the
standard ten-to-one formula for defeating guerrillas, the French
would have needed 3 million troops in Vietnam. Such a number
was out of the question. But what about at least three to one? That
ratio would call for 900,000 troops on the French side. In fact, as the
conflict entered its last and most desperate phases, the forces under
the French flag totaled perhaps 265,000, including 50,000 French
nationals in the army,13 30,000 colonial troops (mainly North Afri-
can and Senegalese), 20,000 Foreign Legionnaires, and 150,000 Viet-
namese, plus 15,000 in the French Far Eastern naval and air forces.
To these one may add another 150,000 Vietnamese in Bao Dai's Na-
tional Army and 30,000 armed members of the sects and the Catho-
lic militias, for a grand total of (at most) 450,000, or just about half of
what the French needed to achieve even the utterly inadequate ratio
of three to one over the Vietminh. And despite more than seven de-
cades of colonial contact and control, the French army was woefully
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short of officers who could speak Vietnamese, making the effective
gathering of intelligence exceedingly difficult.14
Given the severe manpower constraints under which the French
in Vietnam were operating, their manner of making war there was
ill-advised. They certainly forgot, or ignored, the teachings of Gallieni
and Lyautey about counterinsurgency. The behavior of the French
reflected the soldier's original sin: underestimating the enemy. They
liked to execute deep thrusts into enemy-held territory along known
roads; later those thrusts had to be withdrawn in less than glorious
circumstances. They also liked to drop airborne troops behind en-
emy lines, establishing strong points that had to be supplied by their
inadequate airpower or by ground convoys lacking air cover. They
would afterward abandon these strong points, suffering heavy losses
in the process. At Cao Bang, on the mountainous Chinese border,
the French possessed a good fort with impressive defenses both natu-
ral and manmade. In 1950 the High Command in Hanoi decided to
abandon Cao Bang. Accordingly, 1,600 troops plus hundreds of ci-
vilians set out for the city of Lang Son, eighty-five miles to the south;
at the same time 3,500 French Moroccan troops advanced north to
meet and escort the party coming from Cao Bang. The two groups
linked up, only to be finally cut to ribbons by the swarming Vietminh
in "the greatest defeat in the history of French colonial warfare."15
The events at Cao Bang persuaded the French that they must
abandon Lang Son, a city of one hundred thousand. To escape the
Vietminh, the French withdrew from the city without first blowing
up their munitions. Thus the Vietminh obtained a great windfall:
ten thousand 75 mm shells, invaluable gasoline, clothing, medicine,
and much else. It was "France's greatest colonial defeat since
Montcalm had died at Quebec."16
With the fall of the French border strongholds at Cao Bang and
Lang Son, the Vietminh had unrestricted access to supplies and
advisers from newly Communist China. The French could not now
hope to retain all, or even most, of Tonkin. The situation clearly
called for the French to turn the Hanoi-Haiphong area into an en-
clave and to retrench into Cochin China, with its large population
and small Communist presence.17 But instead the French tried to
fight on everywhere.
By 1954 the war had clearly become stalemated. Aside from a
debilitating inadequacy of manpower, the French supposed that their
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principal problem arose from the fact that Giap had learned the hard
way not to engage in pitched battles. As long as the war remained
essentially guerrilla, the French would continue to be at a grave dis-
advantage. They must therefore entice Giap into accepting a major
battle. Thus, the French High Command decided to build the fortress
at Dien Bien Phu.18 A French stronghold so far from the Red River
Delta base would surely prove to be an irresistible temptation to Giap.
Indeed it did. Vietminh casualty rates had been very high, and
the great powers were preparing to gather at Geneva to discuss the
Vietnam situation. If all went well for the Communists at Dien Bien
Phu, Giap would strike a decisive blow not at a fortress in Indochina
but at opinion in metropolitan France and at the Geneva Confer-
ence. That is what the battle came to be about.
At Dien Bien Phu about 13,000 French, colonial, and Vietnamese
soldiers fought 100,000 Vietminh and their Chinese advisers. The
Communist attack began on March 13, and its outcome was evident
from almost the first day. With the garrison cut off, the French tried
to supply the fortress by air but did not have enough planes; fur-
thermore, the antiaircraft fire (much of it Chinese) over Dien Bien
Phu was thicker than that over Germany in World War II.19 The whole
world stopped to watch the last days of the drama, which ended on
May 8, exactly nine years after the surrender of Nazi Germany.
Dien Bien Phu was a tactical disaster for the French but hardly a
strategic one; after all, they had committed about one-twentieth of
their Vietnam assets to the battle, whereas Giap had committed al-
most half of his. Nevertheless, for winning this one-sided, small-
scale jungle battle, Giap achieved the reputation of a modern-day
Napoleon. More importantly, as the Vietminh leaders had hoped,
the fall of Dien Bien Phu had broken the will of the Paris politicians
to continue the war. And so at Geneva the French military and the
Vietminh signed an agreement (rejected by the legitimate govern-
ment of Vietnam) to partition the country at the seventeenth paral-
lel. That was the birth of North and South Vietnam.20
During the conflict, fatal casualties on the French side were ap-
proximately as follows: from metropolitan France, 21,000; from
French Union forces, 55,000; of the Vietnamese in all allied forces,
18,000, with an additional 23,000 allied Vietnamese prisoners never
accounted for. The cream of the French officer corps was destroyed,
including 1,300 lieutenants; by 1953 more French officers were dy-
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ing annually in Vietnam than were graduating from the national
military academy at Saint Cyr. Two thousand women had served
with the French ground forces, another 150 in the air and navy; al-
most 100 of these were killed in action. In proportion to population,
the 21,000 soldiers from metropolitan France who lost their lives
would be equivalent to more than 100,000 American deaths today,
twice the number of American deaths that eventually occurred in
Vietnam. "The numbers suggest that the French troops fought hard
in Indochina."21
As for the Vietminh, nobody knows how many died, but esti-
mates run to 400,000. Civilian deaths almost certainly exceeded
500,000. That was what Ho Chi Minh was willing to pay for a Viet-
nam under his control. And even at that price, he wound up with
only half the country.
Perhaps the French could not have won in Vietnam under any
circumstances, if winning is defined as reducing the Vietminh chal-
lenge to a nuisance level to be handled by police methods. But the
French certainly could have avoided the actual outcome, and per-
haps they could have held onto some very populous areas of Viet-
nam. To do that, they would have had to adopt at least two of the
following courses of action: (1) send substantial reinforcements from
metropolitan France; (2) create a true Vietnamese army, properly
trained, equipped, and officered; (3) close the border with China, by
military or diplomatic means; (4) address some of the main socio-
economic grievances of the peasantry; and (5) employ a conserva-
tive military strategy, including retrenchment into Cochin China,
while holding the Hanoi-Haiphong region as an enclave. As it hap-
pened, the French adopted none of these policies.22
A final observation on the Franco-Vietminh conflict: even if the
sins of the French were as scarlet, that in itself would in no way dis-
prove the proposition that years later large strata within the popula-
tion of South Vietnam did not wish to be conquered by the
Communists.
Ngo Dinh Diem
On June 18,1954, at Paris, Pierre Mendes-France became prime minis-
ter of France and was eager to make the best deal with the Vietminh
that he could. And on that same day, and in that same city, Ngo
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Dinh Diem announced that Emperor Bao Dai had appointed him
prime minister of Vietnam, with full emergency powers. The
Eisenhower administration would call Diem the Churchill of South-
east Asia; the Kennedy administration would come to view him as
the principal source of American frustrations in Vietnam.
Diem was born in 1901, in the city of Hue. The son of a manda-
rin, he was a Christian like Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee, a
member of one of the oldest Catholic families in Vietnam. Diem at-
tended the same secondary school as Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap,
and Pham Van Dong, the three men who would become the princi-
pal leaders of Vietnamese Communism. Declining a scholarship to
study in Paris, he instead attended the French-run School of Law in
Hanoi, from which he graduated first in his class.23 Before Diem was
twenty-five, Emperor Bao Dai appointed him governor of Binh
Thuan Province, and in 1933 he made him minister of the interior.
Diem's nationalism antagonized the French so much that he had to
resign. In 1944-1945, as the Pacific War blazed to its painful conclu-
sion, the Japanese, then the French, and then Bao Dai offered Diem
the premiership; in 1946 Ho Chi Minh wanted to make him minister
of the interior of his new revolutionary regime. Perceiving each of
these offers to be laden with strings, Diem turned them all down. By
1950, with the Vietcong seeking his death and the French unwilling
to protect him, Diem left Vietnam and journeyed to Rome, the United
States, and France. Three more times Bao Dai invited Diem to be-
come prime minister. But Diem wanted to direct the war against the
Vietminh, and the French would not permit that. By refusing time
and again to accept high office at the price of becoming a puppet,
Diem demonstrated his "perfect integrity, competence, and intelli-
gence" to Vietnamese nationalists.24
In 1954 Diem at last became prime minister with the full powers
he had so long demanded. But taking office amid the wreckage of
the French empire in Indochina, Diem found that in fact he con-
trolled hardly more than a few square blocks of downtown Saigon.
The criminal Binh Xuyen gang ran the Saigon police; southern Com-
munist cadres were busily laying their plans; religious sects with
their private armies were entrenched not far from Saigon; a million
refugees were about to flood into the country from the north; Bao
Dai, the French, and Diem's own generals were conspiring against
him; and the politburo in Hanoi, backed by the Soviet Union and
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Maoist China, glared down upon him with undisguised malice. Even
his private offices were defenseless against any group of assassins
who might choose to burst in. In the midst of this chaos and hostility,
Diem must try to establish his authority, eliminate the vestiges of
French colonialism, control the centrifugal forces in Southern society,
and devise a plausible plan to prevent Ho Chi Minh from swallowing
up his state. Hardly anybody expected Diem to last very long.
The most pressing immediate need was to establish personal
security for Diem. That was done with the help of the legendary
Edward Lansdale (called "the Clausewitz of Counterinsugency") and
Philippine Army colonel Napoleon Valeriano, both fresh from the
victorious struggle against the Huks. Then Diem secured the back-
ing of President Eisenhower and support from such influential sena-
tors as Mike Mansfield, Hubert Humphrey, and John F. Kennedy.
He imposed his authority on the army and the sects. He smashed
the power of the piratical Birth Xuyen. He attacked malaria, extended
education, and settled almost a million northern refugees.25 He wrote
a new republican constitution and got himself elected first presi-
dent of the Republic of Vietnam. And he approved the Strategic
Hamlet Program, a fundamentally sound plan for separating the
peasants from the guerrillas. In his first two years in office, Diem
had, apparently, thwarted all his enemies.
Understandably, the Hanoi Politburo concluded by 1959 at the
latest that terrorism and assassination would not overthrow South
Vietnam and decided on a full-scale insurgency.26 Faced with this
new challenge, desperate to find reliably anticommunist and per-
sonally loyal helpers, Diem surrounded himself with members of
his family and filled public offices with those who shared his out-
look. Thus, the Diem government became disproportionately Catho-
lic, urban, northern, and European-educated, in a mainly Buddhist,
peasant, and xenophobic south.27 Nevertheless, the New York Times
attributed Diem's 1961 reelection to rising prosperity and widespread
anticommunism in South Vietnam. In December of that same year,
President Kennedy assured Diem of American support and priority
assistance.28
But in fact Washington was becoming disenchanted with Diem.
Looking for a true nationalist to set up against Ho Chi Minh, the
Americans had certainly found one in Diem. But they grew increas-
ingly unhappy as he proved to be (predictably) a difficult ally, de-
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clining to accept automatically the advice the Americans lavished
upon him. In holding onto and building his power, Diem had beaten
incredible odds; this undeniable fact, along with his deep religious
commitment, increased his self-confidence. Diem had not bent to
the French or the Japanese, to Bao Dai or to Ho Chi Mirth, and he
"had considerable reason to doubt the superior judgment of tran-
sient Americans concerning the ability and reliability of men with
whom he had spent most of his life." He resisted "the assumption
that we Americans understood better than Diem the kinds of poli-
cies and programs he should be conducting in order to win the
struggle against the Communists."29 Above all, Diem would not
permit his country to be taken over and torn up by what he saw as
naive and technology-happy Americans. But in Washington this was
the Camelot era (in more senses than one). To the Kennedy people,
South Vietnam was the place where they were going to refute the
theorists of People's Revolutionary War in Peking and at the same
time show Nikita Khrushchev that Kennedy was indeed tough. Diem
wanted to ultimately bring peace to his country; Washington wanted
to whip the Vietcong. Those desires were quite incompatible.
The American press corps in Saigon openly loathed Diem. In
their eyes everything wrong in South Vietnam was Diem's fault.
Pierre Salinger has testified to the hostility American correspondents
showed toward Diem, and Ambassador Maxwell Taylor wrote of
their "full-scale vendetta" against him, "To me, it was a sobering
spectacle of the power of a relatively few young and inexperienced
newsmen who, openly committed to 'getting' Diem . . . were not
satisfied to report the events of foreign policy but undertook to shape
them."30 The hostile American reporters got their chance in the sum-
mer of 1963 when a dispute arose between local officials in Hue and
some Buddhist monks over who could fly what flags on Buddha's
birthday. When several demonstrators were killed, Diem tried to
soothe tempers, without success. Under the leadership of a group of
highly politicized and ambitious Buddhist monks thoroughly infil-
trated by Communist agents, the Hue affair turned into a full-scale
attempt to overthrow Diem. Soon American newsmen were eagerly
supplying the breakfast tables of Washington with photographs of
monks immolating themselves. The American electorate could not
put these events into the context either of traditional Buddhist prac-
tice and belief or of a country wracked by terrorism and insurgency.
222 • America and Guerrilla Warfare
Increasingly sensational reporting from Saigon shook President
Kennedy's commitment to Diem.31
The Buddhist crisis also provided opportunity to Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon and Averell Harriman in Washington,
who both thoroughly detested the insubordinate Diem.32 Under their
prodding, in September 1963 President Kennedy announced that
aid to the South Vietnamese Army would be cut. Diem's generals
interpreted this as a signal that Washington wanted him thrown out
(yet Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, CIA director John
McCone, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, and former ambassador
to Saigon Frederick Nolting all opposed such a move). None of
Diem's Washington enemies seem to have worried very much about
who, or what, would follow him. On November 2, after an attack on
the presidential palace, South Vietnamese generals captured Diem
and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and murdered them both.33
To Hanoi and the Vietcong, these events were heaven-sent.34
Diem's death threw the country into the hands of less than inspired
generals whom the world viewed as completely dependent on the
Americans. It also quite predictably opened the floodgates of insta-
bility: coup followed coup, purge followed purge, and the Strategic
Hamlet Program fell by the wayside. Buddhist self-immolations,
supposedly caused by Diem, did not stop but instead increased. Less
than a year and a half after Diem's murder, with South Vietnam on
the brink of Communist conquest, President Johnson decided that
he must inundate the bleeding country with American troops.
President Kennedy had stated that the major purpose of his
administration's involvement in South Vietnam was to reassure
America's allies about the reliability of American guarantees. It is
not clear how American complicity in the overthrow of Diem was
supposed to advance this purpose. The Kennedy administration had
connived at the killing of a legitimate and friendly head of state.35 It
had thereby saddled the United States with total responsibility for
the fate of South Vietnam. Years later, CIA director William F. Colby
identified the removal of Diem as America's first great mistake in
Vietnam; many agree with him.36
The South Vietnamese Army
Not a few Americans have placed the blame for the debacle of the
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anticommunist cause in Vietnam directly on the shoulders of the
South Vietnamese Army, the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Viet-
nam), an organization whose most distinguishing features are al-
leged to have been cowardice and desertion. From these premises
many conclusions are drawn about the outcome of the war and about
how the United States should deal with future insurgencies.
The foundations of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam were
those Vietnamese who had fought against the Vietminh either in the
French forces or in Bao Dai's Vietnamese National Army (400,000
by July 1954), plus a liberal admixture of former Vietcong who had
grown disillusioned with the Communists. When the French Army
left South Vietnam in 1956, American officers arrived to assist in
training and expanding the ARVN.37
Rather than developing the type of armed forces that had proved
so effective against subversion in Malaya and the Philippines, Ameri-
can advisers strove to build an ARVN capable of repelling the North
Korean invasion of 1950. The ARVN became roadbound like the
French army and overreliant on heavy firepower like the American
army. Most U.S. advisers were competent, well-trained, and well-
meaning, but they served only one-year tours, did not speak the
language, and taught and learned disappointingly little. The United
States also provided the ARVN with inferior equipment. For instance,
the ARVN did not get the M-16 rifle until after the Tet Offensive of
1968; before then it was completely outclassed by the Communist
forces, which were armed with excellent automatic weapons (and
some veterans claim the M-16 was not as good as the Communists'
AK-47). Even as late as the 1970s, the ARVN's American-made M-41
tank was inferior to the Soviet T-54.38 Nobody paid much attention
to the elements that are most crucial in the early stages of an insur-
gency, namely the police and village militia.
The Romans created armies that were small, well-trained, and
well-equipped. The ARVN was just the opposite. Because the ARVN
was always engaged in fighting and always short of good officers,
an average unit received less than two hours' training a week and
hardly any political education.39
There was a chronic shortage of officers, especially middle-grade
ones. That was because one had to have a high school education to
receive an officer's commission. This rule excluded the peasant class
almost entirely. The ARVN had one of the world's best-educated
224 • America and Guerrilla Warfare
officer corps: in the mid-1960s, 5 percent of the generals, 13 percent
of colonels, and 15 percent of other officers held Ph.D.s. In 1967 one-
fifth of ARVN officers were Catholics, twice the Catholic proportion
of the general population, because Catholics were more likely to have
attended European-type schools.40 A quarter of the officers were
northern-born. Politicization of the officer corps had gone far under
Diem (and contributed to his death). Under President Nguyen Van
Thieu, political considerations became even more central, because
the ARVN had become the main institution holding the country to-
gether.41 Political and personal connections were the key to advance-
ment; good field commanders were left in the field.
In spite of these grave problems, the South Vietnamese Marine
Division and the Airborne Division had no equals among the North
Vietnamese Army (NVA).42 In 1974 a noted British authority ranked
the ARVN second only to the Israeli army among free-world land
forces.43 The ARVN would do its best fighting when its back was to
the wall, in the disastrous spring of 1975. For example, the last bas-
tion between Saigon and the conquering Communists was the town
of Xuan Loc. The place was held by the Eighteenth ARVN Division,
nobody's idea of a prize unit. Yet the Eighteenth put up ferocious
resistance; to finally take Xuan Loc, the NVA had to commit four of
its best divisions.
The Question of Desertion
Desertion rates in the ARVN were high. American journalists some-
how perceived that as proof that the South Vietnamese people did
not want to fight against the North, indeed that they wished for a
Northern victory, just as if the connection between political convic-
tion and military valor is always direct and obvious. The causes of
ARVN desertion, however, were mainly sociological, not political.
In rural South Vietnam, desertion carried no social stigma for the
offender or his family, nor did the government search out and pun-
ish deserters with any vigor. Much more importantly, the ARVN
assigned peasant draftees to units far from their home provinces.
This practice was deeply at variance with the values of rural society
(a consequence of having an officer corps drawn overwhelmingly
from the educated urban sectors). "Few steps the [Communist] Party
could have taken would have been so effective in crippling the mo-
rale and effectiveness of the government's military forces as was the
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government's own decision to adopt a policy of nonlocal service."
This ill-considered sending of young peasant draftees far away from
home accounts for the high desertion rates among first-year soldiers
at harvest time and around the supremely important Tet holidays.
ARVN soldiers served for an indefinite time period, unlike Ameri-
cans, who had a one-year tour of duty; clearly it would have been
much better to rotate ARVN soldiers, after a fixed tour, to militia
battalions near their homes.44
These causes of desertion within ARVN hardly suggest eagerness
for a Communist victory. The effects of desertion are also enlighten-
ing. Some who deserted ARVN later rejoined. Other deserters joined
militia units close to home. In vivid contrast to both the ARVN and
the Vietcong, among the militia, who were defending their native prov-
ince or village, desertion rates were close to zero, in spite of the fact
that their casualty rates were higher than the ARVN's. And here is
another very crucial point: desertion from the ARVN hardly ever meant
defection to the Communists. But for the Vietcong, not only were de-
sertion rates as high as those in the ARVN, but also two hundred
thousand Vietcong actually defected to the South Vietnamese forces.45
One last observation on this subject: one month before
Gettysburg, the largest battle ever fought in North America, the Army
of the Potomac, which was the principal force defending the Union,
was down to half strength because of desertions. During the Ameri-
can Civil War, the general desertion rate in the Federal forces was
330 per 1,000 and among the Confederates 400 per l,000.46
South Vietnamese Casualties
One of the more puzzling beliefs about the Vietnam conflict is that
the South Vietnamese did not do very much fighting. But in fact, the
ARVN paid a very high price in blood. During the entire Vietnam
conflict from 1954 to 1975,57,000 Americans lost their lives, a num-
ber almost exactly equaled by highway fatalities in the United States
in the year 1970 alone. Between the beginning of the Kennedy
buildup in 1961 and the fall of Saigon in 1975, the Americans in-
curred an average of 4,000 military deaths a year. The comparable
figure for the Korean war is 18,000 U.S. military deaths per year and
for World War II, 100,000 per year.
From 1954 to 1975, ARVN combat deaths were higher than those
of the Americans every year. In all, about 200,000 ARVN personnel
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were killed; some authors give higher figures; and these numbers
do not include the militia (nor civilians).47 But to say that the South
Vietnamese army took higher casualties than the Americans only
touches the surface, because the population of South Vietnam was
many times smaller than that of the United States. If American mili-
tary fatalities had been in the same proportion to the population of
the United States as the ARVN's were to the population of South
Vietnam, they would have numbered not 57,000 but 2.6 million. How
is one to comprehend this figure? What does "2.6 million American
military deaths" mean? It means this: total American military fatali-
ties in all the wars the Americans fought during two hundred years—
from the American Revolution through Vietnam, including World War
I and World War II and both sides in the Civil War—amount to less
than 1 million. In the long struggle against an armed Communist take-
over, the ARVN alone (excluding the militia, whose casualty rates were
higher) suffered, relative to the South Vietnam population, more than
forty times as many fatalities as the Americans.
The ARVN, with an inappropriate structure (established by
Americans), second-rate weapons, and inadequate training, saddled
not only with fighting a war of survival but also with running a
country, and consequently riddled with political interference and
financial corruption—with all these handicaps—nevertheless stood
up to twenty years of warfare while suffering enormous casualties
and in the end collapsed because it was short of ammunition, gaso-
line, even clean bandages. That is quite a record.
The Territorial Forces
Any plan to resist the Communist conquest of South Vietnam should
have anchored itself on local militias—the Territorial forces—orga-
nized to protect their own homes from the guerrillas. But in the be-
ginning, such forces received little official attention, no training, and
few weapons, and the weapons they did receive were of poor qual-
ity. Reorganization in 1964 produced the Regional Forces and the
Popular Forces (RF/PF—called "Ruff-Puffs" by Americans). The
Popular Forces were organized in thirty-man platoons and served
on the hamlet and village level, the Regional Forces in one hundred-
man companies on the provincial level. The task of the PFs was to
resist guerrillas trying to enter their village just long enough for RF
units to come to their assistance. But in the Popular Forces there
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were no pay, no rank, and no system of recognition and reward.48
Their weapons were castoffs; their training was sketchy. Even if the
PFs in a certain village were lucky enough to possess a radio with
which to call for help, the Regional Forces often lacked the mobility
to respond in time.
All this changed radically with the 1968 Tet Offensive. Many
Territorial units performed well during the crisis; Saigon responded
by finally giving them good weapons, although they did not receive
the M-16 until 1970. Gen. William C. Westmoreland observed that if
the ARVN and the Territorials had received proper weapons, equiva-
lent to the Communist standard AK-47 automatic rifle, at an earlier
date, South Vietnam might have been ready to defend itself a full
year earlier. At the end of 1968 there were approximately 392,000
Territorials; a year later there were 475,000. Between 1968 and 1972,
the ARVN suffered 37,000 fatal casualties, the Territorials 69,000.
During the 1972 Easter Offensive, RF units gave especially good ac-
counts of themselves against NVA forces at the siege of Hue and
elsewhere. By 1973, when the last U.S. ground combat units were
long out of South Vietnam, Territorial forces numbered over half a
million. The heavily populated Mekong Delta provinces were mostly
under control of these "Ruff-Puffs." The Territorials received only
between 2 and 4 percent of the war budget, but they accounted for
30 percent of VC and NVA combat deaths. They were "the most
cost-efficient military forces employed on the allied side."49
Vietnamization
After the Tet Offensive (see the section titled "The Great Tet Offen-
sive") came the "Vietnamization" program, an unfortunate name
implying that the ARVN would henceforth do its proper share of
the fighting, whereas of course the ARVN had been doing at least its
share for years. Vietnamization had two major aspects: first, the long-
overdue upgrading of American equipment delivered to the ARVN,
and second, the reduction of U.S. combat troops in Vietnam—also
overdue.
The 1972 Easter Offensive provided the great test of Vietnami-
zation. In the spring of that year General Giap threw the entire NVA,
the "most efficient fighting machine in all Asia,"50 against the South.
Nearly all American ground combat units had by then been evacu-
ated. For practical purposes, on the ground the South Vietnamese
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stood alone. The Communist attack was four-pronged, blasting
across the ludicrously named Demilitarized Zone and through "neu-
tral" Laos and Cambodia. The offensive began on March 30; before
mid-May it was clearly a failure. The ARVN had withstood the best
efforts of the Vietcong in 1968; now it withstood the best efforts of
the NVA in 1972. In the picturesque language of Gen. Creighton
Abrams, "By God, the South Vietnamese can hack it!" The ARVN
had demonstrated that if it could count on replacement parts for its
U.S.-made equipment and if it had U.S. air support, especially the
all-powerful B-52s so feared by the NVA, it could stand up to Hanoi
indefinitely.51
And—once again—insistent Communist calls during the Easter
Offensive for the southern urban population to rise up against their
oppressors had fallen on ears quite deaf.
Third-Country Forces
In addition to South Vietnam and the United States, several "third
countries" contributed troops to the struggle. In 1966 there were
53,000 of them, by 1969 70,000. Of the latter, the largest component
was 50,000 South Koreans, all volunteers, mainly stationed in the
dangerous Military Region I, just below the border with North Viet-
nam. Thailand sent another 12,000. The Australian government, very
worried about a Communist takeover in the South, contributed 8,000
well-trained counterguerrilla troops. New Zealand also sent several
companies. The Philippines dispatched mainly medical support
groups. President Johnson declined the Taiwan government's offer
of combat forces for political reasons. Of these third-country forces,
5,200 died in combat.52
The Great Tet Offensive
By the spring of 1967, two years of large-scale American presence in
South Vietnam had resulted in enormous losses for the Commu-
nists. The Hanoi regime was in fact requiring its own people to suf-
fer a casualty rate about twice as high as that suffered by the Japanese
in World War II. In 1969 General Giap told a European interviewer
that between 1965 and 1968 alone, Communist military losses to-
taled 600,000. By way of comparison, from 1960 to 1967, 13,000
Americans lost their lives in Vietnam, fewer than those who had
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died in the United States in that same period from falling off the
roofs of their houses.53
In return for its egregious losses, Hanoi had little to show. The
Thieu government had clearly stabilized itself; morale among the
Vietcong was sinking. In response to those depressing conditions,
Hanoi began to make plans for a great offensive, to coincide with
the Tet holidays of 1968. In the Tet Offensive plans, the Communists
appear to have had two main objectives: first, to disorganize the
ARVN, and second, to provoke a great popular uprising in the cit-
ies, especially Saigon. "The primary objective of the Tet offensive
was to win the war by instigating a general uprising"; indeed, this
concept of the war ending in a general uprising "represents the major
Vietnamese contribution to the theory of people's war." If all went
according to plan, the Americans would find themselves in effect
without a country to defend, and they would go home. The Tet Of-
fensive was nothing less than Hanoi's acknowledgment that its guer-
rilla campaign against the South had failed. And it would become
the central event of the Vietnam War.54
South Vietnam was no police state. Thus it was relatively easy
for the VC/NVA to infiltrate numerous small groups into the cities.
Allied commanders in Saigon were aware well before January 1968
that something big was brewing, but for the most part they refused
to believe that the enemy would throw aside the guerrilla tactics
that had served them well and instead suicidally rise to the surface
and confront allied firepower.55 This incredulity on the part of the
Americans was a major element producing the surprise of Tet. Like
the events immediately preceding the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-
bor, American skepticism about the likelihood of a major Vietcong
offensive illustrates a severe weakness of even the best intelligence
system: human beings are loath to believe any information that seems
to contradict common sense, hesitant to conclude that the enemy is
about to make a major mistake.
On January 30, with half of the ARVN on leave during the tradi-
tional holiday truce, which the Communists had pledged to respect,
the offensive exploded. Vietcong units attacked cities and military
installations all over South Vietnam. In Saigon they tried to storm
the presidential palace, the ARVN headquarters, the airport, and
the radio station. A suicide squad of fifteen managed to penetrate
the outer grounds of the U.S. Embassy compound. The fate of South
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Vietnam seemed to hang in the balance. But the ARVN held to-
gether.56 The total lack of response to their calls for urban uprisings
stunned the Vietcong. And they suffered devastating casualties.
Today there is no dispute that Tet was a calamity of unparal-
leled dimensions for the Communists. Of 84,000 Vietcong involved
in the offensive, some 30,000 were killed. "In truth, the Tet Offen-
sive for all practical purposes destroyed the Viet Cong."57 This bloody
debacle has prompted some, including former Vietcong, to suggest
that the Tet Offensive was a plot by Hanoi not only to destabilize
and discredit the ARVN but also to engineer a massacre of the
Vietcong, "killing two birds with one stone" and thus removing all
obstacles to Hanoi's eventual takeover of the South. Whatever the
validity of these allegations, the guerrilla conflict would henceforth
fade into the background. After Tet, the war openly became a con-
ventional war of conquest by the NVA. It took four years for the
Communist side to feel sufficiently recovered to launch another of-
fensive.58 In effect, Tet "was the end of People's War, and essentially,
of any strategy built on guerrilla warfare and a politically inspired
insurgency."59
Communists and their apologists tried to explain away the fail-
ure of the large and growing urban population of South Vietnam to
rise up against the government; they said that the ARVN was too
strong for the civilians to confront. But such an explanation will not
do. Both Louis XVI and Nicholas II maintained large armed forces
in their capital cities and nevertheless suffered dethronement and
death. The Hungarian Army did not prevent the popular earthquake
in Communist Budapest in 1956; the superbly equipped Iranian army
did not save the Shah in 1978; nor did well-armed and thoroughly
indoctrinated troops stop the revolutions in East Germany, Czecho-
slovakia, and Romania in 1989. Even in April 1975, during what were
obviously the last days of the Saigon government, the South Viet-
namese people did not rise. It is hard to avoid concluding that the
inhabitants of the Southern cities never rose up in support of the
Communists because they did not wish to do so.60
For the South Vietnamese, Tet transformed the war not only
militarily but also politically. Wherever the Vietcong had achieved
temporary control, they committed atrocities against civilians. The
massacres at Hue were especially horrific: survivors and relatives in
that city exhumed the bodies of thousands of students, priests, and
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government workers and their families, many of whom had been
buried alive. These events alarmed the Southern population and
steeled its determination to resist conquest by the North. The Thieu
government distributed arms to hundreds of thousands of new mi-
litia members. In the words of a close student of the war, "Before the
Tet Offensive, 18-year-old villagers would lie and say they were 13
to get out of the draft; after the Tet Offensive, 13- and 14-year-olds
would lie and say they were 18 to get into the draft before the Com-
munists got to them. The perception of the craziness of what the
Communists were doing was increased, and the idea that they were
inevitable winners was so deflated that people changed very much
how they felt."61
In summary, the Communists had suffered an undeniable, dev-
astating military reverse. Nevertheless, in one of history's most stu-
pefying ironies, the Tet Offensive turned out to be the beginning of
the end of both the Johnson administration and the American com-
mitment to the South. That is, Tet turned from a military disaster
into a political triumph for the Communists. How could this have
happened?
The American News Media
Self-serving or ill-informed persons often criticize the news media.
It does not follow, however, that one ought to dismiss all criticism of
the news media as self-serving or ill-informed.
In 1994 Senate majority leader George Mitchell (D-Maine) said
that the American news industry was "more destructive than con-
structive than ever." Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) opined,
"You people [the media] celebrate failure and ignore success. Noth-
ing about government is done as incompetently as the reporting of it."62
Supposing for the moment that these statements by two experienced
political leaders are not totally without merit, what do they mean?
Are they not obviously saying that American reporters, in the Ameri-
can capital, operating within the American culture, fluent in the
American language, fail to inform the American public correctly
about American political processes? But if such statements have
merit, is it unreasonable to inquire whether reporting of events in
Vietnam by American journalists who were familiar with neither
Leninist political tactics nor guerrilla warfare nor Vietnamese cul-
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ture, who spoke none of the local languages, or even French—is it
unreasonable to ask whether such reporting might have sometimes
been less than acute?
During and after Tet, neither Newsweek nor Time published one
single article on the ARVN, and apparently no newspaper in the
United States ever ran even one positive story on the fighting per-
formance of a single ARVN unit. The unprecedented mass arming
of the civilian population after Tet was a very big story indeed, but
the news media never got it. The only Pulitzer Prize in the war went
to photographer Eddie Adams, for his picture of Gen. Nguyen Ngoc
Loan executing a Vietcong prisoner in the streets of Saigon at the
height of the Tet Offensive. Quite understandably, this graphic illus-
tration of the brutality of guerrilla war shocked millions of Ameri-
cans. It was seldom explained to them that throughout Tet, especially
in Saigon, VC terrorists deliberately attacked the wives and chil-
dren of ARVN officers and that just before the picture was taken
Loan had viewed the bodies of a family of six children whom that
VC prisoner had massacred.63
Without doubt, some of the reporting of the war was of good
quality; "those few TV newsmen who actually covered ARVN troops
in combat were a good deal less disparaging in their broadcasts than
their colleagues who did not." And the universally respected dean
of American journalists, Walter Cronkite, reported to the American
people from Vietnam that during Tet the ARVN had fought well,
with no defections, and that the Vietcong had suffered "a military
defeat."64 But these instances were not typical. Television in particu-
lar presented the Tet Offensive as an unprecedented catastrophe for
U.S. forces, a totally unexpected, nearly complete, and probably ir-
redeemable breakdown of security all over South Vietnam. Few view-
ers of the nightly network news could escape the suggestion that
the United States was bogged down in a dirty war against invin-
cible enemies for the sake of feckless allies.
The failure of the enormously expensive and prestigious (in those
days) U.S. news media to get the real story to the American people
had some of its roots in the very nature of the television news indus-
try, which "increased the power and velocity of fragments of expe-
rience, with no increase in the power and velocity of reasoned
judgment." Regular viewers of the Cronkite or Huntley-Brinkley
newscasts saw more infantry combat during Tet than did most U.S.
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troops in Vietnam at the time.65 This "nightly portrayal of violence
and gore and of American soldiers seemingly on the brink of disas-
ter contributed significantly to disillusionment with the war."66
Another major problem with the reporting on Vietnam was the
nature of the situation being reported. Some journalists perhaps con-
sciously allowed their political preferences to override their profes-
sional responsibilities. Others were no doubt simply naive. But above
all, American journalism, even more than the American academic,
intelligence, and military communities, was woefully short of people
knowledgeable about Southeast Asia, and especially about the com-
plexities of the struggle in Vietnam. Armed with the sketchiest ideas
of the country's recent history and sometimes none at all of its more
distant past, unfamiliar with guerrilla warfare, dependent on En-
glish-speaking informants, picking up rumors from one another in
the bars of Saigon, pressured increasingly by editors to supply sto-
ries that would "grab attention," many reporters drew false conclu-
sions from false premises. More and more newsmen portrayed South
Vietnam as a land of corruption, crime, cowardice, and cruelty. All
these elements were indeed easy to find in a war-torn South Viet-
nam open to minute scrutiny from the press. North Vietnam was
not subjected to such scrutiny, but few journalists seemed to appre-
ciate the consequences of that profound asymmetry; at any rate the
closed nature of the North meant that the scars and blemishes of the
South were magnified. Sometimes reporters saved themselves the
discomfort of gathering news on their own by purchasing stories
from helpful Vietnamese, who after the war turned out to be agents
of Hanoi. The influential Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times
sent from Hanoi searing reports of supposed American bombing
atrocities supplied to him by the North Vietnamese government.67
Few reporters in Saigon during the Tet Offensive had seen the
terrific destruction of cities in World War II or Korea. Many of them
were therefore profoundly shocked and frightened at the violence
they saw or heard around them, especially in the formerly pleasant
Saigon. The isolation and inexperience of many reporters stimulated
"the media's penchant for self-projection and instant analysis" so
that major network "specials" on Tet "assumed average South Viet-
namese reactions [to Tet] were those of American commentators"68
and thus that everybody in Saigon was as overwhelmed and terri-
fied by the offensive as the newsmen themselves were.
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These alarming flaws in journalistic coverage later provoked
devastating criticism, not only from experts on Vietnam but also
from within the ranks of professional journalists. One veteran news-
man has written that "drama was perpetuated at the expense of in-
formation." Another journalist wrote that "the New York Times and
many others had succeeded in creating an image of South Vietnam
that was so distant from the truth as not even to be good carica-
ture." Robert Elegant, former editor of Newsweek and winner of three
Overseas Press Club Awards, charges that the "press consistently
magnified the allies' deficiencies, and displayed almost saintly tol-
erance of those misdeeds of Hanoi it could neither disregard nor
deny."69 The Economist noted that many journalists believed every-
thing claimed by the National Liberation Front (the Vietcong) or
Hanoi. North Vietnamese propaganda had "turned skeptical news-
men credulous, careful scholars indifferent to data, honorable men
blind to immorality."70 To say the very least, the coverage of Viet-
nam, and especially of the crucial Tet Offensive, "cannot be treated
as a triumph for American journalism."71 A most effective and au-
thoritative dissection of the failings of the American news industry
during the Vietnamese conflict is found in "Viet Nam: How to Lose
a War," by Robert Elegant, in the August 1981 issue of Encounter.
The Vietnam conflict revealed profound weaknesses in the
American news industry. More than three decades afterward, it is
not in the least clear that these flaws have been corrected, or even
admitted. Most regrettably, many accounts of the war by journalists
were no worse than some produced by academicians, at the time
and for long thereafter.
American Mistakes
In the last analysis, one must concede that although reporters sensa-
tionalized and obfuscated the most distressing aspects of the war,
they did not create them. The errors of the news media were grave,
but they would not have had so great an impact on the American
public and on Congress if there had not been in fact another set of
grave errors, perpetrated not by journalists but by politicians and
soldiers in Washington and Saigon. No single one of those errors
lost the war for the United States and its allies, but their cumulative
effect was decisive. Among the errors were the Americanization of
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the war, the bombing of North Vietnam, the strategy of attrition,
and the acceptance of the permanent invasion of the South through
the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Americanizing the War
The murder of President Diem unraveled the frail fabric of the South
Vietnamese state. By 1965 the Communists appeared to be on the
brink of victory. In response, the Johnson administration completely
broke with the policy of President Eisenhower and began sending a
huge army to Vietnam. This fateful decision occurred in a remark-
ably offhand manner and against the advice of CIA director John
McCone. Just as they had decided to jettison Diem without any clear
idea of what was to follow, so in 1965 the Americans decided to take
over the war.72
Washington was undaunted, even unimpressed, by the failure
of the French in Vietnam. After all, the French had been fighting to
hold onto a colonial position: in contrast, the Americans would be
fighting not for the domination of South Vietnam but for its inde-
pendence, stability, and prosperity. Moreover, the United States was
incomparably richer, stronger, and more united than the Fourth Re-
public had ever been. Clad in these comforting and self-evident
truths, the Johnson administration plunged ahead. In January 1961,
when President Eisenhower left office, 875 U.S. military personnel
were in Vietnam. In November 1963, when President Kennedy died,
that number had multiplied nearly twenty times, to more than 16,000.
Two years after Lyndon Johnson became president, there were
187,000, and in two more years there were half a million. These troops
arrived in South Vietnam knowing little about Vietnamese society
or about the French experience there. More ominously, they knew
little about guerrilla warfare, and the army's policy of one-year tours
of duty ensured that lessons learned at great cost had to be learned
again and again.73 Many officers served a mere six-month tour, a
practice that led to serious problems and abuses. Even if the Ameri-
cans achieved success (however defined), how long could such a
huge force remain in Southeast Asia? Meanwhile, the presence of so
many foreign, unattached, and (by Vietnamese standards) rich young
males contributed greatly to the disruption and corruption of Viet-
namese society.
Even half a million U.S. troops did not provide the numerical
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preponderance that successful counterguerrilla warfare requires.
When the Americans increased their forces in South Vietnam by any
given number, Hanoi countered the move by increasing its own
forces there by merely a fourth or even a tenth of the American num-
ber. In fact, the numerical superiority enjoyed by the allies over the
Communists existed on paper, not in the field. The American forces,
and the ARVN whom they had trained, had a very big "tail": by the
end of 1968, a mere 80,000 out of 536,000 American servicemen in
Vietnam were combat infantry.74 The rest mainly provided support
for the combat troops. Thus, most of the time the allies had a very
small advantage or no advantage at all where it counted: the num-
ber of fighting men prepared to contest control of the countryside.
That is not the way to defeat guerrillas, or anybody. By sending these
forces to the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the Johnson administra-
tion prevented an immediate victory of the Communists, but it also
opened up a fissure in American society that it did not know how to
close or even contain.
Bombing the North
Arguably, the French effort in Vietnam had come to grief because of
grotesquely inadequate airpower. In contrast, American airpower
was to be the big ace in the Johnson administration's hand. Specifi-
cally, bombing the North would serve as a substitute for stopping
the invasion of the South. Quite probably, air interdiction alone
would not have succeeded in persuading Hanoi to stop flooding
South Vietnam with troops and munitions. But the Johnson admin-
istration conceived and executed the air campaign so badly that the
bombing not only failed to accomplish its purpose but also became
a weapon in the hands of opponents of both the war and the United
States, at home and abroad.
The United States dropped several times more bombs in Viet-
nam than it had in all theaters during World War II; the majority of
them fell on South Vietnam, which the Americans were "defend-
ing." But the Americans never bombed North Vietnam the way they
had bombed Germany and Japan; that is, they did not use bombing
to break North Vietnamese civilian morale. On the contrary, the
Johnson administration took great pains to avoid unnecessary dam-
age to civilian areas in Hanoi and to the dikes that were essential to
food production. The crucial port of Haiphong, through which
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poured Soviet supplies, also remained untouched. The bombing cam-
paign aimed only at an incredibly restricted number of targets, often
selected only hours previously by civilians in the White House thou-
sands of miles away, and usually anticipated by North Vietnamese
air defenses. The administration punctuated the air war with pauses—
sixteen of them—that were somehow supposed to convince Hanoi of
American "goodwill"; the North used the pauses to repair damage,
improve defenses, and increase infiltration of the South. Johnson told
his successor that "all the bombing pauses were a mistake."75
Despite all this restraint, critics of American involvement at home
and overseas leveled charges of barbarism against the United States.
They even used the term genocide, as if they actually lacked the wit
to distinguish between Lyndon Johnson and Adolf Hitler. A U.S.
senator from Massachusetts dismayed many Americans and de-
lighted their enemies with his patently false charges that the U.S.
Air Force was deliberately bombing dikes.76
However hobbled and inefficient, the air war against the North
Vietnamese damaged Northern morale and interfered with their war
effort. But the bombing did not prevent them from obtaining more
than enough replacement equipment from the Soviets and the Chi-
nese, and thus it did not decisively impair the North's warmaking
capabilities. At the same time, approximately one out of twenty
American bombs dropped in Vietnam were duds, whose high-qual-
ity metal the enterprising NVA recovered to make ammunition and
booby traps with which to kill more Americans.77 The Johnson
administration's haphazard, ineffective use of American airpower
against North Vietnam prolonged the war, increased American ca-
sualties, contributed to growing disunity in American society, and
provided valuable ammunition to foes of democracy all over the
globe. Conventional wisdom identifies the middle course as the right
one. But in the on-again off-again, self-restrained bombing of North
Vietnam, as in the entire war, President Johnson chose the middle
course and was destroyed.
The Attrition "Strategy"
Sending an overly large American army to Vietnam and waging an
ineffective bombing campaign against the North would not in them-
selves have ruined American aims, if American forces in the South
had pursued an effective strategy. But they did not. First, the Ameri-
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cans took on major responsibility for fighting the guerrillas; that was
a profound error. Then they compounded the error by choosing to
fight the guerrillas the wrong way.
To provide security to the peasantry by separating the guerrillas
from the civilians among whom they operate and from whom they
draw sustenance—that is the core concept of classic (and success-
ful) counterguerrilla warfare. General Westmoreland rejected such
a strategy because it was defensive, and thus would negate the ad-
vantages possessed by the American fighting forces. He wished to
emphasize U.S. superiority in mobility and firepower by pursuing
aggressive tactics against the enemy. Therein lies the germ of what
is usually called the strategy of attrition. The essence of the strategy
was to employ superior technology to kill the enemy in numbers
greater than could be replaced. Then the war eventually would sim-
ply peter out.
Attrition was not concerned with holding territory or increasing
the number of peasants living in secure villages. Hence, there was
no way to measure its progress but by the notorious "body count":
adding up the number of Vietnamese corpses remaining after an
encounter and then announcing that number to the world. That
method of measuring progress may have been the biggest public
relations disaster in American history. And nobody seemed to re-
member Clausewitz's dictum: "Casualty reports on either side are
never accurate, seldom truthful, and in most cases deliberately fal-
sified"; "that is why guns and prisoners have always counted as the
real trophies of victory."78
For several reasons, key groups in the United States began to run
out of patience with the war before attrition had achieved its objec-
tives. First, for attrition to work, the enemy must fight. But in Viet-
nam the tempo of fighting was controlled by the Communists, who
could fight or not as they chose. And when they did fight, they often
"hugged" American units so closely that they rendered American ar-
tillery and airpower ineffective. It is true that with their superior fire-
power the allies were able to break the back of the Vietcong for good
during the Tet Offensive. But here again it was the insurgents who
chose the confrontation, even though their choice violated the most
elementary principles of sound guerrilla tactics. That is, Tet was a
great victory for the allies, but it was handed to them on a platter.
Second, attrition ignored the brutal fact that the Hanoi party-
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state was willing and able to impose enormous sacrifices on its own
people. Years before, Ho Chi Minh had declared that the Vietminh
would suffer ten times as many deaths as the French and still win.
And General Giap revealingly observed that "every minute, hun-
dreds of thousands of people die all over the world. The life or death
of a hundred, a thousand or tens of thousands of human beings,
even if they are our compatriots, represents really very little."79
Third, although the intent of the Johnson-McNamara policy of
gradualism was to force Hanoi to abandon the struggle by slowly
increasing the military pressure on it, in fact the policy provided
Hanoi with time to absorb each blow before the next was delivered.
Moreover, the administration's gradualism included repeated pub-
lic and private assurances to Hanoi that the United States would not
attack North Vietnam on the ground. That is, the Johnson-McNamara
administration never threatened the existence of the North Vietnam-
ese party-state. Consequently, Hanoi was free to employ every ounce
of its strength against the attrition strategy in the South. Gradual-
ism worked against attrition: in the end it exhausted not the North
Vietnamese but the Americans.
In Vietnam the Americans expended bullets, bombs, rockets, and
shells sufficient to destroy all the soldiers in all the armies that ever
existed in the history of the world. At certain points in the war, it
cost the United States four hundred thousand dollars to kill one en-
emy soldier. That unprecedented, absurd use of American military
technology indeed killed many of the enemy; it also killed many
neutral and friendly civilians. The American way of combat was
exceedingly destructive; no American would wish his home or neigh-
borhood to be "liberated" in the style of the American forces in the
Vietnam War. The side effects of American combat tactics made many
converts to the Vietcong.80 If the Americans had not been able to be
so prodigal with money and equipment, they might have been forced
to come up with a real strategy.
The Communist enemy suffered severely from attrition; that was
a main reason for the launching of the disastrous Tet Offensive. And
throughout the long conflict, U.S. forces never lost a significant battle,
a military record probably unparalleled in history. Yet the combina-
tion of growing American casualty lists, an increasingly negative
presentation of the war by the American news media, and the seem-
ingly endless nature of the struggle caused Americans at home to
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question the value of the war; for all this, nothing was more respon-
sible than the strategy of attrition.81
Permanent Invasion: Laos
Almost all the problems American forces encountered in the struggle
to save South Vietnam had their roots, to one degree or another, in
the failure to stop Hanoi's invasion of the South. The principal route
of invasion—the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail—went through Laos.
President Eisenhower had warned President Kennedy that Laos was
the key to South Vietnam, and General Taylor told Kennedy as early
as 1961 that the insurgents could not be beaten as long as infiltration
via their Laotian sanctuary went unchecked.82
The "trail" was begun in 1959 and had a decade later become a
network of roads down which poured thousands of troops and trucks
every month. The construction of the Trail was in itself an epic. Built
at the cost of vast sacrifice of human life, through some of the most
inhospitable territory to human beings in the world, the Trail was a
victory over forbidding terrain, debilitating climate, physical exhaus-
tion, and omnipresent insects, snakes, fungus, and infection. This
logistical triumph would cost many Americans their lives and the
South Vietnamese their freedom, and needlessly so.
If the troops from North Vietnam who had infiltrated the South in
small batches between 1959 and 1965 had all come in at the same
time, it would have looked like a Korea-style invasion. Instead, the
Trail confronted American and ARVN troops with a sort of slow-mo-
tion Schlieffen Plan, by which they were constantly being outflanked.83
General Westmoreland and others wanted to cut the Trail on the
ground by sending three divisions across Laos to the border of Thai-
land, a distance comparable to that between Washington and Phila-
delphia. (The South Korea Demarcation [Truce] Line is almost 150
miles long; the French built the impressive and successful Morice
Line running almost 600 miles along the Algerian-Tunisian border;
in the 1980s, the Moroccans built the Hassan line, a ten- to twelve-
foot-high rock-and-sand antiguerrilla wall with sensors and radar
running hundreds of miles.) Gen. Bruce Palmer advocated extend-
ing the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) across to Thailand; three U.S.
divisions would hold this line, supported by intensive airpower. The
U.S. Navy would blockade North Vietnamese ports and threaten
the coast with invasion; there would be no "strategic bombing" of
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the North. Thus the United States would execute a double mission:
(1) block the infiltration and invasion into South Vietnam, and (2)
train and equip a first-class ARVN. Cut off from replacements and
heavy equipment, the Vietcong would eventually wither. Most of
all, "in defending well-prepared positions U.S. troops would suffer
fewer casualties."84
The Johnson administration, however, forbade any attempt to
use ground forces to block the Trail across Laos; it intended to stem
the tide of men and supplies by airpower alone. Accordingly, the
Americans carried out the most intensive bombing campaign in the
history of warfare. It was to no avail. Traffic down the Trail was
slowed but not stopped. President Johnson later wrote that of course
he was aware that "North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces were
enjoying almost complete sanctuary in Laos and Cambodia." But
then why not put a stop to this? Because in 1962 President Kennedy
had agreed to the "neutralization" of Laos, and, in President
Johnson's exact words, in May 1967 "we were all concerned that
entering Laos with ground forces would end all hope of reviving the
1962 Laos agreement, fragile though it was, and would greatly increase the
forces needed in Southeast Asia."85
Leaving open the Ho Chi Minh Trail seemed to allow no alterna-
tive to massive bombing of North Vietnam. Why and how bombing
would have a greater effect on the North Vietnamese than it did on
the British or the Germans in World War II was never made clear. In
any event, North Vietnamese officials told Robert Shaplen that they
shot down twenty-five hundred U.S. aircraft engaged in bombing
the Trail.86
The failure both to close the Trail and to adopt an alternative
strategy that would have neutralized its effects also meant that Hanoi
could fight on interior lines, a tremendous advantage. It meant that
the enemy was free to invade South Vietnam continuously: the NVA's
colossal 1972 Easter Offensive would have been quite impossible
without the Laotian springboard. It meant that when hard pressed
by allied forces, the enemy could simply retreat into Laos or Cam-
bodia. Thus the policies of the Johnson administration made a last-
ing, or even a temporary, American military victory impossible. And
that fact, in turn, meant that attrition—killing large numbers of North
Vietnamese who came down the Trail into South Vietnam—would
take longer than key segments of the American public would ac-
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cept. Indeed, like the bombing of the North, attrition itself was a
substitute strategy forced on the Americans through their failure to
interrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But "it was impossible to defeat
North Vietnam decisively in South Vietnam without stopping the
invasion" via that Trail.87
Since the fall of Saigon, many in Hanoi have expressed the con-
viction that the Trail was the key to their success. They are not alone
in that opinion. Sir Robert Thompson has written that "if they [the
North Vietnamese] had not had this unmolested avenue through
Laos, the insurgency in Vietnam could have been stopped at any
time in the early 1960s." Several prominent Johnson administration
figures concur. "Surely," wrote William P. Bundy, "we could have
held a line across Laos and South Vietnam with significantly fewer
men than we eventually employed within South Vietnam, far less
American casualties, and in the end much greater effect and less
bloodshed in the South itself." "In retrospect," stated Ambassador
Bunker, "I am more certain than I was in 1967 that our failure to cut
the Ho Chi Minh Trail was a strategic mistake of the first order."
And Walt Rostow declared that the failure to act against the Ho Chi
Minh Trail in 1962 "may have been the single greatest mistake in
United States foreign policy in the 1960s."88
Popular Opposition to Communist Conquest
Long before partition in 1954, the southern provinces of Vietnam
were different in crucial ways from those to the north. For centuries
before the arrival of the French, Vietnam had usually been divided
between a northern and a southern kingdom, the border generally
in the area of the seventeenth parallel. The indigenous Cao Dai and
Hoa Hao sects had their strongholds in the southern provinces.
French political and social presence was much more firmly planted
in Cochin China (Saigon and the Mekong Delta) than in the rest of
the country. During World War II the Japanese occupation treated
Cochin China as a distinct area. At that time, the Vietminh sought
refuge near or across the China border, thus necessarily establishing
their base in northern Tonkin. After the Japanese surrender, elements
of Chiang Kai-shek's army occupied the northern provinces, while
British forces entered the southern ones, and the returning French
first reestablished their control in the Saigon area.
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The Vietcong were never able to develop much support in the
large and constantly growing cities of South Vietnam, and the grisly
massacres of civilians in Hue during the Tet Offensive helped so-
lidify the urban rejection of the Communist side. A source very
friendly to the Communists estimates that in 1974 there were about
5,400 activists in Saigon, a city of 2.5 million people. That is why the
constant, ardent exhortations by the Communists for the urban popu-
lation to stage a general uprising produced such little effect during
both the Tet and the Easter Offensives. In the countryside Commu-
nist support, although much stronger than in the cities, had been
declining for a long time. That was occurring in part because the
Communists had to employ draconian compulsion to replace their
growing combat losses and in part because in the early 1970s the
South Vietnamese government had carried out "the most extensive
land reform program yet undertaken in any non-Communist coun-
try in Asia." In the mid-1970s, estimates of support for the Commu-
nist side put it at less than one-third of the South Vietnamese
population. Catholics, Northern refugees, members of the powerful
Southern religious sects, army officers and their families, the urban
middle class—all were militantly hostile to a Northern conquest.
Some of those groups overlapped, but taken together they were very
numerous; the ARVN and the Territorials together numbered over a
million men. Notably, the Territorial forces (RF/PF), suffering the
highest casualty rates, also had the lowest desertion rates. Above
all, the ARVN had stood up both in 1968 and in 1972 against the
very best the Communists could throw at it. The ARVN as a fighting
force could bear comparison to the Israeli army. And in 1975 North-
ern premier Pham Van Dong conceded that from 50 to 70 percent of
the Southern population would need to be persuaded of the ben-
efits of "reunification."89 That an incredibly large percentage of the
Southern population became "boat people" suggests that he knew
what he was talking about.
Yet, despite the obvious fact that broad strata of the South Viet-
namese population opposed a Communist takeover, and despite the
obvious fact that the ARVN and the Territorials had stood up to the
maximum Communist military pressure—despite all this, power-
ful forces were converging not only to take all American forces out
of the war but also to leave the South Vietnamese friendless and
weaponless.
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The United States Abandons Its Allies
On January 27, 1973, after four years of negotiations, Washington
and Hanoi signed the Paris Agreements. The principal effect of those
accords was that all remaining U.S. fighting forces withdrew from
South Vietnam and all U.S. air attacks on the North ceased. But North
Vietnam continued to keep almost a quarter of a million troops in
South Vietnam and another fifty thousand in Laos. This stunning,
deadly asymmetry—the Americans leave, the North Vietnamese
stay—caused President Thieu to refuse his assent. President Nixon
threatened Thieu with a unilateral American signature but also as-
sured him in writing that if Hanoi resumed its effort to conquer the
South, it would call down upon itself U.S. airpower. In fact, how-
ever, the cessation of American air strikes allowed the North, in com-
plete violation of the accords, to greatly increase the number of its
troops inside the South.90
After the peace accords, President Thieu refused to yield another
province, village, or ARVN strong point to the Communists, no
matter how exposed and vulnerable to attack such places might be.
This policy of holding everywhere was extremely unwise, allowing
the Communists to pursue their familiar tactic of amassing great
numerical superiority at the point of attack. The ARVN was stretched
so thin that it possessed neither a strategic reserve to rush to the
point of danger nor troops to interdict Communist movements in
Laos and Cambodia.
Precisely in these circumstances of great peril, South Vietnam's
American ally began to openly turn against it. On July 1,1973, Con-
gress forbade any combat in or over Vietnam after August 15,1973.
This repudiation of President Nixon's promises to President Thieu
gave Hanoi an unmistakable green light for invasion. Congress also
slashed assistance to Saigon; after 1973, the South Vietnamese were
receiving less than one-third the dollar amount of aid they had ob-
tained in 1972, in inflated dollars. By 1974 the United States had
spent $150 billion (perhaps $400 billion in 2001 values) on the war.
The Saigon government was asking for only 1 percent of that total.
But Congress cut aid to South Vietnam to only $700 million, not
nearly enough for the ARVN to keep its American equipment in
working order. (Yet from 1976 to 1980, Congress would pour out
$15 billion to Israel and Egypt.)
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These Congressional measures "seriously undermined South
Vietnamese combat power." The ARVN had to cut its radio commu-
nications by 50 percent. Many Saigon fighter aircraft ceased to fly
for lack of replacement parts. Artillery batteries in the Central High-
lands could fire only four shells per day. By the summer of 1974,
each ARVN soldier was allotted eighty-five cartridges a month. Ban-
dages removed from soldiers who had died were washed and used
again. During this time the Soviets were supplying Hanoi with great
quantities of oil, ammunition, and heavy weapons.91
The halting of American air strikes had been an incalculable gift
to the North, because NVA divisions, with their great numbers and
their tanks, were infinitely more vulnerable to air attack than VC
units had ever been (as the Easter Offensive had shown). And then,
the drastic reductions in American aid to the South convinced Hanoi
that "a fundamental turning point" had been reached in the con-
flict.92 Accordingly, in December 1974 North Vietnamese Army units
overran Phuoc Long Province. To this dramatic, undeniable repu-
diation of the peace agreements, the United States made no response.
In fact, in his first State of the Union address, President Ford men-
tioned Vietnam not even once. The Hanoi Politburo now had abso-
lute assurance that it could do as it wished.
The Fall
On March 11, 1975, NVA units seized Ban Me Thuot. Hanoi had
publicly ripped up the Paris peace accords and defied the United
States. By way of response, the Democratic Caucus of the House of
Representatives rejected President Ford's plea for emergency aid for
South Vietnam. (Even the Soviets, when they pulled their troops out
of Afghanistan, did not abandon their allies so utterly, although they
might have done so with much justification.) Thereupon, President
Thieu revealed to his generals a plan for strategic retrenchment: ex-
cept for enclaves at Hue and Da Nang, the ARVN would withdraw
from Military Regions I and II (the northern and central parts of
South Vietnam) and fall back to consolidated positions in Military
Region HI (which included Saigon) and Military Region IV (the
Mekong Delta.)
Retrenchment was in fact long overdue. Most of the ARVN's
thirteen divisions were in MRs I and II, which contained only 20
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percent of the South's population. Thieu had not previously carried
out a consolidation of ARVN forces toward the densely populated
southern provinces because he had always believed that the United
States would not desert South Vietnam. When Thieu at last decided
on a pullback, the South was without American advisers, without
fuel and replacement parts, without even the goodwill of its mighty
onetime ally across the Pacific. And Thieu and his staff had done
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little serious preparation for such a massive operation. Many key
ARVN officers and civil officials did not know what was happen-
ing. Often the roads and bridges designated for retreat to the South
were impassable.
When the civilian population in the northern provinces realized
that the ARVN was retreating, memories of the Communist massa-
cres of civilians in Hue in 1968 provoked a torrent of refugees who
clogged the roads to Hue and Da Nang, making both movement
and defense almost impossible. North Vietnamese aircraft constantly
strafed and bombed the helpless civilians thronging the roads. The
numerous Hanoi agents inside the Saigon civil service and army
spread rumors and panic. Many soldiers added to the chaos by leav-
ing their units to search for their families and ensure their escape
toward the south; here was the disastrous payoff of the ARVN's
policy of assigning draftees far from their home villages.
Almost overnight, retrenchment turned into collapse. Most of
the ARVN forces that had been holding MRs I and II simply disinte-
grated. On March 24, the North Vietnamese captured the ancient
capital of Hue. Six days later Da Nang, where the U.S. Marines had
landed ten years before, in the first days of President Johnson's
Americanization of the war, fell to the invader amid scenes of inde-
scribable suffering. Yet the Southern government still held Saigon;
it still held the Mekong Delta: every single one of the Delta's sixteen
provincial capitals and scores of district capitals were in Saigon
hands. Between Saigon and the Cambodian border, many ARVN
units were fiercely resisting the NVA. Some ARVN units had bro-
ken out of the encirclement at Xuan Loc and were headed for Saigon.
Thirty miles north of Saigon, the Fifth ARVN Division was fighting
to get to the city. There was no uprising or disturbance inside the
capital. Plans were afoot to turn Saigon into a second Stalingrad.93
And with the whole NVA beginning to concentrate around Saigon,
the ever-expected B-52s could smash Northern military power for a
decade. Furthermore, the rains were coming, the tropical inunda-
tions that would halt the NVA's tanks in a sea of mud and give be-
leaguered Saigon the chance to repair its position.
But on April 30 the new president, Gen. Duong Van Minh, as-
sassin of Diem, announced the surrender. Halfway through his
speech, the heavens opened and the rains poured down, the rains
that would have mired the Northern offensive. Twenty-five years to
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the day after President Truman first authorized assistance to the
French war effort in Vietnam, Saigon fell.94
To Lose a War
In the Vietnamese conflict, the Americans confronted an experienced
Communist regime that had been able, through a successful struggle
against an important European power, to establish a near-monopo-
listic claim on the cause of national independence. To say the least,
this capture of the nationalist banner by Leninists has been a rare
phenomenon in world politics.95 The Americans vastly escalated their
ground commitment to the war without the assistance or even the
approval of their principal European allies. They permitted the coun-
try that they were pledged to defend to be subjected to continuous
invasion through the territory of two officially neutral neighboring
states, an invasion that the Americans could have prevented. Dur-
ing the conflict the White House patched together a program of
Americanization and attrition almost perfectly guaranteed to arouse
that impatience for which the American electorate is notorious. Coun-
tries avowedly hostile to the United States openly sent its adversar-
ies great quantities of essential munitions. It may be very difficult to
imagine a future American administration allowing itself to stumble
and sink into a similar strategic swamp; nevertheless, careful reflec-
tion on the Vietnam wars will surely yield up some insights, although
they may turn out to be unpalatable.
Because of the debacle in 1975, one of the most important "les-
sons" of the Vietnam conflict is also the most overlooked: people's
revolutionary war—that invincible Maoist weapon of the 1960s—
failed. The United States, of all the industrialized democracies, is
probably the most culturally alien to underdeveloped countries;
nevertheless, however expensively and destructively, the Americans
and their allies beat the Vietcong guerrillas, despite the fact that the
latter possessed sanctuaries and received outside help. Any list of
the causes of the defeat of the Vietcong would include irresistible
American firepower, sweeping land reform, determined South Viet-
namese resistance, and the Communists' fatal abandonment of clas-
sical guerrilla tactics in the Tet Offensive.
But why then did South Vietnam fall? One sometimes hears the
observation that the United States should never again become in-
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volved in a war on behalf of a government that does not enjoy the
support of its own people. This is another way of saying that the fall
of South Vietnam was the fault of the South Vietnamese: the final
and total defeat of the Saigon government is taken as proof that the
South Vietnamese people did not truly desire (and probably were
not really worthy of) independence. Hence, there was nothing that
the Americans could have done to save them.
It certainly is not hard to understand that many Americans
should wish to shift the blame for the outcome of the war primarily
or solely onto the South Vietnamese. But the conquest of South Viet-
nam by the NVA in 1975 does not prove that its people desired the
Communist victory any more than the conquest of South Korea by
the North Korean Army in 1950 or the defeat of the Spanish Repub-
lic by Franco's forces or the subjugation of the Confederate States
by the Union armies proves that any of those populations desired
those outcomes.
Recall that in Communist Hungary in 1956, in Fulgencio Batista's
Cuba in 1958, in PDPA Afghanistan in 1980, in Nicolae Ceausescu's
Romania in 1989, the armed forces of those tightly controlled police
states broke apart under remarkably little pressure.96 But even un-
der the ferocious blows of Tet and the Easter Offensive, the South
Vietnamese army did not break up. On the contrary, the ARVN, along
with the Territorials, sustained huge casualties year after year after
year. The steadfastness of the fighting forces, the wide distribution
of arms to the population by the Saigon government after Tet, the
unwillingness of the inhabitants of Saigon to rise up against their
government in 1968 or in 1972 or even in 1975, the consequent ne-
cessity for the whole North Vietnamese Army to fight its way through
to Saigon, the constant flow of refugees southward even in the weeks
of collapse in 1975, the tragic epilogue of the Boat People—surely
none of these things indicates that a majority of the people of South
Vietnam desired conquest by Hanoi.
No, it was not the desire of the South Vietnamese for Commu-
nism that caused the fall of South Vietnam. The truth is much more
embarrassing than that. By 1973 South Vietnam was becoming what
the Americans always said they wanted it to be, a country with a
stable government and at least some of the external trappings of
democracy. The war also had become what the Americans always
said they wanted it to be, not a guerrilla conflict but a clear-cut
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conventional campaign of conquest by Hanoi. In such a war the ARVN
needed only American supplies and air support to stand up to the
best efforts of the NVA, as the 1972 Easter Offensive had demonstrated.
And precisely at the conjunction of all these favorable developments,
precisely when South Vietnam was in the best shape it ever had been,
the U.S. Congress decided to repudiate and abandon its ally. The
Americans slashed their aid to the South while the Soviets continued
theirs to the North. The South Vietnamese were not only cut off from
supplies; they were psychologically isolated as well: surrounded by
enemies, they could look to no other country for assistance or even
sympathy. It was in these devastating circumstances that President
Thieu attempted the retrenchment that turned into disaster.
Then the Americans watched as North Vietnam, trampling on a
peace agreement that the United States had signed a scant two years
before, launched perhaps the largest conventional invasion Asia had
witnessed in thirty years. In the face of this invasion, South Vietnam's
American-trained and American-equipped armed forces ground to
a halt for lack of supplies. In Hanoi's 1972 Easter Offensive, the South
Vietnamese, bolstered by U.S. airpower and supplies, repulsed Gen-
eral Giap's best efforts. In Hanoi's 1975 offensive, the South Viet-
namese, deprived of promised U.S. support, came apart.
Cutting off its allies from their only source of supplies and re-
placement parts was but part of the picture. All through the war,
what passed for American strategy had permitted Hanoi to construct
across so-called neutral neighboring states a complex of major mili-
tary highways, like a noose around South Vietnam. Thus, when the
Americans abandoned their allies, the outflanked South Vietnam-
ese fell victim to the geography of Indochina that enabled Hanoi to
substitute invasion for subversion.
True, the South Vietnamese could not have preserved their inde-
pendence without long-term American assistance, but the same was
once true of the West Europeans and the Israelis. The South Koreans,
under U.S. protection for decades, today live in independence and
prosperity. And since the American impact was much greater on
South Vietnamese society than on that of South Korea (it was, in
fact, far more comparable to the U.S. impact on Japan by 1951), the
people of South Vietnam, whatever their political frailties, would
by now quite possibly have made significant advances toward some
recognizable kind of democracy. But they never got the chance.
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It is at the very least unbecoming for Americans to heap all or
most of the blame for their unhappy experience in Vietnam on the
heads of the South Vietnamese, since it was the United States that
permitted the murder of President Diem, insisted on pursuing an
inappropriate military strategy, allowed the Ho Chi Minh Trail to
function, imposed a disastrously one-sided treaty on Saigon, and
finally declined to supply the South Vietnamese even with replace-
ment parts—all this done to an ally that had suffered a notably higher
rate of military fatalities than the Americans.
One sometimes hears that the lost struggle to preserve South
Vietnam was not totally in vain, because it provided other countries
in Southeast Asia with sobering evidence of what Communism re-
ally meant, and time—two decades—to get their economic and po-
litical houses in order. Probably this is of little consolation to the
South Vietnamese people, who after an incalculable effusion of blood
and an unimaginable destruction of the environment were forced to
dwell in Asia's most efficient police state and most mismanaged
economy. Their fate has been inexpressibly sad.
A Different Strategy
The Hanoi regime was tightly in control of its population, deter-
mined to have its will at any cost, and thus impervious to consider-
ations of loss of life. To defeat that adversary would have required the
United States and South Vietnam to carry the land war to the North.
But Washington deemed such a strategy impossible for both political
and military reasons. Consequently, the so-called attrition strategy
was an effort to defeat North Vietnam primarily through actions in-
side the South, which was probably not possible, and certainly not
possible within a time frame that the misinformed American elector-
ate would tolerate. And even if attrition had worked, it would have
saved South Vietnam only/or the time being; there could be no guaran-
tee that the Americans would support an attrition-based war in the
future. Hence, the survival of South Vietnam required another—an
altogether different—strategy, a strategy to permit the Americans to
assist in the defense of South Vietnam at a reasonable cost in lives,
money, and damage to the human and natural environment.
Certainly there is no easy way to defeat a well-organized guer-
rilla insurgency receiving massive outside help; that is what the al-
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lies were facing up to at least 1967. But the Johnson-McNamara policy
in Vietnam stands out as a model of what not to do. Sending a huge
American army to Vietnam for active campaigning ignored the es-
sence of counterguerrilla war: it sought to kill rather than isolate the
guerrillas. It neutralized American technological advantages, caused
needless American casualties, inflicted tremendous hurt on friendly
civilians, alarmed our friends, gratified our enemies, and exhausted
the American public.
Americans were in fact doing some effective thinking about how
to fight guerrillas in the context of Vietnam, but sadly, their efforts
and warnings went unheeded. A significant indicator of American
ability to formulate effective plans for counterinsurgency is the Army
study called PROVN, "A Program for the Pacification and Long-
term Development of South Viet Nam." Commissioned by the army
chief of staff in July 1965, PROVN was finished in March 1966, a
nine hundred-page document earmarked for internal army circula-
tion only. Having questioned numerous army officers about their
experiences in Vietnam and studied the history of that country,
PROVN's youngish officer-authors declared that "without question,
village and hamlet security must be achieved throughout Viet Nam."
Attaining that primary objective required "effective area saturation
tactics in and around populated areas"—the first essential step in a
serious clear-and-hold strategy.97 PROVN also advocated cutting the
Ho Chi Minh Trail, increasing direct U.S. supervision of South Viet-
namese government activities, and placing all U.S. personnel and
programs in the South under a single head, the U.S. ambassador.
Partly because of PROVN's direct criticisms of the search-and-de-
stroy methods then in place, it received polite inattention until Gen-
eral Abrams took command in 1969, by which time the war had
become largely a conventional one.
One approach to the fundamental problem of civilian security,
perhaps "the most imaginative strategy to emerge from the Viet Nam
conflict," was the CAP program, the Combined Action Platoons,
begun in August 1965. A Marine rifle squad of 14 men, all volun-
teers, would receive permanent assignment to a particular village,
to work with and train a Popular Forces platoon of 38 men. (In prac-
tice most CAPs had fewer than 14 Marines, and in later years not all
were volunteers.) Typically a village included five hamlets over an
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area of about four square kilometers, with a population of perhaps
3,500 persons. By the end of 1967 there were 79 CAPs, and 114 by
early 1970, all in the exceedingly dangerous MR I, just below the
border with North Vietnam. At the height of the program, 42 Ma-
rine officers, 2 Navy officers, 2,050 enlisted Marines, and 126 Navy
hospital corpsmen were involved. "The Combined Action Program's
basic concept was to bring peace to the Vietnamese villages by unit-
ing the local knowledge of the Popular Forces with the professional
skill and superior equipment of the Marines." The permanent pres-
ence of Marines protected the villagers from excessive American fire-
power, but most of all it signaled to the villagers that they would
not be abandoned.98
General Westmoreland did not like the CAPs. In his memoirs he
devotes exactly one paragraph to the program, saying: "I simply
had not enough numbers to put a squad of Americans in every vil-
lage and hamlet."99 It is not easy to understand exactly what the
general meant: to place a rifle squad of Marines into, say, two thou-
sand villages would have required 28,000 troops, about one-twenti-
eth of the total American military personnel in Vietnam in 1968; but
this small fraction of U.S. troops would have provided physical and
psychological security to—and deprived the enemy of—over seven
million peasants.
To be worthwhile, any alternative strategy would have had to sepa-
rate the bulk of the Southern population from the VC and the NVA,
keep the number of American troops within reasonable limits, opti-
mize American firepower, rrtinimize American and friendly civilian
casualties, neutralize the effects of the Ho Chi Mirth Trail, and place
the main responsibility for coping with guerrillas where it be-
longed—on the Vietnamese.
Analysts of the conflict have forcefully argued that the funda-
ment of a proper strategy for the United States was to halt the con-
tinuous invasion of South Vietnam by blocking the Ho Chi Mirth
Trail. In their scenario, American and ARVN forces would have de-
ployed along a roughly east-west axis across Laos to the border of
Thailand. I suggest here a different alternative strategy, based on
several important assumptions. The first is that the Johnson admin-
istration would have continued to veto a move into Laos, on the
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grounds that it would widen the conflict, invite an NVA attack
through northeastern Thailand, put too many Americans on the
ground too far from blue water, and so on. The second assumption
is that President Johnson would have continued to forbid an inva-
sion even of the southern provinces of North Vietnam because he
and his advisers feared a Chinese intervention on the Korean model.
That was not an unreasonable fear, given the experiences of the de-
cision makers in Washington. In fact, by the end of the Johnson ad-
ministration, nearly a third of a million Chinese military personnel
served in the Vietnam conflict as engineers and antiaircraft troops.
The third assumption concerns clear-and-hold counterinsurgency
operations of the type so ably advocated by Sir Robert Thompson.100
Clear-and-hold means patiently, systematically, and permanently
driving the guerrillas out of first one area, then another, then an-
other. That strategy produced excellent results in Malaya and is prob-
ably the best response to insurgency in any country where the
guerrillas are essentially lacking a true sanctuary. In South Vietnam,
however, clear-and-hold tactics would not in themselves have been
sufficient because the insurgency was only one arm of the campaign
to destroy the Saigon government, the other being a slow-motion
invasion (fast-motion in 1972) from the North via Laos. Any suc-
cessful strategy needed to be based on clear thinking about South
Vietnam's geography.
A New Geography
Geography was destiny for South Vietnam. If that state had been a
peninsula, like South Korea or Malaya, or an archipelago, like the
Philippines, its defense would have been incomparably easier. But
it was neither of those things. Instead, the country was too big, too
poorly shaped, too exposed to flanking attacks from Laos and Cam-
bodia to defend in its entirety. The allies would neither invade the
enemy's base (North Vietnam) nor prevent him from coming at them
as he chose (down the Ho Chi Mirth Trail). Thus, in order to succeed
they would have had to remake the geography of South Vietnam to
their own advantage: to redefine the shape of political South Vietnam.
That is the essence of the strategy proposed here: a demographic
frontier combined with the techniques of counterinsurgency.
A map of South Vietnam emphasizing demography circa 1970
would have shown the overwhelming majority of the population
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living in greater Saigon and the Mekong Delta (Military Regions III
and IV), plus a few urban centers along the coast. Defending these
areas is the heart of the alternative strategy proposed here. The north-
ern boundary of Military Region III (approximately twelve degrees
north latitude) constituted a rough "demographic frontier" divid-
ing the heavily populated from the sparsely populated provinces.
In this alternative strategy, most U.S. and some ARVN forces would
deploy along that line and along the border between MR III and
Cambodia, supported by mobile reserves. Behind the allied troops
holding the demographic frontier, ARVN units and the Territorial
forces would deal with remaining Vietcong elements. (With far fewer
U.S. troops in country, the ARVN and the Territorials could have
received weapons whose quality equaled those of the Communists
much sooner.) Units modeled on the Combined Action Platoons
(CAPs) would operate in highly exposed districts.101 All civilians liv-
ing above the demographic front line but wishing to come into al-
lied territory would be welcomed. Hovering above this deployment
of forces would be the awesome airpower of the allied states.
Some carefully selected and highly trained South Vietnamese
guerrilla units might remain behind (on the north side of the demo-
graphic frontier) in the highlands. In MR I, allied forces would hold
Hue and Da Nang, supported by the U.S. Navy. Hue was a tremen-
dously important symbol to all Vietnamese, and both places would
serve as potential launching areas for seaborne flanking attacks (Da
Nang would be the Inchon of South Vietnam, except that the Ameri-
cans would already be there). The refugees who would surely inun-
date those two coastal cities could be sea-lifted south, behind the
demographic frontier.
If there had been a true front line, with the enemy on one side
and the civilians on the other, superior American firepower could
have had free play. The United States could have deployed in Viet-
nam not a partly conscripted army of half a million but a much
smaller professional, even perhaps volunteer, force that by pursu-
ing conservative tactics would have incurred far fewer losses: no
more chasing the enemy, no more search and destroy, no more body
counts, no more booby-trap casualties—and no more one-year tours,
either. The bombing of North Vietnam would have been unneces-
sary, the Ho Chi Mirth Trail irrelevant.
Confronting such a front line, Hanoi would have had two choices:
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either to abandon the struggle by accepting this de facto new parti-
tion, which was much more advantageous militarily to the South,
or else to seek a decisive confrontation in the teeth of overwhelming
allied fire superiority. In addition to greatly decreasing the size of
the American forces in Vietnam and directing their firepower to-
ward the enemy and away from civilians, this strategy, by creating a
true rear area, would have made possible a thorough clear-and-hold
cleanup in the regions of dense population, and it would also have
allowed time for serious social and economic improvements to take
hold in those same areas.
The supreme advantage of the demographic strategy—next to
reducing American and South Vietnamese casualties—would have
been that the debacle of 1975 could not have occurred. In January
1975 most of the ARVN was in the sparsely populated Central High-
lands and the dangerously exposed Military Region I below the sev-
enteenth parallel. President Thieu's decision to remove the bulk of
these forces to positions closer to Saigon was a very good one and
should have been carried out years earlier. But the 1975 retrench-
ment turned into a catastrophe for two main reasons. One was hasty
planning; the other was the presence of the families of ARVN sol-
diers in the Central Highlands and other exposed areas. The per-
fectly understandable desire of ARVN soldiers to see to it that their
relatives did not fall into Communist hands resulted in disintegra-
tion of many ARVN units and the conquest of the South.
Instead of stationing soldiers far from their home areas and let-
ting their families follow them, the government, under the demo-
graphic strategy, would have let the families stay put in their true
homes and deployed the soldiers to defend them. If the ARVN had
been previously (before 1975) concentrated farther south, in an or-
derly manner, with their families on one side of them and the Com-
munists on the other, not only would a retrenchment have been
unnecessary, but retreat or desertion also would have become hardly
thinkable. No one ever thought the Eighteenth ARVN Division was
worth much, but in the last days of the war, after its dependents had
been evacuated southward, it put up a truly ferocious defense of
Xuan Loc.102
Some Objections
Of course, objections to this strategy come immediately to mind. In
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the first place, a demographic strategy is defensive, giving the ini-
tiative to the enemy. But so what? The Ho Chi Minh Trail put Gen-
eral Westmoreland's forces on the defensive anyway (and on exterior
lines), but they refused to acknowledge this and thus could not take
advantage of it. The pace of the fighting was dictated by the NVA
and the VC, not by the United States. The Communists could con-
trol the level and locus of fighting mainly because of their sanctuar-
ies in Cambodia and especially in Laos. How to eliminate or nullify
those sanctuaries—that is the question. Clausewitz wrote that "it is
easier to hold ground than to take it" and that "the defensive form
of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive."103 Under this
demographic strategy, if the enemy "took the initiative," so much
the better for the allies: NVA forces mounting major attacks against
one or more points on the frontier would pull down on top of them-
selves everything from B-52s to the sixteen-inch shells of the USS
New Jersey, while confronting highly mobile allied forces operating
from behind prepared positions on interior lines. One should never
forget what happened to Giap's forces during the Easter Offensive,
when they were attacking under the most favorable conditions. (In
what was perhaps his biggest victory, the battle of Fredericksburg,
Robert E. Lee was fighting from a prepared defensive position that
his enemies obligingly attacked.)
A second objection might ask how one could induce the South
Vietnamese government to abandon large sections of its territory.
But they did it anyway in 1975, only in the worst possible circum-
stances. There was nothing sacred about the seventeenth parallel;
the French had made it a border, not the South Vietnamese. South
Vietnam had no obligation to defend indefensible territory—and
neither did the United States. Allied strategy should have focused
on preserving a viable South Vietnamese state, not this or that arbi-
trary line on a map. Moreover, trading territory for survival is a ven-
erable stratagem: the Russians retreated before Napoleon and Hitler;
the Chinese retreated before the Japanese; Lee defended Virginia,
not Arkansas. Most of the South Vietnamese and almost all of the
Americans who were killed during the war met their fate in the ter-
ritory between the thirteenth and the seventeenth parallels—for
what? And it was precisely there that the ARVN collapsed into chaos.
By trying to hold everything, the South Vietnamese lost everything.
Perhaps another objection would be that a demographic strat-
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egy would require the commitment of American forces for too long.
But how long is that? American troops have stood guard in Ger-
many, Japan, and Korea for more than two generations. Besides that,
assume that attrition had worked the way it was hoped, that Hanoi
concluded that conquest of South Vietnam was too costly in the face
of serious American commitment. Would not the attempt to con-
quer be renewed as soon as American commitment ceased? Thus,
the independence of South Vietnam, like that of West Germany,
would require an indefinite and credible American involvement. The
real question concerning the demographic strategy is not "how many
years?" but "how many U.S. casualties?" which such a strategy, prop-
erly executed, could have dramatically decreased.
8El Salvador
A Long War in a Small Country
The only Central American republic without an Atlantic coastline,
El Salvador is the smallest Spanish-speaking state in Latin America,
the size of Massachusetts. In 1980, when the insurgency broke out,
its population was about 3.9 million. El Salvador is the very stereo-
type of a Central American society: for generations it has been a
commodity-export economy, with grave maldistribution of land and
wealth and a dreary history of oligarchical control and military dic-
tatorship.1 The country has the highest population density in Latin
America; the living conditions of the lowest strata were for decades
the worst of all Latin American countries except perhaps Haiti. Cer-
tainly no other Central American society had a greater potential for
class conflict.
In 1932 the Communist Party of El Salvador launched an armed
revolt, which the army brutally and effectively suppressed. Out of
those events the army emerged as and remained the dominant insti-
tution in the country's political life. This army consisted of an of-
ficer elite presiding over peasant conscripts; the common soldiers
did not receive decent training or care, and the unprofessional of-
ficer corps had no real mechanism for rewarding competence or
weeding out incompetence. In close alliance with the oligarchy, the
army compiled a notable record of human rights abuses, including
massacres of restless peasants.
The example and rhetoric of the Castro regime galvanized the
Left all over Latin America. Accordingly, in 1961 the Salvadoran
Communist Party again organized an armed uprising, which the
army quickly defeated. The Communists then decided to turn away
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from violence: aside from the painful lesson of the 1961 failure, the
party decided that some scope existed for legal opposition, and even-
tually it tended to condemn all guerrilla uprisings as "focoism" in the
style of the disastrous Guevara expedition in Bolivia. The Salvadoran
Communists would not again embrace armed struggle until 1980.2
Another profoundly destabilizing factor was at work in the 1960s:
the Catholic Church first began to engage in rural organization,
founding cooperatives and similar groups with a pronounced reli-
gious emphasis. Out of these efforts grew independent local peas-
ant organizations, which were not revolutionary or even overtly
political in themselves, but the revolutionary Left sought to infil-
trate and manipulate them. The backwardness of the society, the
deteriorating standards of life in the countryside, and the unrespon-
siveness of the government, combined with church activism and the
spread of so-called liberation theology, began to produce demands
for serious change by certain middle-class elements, including some
army officers. In the presidential elections of 1972 and 1977, massive
government fraud against reformist candidates effectively closed off
the electoral road to change.3 Then in October 1979 a military coup
installed a predominantly civilian junta that pledged to carry out re-
forms but proved unable to pursue coherent policies or to prevent the
escalation of violence. Thus, the stage was set for an insurgency.
The FMLN
In December 1979 several Salvadoran revolutionary groups gath-
ered in Castro's Havana to organize the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN). The name derived from a Salvadoran
Communist contemporary of the Nicaraguan Augusto Sandino (who
himself was never a Communist). The bold leadership and effective
tactics of the FMLN, augmented by the ineptitude of the army, soon
presented a serious challenge, approximating a conventional war.
The insurgents operated in battalion-sized units and cleared the Sal-
vadoran Army out of whole regions. For their part, elements of the
oligarchy, the army, and the police sanctioned the activities of "death
squads," which sought to achieve the elimination of anyone identi-
fied as dangerous to the regime. Oscar Romero, the archbishop of
San Salvador, shot in March 1980, was almost certainly one of their
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victims. And in its efforts to get at guerrillas, the army killed many
civilians who found themselves in the way.
The conflict in El Salvador emerged during a very anxious pe-
riod for the United States. Saigon had finally fallen to the North
Vietnamese army in 1975, mobs in Tehran had taken the American
embassy staff hostage in 1979, Pol Pot was devastating Cambodia,
the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan, and Cuban troops were fight-
ing in Angola. The presence of thousands of Cuban soldiers and
schoolteachers in neighboring Nicaragua also alarmed Washington.
The Salvadoran Left was going to pay a very high price indeed for
the close ties that the Nicaraguan Sandinistas had established with
Havana and Moscow.4
According to the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, the small size of El
Salvador should have been a serious disadvantage to the guerrillas.
The border with Honduras, however, had never been well defined;
both governments had no-entry zones for their troops, and these
areas (bolsones) provided the insurgents with convenient sanctuar-
ies. In addition, the rebels received priceless assistance, including
military training, from neighboring Nicaragua and from the USSR,
Cuba, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Vietnam.5
In these difficult circumstances, the Carter administration, al-
though preoccupied with many other foreign crises, decided in the
spring of 1980 that the United States must help the Salvadoran gov-
ernment overcome the challenge from an insurgency that was clearly
Communist-controlled. U.S. assistance to the government of El Sal-
vador was probably not the decisive factor, and certainly not the
only factor, in the defeat of the insurgency. Nevertheless, President
Carter's decision was one of the most important events of the entire
conflict. Because analyses of U.S. involvement in El Salvador tend
to become enmeshed in and reflect the analyst's attitudes toward
President Reagan, it is worth noting that it was President Carter who
committed the United States against the FMLN and that this com-
mitment had the open support of Honduras, Guatemala, and Ven-
ezuela, among others.6
Despite the Carter administration's resolve, the Salvadoran gov-
ernment and army seemed to be on the verge of collapse. The
economy was badly deteriorating. The insurgents were able to mo-
bilize between ten and twelve thousand fighters, a formidable array
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indeed and one far greater than either the Cuban Fidelista or the
Nicaraguan Sandinista insurgencies had commanded. In January
1981 the FMLN launched its "final offensive." Scoring some impres-
sive gains at first, by the end of the month it was receding. Thus,
before any appreciable American aid had reached El Salvador, it was
clear that the government was not going to fall.7 Most notably, the
popular uprising that the FMLN called for in conjunction with the
January offensive was a resounding failure. This was the first major
indication that support for the insurgents was not as widespread as
many outside El Salvador liked to claim, a point to receive more
attention later.
Succeeding Jimmy Carter in January 1981, President Reagan
believed like his predecessor that the victory of the FMLN would be
interpreted as a triumph for the Sandinistas and Castro and, behind
them, the Soviet Union.8 Determined to prevent that, Reagan dis-
patched a small number of U.S. military advisers to El Salvador,
and in January 1982 army officers from that country began training
in counterinsurgency techniques at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Out
of those efforts would eventually arise a better-equipped and more
competent Salvadoran army. Such training was sorely needed in light
of that army's peculiar shortcomings, notable among which were
(1) the "tanda" system, whereby an entire class of officers received
promotion at the same time, negating any concept of merit, (2) struc-
tural corruption, whereby officers profited from government pay-
ments for nonexistent soldiers and sold goods at inflated prices to
their troops, and (3) a reluctance on the part of many officers to see
the war end, because U.S. aid would then also end. And so bitter
fighting raged across the little country during the early 1980s.
At the same time, the Americans were trying to promote politi-
cal and social reforms. Vice President George Bush visited the capi-
tal, San Salvador, in December 1983 to deliver a tart message: if
human rights abuses by government forces did not visibly decrease,
then American assistance would. Bush told his audience, "Your cause
is being undermined by the murderous violence of reactionary mi-
norities." He especially insisted on the necessity for the army not to
interfere with the approaching elections.
A month after Bush's visit, the prestigious Bipartisan Commis-
sion on Central America, the so-called Kissinger Commission, ap-
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pointed by President Reagan, delivered its long-awaited report on
the subject of the strategic and ideological interests of the United
States in Central America.9 This document requires attention.
The Kissinger Commission Report
The Kissinger Commission identified the armed struggle in El Sal-
vador as in large part the result of foreign Communist interference.
Certainly, conditions in El Salvador were wretched for many, but "if
wretched conditions were themselves enough to create such insur-
gencies, we would see them in many more countries of the world."
"We have stressed before, and we repeat here: indigenous reform
movements, even indigenous revolutions, are not themselves a se-
curity concern of the United States."10 But in El Salvador, "the roots
of the crisis are both indigenous and foreign. Discontents are real,
and for much of the population conditions of life are miserable; just
as Nicaragua was ripe for revolution, so the conditions that invite
revolution are present elsewhere in the region as well. But these con-
ditions have been exploited by hostile outside forces—specifically by
Cuba, backed by the Soviet Union and now operating through Nica-
ragua—which will turn any revolution they capture into a totalitar-
ian state . . . in the image of their sponsors' ideology and their own."11
The conflict in El Salvador thus had strategic implications of the
first order. "Cuban and now Nicaraguan support was subsequently
critical in building the fighting forces of the Farabundo Marti Lib-
eration Front in El Salvador, in maintaining them in the field, and in
forcing them to unite in a combined effort in spite of the deep-seated
distrust among the guerrilla factions. Indeed, it was a meeting hosted
by Castro in December 1979 that had produced agreement among
the Salvadoran insurgent factions to form a coordinating commit-
tee, as was publicly announced the following month." And "by 1979,
in terms of modern military capabilities Cuba had become perhaps
the strongest power in the Western Hemisphere south of the United
States." "As a mainland platform, therefore, Nicaragua is a crucial
stepping stone for Cuban and Soviet efforts to promote armed in-
surgency in Central America." "The use of Nicaragua as a base for
Soviet and Cuban efforts to penetrate the rest of the Central Ameri-
can isthmus, with El Salvador as the target of first opportunity, gives
the conflict there a major strategic dimension." "Therefore, curbing
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the insurgents' violence in El Salvador requires in part cutting them
off from their sources of foreign support."12
The commission rejected the concept of power-sharing between
the government and the insurgents, because "to install a mixed pro-
visional government by fiat would scarcely be consistent with the
notion that the popular will is the foundation of true government."
Instead, the goals of U.S. policy must be the creation of a function-
ing democratic state that could and would carry out long-overdue
social reforms. "The essence of our effort together must be the legiti-
mation of governments by free consent—the rejection of violence
and murder as political instruments, of the imposition of authority
from above, the use of the power of the state to suppress opposition
and dissent." "A major goal of US policy in Central America should
be to give democratic forces there the time and the opportunity to
carry out the structural reforms essential for that country's security
and well-being"; in short, "to promote peaceful change in Central
America while resisting the violation of democracy by force and ter-
rorism [sic]."13 "Experience has destroyed the argument of the old
dictators that a strong hand is essential to avoid anarchy and com-
munism The modern experience of Latin America suggests that
order is more often threatened when people have no voice in their
own destinies. Social peace is more likely in societies where politi-
cal justice is founded on self-determination and protected by formal
guarantee."14 Therefore, said the members of the commission, "We
believe that a true political solution in El Salvador can be reached
only through free elections in which all significant groups have a
right to participate." To that end, "in March 1984 [El Salvador] will
elect a president under a permanent constitution," in preparation
for which "a system of international observation should be estab-
lished to enhance the faith and confidence of all parties in the pro-
bity and equity of arrangements for elections."15
Democratic forces faced a serious threat, however, from the in-
surgents and their foreign backers: "Although their absolute num-
bers have not increased over the past three years, and although they
have not attracted the broad popular support they hoped for, the
guerrillas after four years of experience in the field demonstrate an
increasing capacity to maneuver, concentrate their forces and attack
selected targets."16
In the short term, therefore, the United States must help the gov-
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eminent of El Salvador avoid violent overthrow: "A successful coun-
terinsurgency effort is not a substitute for negotiations. But such an
effort—the more rapid the better—is a necessary condition for a
political solution." The El Salvador government would not have carte
blanche, however: "military aid should, through legislation requir-
ing periodic reports, be made contingent upon demonstrated
progress toward free elections; freedom of association; the estab-
lishment of the rule of law and an effective judicial system; and the
termination of the activities of the so-called death squads, as well as
vigorous action against those guilty of crimes and the prosecution
to the extent possible of past offenders. These conditions should be
seriously enforced."17
Many grave obstacles lay ahead. Said the commission's report:
"The dilemma in El Salvador is clear. With all its shortcomings, the
existing government has conducted free elections. But it is weak.
The judiciary is ineffective. The military is divided in its concerns,
and in the degree of its respect for human rights. Privileged Salva-
dorans want to preserve both their political and economic power."
The activities of the "death squads" are, like those of the insurgents,
"morally and politically repugnant to this Commission, which
strongly supports the consolidation and defense of democratic in-
stitutions in El Salvador."18
The release of the Kissinger Commission Report, following
closely upon Vice President Bush's remarks in San Salvador, im-
proved the climate for congressional support of the Salvadoran gov-
ernment. Between 1979 and 1987 the United States provided $2 billion
in economic and $700 million in military assistance. During the same
period Salvadoran security forces increased from ten thousand to
fifty-six thousand.19 In 1980 the ratio of security forces to insurgents
was only 1.5 to 1; by 1987 it was nearly 8 to 1. Certainly one must be
cautious about such figures, because they can be used to gloss over
important qualitative questions. But clearly, if the ratio is changing
over time in favor of the guerrillas, the government is losing the
war; that was the opposite of the situation in El Salvador.
Slowly Creating a Democracy
In the spring of 1982, elections for a new Legislative Assembly took
place. In spite of FMLN threats and acts of terrorism to keep Salva-
El Salvador • 267
dorans from voting, the turnout was high. Foreign observers con-
cluded that, in the Central American context, these were fair elec-
tions. The governing Christian Democrats did much less well than
predicted, receiving 41 percent of the votes, whereas ARENA, the
National Republican Alliance, obtained 29 percent. The Assembly
chose Alvaro Magana, holder of a master's degree in economics from
the University of Chicago, as its provisional presiding officer.
ARENA was the first serious and open political vehicle of the
upper classes since the early 1930s. Hitherto they had been content
to let the army run the country. Roberto D'Aubuisson, who founded
the party in September 1981, was born in 1944 in modest family cir-
cumstances. A former army officer, he was associated with the noto-
rious "death squads" that meted out execution to proven and
suspected insurgents; some linked him with the death of Archbishop
Romero. D'Aubuisson himself was a frequent target of assassina-
tion attempts and terrorist acts. Called by the Washington Post "the
most charismatic politician in El Salvador," he would run unsuc-
cessfully for president in 1984.
Meanwhile, President Reagan found a reformist center that he
could persuade the U.S. Congress to support. The embodiment of
that center was Jose Napoleon Duarte (1925-1991), elected presi-
dent of El Salvador in May 1984. Duarte, the illegitimate son of a
tailor, had been able to attend and graduate from Notre Dame Uni-
versity because his father had won a lottery. A civic activist and critic
of the status quo, he was one of the founders of the Christian Demo-
crats, a party that for years was the principal opponent of the Salva-
doran establishment. In his memoirs he summed up Salvadoran
politics in this way: "For forty years, a military dictatorship had pro-
tected the interest of a few wealthy families." Duarte took office as
mayor of the capital city, San Salvador, in 1964 and served three terms.
Most observers believe that he had won the presidential elections of
1972 but had been counted out; this closing off of the route of peace-
ful change was a major contribution to the outbreak of massive in-
surgency a few years later. In the 1984 presidential contest, Duarte
defeated Roberto D'Aubuisson 54 percent to 46 percent. His inau-
guration was the first time in the history of El Salvador that an op-
position candidate had peacefully attained the presidency.20
In the Legislative Assembly elections of March 1985, President
Duarte's Christian Democrats won a majority of seats: the returns
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showed them with 505,000 votes and 33 seats, ARENA and other
rightist parties with 367,000 votes and 25 seats, and minor parties
with 222,000 votes and 2 seats. Before the voting, army leaders had
made clear their intention to uphold the results of the elections.21
Thus, as the military situation stabilized in favor of the government,
electoral democracy was slowly establishing itself in the society.
By this time it was obvious that the insurgency would not tri-
umph and that, although the war had become a stalemate, the scales
were increasingly tipping toward the government side. Under these
circumstances, the FMLN's internal fissures began to widen. The
FMLN had never been one homogeneous organization; on the con-
trary, it was an alliance (organized in Havana) of five different guer-
rilla groups, suspicious of and even hostile toward each other. In
1985, with the war not going well and regular elections taking place,
the most hard-line of the guerrilla organizations, the ERP, began to
radicalize the FMLN's tactics. The guerrillas made the destruction
of the economic life of the country their central goal. They contin-
ued to force peasant youths into their armed units. Government of-
ficials and their relatives became the target of a systematic program
of assassination; the rebels chose for their victims not the worst but
the most popular and honest officers, politicians, and administra-
tors (recalling the Vietcong assassination program in South Vietnam).
By thus downgrading its actions from guerrilla war to terrorism ("ur-
ban guerrilla warfare") the FMLN began to suffer a serious loss of
prestige and popular support and to alienate the less intransigent
elements of its own membership.22
Although the violence continued inconclusively, growing dis-
putes within the FMLN over the strategy of terror eventually pro-
duced a major breakthrough: in 1989 several leading figures in the
FMLN publicly renounced guerrilla revolution in favor of political
participation. Most notable among those disillusioned FMLN sup-
porters was Ruben Zamora. A one-time student for the priesthood,
ex-Christian Democrat, former university professor, and prominent
figure of what was called the democratic Left, Zamora returned to
El Salvador in 1987 after eight years in exile. And in the March presi-
dential election of that same year, Alfredo Cristiani, a Georgetown
University graduate who had ousted D'Aubuisson as head of
ARENA, won an easy victory, witnessed by the international press,
hi a large voter turnout, Cristiani received 53.8 percent against 36.6
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percent for the candidate of President Duarte's Christian Democrats.
The inauguration of Cristiani represented the country's first
handover of power by a civilian president to the civilian leader of
the opposition. Shortly thereafter most of the FMLN leadership de-
cided to enter into negotiations with its former archenemies of
ARENA. Following the collapse of these talks, in November 1989
the FMLN launched another major offensive. This was their most
ambitious military effort ever, but it failed nonetheless.23 The FMLN's
revolutionary strategy was bankrupt.
This final, public bankruptcy coincided with the ending of the
Cold War. For many Americans, one of the most disheartening as-
pects of Salvadoran society during the eighties had been what ap-
peared to be the erosion of moderate political elements and the
strengthening of the extremes. But both sides soon felt the pressures
generated by the ending of the Cold War. Support for the FMLN
from Communist countries was drying up. At the same time, lead-
ers of the army and ARENA realized that with the Soviet Union
imploding, Washington found the specter of a Communist regime
in El Salvador considerably less menacing than before, to say the
least. Hence, the United States now felt itself in a position actually
to be able to cut off aid. Furthermore, the 1989 offensive, although a
failure, seemed to suggest that the Salvadoran Army would be un-
able to achieve outright military victory for the foreseeable future. It
was time to make a peace. Accordingly, in January 1992, with UN
Secretary-General Boutros Ghali and U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker in attendance, the administration of President Cristiani and
the FMLN signed peace accords in Mexico City. The FMLN under-
took to disarm under UN supervision and to transform itself from a
guerrilla army into a political party; some of its members were to be
permitted to enroll in a new national police force. The UN pledged
to send up to one thousand military and civilian supervisors into
the country. The treaty marked the end of a twelve-year insurgency
that had taken an estimated seventy-five thousand lives.24
The next presidential election, in March 1994, took place peace-
fully in the presence of 3,000 international observers, 900 of them
from the United Nations. ARENA nominee Armando Calderon re-
ceived 49 percent of the vote; Ruben Zamora, as the candidate of a
Marxist coalition based on the former insurgents, obtained 26 per-
cent (the candidate of the Christian Democrats had only 15 percent).
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The April runoff election (necessary since no candidate had received
the required majority of the vote) gave Calderon 68 percent, Zamora
32 percent. ARENA did less well in the Legislative Assembly elec-
tions, winning 39 of the 84 seats in that body, while the FMLN and
two leftist allies took 22 and the Christian Democrats 18. Calderon
was the third freely elected civilian president in succession.
Neither Vietnam nor Cuba
In spite of this apparently benign denouement, U.S. counter-insur-
gency efforts in El Salvador have been the object of searching criti-
cism. Among their most notable critics has been Benjamin Schwarz.
The essence of his argument is that the counterinsurgency strat-
egy of the U.S. government did not defeat the FMLN and must
therefore be considered a failure. Although the war in El Salvador
eventually ended in a way that Washington found acceptable, that
result derived mainly from changes in the international environ-
ment, especially the end of the Cold War and the unexpected elec-
toral defeat of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, not from the
application of the principles of American counterinsurgency. The
long American involvement in the conflict from 1980 to 1990 had
achieved, at the cost of much bloodshed and destruction, only a stale-
mate, not a victory. "If the conflict in El Salvador presents the ideal
for implementing counterinsurgency doctrine, but after 11 years of
effort that doctrine has not achieved its goals, then perhaps the doc-
trine is flawed."25
For Schwarz, the heart of U.S. strategy in El Salvador consisted
of three objectives: (1) improve the performance of the Salvadoran
armed forces, (2) encourage the distribution of land to landless peas-
ants, and (3) institute democratic elections.
The United States did indeed, to a notable degree, help to in-
crease the size and efficiency of the Salvadoran Army; it also suc-
ceeded in reducing the number of major human rights abuses.
American assistance, however, could not change the whole culture
of the army, which was after all rooted in the culture of El Salvador
itself. Schwarz points out that according to the Kissinger Commis-
sion, the training of the Salvadoran Army by American instructors
would curtail abuses, but the slaying of six Jesuits in the capital city
in 1989 showed that such training was by no means an infallible
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formula. Moreover, the Kissinger Commission had stressed the im-
portance of building local civil defense forces, but the Salvadoran
Army resisted giving weapons to local groups. In part this reflected
the army's desire to save weapons against the day when the United
States might abandon El Salvador, as it had abandoned South Viet-
nam a few years before.26
In addition, the Americans found it very hard to force El
Salvador's establishment to carry out political and economic reforms.
U.S. political leaders of both parties made it clear that they would
not in the end suffer El Salvador to fall under FMLN control; hence,
threats by the Americans to wash their hands of El Salvador if that
country's government did not do what was required were not cred-
ible. The Salvadoran establishment usually (and correctly) saw the
reforms demanded by the United States not as a means of extending
its control but of destroying it. Land distribution was a centerpiece
of the Kissinger Commission recommendations, but Salvadoran
landowners and their army allies sabotaged land reform in several
ways, including violence against peasants. President Cristiani vig-
orously criticized land reform on classical economic grounds; fur-
thermore, even the most extensive and sincere program of land
redistribution could not solve El Salvador's basic problem of over-
population.27
Finally, according to Schwarz's critique, American policymakers
consistently confuse democracy with democratic institutions such
as orderly elections. But in a country like El Salvador, torn by years
of internecine war, democratic elections are problematical because,
among other problems, they presuppose a willingness on the part
of the losers to accept defeat and allow the winners to govern until
the next elections.28 hi El Salvador, moreover, the United States in-
tervened noticeably to prevent the electoral victory of intransigent
rightists and bolster the fortunes of the favored Christian Demo-
crats, and that intervention achieved only limited success.29
A Different Perspective
These are serious indictments of the general American approach to
the conflict in El Salvador. But even if one grants that Schwarz's
analysis has merit (as it does), one can arrive at a drastically differ-
ent evaluation by approaching the question of the success or failure
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of American policy in El Salvador from a different perspective. If
success for U.S. policy is defined as the decisive military defeat of
the FLMN in a relatively short time,30 then clearly U.S. efforts were
quite disappointing. But such a definition of success in guerrilla
warfare would be unrealistic and ahistorical. The aims of the United
States under Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush were to prevent
the imposition of a pro-Soviet dictatorship on another Latin Ameri-
can state, while avoiding a massive deployment of U.S. armed forces
on the order of the Dominican intervention of 1965. Those aims were
fulfilled; it is therefore not clear why the outcome should not be
seen as constituting a success for U.S. policy.31
That outcome, moreover, was achieved in some remarkably un-
favorable circumstances. Recall that (1) in the early years a military
victory by the FMLN appeared imminent to many observers, be-
cause (2) El Salvador exhibited multiple, severe, and obvious social
pathologies, (3) the numerous organized and dedicated insurgents
were receiving assistance from the Soviet bloc and especially from
neighboring Nicaragua, and (4) the principal anti-FMLN groups—
the army, the elite, and the Christian Democrats—had incompatible
aims. In addition (5), left-wing opinion all over the world, including
within the United States, vitriolically and ceaselessly opposed U.S.
involvement, especially during the Reagan presidency, (6) the re-
cipients of American assistance hardly qualified as poster persons
for enlightened government, (7) the conflict went on for many years,
a circumstance that is supposed (with some validity) to cause demo-
cratic polities to lose interest, and (8) the United States never had as
many as two hundred military personnel in El Salvador.32 Yet in the
end, armed conflict ceased in El Salvador as pro-U.S. administra-
tions succeeded each other through effective elections.
Thus, contrary to fashionable predictions (and perhaps hopes),
El Salvador never turned into "another Vietnam." And why should
it have? The differences between the wars in El Salvador and Viet-
nam were, or ought to have been, much more impressive than the
similarities. Consider simply the basic dimensions of the struggle:
El Salvador had one-eighth the area and one-fifth the population
of South Vietnam alone. Another contrast is in the locus of the
struggle: Washington is nearer to the South Pole than to Saigon,
but San Salvador is closer to Houston and San Diego than either of
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those cities is to New York. And there is no Communist China in
Central America.
In addition to these fundamental conditions of demography and
geography, the determination of three U.S. presidents to prevent an
FMLN takeover in El Salvador powerfully affected the outcome.
Acutely aware that committing substantial U.S. ground combat forces
in El Salvador was politically impossible, Presidents Carter, Reagan,
and Bush had no choice but to work to strengthen the Salvadoran
armed forces. American aid and pressure resulted in significant up-
grading of the Salvadoran Army's military capabilities.33 And de-
spite continuing serious shortcomings, that army's treatment of
civilians indisputably improved. Thus, if the United States had not
intervened, the El Salvador conflict would almost certainly have been
much more ferocious.
Consistent U.S. pressure also hastened the coming of honest elec-
tions, which quickly clothed the Salvadoran government with much
legitimacy at home and abroad. The return of free elections to El
Salvador in 1984, as to the Philippines in 1951 (see chapter 6), de-
prived the insurgents of their most powerful argument in favor of
violent revolution, that there was no peaceful way to change an in-
tolerable situation. Repeated dire threats by the FMLN against those
who participated in the elections only served to underline and in-
crease its isolation. The commonsense thesis popularized by Che
Guevara, that one cannot successfully make violent revolution
against a democratic government (or even a pseudodemocratic one),
received new confirmation. In El Salvador as elsewhere, "the ballot
box . . . has proven to be the coffin of revolutionary movements."34
But if the elections were free and honest, why did the FMLN
candidates not win them? Here we arrive at the very important35
question of how much popular support the FMLN really had.
Insurgent Weaknesses
There are at least two good reasons to strongly suspect that outside
estimates of FMLN support were often exaggerated. First, the Sal-
vadoran population failed repeatedly to heed FMLN calls for a mas-
sive popular uprising. One might explain, or explain away,36 such
repeated failure except for the complicating presence of the second
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reason to question FMLN popular support, namely the generally
poor showing its candidates have made in internationally super-
vised elections since the end of the war. The FMLN's unimpressive
vote totals, especially in 1994 (only two years after the fighting
ended), inescapably suggest that its authoritarian Marxism and its
increasingly terrorist tactics in the late 1980s had made it more and
more unattractive to broad strata of the Salvadoran society.
Such a position seems to contradict a widely held conception
about Third World revolutionary movements. Some commentators
easily assume that glaring socioeconomic disparities produce popu-
lar (especially peasant) protest, which the regime meets with sav-
age repression, which in turn triggers a revolutionary struggle. But
poverty, even of the most indefensible sort, is not enough to gener-
ate revolution, as societies from India and Bangladesh to Haiti and
Honduras suggest, and as Lenin, Trotsky, and Guevara have taught.
To the contrary, Blanquists, Bolsheviks, and Focoists have all believed,
or at least claimed, that a small dedicated group of revolutionaries
can, and sometimes must, substitute for objective revolutionary con-
ditions. Hannah Arendt has shown that this approach to revolution
has been the dominant one in the twentieth century.37 Furthermore,
if socioeconomic factors determined the outbreak of the FMLN in-
surgency, why did the war come to an end with the socioeconomic
system still fundamentally intact?38
To put it all another way: why did the outcome in El Salvador
differ so dramatically from that in Cuba and in Nicaragua? The fun-
damental explanation for the FMLN failure, first on the battlefield
and then at the ballot box, lies in the inability (and unwillingness) of
its leaders to imitate the Cuban and Nicaraguan models by forging a
broad coalition behind a program of democratic revolution, thereby
isolating the regime and avoiding or negating American intervention.
Let us cut through the clouds of romanticization and propaganda
and recall the actual circumstances in which the Castro brothers came
to power in 1959. The widely disseminated myth of a massive peas-
ant uprising that destroyed an American-equipped army is a per-
fect example of what Chalmers Johnson meant by "getting the
paradigm wrong." The truth is that the coming to power of the
Castros was the result of a collapse, not of a revolution, and cer-
tainly not a peasant revolution under the banner of Marxism.
Fulgencio Batista (who had first been elected president of Cuba back
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in 1940 with Communist support) established a dictatorship in 1952
that became increasingly repressive, corrupt, personalistic, and thus
narrowly based. That extortionist regime alienated decisive elements
of the population, including businessmen and church leaders. Like
the regime, the army was corrupt and confused.39 Campaigning in
the Sierra Maestra at the head of a few hundred guerrillas, Fidel
Castro told the Cubans (and the New York Times) that he would re-
store the constitution of 1940, and perhaps at the time he meant it.
Thus the building blocks were available for a broad coalition under
a middle-class revolutionary banner that promised the swift return
of electoral democracy, not the imposition of a Leninist dictatorship.
(With some important changes in detail, much of this description
would apply to the Somoza regime toppled by the Sandinistas in
July 1979.)
To forge in El Salvador an interclass coalition along the lines of
the Fidelistas and the Sandinistas was essential because the core of
the FMLN was not extensive. Very nearly all revolutions in Latin
America since World War II, successful or not, have been organized
by elements of the urban middle class, with university personnel
being especially prominent. "With some notable exceptions, the lit-
erature that emphasizes the role of peasants in revolution tends to
ignore the role of professional revolutionary organizations, groups
that tend to be disproportionately middle class in social composi-
tion." This has been true in the Castro, Sandinista, and Sendero
Luminoso conflicts, and for El Salvador as well. The hard core of the
FMLN—middle class, university associated—never had much orga-
nized support in urban areas to begin with. By the late 1980s the ter-
rorist activities of some FMLN elements (kidnappings, assassinations,
forcible recruitment, laying mines near populated areas, bombing
cafes) had alienated large elements of the war-weary population.40
Resistance to Revolution
On the other side, the Salvadoran upper and upper-middle classes
were nearly unanimous in their backing for the army. That unity
was rooted in the defeat of the peasant-based Communist uprising
of 1932, which had solidified "the strongest anticommunist senti-
ment in Latin America."41 Besides that, the fate of the Cuban middle
class under Castro was a grim lesson duly noted throughout Latin
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America. Conservative forces, moreover, were able to attract or pur-
chase considerable support among workers and peasants: thus the
rightist ARENA Party won the internationally supervised presiden-
tial elections in both 1989 and 1994 and obtained 44 percent of the
vote in the 1991 Legislative Assembly elections.
And certainly not least, no stretch of imagination could make
President Duarte into either a Batista or a Somoza. The El Salvador
of 1989, in which for the second time in a row a freely elected civil-
ian leader of the opposition was inaugurated as president, was clearly
not the El Salvador of 1979, to say nothing of the Cuba of 1959. Dur-
ing Duarte's administration international support had increased for
the government and decreased for the guerrillas.
Thus, the grim solidarity of the upper strata and their depen-
dents, the open authoritarianism (at least) of the FMLN, and the
increasing democratization under Duarte prevented El Salvador from
following the scenario of Cuba and Nicaragua, in which isolated
regimes with many enemies and few supporters eventually col-
lapsed. In contrast, the struggle in El Salvador was a civil war, with
the FMLN facing a broad interclass phalanx of enemies whom it
could not divide and thus failed to defeat.42
Because the FMLN could not mobilize a sufficient mass in Sal-
vadoran society, it had no alternative to taking power by force. But
American aid and tutelage was increasing the size and competence
of the Salvadoran Army to the point where the prospects for rebel
military victory became ever dimmer. Simultaneously, help for the
FMLN from foreign states began to diminish. It is no denigration of
the personal bravery of many of the FMLN guerrillas to recognize
that both materially and psychologically they were dependent on
outside assistance. But as the Cold War entered its final phase, the
Soviets rapidly lost interest in the Salvadoran contest; there was of
course no way to involve China in the struggle; and the unexpected
electoral debacle of the neighboring Sandinista regime in February
1990 gave the coup de grace to whatever vision of military victory
the guerrillas may have still entertained. Thus, the course of the Sal-
vadoran insurgency was intimately sensitive to developments in the
international environment.43
And not incidentally, if the analysis presented here is gener-
ally valid, then U.S. efforts in El Salvador were worthwhile be-
cause they protected that country from the bloody imposition of
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an economically devastating police state on the Cuban and East
European models.
In summary, El Salvador's government, legitimating itself and
undermining its enemies through democratic elections, retained the
support of most of the country's middle classes, along with sub-
stantial segments of the peasantry and the town workers, and also
of the U.S. government. In these ways the Salvadoran case contrasts
fundamentally and decisively with the Cuban and Nicaraguan ex-
periences. From the point of view of the United States, instead of
"another Vietnam," El Salvador was more like a return to the Greek
model. That is, the United States provided economic aid and mili-
tary equipment to the Salvadoran government, along with a limited
number of military advisers to tone up the local armed forces, pro-
viding time for its ally to deal with its more egregious shortcom-
ings. Again, in El Salvador as in Greece, the insurgents had already
clearly railed even before they lost their sanctuary, Yugoslavia in the
one case and Nicaragua in the other (see chapter 5).
Like the American campaign against Aguinaldo, the conflict in
El Salvador deserves a great deal more close and dispassionate scru-
tiny than it is likely to receive.44
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Afghanistan, 1980.
Afghanistan
Cracking the Red Empire
To describe the guerrilla insurgency in Afghanistan during the 1980s
requires a whole string of superlatives. The revolt of the Afghan
people against Soviet occupation was "the largest single national
rising in the twentieth century."1 It was the longest military struggle
the Soviets ever experienced; their direct involvement in the war
extended from December 1979 to mid-1988. In the course of that
war, Soviet troops reached Qandahar, the southernmost expansion
of Russian power since the days of Peter the Great. The Soviets pur-
sued one of the most destructive counterinsurgency policies ever
seen, and also one of the most unsuccessful. The war inflicted the
clearest reversal on Soviet military power since the fall of Berlin. It
provided the stage for the biggest clandestine CIA operation in his-
tory. It was perhaps the most satisfying experience the Americans
ever had with guerrilla warfare. The Afghan insurgents received
assistance from a most diverse coalition of states. All of this, along
with the proclamation of the Carter Doctrine, helped set in motion
forces that would soon exert the profoundest effects on the entire
global situation.
The Far Country
Arnold Toynbee called Afghanistan, situated at the intersection of
the Middle East and East Asia, one of the two great crossroads of
cultural dispersion before the Renaissance. The country is approxi-
mately equal in size to France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Swit-
zerland combined, or to Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and
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Wisconsin combined. Afghanistan is five times the size of Greece or
British Malaya, and thirty-one times the size of El Salvador. During
the nineteenth century, Afghanistan served as a buffer between the
czarist and the British empires. The modern world burst in upon
the country with the First Afghan War, 1839-1842.2 The British found
it much easier to overrun Afghanistan than to control it; they would
not be the last to make this distressing discovery. The war ended
with the annihilation of the British garrison at Kabul, the greatest
British defeat in modern history up to the fall of Singapore. After
World War II the British left India, and the Americans were far away
and uninterested. Hence, there was no longer any counterweight to
Soviet pressure.
Of the preinvasion population of about 16 million, 600,000 lived
in Kabul, the capital and only really large city. The population dis-
plays much ethnic and linguistic diversity; in terms of numbers and
geographical position, the most important ethnic component is the
Pushtuns. The population was overwhelmingly rural, large land-
holdings were rare, the literacy rate was 10 percent, and nine out of
ten Afghans adhered to Sunni Islam.3
The Communist Regime
On July 17,1973, after a bloodless coup in Kabul against King Zahir,
former prime minister Mohammed Daoud proclaimed himself presi-
dent. Full of grandiose ideas about economic development, Daoud
asked the Americans for aid, which they refused. He then approached
the more receptive USSR. But Daoud soon turned against the Sovi-
ets, and in April 1978 leftist army officers murdered him along with
all the members of his family. Afterward, the Afghan Communists
called this coup by a handful of army officers the Great Saur [April]
Revolution. The installation of a Communist cabinet followed the
coup; exactly how or why is not clear. Direct Soviet participation in
the Saur coup seems to have been minimal.4
The Communist party—the PDPA, the People's Democratic Party
of Afghanistan—had existed only since January 1965. Its founders
were all from the country's social elite; there were no worker or peas-
ant activists, and in the 1969 parliamentary elections (in which
women voted, not for the first time) the PDPA won only two seats
out of more than two hundred. Yet this minuscule party contained
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two irreconcilable factions: the Khalq (the masses) and Parcham (ban-
ner). In general, Parchamis were relatively sophisticated Kabulis;
the Khalqis were provincial, Pushtun, and military.5 The regime
turned against the Parcham faction, with the result that young and
inexperienced Khalqis found themselves in high positions in which
they soon made a disaster of government programs. The noncom-
munist intelligentsia and the religious leadership also became a tar-
get of the regime, which admitted killing twelve thousand political
prisoners in 1978-1979.
Social progress at full speed became the watchword. Women must
become literate: police and young PDPA activists therefore dragged
village women from their homes and forced them to sit in classes and
hear attacks on their religion. Islamic religious teachers (mullahs) who
opposed this practice were shot out of hand, without trial. With 320,000
mullahs in the country, the regime's attitude was decidedly ill ad-
vised. Afghans came to view the policies of the Kabul clique as "re-
pulsively anti-Islamic." The regime also believed in land redistribution,
a prelude to collectivization. In the villages land was taken from "rich
landlords" and handed over to "poor peasants" on the Leninist model.
Such actions cut tenant farmers off from the age-old village social se-
curity system provided by patronage from larger landholders and
also offended traditional Islamic concepts of legality.6
Launching headlong attacks on the whole Afghan way of life,
treating all who resisted such attacks (which eventually included
the large majority of Afghans) as enemies to be crushed, the PDPA
approach suggests not naive sympathy but profound hostility to-
ward the common people. The PDPA intended to impose not lib-
eration but modernization, whatever the cost, however destructive:
a true Central Asian Stalinism. "It was the attempt by a minority
regime to drastically alter the existing Afghan value system and
social structure, and the brutality associated with this attempt, that
finally provoked large-scale resistance." This tiny PDPA minority,
urban-oriented, foreign-educated, religion-hating, peasant-despis-
ing, teacher-killing (reminiscent of the Greek Communists) kindled
the wrath of the people against it. In March 1979, nearly a year
before the Soviet invasion, furious crowds killed hundreds of Af-
ghan Communists and scores of Soviet personnel in the streets of
Herat. The regime restored control in the city at the cost of perhaps
five thousand civilian deaths. By the eve of the Soviet invasion, as
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many as twenty-three out of twenty-eight Afghan provinces were
under guerrilla control.7
The Invasion
Signs that the Kremlin had decided it might be necessary to invade
Afghanistan were visible as early as the spring of 1979. Among those
signs were visits to Kabul by high-ranking Soviet officers, including
Gen. Ivan Pavlovskii, commander of the invasion of Czechoslova-
kia in 1968. The invasion of Afghanistan was in fact modeled on the
Czechoslovakian scenario: subversion of an unreliable Communist
regime and its replacement, after Soviet troops had taken control of
the capital city in a lightning move, by pliant stooges.
In preparation for the coming invasion, Soviet advisers began re-
moving the batteries from Afghan army tanks during the last weeks
of December for "winterization" and gathering up antitank ammuni-
tion for "inventory." Afghan army officers invited to a Soviet recep-
tion got drunk and found themselves locked up. On December 24
flight after flight of Soviet airborne troops began to descend upon
Kabul, seizing key positions and buildings. Simultaneously, ground
troops poured across the border, heading for Kabul and Herat. On
December 27 special Soviet units attacked the palace where President
Hafizullah Amin was living. They sustained many casualties in the
fierce fight during which they killed Amin and members of his fam-
ily.8 Moscow brazenly told the world that the Afghan government
had requested Soviet aid. A request for assistance—that is, for inva-
sion—was in fact made, but by Babrak Karmal, an Afghan puppet
of Moscow, from a radio station inside the Soviet border, after twenty
thousand Soviet troops had already crossed the frontier.9 In return
for his services, the Soviets installed Babrak as president. They also
proclaimed that Amin had all along been a CIA agent.10
A masterpiece of its kind, the takeover had been better planned
and executed than even the Czech invasion; practice makes perfect.
Amin might have organized resistance around Kabul, called for a
popular rising, or requested foreign assistance. "But Amin could do
[none of these things] because the first move of the Soviet invasion
was an airborne coup de main which suppressed any attempt at
resistance."11 The timing seemed good, too: the Carter administra-
tion was reeling from both foreign and domestic setbacks, the Ameri-
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can polity was still punch-drunk from Vietnam and Watergate and
distracted by the upcoming presidential election and the Iranian
hostage crisis. But the invasion, technically a success, did not work
out as intended. Instead of quenching popular resistance to the Com-
munist regime in Kabul, it inflamed it. Seizing Kabul was the easy
part; enforcing the authority of a Russian puppet regime over the
rest of the country would prove a greater challenge. Indeed, the So-
viets would soon embark upon what can only be described as a text-
book case of how not to wage war against guerrillas.
Why the Soviets Invaded
At the time many observers expressed the belief that the main rea-
son for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was to prevent the over-
throw of a Communist regime; that is, to enforce the Brezhnev
Doctrine. But that explanation is problematical. From an ideological
standpoint, the Afghanistan that the Soviets invaded in 1979 was
not a Communist or even a socialist state, but merely a state ruled
by persons calling themselves Communists. Moreover, there are
other, much more historically rooted, explanations. Afghanistan's
geography, notably its thousand-mile border with the USSR, made
it inescapably interesting to its northern neighbor. Czarist Russia
had long cherished ambitions to move toward the shores of the In-
dian Ocean. Leon Trotsky said in 1919 that "the road to Paris and
London lies through the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab, and Ben-
gal." (Trotsky was of course wrong about this, as about so many other
things—<lead wrong, so to speak—but that is irrelevant: he and other
Communist leaders probably believed it.) The infamous Hitler-Stalin
Pact of 1939 identified the future area of Soviet territorial expansion
as being "south of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian
Ocean" and "in the general direction of the Persian Gulf."12
After World War II Stalin displayed little interest in what came
to be called the Third World, occupied as he was with digesting and
imposing socialism on his new subjects in Eastern Europe. But when
Khrushchev emerged as supreme leader by 1957 at the latest, he
displayed a neo-Trotskyite interest in the underdeveloped world as
the weak link in the defenses against Soviet expansionism. Accord-
ingly, he paid a lot of attention to neighboring Afghanistan. There
was much ethnic overlap between Soviet Central Asia and Afghan-
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istan's northern, Soviet-contiguous provinces, which also contain most
of its natural resources. Impressive mountain chains divide these
northern provinces from the rest of the country, and for decades there
had been sentiment in favor of at least regional autonomy in the area.13
In addition, a pro-Soviet Afghanistan would have made a perfect base
from which to propagate the independence of "Baluchistan" and
"Pushtunistan." The success of this maneuver would achieve the dis-
memberment of Pakistan, ally of the United States and China, and
the establishment of a group of Soviet protectorates stretching all the
way from the USSR border to the Arabian Sea.
Under Khrushchev, therefore, the Soviets gave Afghanistan loans,
delivered MiG-15 fighters, and built three air bases in the country.
Many Afghan army and air force officers and cadets went to the
Soviet Union for training.14 Most of the officers who had been ex-
posed to the Soviet Union came back to Afghanistan profoundly
impressed with the military might of their northern neighbor. The
king, suspicious of these returnees, would not let them rise to the
highest ranks; here was one of the roots that destroyed the monar-
chy and eventually brought the country to its subsequent catastro-
phe. Another was that the educational reforms of the 1950s began to
produce an element in the population cut off from both the tradi-
tional power wielders and the conservative masses. Embarrassed
by their country's position in the world and their own position within
their country, these new would-be elites looked to the Soviet Union
for inspiration.
Thus, quite aside from the Brezhnev Doctrine, "the invasion
appears as the logical culmination of decades of Soviet [and czarist]
policies aimed at achieving ever-greater control of Afghanistan."
Concerns for stability along the southern border also figured promi-
nently in the Kremlin decision to invade. If the Soviets had not in-
vaded in 1979 and the friendly regime in Kabul had been replaced
by a militantly anticommunist and Islamic one, the effects on the
millions of Muslims living in Soviet Central Asia could have been
cataclysmic. Lastly, the context in which the invasion took place was
one of increasingly bold international behavior on the USSR's part.
Article 28 of the Brezhnev constitution of 1976 proclaimed, "The for-
eign policy of the USSR shall aim a t . . . supporting the struggle of
peoples for national liberation." Soviet submarines were making
repeated incursions into Swedish waters, Soviet aircraft wantonly
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downed a Korean airliner in 1983, and so on. The invasion of Af-
ghanistan merely underlined in red that the world was "confronted
by clear evidence of an utterly novel boldness on the part of the
Soviet military leaders, and of an equally new confidence on the
part of the Kremlin in the professional competence of their military
colleagues."15
A People in Arms
Armed risings occurred in several provinces shortly after the Saur
coup. These were revolts against government policies, not necessar-
ily intended to precipitate or end in the fall of the government itself;
armed resistance to unpopular Kabul actions was a venerable exer-
cise. But the PDPA in Kabul responded with such violence that it
drove the resisters to real civil war.16 Then came the Soviet invasion,
the first true foreign occupation of Afghanistan in modern times.
Now opposition to government policies would be overshadowed
by the explosive, elemental power of outraged religion.
Truly tremendous odds confronted the Afghan freedom fighters
(as President Reagan called them), including the enormous dispar-
ity in size, wealth, population, and technological capacity between
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union; the proximity of the invading
power; the geographical and political isolation of Afghanistan; a
widespread tendency in world capitals to write the country off as
being "within the Soviet sphere of influence"; and internal disunity—
approaching fragmentation—within the insurgent ranks. As one
keen observer put it, "the Afghan Resistance is not an army but rather
a people in arms; its strengths and weaknesses are those of Afghan
society."17
Local leadership had traditionally been independent of national
or even provincial control; in this conflict the first loyalty of the guer-
rilla was usually to his commander, often a tribal or provincial fig-
ure of importance. The localism, individualism, and readiness to
defend one's honor so characteristic of the Afghan people made them
excellent prospects for guerrilla war; but these admirable traits
worked against them as well because individualism and localism
hindered resistance unity. Indeed, within the insurgency were many
potentially explosive rivalries: among the various religious, regional,
and tribal groups inside Afghanistan; among the exiled party politi-
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cians in Pakistan; between those politicians and the guerrilla com-
manders inside Afghanistan; and among the guerrilla commanders
themselves. Ethnic divisions made it possible for the Kabul regime
here and there to recruit local militias, composed of tribes or clans
different from those in the area that supported the resistance. "The
majority of them [members of these militias] are simply mercenar-
ies attracted by the substantial pay (about £30 per month)"; "through-
out the war, the militia's willingness to take Communist money has
far exceeded their willingness to fight."18
Entering Afghanistan in 1980, Gerard Chaliand noted that the
resistance was vastly popular but politically weak. Unlike many other
post-World War II guerrilla movements, the Afghan resistance was
overwhelmingly conservative in its political orientation (resembling
the Spanish guerrillas that fought Napoleon's occupation). But the
old precoup establishment—especially army officers and profes-
sional politicians—was largely absent from the leadership of the re-
sistance. The pre-Saur political structure seemed completely
shattered. In its place was rising a new leadership group, including
many non-Pushtun elements. But the lack of unity (and worse) within
this group presented an unattractive picture to the outside world.
The resistance movement divided into many different parties, each
with its headquarters in Pakistan, which funneled supplies to par-
ticular guerrilla bands associated with them inside Afghanistan. They
also sought to represent the resistance to the outside world. Lacking
central coordination, the insurgents never developed an overall strat-
egy. Thus the Soviets could operate against one group at a time.19
Disarray inside the resistance ranks lessened to some degree af-
ter 1984. Significant moves toward at least formal unity among most
of the groups resulted in a unified delegation being sent to the For-
tieth Anniversary celebration at the United Nations. In January 1987
leaders of the resistance parties in Peshawar proclaimed a united
program consisting mainly of two points: (1) the Soviets must with-
draw completely from Afghanistan and (2) the resistance mujahideen
(meaning "warriors of God") would govern the country until free
nationwide elections were held. Early in 1988 resistance leaders es-
tablished a provisional government that included the heads of the
principal parties.20
The mujahideen lacked weapons as well as unity. For years they
were poorly equipped, much more so than their contemporaries in
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El Salvador or Angola. Most guerrilla units captured their guns from
Soviet and Kabul forces. Defectors from the Kabul army and from
ostensibly pro-Kabul local militias were another source of weapons
and ammunition. Foreign arms shipments did not assume any im-
portance until well after the Soviet invasion.21 Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, China, and Kuwait sent arms; particular types of modern
weapons supplied by the United States became especially crucial in
the mid-1980s.
At first everything seemed stacked against the resistance. The
dominant theory of guerrilla warfare holds that as the fish move in
the water, so the guerrillas move among the civilian population, re-
ceiving life-giving sustenance and life-saving intelligence from it. But
by 1984, because of the dreadful depredations of the Soviet invaders
and their murderous marionettes in Kabul, the impoverished civil-
ians in many areas were not able to provide the guerrillas with food,
so that the freedom fighters had to carry their own. In fact, the guer-
rillas themselves often had to provide food for starving villagers.22
Both the KGB and KhAD, Kabul's East German-trained intelli-
gence/secret police, penetrated the various resistance groups inside
Afghanistan, in Pakistan, and in Europe. That some KGB agents were
from Soviet Central Asia facilitated the infiltration. This is one area
where the fragmentation within the resistance did not have entirely
negative consequences, because it limited what the KGB and KhAD
could discover. KhAD operated with some effect in the refugee camps
in Pakistan, spreading rumors and dissension and occasionally kill-
ing a resistance leader. These two intelligence agencies also took
Afghan children to the Soviet Union, where they were trained in the
use of explosives and sabotage and then sent back to infiltrate resis-
tance units.23
Assets of the Resistance
But of course the resistance picture was not all bleak, or the war
would have soon ended with a Soviet victory. The fragmented na-
ture of Afghan society made resistance unity impossible, especially
since no truly charismatic leader appeared who could transcend the
tribal, regional, and religious differences among the freedom fight-
ers. But it also deprived the Soviets of a target against which to launch
a major decisive attack. The resistance was amorphous and there-
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fore almost impossible to destroy. Recall that it was a loosely orga-
nized, multilingual Afghan commonwealth that inflicted a humili-
ating defeat upon the mighty British Empire in the First Afghan War.
The years of combat against the Soviets also helped forge at least to
some degree a new sense of Afghan nationality.24
Covered with rugged mountains, Afghanistan is well suited to
guerrilla warfare. Most of the mujahideen came equipped with strong
bodies and stoic souls, the products of many centuries of spartan
living. The resistance also had the truly priceless asset of a sanctu-
ary in Pakistan. That country served not only as a place where guer-
rillas could leave their families in relative safety but also as an
irreplaceable conduit for outside assistance. But above all, the fun-
dament and strength of the resistance was Islam. Western analysts
are often uncomfortable with the subject of religion and tend to ig-
nore the essential place of Islam in the resistance movement. From
the first days of the Soviet invasion, however, the guerrillas were
fighting not only for national (or more accurately, provincial) free-
dom, most especially they were fighting for the true religion. The
one weapon that the resistance never lacked, therefore, that most
important weapon for any army, was high morale; after all, as the
freedom fighters would ask, If God is with us, who shall prevail
against us?25
Exactly how many guerrillas were active at any one time cannot
be known. Estimates vary from 80,000 to 150,000, with the latter fig-
ure probably too high. Arrayed against the insurgents by 1985 were
115,000 Soviet troops, along with 30,000 regular Afghan army troops
(down from a preinvasion force of 100,000), and perhaps 50,000 in
other Kabul units. The Communist forces controlled the cities and
large towns, and the resistance controlled the countryside.
The mujahideen supply effort often consisted of men carrying
backpacks over little-known but dangerous trails. Medical care was
almost totally lacking. The mujahideen were most active at night,
attacking small fortified posts, blowing up bridges, launching rocket
attacks. "Sniper fire from the insurgents was a particular headache
for the Soviets."26 They also relied heavily on the classic guerrilla
tactics of mining roads and ambushing convoys. The paucity of good
roads magnified the effects of those tactics, so that the tasks of send-
ing supplies to and maintaining communications between regime-
held urban centers became especially difficult and dangerous. Here
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and there the mujahideen would literally isolate a city or fortress,
requiring the Soviets to supply the place by aircraft, sometimes for
years. And assassinations of government figures, notorious collabo-
rators, and even Soviet officials, increased yearly.
In the early years, Soviet and Kabul forces emerged from the
cities to carry out large "sweeps" of the surrounding guerrilla-in-
fested territory. The usual response of the mujahideen to these ma-
jor efforts was simply to fade into the hills. Villagers would also
disappear, abandoning their homes and their scanty possessions.
The troops would arrive in a designated area and find no one to kill,
little to loot, and nothing to eat. Unable to live off the land, they
would have to bring in supplies by truck convoy—always very
risky—or retreat to their strongholds. When the troops went away,
the villagers would return. This was the general pattern of repeated
Soviet-Kabul campaigns in the strategic Panjshir Valley. Sometimes,
however, the insurgents would not retreat in the face of enemy forces.
The typical attack would place Kabul troops in the lead, with Soviet
soldiers behind them. The mujahideen knowledge of the terrain al-
lowed them to set up ambushes in places through which they knew
the enemy troops would be channeled. Usually the insurgents would
let the Kabul forces pass and then concentrate fire on the Russians.
In the meantime, many of the Kabul soldiers would have run away
or defected to the mujahideen. Sometimes a freedom fighter would
strap a homemade gasoline bomb to his body and leap onto a Rus-
sian tank.27 Neither side took many prisoners.
The resistance did not have a strategy for the defeat of the Sovi-
ets, whose superior firepower and discipline made that impossible.
Instead, the insurgents sought to make the war so expensive for the
invaders that they would eventually negotiate or just get out alto-
gether. The objective of the resistance was stalemate, and it achieved
that before the end of 1985.
None of this would have been possible except for the truly in-
credible incompetence and self-destructive tendencies of the regime
in Kabul.
The PDPA Regime
The leaders and activists of the PDPA were urban or urban-oriented,
and they admired all aspects of Soviet society, as they imagined it.
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Consequently, they seethed with impatient and embarrassed con-
tempt for traditional Afghanistan. In no area did these characteris-
tics show so clearly, or with such disastrous consequences, as in
regime policies toward the peasantry, the overwhelming majority
of the population. No doubt many small farmers and landless peas-
ants were quite poor and could have benefited from land reform, a
principal PDPA program. But many country people were reluctant
to participate in land reform activities that seemed unnecessarily
punitive, confiscatory, and repugnant to local custom and Islamic
law. PDPA activists sent to stir up class feelings in the rural areas
made the peasants march in formation through the streets of their
villages, shouting strange slogans and denouncing unknown en-
emies ("American imperialists"). Rural people considered such be-
havior to be immodest and demeaning. Apparently no opportunity
was lost to annoy, offend, or shock the peasants: PDPA activists even
forbade dancing at weddings and set very low maximums for how
much food could be served at these celebrations. All this deeply af-
fronted concepts of propriety and hospitality among the peasantry.
Now, a proper Marxist-Leninist revolution of course requires a
proletariat. Because such a class was hardly visible in Afghanistan,
PDPA activists decided to create a "Proletariat of Women," who pre-
sumably would be glad to support radical social change. As any-
body but PDPA zealots could have predicted, village women were
not interested in fulfilling the role of historic substitute for the
Petrograd proletariat; besides that, the government made few ef-
forts to follow up on this idea (it faced more explosive problems).
The whole project collapsed, but not before additional strata of the
Afghan rural population had been further alienated. And things were
not much better in Kabul itself. Many reports described government
or party agents entering a private house on the pretext of searching
for rebels and weapons and then simply looting the place. Even be-
fore the Soviet invasion, Afghan civil society had begun to crumble,
and the process accelerated over the years. Early in the occupation,
many members of the Afghan elite either defected to the resistance
or escaped to foreign countries: diplomats, athletes, airline crews,
almost everybody who was in a position to get out of the country.
The educational system suffered mortal wounds. The PDPA put in-
tense pressure on schoolteachers to join the party; those who refused
lost their jobs, often their freedom, and sometimes their lives. Higher
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education was totally disrupted: almost the entire preinvasion fac-
ulty of Kabul University had been purged or had fled by the end of
1981. Their posts were filled by Russians or by unqualified PDPA
members. By 1985 perhaps 50 to 75 percent of the preinvasion univer-
sity faculties had been thrown into prison, driven into exile, or killed.28
Aware that it was attracting few supporters, the PDPA resorted
to the time-tested Leninist expedient of the front organization. The
National Fatherland Front was supposed to provide an umbrella
group for people who would not join the PDPA but might be in-
duced to support the government because they disliked the resis-
tance. Like all the other PDPA programs, the Front came to nothing.
Yet within the PDPA, hostility between Parcham and Khalq con-
tinued and even intensified, in spite of the fact that the party-regime
was fighting for its very survival. After the overthrow and murder
of Amin, President Babrak Karmal freed his fellow Parchamis from
prison; they immediately turned on their Khalqi persecutors, hu-
miliating and even killing many.
The fissure within the party was taking on aspects of a tradi-
tional Afghan blood feud. It nevertheless reflected some serious
policy differences. The Parcham side was totally pro-Soviet and fa-
vored "softening" the PDPA revolutionary program in order to at-
tract more support or at least calm some of its opponents. The
Khalqis, however, grew ever more bitter and intransigent toward
the resistance, indeed toward the whole population; they wanted a
total, immediate revolutionary assault on the entire fabric of Afghan
society. Correctly perceiving the Kremlin as being in favor of "soft-
ening," many Khalqis displayed increasing suspicion and hostility
toward their Russian mentors.
For their part, the Soviets despaired of finding real support for
Communism in a country like Afghanistan; accordingly, they sent
ten thousand Afghan children to the Soviet Union to mold them
into the nucleus of a new Communist society. In November 1984
alone, nearly nine hundred Afghan children under ten years old were
sent to the USSR for ten years of schooling.29
But the most dreadful result of the PDPA's war against Afghan
civil society and the Soviet invasion and subsequent campaign to
destroy the resistance was depopulation. Out of a preinvasion popu-
lation of 16 million, more than 1 million civilians lost their lives;
additional millions fled across provincial or national borders, so that
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whole areas of the country became uninhabited. These disasters, this
massive killing and destruction, did not trouble PDPA activists; on
the contrary, one official stated that even if in the end only a million
Afghans were left alive, that number would be sufficient to build
the new socialist society.30
The PDPA Army
While the actual Soviet invasion was occurring, most Afghan troops
allowed themselves to be disarmed by Russian advisers and sol-
diers. There were exceptions: the Afghan Eighth Division put up
very stiff resistance and suffered heavy casualties. Predictably, the
subsequent military performance of regime troops was so miser-
able that the Soviets found themselves, to their dismay, assuming
an ever-greater share of the fighting. Contributing to the poor per-
formance of the puppet army was the condition of the officer corps.
Almost all the postinvasion officers were new men. What had be-
come of the eight thousand officers of the pre-1978 army? The PDPA
regime had killed great numbers of experienced officers because they
were not Communists or because they belonged to the wrong PDPA
faction. (As late as September 1982, General Wodud, commander of
the Central Corps, was found shot dead in his office.) Many of the
rest had gone into exile, accepted jobs in other government agen-
cies, or joined the resistance.31 Political interference with promotions
and assignments also weakened and demoralized the officer corps.
Of the officers who belonged to the PDPA, most were Khalqis; the
Babrak Karmal regime, as well as the Russians, distrusted them and
therefore took care to give them less critical assignments.
As the war raged on, the training period for officers was cut
from three years to two. Some officers who deserted to the resis-
tance claimed that they had had only three months of training. The
conditions among enlisted men were comparably bad. In addition
to poor preparation and humiliating subservience to the Russians,
the Kabul troops were often improperly used. For example, the 444th
Commando Brigade was perhaps the best of the regime units; para-
chuted into the Panjshir Valley in the summer of 1985, in one of the
many efforts to sweep the area, it was decimated.32
But the Kabul army was being destroyed most of all by the un-
willingness of its members to serve. Most of those who deserted just
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went home, but significant numbers wound up with the resistance,
often bringing their invaluable weapons with them. Of the eighty
thousand men in the Afghan army on the eve of the invasion, over
half either deserted or defected to the resistance.33 Even before the
Soviet occupation, the unreliability of the Kabul forces had assumed
alarming proportions. In May 1979, for example, on the road be-
tween Gardez and Khost, the motorized brigade of the Afghan Sev-
enth Division—the entire unit, two thousand officers and men, with
armored vehicles, heavy weapons, everything—surrendered to the
guerrillas without a fight. Mutinies, including the killing of officers,
were common. During most of the war, regime troops outside the
defense perimeter of the capital city were completely unreliable.
Consequently, Soviet officers planned most of the Kabul forces'
operations. The Soviets suspected, with reason, that officers even of
the highest ranks of the Kabul army were collaborating with the
insurgents; so they forced any Afghan, even a general officer, who
entered the precincts of the Ministry of Defense to submit to a per-
sonal search. Rightly fearing infiltration of the Kabul army by
mujahideen, Soviet commanders never informed their Afghan al-
lies of operations until the very last moment. They eventually de-
prived their allies of what tanks and heavy weapons the resistance
had not destroyed, for fear that those also would eventually fall into
insurgent hands. So great became the Russian distrust for the Kabul
forces that the latter were not allowed to have on hand at any one
time more than a week's supply of materiel. Conditions eventually
sank to such depths that Kabul soldiers were required to turn in
their weapons when not fighting. The Russians tried to increase the
reliability of the Afghan army by training officers in the Soviet Union,
but many of them also deserted or defected.34 Resistance fighters
naturally targeted Kabul officers, so that they became even more
reluctant to lead their men into combat.
The PDPA regime tried desperately to induce men to join its forces
and not to desert or defect. It sent conscripts to duty away from
their home areas. The minefields that surrounded regime garrisons
and forts served both to keep the mujahideen out and the troops in.
Another method was accelerated promotion: one defecting officer
told the mujahideen that of four hundred men in his unit, no less
than twenty were brigadier generals. The salaries of officers were
much higher than for comparable civilian jobs, and young men who
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joined the Kabul paramilitary forces were paid more than what a
deputy minister received before the 1978 coup. Any tenth grader
who volunteered for the army would receive a twelfth-grade diploma
after completion of his military service. Any eleventh grader who
volunteered would be guaranteed admission to any institution of
higher education without having to take entrance examinations. All
these inducements proved inadequate. Hence, in 1984 the draft age
was lowered to sixteen, and eventually the government declared all
males between fourteen and fifty liable to conscription (PDPA mem-
bers were exempt). These moves, plus an increase in conscripted
service from three years to four, contributed to mutinies and defec-
tions even in the Kabul area.35 When the mujahideen captured young
regime conscripts, they usually either paroled them to their homes
or incorporated them into the ranks of the resistance.
As 1987 dawned, the regime had about 30,000 regular troops,
with 10,000 in the air force and perhaps another 40,000 in paramili-
tary units, secret police, and militia organizations. Relatively few
new officers joined the PDPA, and some who did were acting on the
request of the resistance to infiltrate the party. And in the midst of
these dangers and calamities, violence between the Khalq and
Parcham factions raged without letup.36
The Background of the Soviet Strategy
The Afghanistan invasion was of course not the first time Russian
troops faced Muslim guerrillas in mountainous terrain. During their
conquest of the Caucasus, from 1820 to 1860, the Russians devel-
oped their basic strategy for dealing with situations of this type.
That strategy included the following components: (1) isolate the in-
surgent region, (2) destroy the insurgent leadership, and (3) devas-
tate the local economy so that it cannot sustain the guerrillas. To
these ends, the Russians advanced slowly into the Caucasus, build-
ing roads and bridges as they went, constructing lines of forts, lay-
ing waste to settlements, driving off and killing cattle, and—most
important of all—bringing in enough troops to make these activities
effective. Even so, from time to time forts in the Russian line would
be overrun with heavy losses; for example, in 1845, near Dargo, in-
surgents killed or captured four thousand Russian soldiers, includ-
ing three generals. The Russians were able to take advantage of
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internal cleavages among their opponents: in later phases of the
Caucasus conflict, Christian populations in Georgia and Armenia
supported the Russians against the Muslim guerrillas. The resistance
received encouragement and sometimes weapons from the Turks
and the British.37
The inhabitants of Russia's Central Asian provinces (the ones
bordering or close to Afghanistan) were considered so politically
unreliable that the czarist army would normally not accept recruits
from those areas. But the huge losses suffered by the Russian Army
in World War I led to the imposition of the draft in Central Asia, a
move that provoked massive and persistent riots. During the 1920s
and 1930s the Soviet regime faced a serious rising in the same terri-
tories, which it called the Basmachi Revolt, in essence an outright
struggle between Leninism and Islam. Predictably, tribal rivalries
weakened the Basmachi insurgents,38 but their revolt lasted a long
time, in part because the kingdom of Afghanistan allowed them to
cross the border at will. Soviet troops also crossed into Afghanistan
several times. The Kremlin never resolved these deep-rooted con-
flicts, and during World War II the Germans found many willing
recruits among the ranks of captured soldiers from Soviet Asia.
When the Afghanistan war broke out, most of the USSR's Cen-
tral Asian subjects had inferior educations and were found in the
lower ranks of the Soviet Army and in the less technical and non-
combat branches of the service. Consequently, many ethnic Russians
came to believe that an unfairly large share of the blood cost of the
war in Afghanistan was being borne by young Russians. But some
evidence suggests that the Kremlin wished to preserve its Russian
units and therefore sent to Afghanistan troops drawn disproportion-
ately from other ethnic groups.39
The Soviet War
Considered in itself, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a great
success, a model operation. Yet, as the fighting developed, "the over-
all counterinsurgency capabilities of the average Soviet conscript
[were] unimpressive."40 And so they remained. It is not hard to ac-
count for this.
The Soviet Army had long enjoyed a formidable reputation as a
fighting force. This was mainly due to its great size, but also to its
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achievements against Germany in World War II. But between the
surrender of Nazi Germany in May 1945 and the invasion of Af-
ghanistan in December 1979, the Soviet Army had had less real com-
bat experience than the armies of Britain, China, Colombia, Egypt,
France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Portugal, South Korea, Syria, Turkey,
the United States, or Vietnam. Probably for that reason the Soviet
Army sought to give as many of its officers as possible a "turn" at
the Afghanistan fighting, a policy similar to that pursued by the U.S.
Army in Vietnam, and probably with the same negative effects on
the progress of the war. An "Afghan Brotherhood" grew inside the
Soviet Army and might eventually have replaced the dominance of
those who served in "the West" (World War II) with those who served
in "the South" (Afghanistan).41
Not only had the Soviet Army been untested in extended com-
bat for decades, much like the U.S. Army, it had been built to fight
World War III, to fight NATO forces in Europe, not Central Asian
mountaineers armed with antique rifles and homemade gasoline
bombs (called, ironically, "Molotov cocktails"). True, in the 1940s
and early 1950s elements of the Soviet Army had waged a fierce
campaign to exterminate guerrillas in the Ukraine, but since that
struggle was "secret," even a nonevent, there were no serious stud-
ies on the topic for wide use within the Soviet Army. Modern Soviet
counterinsurgency doctrine was thus woefully underdeveloped.42
Another major factor affecting the Soviet performance was that
the number of Soviet troops committed to the conflict was inad-
equate. The Soviets had expected that Kabul forces would do most
of what fighting needed to be done. By January 1980 there were only
about 50,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, many of them Central
Asian reservists recently mobilized; the invasion of Czechoslovakia
a decade earlier had been on a much larger scale. But the intensity
of popular resistance, as well as the reluctance to fight and the ten-
dency to desert shown by the Kabul troops, made it clear that the
Soviets were going to have to carry a much bigger share of the fight-
ing than originally planned. They were never able to do that effec-
tively because Moscow never committed enough troops to
Afghanistan. Five years after the initial invasion, the Soviets had
115,000 military personnel inside Afghanistan, raised to 120,000 by
1987. Fully 22,000 of those were needed just to hold down Kabul.
The total number amounted to less than 4 percent of all Soviet ground
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forces; only perhaps 6 of 194 Soviet combat divisions were in Af-
ghanistan on a full-time basis. Admittedly, over 50 percent of those
forces were combat troops, a much higher ratio than the Americans
ever reached in Vietnam. But after subtracting garrison security
forces, the Soviets were left with only about one battalion in each
province for offensive operations.43 Even with their Kabul allies, the
Soviets never remotely approached the ten-to-one ratio of govern-
ment troops to insurgents that many students of guerrilla warfare
have believed necessary for victory.
Soviet forces in Afghanistan lacked not only numbers and expe-
rience but also training. Many Soviet privates arrived in Afghani-
stan after having been trained for a mere month.44 Even
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) often knew little about tactics or
leadership. The Soviet Army threw into mountain warfare youths
who had never even seen a real mountain.
Serious morale problems plagued the Soviets almost from the
beginning of the war and eventually reached crisis proportions.
Those conscripts who were sent to Afghanistan were often ones who
had been unable to pay the proper bribes to avoid such service. Bru-
tality by older soldiers against younger ones, even against NCOs,
was common and not infrequently resulted in death. Health services
for the troops were substandard; alcoholism and drug abuse were
common. Increased combat activity after 1982 meant increased ca-
sualties. Many of the soldiers had been told that they were in Af-
ghanistan to save the people; what they encountered must have
severely shaken them, accounting to a large degree for the increas-
ing incidents of theft and sale of weapons to the resistance, in return
for drugs, including heroin. Naturally, the Soviet Army reflected in
many ways the larger society from which it was drawn: centraliza-
tion, rigid discipline, and punishment for failure discouraged initia-
tive among junior officers. All of these conditions combined
constituted a very severe handicap in fighting guerrillas, where so
much depends on small-unit action under vigorous officers.45
Strategy and Reality
All these insufficiencies, especially in numbers and training, dic-
tated the strategy eventually adopted by the Soviets, a modified
enclave strategy, hi essence it had five elements: (1) hold Kabul and
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the other main cities with enough forces to prevent expulsion, (2)
protect communications between those cities (Soviet supply lines
were long: Kabul is well over 400 km from the Soviet border and
Qandahar is 600 km from Herat; control of the roads was so tenuous
that Soviet bases and even the garrisons in big towns had to be sup-
plied mainly and sometimes exclusively by aircraft), (3) clear guer-
rillas out of the northern Afghan provinces in order to safeguard
supply routes to Soviet forces in Kabul and to prevent any spillover
of fighting from northern Afghanistan into the Muslim provinces of
the USSR, (4) launch periodic sweeps to break up mujahideen con-
centrations or seize their strongholds, and (5) interdict infiltration
from Pakistan and Iran. As the conflict dragged on and the frustra-
tion of the Soviets increased, they also sought to build up a Soviet-
ized Afghan elite that would one day take over the war and run the
country; in addition, they attempted to systematically destroy the
economy of those provinces that were outside Soviet control.46
The mounting Soviet difficulties in Afghanistan need not have
come as a total surprise. The USSR had been extending help to Third
World regimes fighting against guerrillas for a long time. Almost
everywhere—not only in Afghanistan but also in Angola, Cambo-
dia, Ethiopia, and Mozambique—Soviet assistance had produced
disappointing results. The unimpressive Soviet record of counter-
insurgency in the Third World had several causes. First, and most
obvious, was the absence of good counterinsurgency doctrine. Sec-
ond, the Soviets were generally unsuccessful in denying the guerril-
las outside assistance and sanctuaries. Third, they tried to get the
army of the host regime to do most if not all of the real fighting; in
itself this was a sound idea, but Soviet efforts to build up forces
capable of carrying out such a responsibility were disappointing at
best (Afghanistan merely being a most egregious case). Fourth, the
Soviets, and the regimes they controlled or influenced, would not
address the root causes of the local insurgency: disastrous govern-
ment policies.47 The Soviet method, the "socialist" prescription, for
dealing with Third World societies (or any society in their grip) was
centralized political control, a bureaucratized, collectivized economy
(including agriculture), and brutal repression of any who dared pro-
test. Of course such policies aggravated rather than alleviated the
conditions that had produced the insurgency.
All of this helps explain how the Soviet Army performed so well
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in the invasion but not well at all in the long struggle to subdue the
rebellious rural population.
Nevertheless, Soviet forces in Afghanistan learned. They even-
tually placed less emphasis on ineffective and dangerous big-sweep
operations. They began to rediscover some classic counterinsurgency
tactics, including airlifting small, well-trained detachments of Spe-
cial Purpose Forces (Spetsnaz), of which perhaps five thousand were
in Afghanistan in 1986. Still, at the end of the fighting, as at the be-
ginning, most Soviet forces consisted of road-bound motorized rifle
units. But at least they had begun placing at the head of convoys
turretless tanks with mine-detecting rollers mounted on the front.48
A major innovation was the introduction of the helicopter gun-
ship as the mainstay of the Soviet effort. In February 1980 and again
in April, when antiregime and anti-Soviet riots gripped Kabul, the
Soviets strafed the crowds with these heavy-gunned helicopters,
killing hundreds. But it was against guerrillas, not civilian rioters,
that the Soviets found the best use for these machines, and they
turned out to be their most effective weapon. The Soviets had sixty
helicopters in Afghanistan in mid-1980; by the end of 1981 they had
more than three hundred. The helicopters provided the Russians
with the kind of firepower normally obtainable only from tanks, but
the helicopters could be used in the mountains, where tanks cannot
operate. Gunships escorted convoys passing along especially vul-
nerable sections of mountain roads. But helicopters are relatively
slow and can be easily hurt, especially their rotor blades, as the
Americans had learned to their great cost in Vietnam. In January
1982 freedom fighters in Paktia Province were able to down a heli-
copter transporting a Soviet lieutenant general.49 Nevertheless, un-
til the resistance obtained heavy machine guns in 1983, there was
little defense against the gunships. hi 1986 the Russians introduced
helicopters with armored bottoms that were almost totally immune
to machine-gun fire.
But the days of nearly complete domination of the battlefield by
Soviet helicopters were drawing to a close. In 1983, using surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs), resistance fighters shot down several heli-
copters near Khost. The introduction of SAMs sent waves of panic
throughout the Soviet establishment in Afghanistan. Nobody knew
how many SAMs the freedom fighters had, but the knowledge that
they had any at all forced helicopter pilots to fly higher than was
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effective. And in the latter half of 1986 the United States at last be-
gan providing the resistance with the excellent Stinger missile, which
was lightweight and easy to use. This weapon obliterated the domi-
nance of the helicopter gunship: "the Stinger missile . . . robbed the
Soviet forces of their command of the air." Beginning in 1987, Soviet
helicopter and fighter aircraft losses reached 1.2 to 1.4 a day, or 420
to 500 a year. Consequently, the Soviets sharply cut back their air
operations. Indeed, "the [mujahideen's] acquisition of surface-to-
air missiles was critical to their ability to counter . . . Soviet tactics.
Since late 1986, when SAMs were used in significant numbers, the
mujahideen were able to move without constant fear of helicopter
attacks."50
Actually, the Soviets had already lost about one thousand air-
craft before December 1986, when large numbers of Stingers first
reached the battlefield. Thus, "it is important to stress that the Stinger
alone scarcely forced the USSR to withdraw from Afghanistan. The
sheer dedication and persistence of the Mujahideen did that."51
The Destruction of Afghan Society
When Western governments have found themselves trying to sup-
press an insurgency, they have typically tried to separate the guer-
rillas from the civilian population and win the goodwill of the latter.
That was not the Soviet way. In Afghanistan they made some efforts
at winning over the religious leaders by suggesting the compatibil-
ity of Leninism and Islam, by helping to repair mosques, and so
forth. But the Soviets did not seek to "win the hearts and minds" of
the peasantry; rather, their method was to drain the water in which
the guerrillas swam: to destroy any civilian population friendly to,
or even proximate to, the guerrillas.52 The Soviets sought, by forced
migration, to empty the provinces along both the Soviet and the
Pakistan borders. But since virtually the whole country rose against
the Soviets and their Kabul puppets, the policy of devastation was
eventually unleashed against nearly every province.
The insufficiency of the Soviet and Kabul troop numbers, the
low level of their training and morale, and the tenacity of the resis-
tance led inexorably to the most appalling aspect of the entire war:
the Soviet policy of depopulating the main resistance areas. The dis-
tinguished anthropologist Louis Dupree called this policy "migra-
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tory genocide." Helsinki Watch and other human rights organiza-
tions reported that the Soviets were waging a campaign of deliber-
ate terror against the civilian population. They systematically
bombed villages, attacked columns of refugees, killed or maimed
animals, and chopped down orchards.53 In October 1981, when the
resistance captured a noted Soviet geologist and offered him in ex-
change for fifty Afghan hostages, the Soviets replied by killing all
the hostages. A report issued by the United Nations in the autumn
of 1982 suggested that the Soviets had used chemical weapons, and
they apparently employed poison gas campaigning in the Panjshir
Valley in the spring of 1984. They trained children to act as sabo-
teurs and even assassins. Responsible observers have accused them
of the deliberate and repeated bombing of hospitals.54 Numerous
witnesses have testified that Soviet aircraft often dropped explosive
devices in the shape of toys and pens; "their main targets are chil-
dren, whose hands and arms are blown off."55
During the first year of Soviet occupation, these policies turned
1.5 million Afghans into refugees. Within a few more years, over 4
million Afghan men, women, and children had become refugees; no
one knows how many were killed. In 1985 perhaps one Afghan in
three was an internal or external refugee. Soviet claims that this di-
saster, this "migratory genocide," resulted from the machinations
of native reactionaries and CIA troublemakers were embarrassing
in their pedestrian mendacity. The world, for the most part, includ-
ing notably the Western media, pretended to be ignorant of this crime.
But truth, an elementary respect for truth, forces one to recognize
that the refugee status of so many people, inside Afghanistan, in
Pakistan, and in Iran, was not an accidental or unavoidable conse-
quence of war; it was an intended, engineered result, a "part of So-
viet warfare strategy."56
The War Rages On
Risings against the PDPA regime had begun in October 1978, more
than a year before the Soviet invasion. In March 1979 in Herat, the
country's third-largest city, serious fighting took the lives of hun-
dreds of Afghan Communists and Soviet personnel. Thousands of
civilians were killed as the regime restored control.57 By November
1979, a month before the invasion, insurgent forces dominated
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Badakhshan Province (the link to China) and most of the Hazarajat,
the center of the country. During 1980 strikes and demonstrations
rocked Kabul. Because Afghan soldiers often refused to fire on stu-
dent demonstrators, Soviet troops had to do much of the killing.
After their invasion, the Soviets pursued a very conservative
strategy, limited mainly to holding key cities and the roads between
them. Because of that policy and because they lacked confidence in
the Kabul army, there were few sizable operations during the first
year of Soviet occupation and for much of 1981. The road-bound,
mountain-hating Soviet Army thus failed to take advantage of
mujahideen disunity, lack of equipment, and inexperience with
modern guerrilla techniques. More than half of the country was
under insurgent control by the end of 1980.58 In April 1981
mujahideen killed the deputy head of KhAD in Kabul. That same
month and again in September insurgents briefly overran Qandahar,
the country's second-largest city. By the end of 1981 every single
Afghan province was experiencing some form of armed resistance.
Much more elaborate "pacification" efforts dominated 1982. The
Panjshir Valley lies about sixty miles northeast of Kabul; resistance
control of the valley threatened the capital, the vital Bagram Airbase,
and road communication between Kabul and the Soviet Union.
About 14,000 Soviet and Kabul troops attacked the 5,000 insurgents
in the Panjshir, whose leader was Ahmed Shah Massoud. After cam-
paigning hard for six weeks and suffering 3,000 casualties and 2,000
defections, the Soviet-Kabul forces withdrew. During the following
year the insurgents extended their control to about two-thirds of the
country's territory and three-quarters of its population. The Soviets
again bombed Herat, killing thousands of civilians. The insurgents in
turn carried out increasingly frequent and deadly attacks inside Kabul,
hitting the Soviet Embassy and assassinating numerous Kabul regime
officials and collaborators. As the fourth year of the Soviet occupation
drew to a close, resistance casualties totaled between 50,000 and
100,000, Soviet and regime casualties between 50,000 and 60,000.59
The Soviets increased the tempo of the fighting during 1984. For
big offensive movements they no longer relied on conscript units
but on trained mountain fighters. They again attacked the Panjshir,
this time with 20,000 Soviet troops, five hundred armored vehicles,
and thousands of Kabul soldiers—and again they failed. In June the
Soviets launched a massive effort around Herat, forcing some in-
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surgent groups to retreat into Iran. High-altitude saturation bomb-
ing was a common feature of these campaigns, and in October So-
viet forces also looted the city of Qandahar twice.60 Concerted efforts
were made to assassinate key insurgent leaders. Radio Kabul an-
nounced the death of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the "Lion of the
Panjshir," a onetime engineering student who had become the most
famous of the resistance chiefs. The announcement turned out to be
quite premature. Many of the assassination attempts, especially by
KhAD, failed because the intended victims were tipped off in time.
Massoud and his followers would survive no less than nine Soviet-
directed offensives against them.
As the sixth year of occupation opened, close to ten thousand
Soviets and their wives (no children) lived in a special ghetto in
Kabul, surrounded by barbed wire, armed guards, and great dan-
ger. Life in Kabul had never been secure, but during 1984 conditions
deteriorated. In March alone, fifteen PDPA officials were killed by
the resistance in just one area of the city. On August 31a bomb went
off at Kabul International Airport; less than a month later, another
action inside the city destroyed a dozen Soviet armored vehicles and
killed numerous regime troops.51
The year 1985 saw another major (and unsuccessful) Soviet of-
fensive in the Panjshir. The insurgents were now acquiring heavy
weapons, and above all they had improved their air defenses. By
reducing Soviet airpower, the resistance was able to increase the
number and effectiveness of their ambushes along roads, thus de-
feating the basic Soviet strategy of maintaining communications
between major cities.62 Life in the capital became even more peril-
ous, while Ahmed Shah Massoud led a spectacular raid on the five
hundred-man fort at Pechgur, capturing almost all the troops and
many weapons. Clearly, at the end of the sixth year of Soviet occu-
pation, the war had become stalemated.
hi early 1986 the PDPA declared a six-month cease-fire, but nei-
ther their troops nor the Soviets reduced operations against the re-
sistance under this or subsequent so-called cease-fires. The Soviets
dumped Babrak Karmal and replaced him with the head of the se-
cret police, one Najib. Mujahideen often succumbed to the tempta-
tion to kill Kabul army prisoners, and consequently mass defections
by Kabul troops had practically ceased; sometimes they would ac-
tually stand and fight. The insurgents had never yet held a provin-
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cial capital for any extended period, and KhAD agents had pen-
etrated their organizations. But the guerrillas had even more thor-
oughly penetrated the regime: it was very difficult for Kabul or the
Soviets to mount surprise operations because of the omnipresence
of resistance agents and sympathizers. Security in Kabul became
ever more inadequate. In September the resistance overran the fort
at Ferkhar, killing or capturing three hundred Kabul soldiers.63 Sig-
nificantly, Massoud was now deploying units of men who were will-
ing to fight not only in their own province but anywhere in the whole
northern region.
During 1987 the war discernibly worsened for the Soviet-Kabul
side. The insurgents by then had permanent bases in strongly de-
fended mountain areas, their leaders were cooperating more closely,
and they were getting better equipment from outside. In Paktia Prov-
ince, on the Pakistan border, a major Soviet-Kabul operation includ-
ing Spetsnaz commandos was repulsed with heavy losses. A sizable
Soviet effort to open the road between Gardez and Khost, closed by
the guerrillas for years, failed as well. Mortar shells continued to hit
the Soviet Embassy in Kabul, and to the north of the capital rockets
fell on Bagram Airbase, the most important Soviet installation in the
country. Because the resistance was increasingly using fairly long-
range artillery, the Soviets had to expand their security perimeter
around Kabul. During the summer the Soviets abandoned several
outlying posts, leaving most of the country without any Soviet pres-
ence at all. The resistance showed growing willingness to target So-
viet forces and operate in Soviet-controlled areas. In July insurgents
stormed Kalafgan, only fifty miles from the Soviet border, and seized
priceless artillery. The Soviets acknowledged that the resistance had
actually raided into the territory of the USSR itself (reports of such
forays had appeared in the Western press years earlier). Izvestia il-
lustrated the growing desperation of the Kremlin when it charged
that the mujahideen were being trained by instructors from Paki-
stan, France, Saudi Arabia, the United States, China, Egypt, Iran,
Britain, and even Japan.64
But the most important new aspect of the conflict was the in-
creasing availability of the American Stinger. The first of these one-
man surface-to-air missile launchers had been delivered to the
insurgents in the autumn of 1986. Hitherto, it had always been very
dangerous for the resistance to stand and fight against Soviet and
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Kabul forces because of the probability of air attacks. The Soviets
relied more and more on their total control of the air to surprise
resistance forces and devastate rural society. Now painfully aware
that the resistance possessed Stingers, Soviet and Kabul pilots be-
gan to fly at inefficiently high altitudes, and daylight airlifts of sup-
plies and troops became rare. This diminishing of their airpower
was thus the latest in a series of devastating blows suffered by the
Soviets.65
The Outside World
International relief workers and diplomatic agencies estimated that
by the end of 1988 1.3 million Afghan men, women, and children
had died as a direct result of the war. Additional tens of thousands
had been maimed for life. One-third of the prewar population of 16
million had fled across one or another border, producing the planet's
largest refugee mass. Three-quarters of Afghanistan's villages had
been destroyed or abandoned. "Moscow," said the Washington Post,
"[was] committing one of the world's great crimes." Nevertheless,
the international response was astonishingly subdued. "The discrep-
ancy between the magnitude of the tragedy and the international
attention it receive[d] workfed] very much to Moscow's advantage."
The Soviets counted on being able to carry out this genocide in rela-
tive secrecy, with the world simply pretending to forget about Af-
ghanistan. The Soviets from time to time issued threats about what
might happen to foreign journalists captured in the company of
mujahideen, but the undeniable lack of concern of the world's press
was of enormous help to Moscow.66
Pakistan provided the most essential foreign support of the free-
dom fighters. It gave shelter to millions of Afghan victims of war,
and all of the important Afghan political parties made their head-
quarters in Peshawar. Most crucial of all, Pakistan allowed its terri-
tory to be used for transshipment of aid from other countries into
Afghanistan. With its scores of mountain passes, the fourteen hun-
dred-mile-long Afghanistan-Pakistan border was the lifeline of the
resistance. Helping the Afghan resistance posed many risks to Paki-
stan. Major ethnic groups overlap the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, and the Soviets promised to punish Pakistan by stir-
ring up Baluchi and Pushtun nationalism, a menace to the country's
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very existence. If the Soviets had decided to make an all-out effort
against the huge mujahideen infrastructure that lay over the eastern
border, Pakistan would have been in mortal peril. But the Soviets
held back from a major blow, no doubt influenced by the hostility
toward its Afghanistan aggression of all the world's other great pow-
ers, from the United States to China, from West Germany to Japan.
In June 1981 the Chinese premier significantly made a visit to a refu-
gee camp near Peshawar; two years later the U.S. secretary of state,
George Shultz, told refugees in Pakistan, "We are with you." Even
so, many Pakistanis paid with their lives for the policy of assisting
the insurgency: in 1984 alone, Soviet air and artillery "errors" killed
two hundred Pakistanis. It is true that corrupt Pakistani officials si-
phoned off some of the aid flowing through that country from the
outside world; sometimes old weapons replaced new ones. Yet with-
out the support of the Pakistani government, it is hard to see how
the Afghan resistance would have survived.67
The resistance received help from other Islamic states as well.
Aside from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia was the first and for a while the
only country to give tangible aid to the mujahideen. But then Presi-
dent Anwar Sadat of Egypt began supplying weapons he had re-
ceived from the Soviets before his 1972 break with them.68 In January
and May 1980, conferences of foreign ministers of Muslim countries
condemned the Soviet invasion. Various Islamic conferences issued
invitations to resistance leaders.
In that most self-consciously militant of Muslim states, Iran, the
leadership was at least as embittered against the Americans as against
the Russians. As the Soviet genocide in Afghanistan became well
known, and Soviet units in pursuit of fleeing insurgents crossed into
Iran on several occasions,69 the Iranians after September 1980 had to
devote most of their attention to their bloody and protracted con-
flict with their Muslim neighbor to the west, Iraq. Nevertheless, Te-
heran included mujahideen leaders in its own delegation to the May
1980 Islamic Conference (from which Kabul's representatives were
banned) and supplied arms to particular Afghan resistance groups,
almost exclusively those drawn from the Shia minority.
Soviet clients and semiclients in the Islamic world, such as Syria,
South Yemen, and the PLO, gave at least verbal support to the Kabul
regime. In 1987 Saddam Hussein received the Kabul prime minister
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in Baghdad, the highest-level reception any member of the puppet
government had enjoyed outside the Soviet bloc up to that time.70
In Beijing the leadership viewed the Soviet occupation of Af-
ghanistan as another move in a gigantic Soviet encirclement of China,
a strategy including Vietnam, India, and Mongolia. Accordingly,
China repeatedly declared that the withdrawal of all Soviet forces
from Afghanistan was a precondition for improved relations between
the two Communist behemoths.71 The Chinese backed Pakistan, their
only friend in the region. They also sent rocket launchers, heavy
artillery, and assault rifles into Afghanistan, but in what quantities
no one outside the Chinese government seemed to know.
In Europe, governments, political parties, and private groups
reacted with hostility to the invasion. The Italian Communist Party
was so bitter about Afghanistan that its leaders were refused per-
mission to address the Twenty-sixth Soviet Party Congress in Mos-
cow in 1981. But perhaps the most active sympathy for the Afghan
resistance arose in France. French medical personnel provided sig-
nificant help to refugees, often at the peril of their lives. French citi-
zens helped found Radio Free Kabul in 1981, identified by the Kabul
regime as "a Jewish radio station."72 And in 1987 the French foreign
minister met with resistance leaders in Pakistan.
At the United Nations, large majorities voted annually that "all
foreign troops" should leave Afghanistan. In 1986 the vote was 122
to 20. It is not clear exactly how these votes assisted the Afghan
people, whose villages and society were being destroyed. As late as
September 1986, when the facts about Afghanistan were undeniable,
UNICEF actually presented an award to the puppet regime in Kabul
for its literacy campaign, a campaign whose brutality had in part
sparked the insurgency in the first place.73 And here the role of India
deserves attention. At the Emergency Session of the United Nations
General Assembly in January 1980, the Indian representative criti-
cized the General Assembly for presuming even to discuss the So-
viet invasion of Afghanistan. Consistently refusing to condemn the
Russian occupation, India recognized the Kabul regime and extended
aid to it. In 1987, when the United Nations voted that "foreign troops"
should leave Afghanistan by a vote to 123 to 19, India abstained. On
May 3, 1988, the chief of the Kabul regime visited New Delhi, the
only noncommunist capital to accord him full honors as a head of
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state. Meanwhile, the vaunted and misnamed Non-Aligned Move-
ment accomplished absolutely nothing for the suffering millions of
Afghanistan.
And what was the United States doing?
The Americans and the War
The nature of the Soviet intervention and of the Afghan response to
it, as well as internal political problems facing the Carter adminis-
tration, helped shape U.S. involvement in the conflict. The number
of active-duty U.S. military personnel in direct contact with the war
in Afghanistan was quite limited; at the same time the unfolding
and outcome of the struggle provided much profound satisfaction
to many Americans.
The traditional American approach to Afghanistan received suc-
cinct expression in 1953, in a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to President Eisenhower: "Afghanistan is of little or no strategic
importance to the United States." Presidents Truman and Eisenhower
each denied requests from Afghanistan for military assistance. So-
viet moves to increase their influence in Kabul did not cause alarm
in Washington; no one believed there was much the United States
could.do about it in any case. Americans viewed Afghanistan as
within the "Soviet sphere of influence" and believed that the coun-
try would never be able to move out of the Soviet orbit, no matter
how much assistance the United States might send. The National
Security Council informed President Eisenhower in 1956 that pro-
viding arms to Afghanistan might well provoke strong Soviet coun-
termeasures. In addition, Pakistan, Washington's faithful ally in the
ill-fated Baghdad Pact, had age-old border disputes with Afghani-
stan; hence, any American plans to assist the Afghans would have
aroused strong protests from Karachi. Rarely was there anybody in
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul who could speak adequate Dari. Thus, it
may be no surprise to find that the name Afghanistan does not ap-
pear even once in the index of volume one of Eisenhower's presi-
dential memoirs. It does not appear at all in the memoirs of President
Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, or the theorist of contain-
ment George F. Kennan.74
Pakistan had the support of Secretary of State Dulles in its bor-
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der disputes with Afghanistan. President Daoud therefore turned
to the Soviets, who constructed the Bagram airport north of Kabul
and the Salang Pass through the mountains near the Afghan-Soviet
border. The Soviets found both very useful in the 1979 invasion.
Moscow anticipated no real trouble with the United States over
the invasion of Afghanistan. The Americans, after all, had done little
about the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslova-
kia in 1968. Agonizing in its "Vietnam Syndrome," the United States
ignored Soviet activities in Ethiopia and Angola. By 1979 the Carter
administration was clearly foundering. Another reason the Kremlin
expected no effective response from the Americans was that it ex-
pected no effective response from the Afghans.75
But the invasion thoroughly alarmed the Carter White House.
In a historic hyperbole, the excited U.S. president called the Soviet
move into Afghanistan "the greatest threat to world peace since the
Second World War."76 Washington viewed the invasion as extremely
ominous. It was not only the first-ever Soviet military move outside
the boundaries of the Soviet bloc, but it also brought the Red Army
perilously close to the source of major Western and Japanese oil sup-
plies. "If the Soviets could consolidate their hold on Afghanistan,"
Carter later wrote, "the balance of power in the entire region would
be drastically modified in their favor, and they might be tempted
toward further aggression."77
President Carter's response to the invasion was truly multifac-
eted. He postponed consideration of the Salt II treaty by the Senate
(where in light of the invasion it was dead anyway). He proclaimed
an American boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, in which he
was joined by West Germany, China, Japan, and fifty other coun-
tries. He canceled wheat sales to the Soviets, asked the United Na-
tions to condemn the invasion, and initiated legislation aiming at a
reintroduction of the military draft. Perhaps most importantly in
Moscow's view, Carter called for greatly augmented help for Paki-
stan, sent Defense Secretary Brown to Beijing, and began the flow of
military and financial assistance to the mujahideen. And just in case
the Kremlin entertained ideas about further advances toward the
Persian Gulf, the president issued this warning in his State of the
Union message on January 23,1980: "Let our position be absolutely
clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian
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Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of
the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled
by any means necessary, including military force."78
During the Greek Civil War, President Truman had announced
that it would be the policy of the United States to aid free peoples
resisting subjugation or subversion by Communist forces. This po-
sition, the essence of the Cold War Containment policy, became
known as the Truman Doctrine. During the Afghan conflict, Presi-
dent Reagan proclaimed that U.S. assistance would go not only to
free peoples resisting the imposition of Communism but also to sub-
jugated peoples seeking to escape from it, a position soon called the
Reagan Doctrine.79 This doctrine was rightly seen as a challenge to,
indeed a repudiation of, the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, which held
that once Communists had acquired control of a country, by what-
ever means, the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist states
would never allow that country to have any other kind of govern-
ment—ever. The Brezhnev Doctrine had been the basis for the inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact.
In spite of all this, during the early years of the conflict the flow
of American military assistance to the mujahideen was not very great.
There was no sizable Afghan ethnic element within American soci-
ety to put pressure on Congress; U.S. news media coverage of the
fighting and destruction inside Afghanistan was scanty. One observer
wrote that only about 20 percent of resistance weapons came from
foreign sources. By the end of 1984 the United States was providing
only perhaps $80 million a year in aid to the Afghan resistance.80
As both Soviet brutality and mujahideen determination became
ever clearer, American commitment to the resistance deepened, in
the White House and in Congress. U.S. aid increased to $470 million
a year by 1986 and $700 million by 1988 (figures vary). A significant
proportion of that aid never made it out of Pakistan into Afghani-
stan, something American policymakers will have to take into con-
sideration in similar future conflicts. The Central Intelligence Agency
received overall charge of assistance to the insurgents. This became
the largest "covert" CIA operation since Vietnam. The CIA often
provided the insurgents with Soviet-made weapons, fearing that a
too-blatant U.S. assistance program would provide the Soviets with
a good excuse to retaliate against Pakistan.81
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The Soviet Departure
After more than seven years of occupation and combat, the military
situation from the Soviet point of view was at best an embarrassing
stalemate. The mujahideen could not capture the big cities because
they could not overcome the combination of Soviet airpower and
firepower, fortifications, and land mines that defended them (the
Soviets laid down tens of millions of mines in Afghanistan; most
mujahideen casualties were caused by them).82 The Soviets and their
Kabul allies had lost their complete domination of the air; they con-
trolled little of the countryside, holding only the largest cities, the
key airports, and the north-south highway to Kabul, and all of this
tenuously. By 1987 the insurgents were better armed and more de-
termined than ever before.
In eight years of war the Soviets had suffered between 48,000
and 52,000 casualties, including at least 13,000 to 15,000 deaths. If
one accepts the latter figure (which is probably too low), it amounts
to 35 Soviet deaths per week between December 1979 and Decem-
ber 1987. In view of the fact that the Soviets were combating a resis-
tance force of between 100,000 and 200,000, this was hardly an
oppressive number of fatalities. But the point is that such a figure
was far more than anybody in the Kremlin would have predicted in
January 1980. The divergence between Soviet expectations and ac-
tual losses is even greater for the number of aircraft, including heli-
copters, downed by the resistance, perhaps 500 lost in 1987 alone
(the Stinger effect). The mujahideen had also destroyed about 600
tanks, 800 armored personnel carriers, and several thousand other
military vehicles; Western correspondents sometimes reported see-
ing dozens of Soviet and Kabul army vehicles destroyed in a single
engagement.83 And there was no end in sight.
The war was costing the Soviets about $3 billion annually by 1984.
A lot of the expense was being recovered through Russian exploita-
tion of Afghanistan's mineral resources. Had the Soviets won the war,
Afghanistan's economic future would have been grim indeed.84
Brezhnev's war was imposing many other costs on Gorbachev's
Russia. By dissipating the mystique of the invincible Soviet Army,
by bringing Washington and Beijing closer together, by creating pro-
found hostility among Islamic states, by providing one of the levers
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President Reagan used to pry big defense budgets out of his Con-
gresses—in all these ways the occupation of Afghanistan was not
enhancing Soviet security but undermining it.
But of all the war's effects on the Soviet Union, perhaps the most
menacing was a peculiar Soviet variation of the venerable Domino
Principle: the long-term consequences of the endless Afghanistan
fighting for the Soviet Union's Muslim population, fifty million
strong and rapidly increasing. These peoples lived in territories (So-
viet Central Asia) conquered by the Russians relatively recently. They
were held inside the Soviet Union not by the appeal of Marxism—
"perceived not as an international philosophy but as a technique
devised by the Russians to protect their colonial rule"—but by the
power of the Soviet Army and the secret police. There was practi-
cally no intermarriage at all with ethnic Russians. The Central Asians
were truly subject peoples. Now, the subject peoples of the British
and French empires had shown relatively little inclination to chal-
lenge their imperial overlords—until they saw them defeated at the
hands of an Asian people in World War II. What conclusions, then,
might Russia's Central Asian Muslim subjects draw from the events
in Afghanistan, where the Invincible Red Army had for years been
hard pressed by the warriors of God, the Red Star eclipsed by the
Crescent, Leninism tamed by Islam, an Islam resurgent all over the
world and nowhere more vigorous than on the southern borders of
the Soviet empire? What if the international response to the war in
Afghanistan taught the Central Asians that there was indeed a Mus-
lim world community that stretched far beyond the borders of their
less-than-invincible Utopia?85 No one could provide certain answers
to these questions. But at a minimum, in the words of a U.S. State
Department report, "by 1987 the mujahideen had fought the Soviet
and regime [Kabul] forces to a stalemate: Moscow's Afghan policy
had alienated it from the Islamic, Western and non-aligned coun-
tries; and the Soviets failed to find a client leader in Kabul who could
capture the loyalty of the Afghan people."86 How had the Soviets
become entangled in this predicament?
The Elements of Stalemate
What happened to the Soviets in Afghanistan can perhaps best be
understood as the mutually aggravating effects of four basic circum-
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stances. First, the invading Russians found themselves confronted
with a forbidding terrain inhabited by hardy and high-spirted people
who saw themselves as intolerably provoked into a defense of both
their liberties and their religion, ha a word, Afghanistan was no
Czechoslovakia. (Did no one in the entire USSR power structure fore-
see this?)
Second, right from the start the Soviets greatly overestimated
the ability of their modern weapons technology to cut off supplies
to the guerrillas. Weapons got in from Pakistan, from America, from
Iran and China and Egypt and Saudi Arabia—surely one of the most
heterogeneous coalitions ever seen, and daunting indeed in its im-
plications for Moscow. The Soviets thus came to understand how
very difficult it is to defeat a popular insurgency possessing secure
sources of outside aid. (Indeed, they had encountered great diffi-
culty in suppressing insurgency in the Ukraine after World War II,
even though outbreaks there were totally isolated from the world.)
And late in the war, but not too late, foreign supporters of the
mujahideen provided them with weapons that came close to driv-
ing the vaunted Red Air Force from the daytime skies. In analyzing
this war, it would be impossible to overestimate the importance ei-
ther of the willingness of foreign powers to supply the insurgents
with modern weapons or the failure of the Soviets to isolate the coun-
try from that assistance.87
Third, the various political formulas advanced by Moscow to
mitigate the Afghanistan problem had all failed miserably. From the
beginning the Soviets and their mannequins in Kabul had responded
to Afghan armed resistance in ways that only made their opponents
more determined. Subsequent attempts to reverse those blunders,
such as engineering major leadership changes and launching a "na-
tional conciliation government," achieved nothing. Efforts to estab-
lish a pro-Soviet government in Kabul that would be popular and
legitimate, or a least tolerated by the Afghan people, failed utterly.
The Soviet political failure produced the military failure.88 Is it not
astonishing, truly, that in a country like Afghanistan, with so many
and such profound racial, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and tribal fis-
sures—is it not astonishing that the Soviets proved so incapable of
developing effective divide-and-rule policies?
Fourth, the Soviets never came close to committing troops in
numbers sufficient to subjugate the country or even to possess ma-
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jor parts of it securely. The numerical inadequacy was the root of the
Soviet terror campaign against the civilian population: lacking the
manpower for pacification, they turned to depopulation. But the tre-
mendous firepower of the Soviet armed forces, with apparently no
limitations whatsoever on its use, enhanced by incursions into Pa-
kistan and assassinations of resistance leaders in Peshawar, did not
intimidate the insurgents. On the contrary, the Soviet terror policy
actually constructed a vast support system and recruiting ground
for the resistance among the millions of Afghans who fled across
the borders into Pakistan and Iran. Thus, depopulation fatally back-
fired. The Soviets paid a very high price indeed for their systematic
inhumanity.
One way to respond to all this would have been to decide finally
to win the war. But "the Soviet leadership recognized that there could
be no military solution in Afghanistan without a massive increase
in their military commitment."89 There were approximately 200,000
mujahideen in 1987, and perhaps 100,000 of them were active fight-
ers. To reach the standard ten-to-one ratio of soldiers to insurgents
widely believed necessary to wage conclusive counterguerrilla war-
fare, and assuming that the ineffective Kabul forces remained at
around 80,000 (an optimistic assumption indeed), the Soviets would
have had to put at the minimum more than 900,000 troops into Af-
ghanistan—eight times their actual commitment. The logistical chal-
lenges of supplying such a force in the Afghan terrain were staggering.
And by the middle of the 1980s the Soviet leadership had ceased try-
ing to hide the fact that the Soviet Union was facing a systemic eco-
nomic crisis with the most profound and alarming implications.
Yet, even if the Kremlin had bitten the bullet and decided on a
massive increase of its troop levels in Afghanistan, that alone would
not have guaranteed either quick or complete success. The Ameri-
cans had sent to South Vietnam, a territory one-quarter the size of
Afghanistan, an army five times the size of the Soviet force there.
Assisting the Americans in South Vietnam was an indigenous allied
force eventually numbering 1 million out of a population of about
17 million, compared to the 80,000 men and boys the Kabul regime
was able to scrape together out of a population of 15 million.
So, although the Soviets had not suffered actual defeat in Af-
ghanistan, they faced either continuous conflict or unacceptable es-
calation. Why was Gorbachev obligated to pursue and perhaps
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massively escalate this depressing war—against precisely what dan-
ger, for precisely what gain, and at precisely what internal and in-
ternational costs? This Afghanistan mess was not even his creation;
it was Brezhnev's. By 1988 Brezhnev was dead, and most of the
members of the Politburo who had supported his invasion were also
dead or retired. "In the final analysis, Moscow deemed the overall
costs of pursuing a military solution to be too high." And so the
Kremlin chose to withdraw from Afghanistan.90
On April 14,1988, Pakistan and the PDPA regime signed accords
at Geneva; the United States and the Soviet Union were guarantors
of the pact. And "on May 15 [1988], in compliance with the Geneva
agreement, the Soviets began to withdraw their troops from Afghani-
stan," monitored by the United Nations Good Offices Mission to
Afghanistan and Pakistan. By February 1989 all or almost all Soviet
troops had left Afghanistan, but substantial numbers of advisers and
KGB personnel remained. Those advisers, along with Soviet-sup-
plied aircraft, would play a crucial role in the defense of Kabul, and
Moscow continued to supply the Kabul regime to the tune of $250
million per month.91
What the War Meant
References to Afghanistan as "Russia's Vietnam" were very com-
mon in the 1980s and to some degree thereafter. Such a comparison
has some validity: "The Soviet forces in Afghanistan repeated the
U.S. experience in Vietnam, in that they did not lose but could not
win at a politically acceptable cost."92 Nevertheless, though no two
wars can ever be exactly the same, the contrasts between the Ameri-
can and the Soviet conflicts in Asia are so arresting that one should
be especially skeptical of facile comparisons between them.
Three fundamental differences between the Vietnamese and the
Afghan conflicts, quite aside from the size of the Soviet and Ameri-
can troop commitment, come quickly into view. First, Afghanistan
was just over the Soviet border. In contrast, Washington is 9,000 miles
from Saigon. It would therefore be less misleading to compare the
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to an American withdrawal
not from Vietnam but from northern Mexico.
Second, the proportion of the South Vietnamese population will-
ing to associate itself publicly with the Americans was much higher
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than the proportion of the Afghan population openly supporting the
Soviets.93 (The final conquest of Saigon by a massive North Vietnam-
ese Army invasion does not disprove this statement but confirms it.)
The third and perhaps most decisive contrast was the nature of
the opponents the Americans and the Soviets each faced. American
casualties in Vietnam were a great deal higher than Soviet casualties
in Afghanistan, but that disparity was by no means due solely to the
much smaller Soviet troop commitment. The mujahideen were brave
and resilient, but in Vietnam the Americans faced an enemy much
better trained, organized, and equipped than the Soviets ever
dreamed of in Afghanistan. The Hanoi Politburo had developed its
military and political techniques during long years of struggle against
the French. It gave the Communist-led insurgency in the South unity,
direction, and discipline. It sent southward a constant and increas-
ing flow of well-trained combatants with effective weapons. It even-
tually committed quite substantial military formations. And it
learned how to manipulate public opinion in the United States. The
mujahideen had nothing like all that.
No, the meaning of the Afghan insurgency must be sought be-
yond sweeping and misleading comparisons to Vietnam.
For nearly a decade the Soviets poured out upon the poor and
simple people of Afghanistan the full horror of a deliberate cam-
paign of annihilation. By 1988 roughly 1.25 million Afghans "had
died as a result of aerial bombing raids, shootings, artillery shelling,
antipersonnel mines, exhaustion and other war-related conditions."94
Wielded with utter indifference to questions of legality or human-
ity, the fearsome technology of the Soviet armed forces nevertheless
proved insufficient for victory. At a truly frightful price, and with
good help from their well-wishers in the outside world, the Afghan
people fought to a stalemate the forces of a totalitarian superpower
on their very border. And Afghanistan provides an exceedingly rare
example of guerrillas prevailing without the support of conventional
armed forces.
The Afghan struggle was indeed a mortifying colonial reverse
for the world's last multinational empire. But it was so much more
than that: by successfully refusing to be made into a Central Asian
imitation of Ceausescu's Romania, the Afghan freedom fighters in-
flicted the first (but not the last) indisputable reverse on the "his-
torical inevitability of Marxism-Leninism" of which Brezhnev had
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so confidently boasted. This double defeat helped stimulate the gath-
ering forces of change inside the Soviet empire, hastening the pro-
cess of its decomposition. Thus, the brave, sad, martyred people of
Afghanistan helped in no small measure to alter the entire course of
world politics.95 In a most ironic, fitting, and devastating way, Trotsky
turned out to be right after all about the connection between revolu-
tion in Asia and Europe: the cries of battle in the Afghan mountains
had their echo in the cries of freedom on the Berlin Wall.
10
Implications and Provocations
Let us now briefly review the most salient aspects of the conflicts
examined in this volume and see whether they yield up any gener-
ally useful conclusions.
The American Revolution
The southern colonies that the British tried to subdue were vast in
terms of eighteenth-century communications. Direct and indirect
foreign assistance to the American side drew off British forces to
other pressing areas and played a major role in the bagging of
Cornwallis's army. In the Carolinas the British found themselves
confronted by one of history's great guerrilla chiefs, Francis Marion,
the Swamp Fox. The guerrillas effectively disrupted British lines of
communications and harassed small parties of troops. The guerril-
las' impact was the greater because for much of the time they were
operating symbiotically with regular American forces under the very
capable Gen. Nathanael Greene. (Nearly two hundred years later,
the United States found itself confronting the same sort of powerful
guerrilla-regular symbiosis in Vietnam.)
The situation brings into clear focus the inadequacy of British
numbers, in North America as a whole and in the Carolinas in par-
ticular. That numerical insufficiency made irresistible the loyalist
mirage that enticed the British to mount a major effort in the south-
ern colonies in the first place. It also accounted for the failure of
Cornwallis's strategy of strong points. And it was linked to the self-
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defeating punishment of the civil population (the burning of churches
and plantations, the destruction of Georgetown, South Carolina).1
For Cornwallis to suppress the Carolina guerrillas with the forces
available to him was almost certainly impossible.
The American Civil War
In Virginia the dash and courage of Mosby and his followers showed
to great advantage because, even though they were operating in the
presence of large numbers of Federal troops, the attention of those
forces was riveted on Richmond.
In Missouri, in contrast, there were never enough Union soldiers
and militia to maintain order. Thus, some of the worst aspects and
consequences of guerrilla warfare were obvious for all who wished
to see. In many ways Missouri, a Union state, suffered more than
secessionist Georgia or South Carolina.
Nevertheless, after Appomattox some Confederates wished to
carry on a guerrilla struggle. Union leaders had no plans for dealing
with such a challenge. But the dread specter never materialized. The
Confederacy was thoroughly exhausted by clear defeat in a devas-
tating war few had expected and further demoralized by years of
bitter political infighting, as well as profound unease regarding sla-
very. A guerrilla movement would have had no conventional forces
to support it, because the major Southern military leaders refused to
countenance a continuation of the fighting. Finally, advocacy of con-
tinued struggle collapsed under Lincoln's easy peace terms, the ab-
sence of an alien enemy and the knowledge that no outside assistance
would be forthcoming.
The Philippines: 1898
There was nothing foreordained about the American victory against
the Philippine insurrection. On the contrary, the situation confronted
the Americans with potential disaster. U.S. forces were totally alien
to the Filipinos, far from home, and few in number.2 They had no
experience as colonial administrators. They possessed no air sup-
port, no medevac, no AWACs, not even telephones. At home, the
Philippines conflict was arousing great political controversy.
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Certain objective factors, however, favored the Americans. The
geographical isolation of the islands meant that the insurgents could
count on no outside aid, and numerous ethnic rivalries within the
native population inhibited the growth of nationalistic sentiment.
The Americans capitalized on these objective factors by employing
tactics that hurt the guerrillas without spilling blood. They provided
written promises of eventual independence to the Filipinos. They
practiced a policy of attraction: building schools, fighting disease,
improving the courts, cleaning the streets. They recruited many in-
digenous personnel as scouts and auxiliaries. They bought up guns
and disrupted the insurgents' food supplies. This general approach
provided scope for the complex ethnic and class divisions of Philip-
pine society to work against the insurgents.
Accordingly, the symbol of the American presence became not
the helicopter gunship but the schoolhouse. Herein lay the founda-
tions of that peace and friendship which characterized Philippine-
U.S. relations for the rest of the 1900s.
With regard to the campaigns against the Moros, American sol-
diers found those opponents to be personally courageous but stra-
tegically and tactically primitive. Both the culture and the geography
of the Moros severely limited their efforts. Besides that, the Ameri-
cans generally displayed a willingness to respect Islam, which did a
good deal to calm the situation. In the end the Moros decided that
they hated the Americans much less than they hated the Spanish
and the Christian Filipinos, and eventually they settled down to a
grudging but serviceable peace.
Nicaragua
In Nicaragua during the 1920s and 1930s, the United States was not
pursuing an imperialist adventure. On the contrary, the small num-
bers of American military personnel in that country were a response
to the repeated requests of the constitutional authorities there and
the leaders of both major Nicaraguan political parties for help in
restoring order in the face of chronic minoritarian rebellions, in an
area the U.S. government considered highly strategic.
With specific regard to the Sandino uprising, important political
factors severely limited its appeal. One factor was partisanship:
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Sandino was the leader of one faction of the Liberal Party, automati-
cally making him unacceptable to the Conservatives. Another fac-
tor was the government's electoral legitimacy; the Liberals (Sandino's
own party) were in power in Nicaragua most of the time, as a result
of relatively free and honest elections supervised by U.S. forces. Thus,
Sandino's insurgency had no chance of mobilizing anything like a
majority of the Nicaraguan people.
But the guerrillas did enjoy some key advantages. Unsupervised
international borders were close at hand. In addition, the number of
American military personnel in the country was too small to effec-
tively hold posts, protect communications, patrol borders, and chase
guerrillas all at the same time. The numerical insufficiency was the
result of widespread opposition within the United States to any
Central American intervention, which was in any case always viewed
in Washington as short-term.
Nevertheless, when the American forces left Nicaragua, the af-
fairs of that country were in the hands of duly elected civilians. And
the U.S. Marines learned some valuable lessons from their Nicara-
guan experiences, especially regarding the treatment of civilians, the
control of firepower in settled areas, and the value of local recruits.
Greece
As World War II ended, Greece—poor, mountainous, on the periph-
ery of Europe, devastated by war, and bordered by new Stalinist
states—might well have seemed the ideal European setting for a
Communist insurgency. But the Communists suffered a defeat as
thorough as it was unpredicted.
Many have identified Tito's closing of the Yugoslav border
against the guerrillas as the key factor in their defeat. It was undeni-
ably a grave blow to the insurgent cause. But before the border clos-
ing, the guerrillas were already strategically defeated. U.S. aid and
advice to the Greek government helped create a larger, more vigor-
ous, better-commanded army. The guerrillas threw away their tacti-
cal advantages against that ever-improving army by adopting
conventional tactics. Most of all, they polluted the water in which
they had to swim by grossly and systematically mistreating the peas-
ant population.
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The Philippines: The Huk War
The Huk rebellion fed on government corruption and incompetence
in the wake of the devastation of World War II. The arrival on the
scene of Ramon Magsaysay severely reduced the appeal of the in-
surgents. He greatly improved the military's treatment of the civil
population and restored elections as a peaceful path to change. He
supplemented those effective measures with easy amnesty for guer-
rillas who would give themselves up and fabulous rewards for the
capture of those who would not.
Other factors weighed heavily against the Huks: in the indepen-
dent Philippine republic there was no foreign oppressor to rise
against, and geography ruled out any effective help for the guerril-
las from abroad. Therefore, the insurgency, which reached its peak
by mid-1950, had ceased to be a menace by mid-1952. The United
States was greatly interested and deeply involved in the struggle,
but not a single U.S. combat unit was deployed against the Huks.
El Salvador
The Salvadoran guerrillas, the FMLN, had an excellent hand to play:
the country suffered from many obvious problems, the electoral path
to change had been crudely blocked, the army was brutal and inept,
and outside aid flowed to the insurgents across borders that were
near at hand. But consistent U.S. aid and pressure improved the
army's tactics and its treatment of the civil population. The United
States also insisted on free elections, which divided the insurgents
and showed how limited their support was. The report of the bipar-
tisan Kissinger Commission placed the struggle in El Salvador in a
larger context, much as the Truman Doctrine had done for the Greek
conflict. The end of the Cold War convinced almost everybody that
the time to make peace had arrived. Thus, order returned to El Sal-
vador under pro-U.S. administrations, with no U.S. combat units
having been sent there and with very few American casualties.
Afghanistan
The Afghan mujahideen enjoyed those advantages most prized by
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guerrillas: popular support, high morale, favorable terrain, foreign
sanctuary, and copious assistance from the outside.
Nonetheless, the counterinsurgency waged by the Soviet Union
was incredibly poor. Consider that the Soviets, allegedly the world's
greatest military power, were fighting in an undeveloped and re-
mote country just across their border. The Afghan guerrillas fought
without the support of conventional units. Above all, the racial, eth-
nic, linguistic, and religious diversity of Afghanistan provided the
Soviets with unparalleled opportunities to divide their opponents.
The Soviet inability to take advantage of fissures in Afghan society
is simply stunning. Nor were the Soviets able to prevent help for the
mujahideen from pouring across the Pakistan and Iran borders.
Communist political failure was even more decisive in Afghanistan
than in Greece thirty-five years before.
The Soviets completed this political failure with disastrous mili-
tary tactics. Their brutally destructive assault on the civil popula-
tion only deepened the determination of the resistance. Soviet tactics
derived in part from an inadequate commitment of troops, a situa-
tion reminiscent of the Napoleonic failure in Spain. The Americans,
perceiving an opportunity, exploited it at little cost to themselves
but with incalculable cost to the Soviet empire. As it turned out, the
failure in Afghanistan was not some peculiarity of time and place
but instead foreshadowed the Russian debacle in Chechnya in the
mid-1990s.3
The guerrilla war in Afghanistan deserves much study by Ameri-
cans, not least because in years to come the U.S. government may
well find itself supporting another popular uprising in the same
general area of the Asian continent. And Americans might further
wish to ponder the great strength the Afghan resistance derived from
the lively religious faith of most of its members. What might hap-
pen if American forces ever find themselves confronting that kind
of strength?
Vietnam: The Great Exception
hi 1963 the Communist rulers in Hanoi were orchestrating a guer-
rilla insurgency in South Vietnam. Reacting with excited incompre-
hension to sensational and obscene images of Buddhist
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self-immolations avidly furnished by the news media, high U.S. of-
ficials gave their approval to a coup against President Diem, which
predictably ended in his murder. Punishment for this unconscio-
nable act was not long in coming: the chaos following the killing of
Diem led directly to the dramatic escalation of the U.S. presence in
Vietnam. That depressing episode provides the clearest possible
warning of how dangerous it is when Washington decision makers
try to micromanage political affairs in a cultural context of which
they know little.
Sending so many Americans to a guerrilla war in a far-away
country of questionable strategic importance to the United States
was a formula for disaster. The mistakes and crimes inevitable in
such a conflict, along with the wastefulness and destructiveness of
the American way of war, blazed nightly on American television
screens. The culmination of the process was the mishandling by the
news media of the Tet Offensive of 1968, the turning point of the
war. The president and his advisers, huddled in the lower depths of
the White House, busied themselves with selecting targets for the
U.S. Air Force in Vietnam; they also repeatedly halted the bombing
to prove American "goodwill." Both of these activities cost Ameri-
can and allied lives. Confronted by the Tet crisis, the administration
could not explain its purposes to the American electorate and thus
mercifully disappeared from the stage, leaving the dreadful mess in
Vietnam for its successors to clean up as best they could.
For nearly twenty years, the Americans failed to deal effectively
with South Vietnam's most serious vulnerability and North
Vietnam's most effective weapon: the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Neverthe-
less, the Americans and their allies defeated the guerrillas. The cost
in American lives was equivalent to the number of fatalities on U.S.
roadways in 1970 alone. Not only had the Vietcong suffered defeat,
but also South Vietnamese opposition to conquest by Hanoi was
wide and deep.4 That is why the destruction of South Vietnam re-
quired a massive invasion by the North Vietnamese Army, an inva-
sion that developed because the South Vietnamese were abandoned,
even repudiated, by their self-anointed American protectors.
However regrettable the initial U.S. commitment to Vietnam or
the subsequent escalation of that commitment may have been, surely
very few today can contemplate the final American desertion of the
South Vietnamese without deep disquiet.
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And what, in the end, did the conquest of South Vietnam prove?
A leading British authority on insurgency offered this troubling an-
swer: "Perhaps the major lesson of the Viet Nam war is: do not rely
on the United States as an ally."5
The Past and the Future
What are some general conclusions or inferences to be derived from
the comparison of these conflicts? Here is one: during the American
Revolution and the U.S. Civil War, Americans demonstrated great
prowess as guerrillas. Analysis of their campaigns ought to be in-
corporated into the conscious view of those who will command U.S.
forces against guerrillas in the future: to understand why Marion,
Sumter, Mosby, and others were successful is to begin (at least) to
understand how to defeat guerrillas.
And, perhaps even more importantly, in the opening years of
the twentieth century American armed forces achieved a clear and
lasting victory over insurgents in the Philippines. In fact, of the seven
instances examined in this book in which the United States inter-
vened abroad in a guerrilla struggle, important American objectives
were achieved in six: the Philippines (twice), Nicaragua, Greece,
Afghanistan, and El Salvador. The great exception was South Viet-
nam, where the United States defeated the insurgency and then aban-
doned the country and its people to blatant invasion.
The deplorable experience in Vietnam overshadows American
thinking about guerrilla insurgency. This is understandable but un-
fortunate. The conflict in the Philippines, and in Nicaragua as well,
demonstrated that U.S. forces could operate effectively against guer-
rillas under adverse circumstances. Notably, they carried out their
mission with what would today be considered remarkably low lev-
els of technology. The absence of advanced weaponry was an ad-
vantage, actually, because it restricted the ability of the Americans
to inflict damage on civilian areas and forced them to work out a
sound strategy.
Nevertheless, given certain features of contemporary American
society, it would be better, with few if any exceptions, for the United
States not to take on the burden of direct confrontation with insur-
gents. Whatever the particular circumstances, U.S. troops would be
by definition foreigners, and there is but a bayonet's breadth be-
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tween "foreigners" and "invaders." In addition, insurgencies based
on ethnic or religious differences, or both, tend to be extremely bit-
ter and hence protracted. The type of effort the United States pur-
sued against the Greek Communists, the Philippine Huks, and the
Salvadoran FMLN, however—assistance to the incumbent govern-
ment without actual commitment to combat—both minimizes
American vulnerabilities and emphasizes American strengths.6 Those
strengths include providing financial help to the local government
while dissuading other governments from aiding the guerrillas, and
assisting the local armed forces with intelligence, mobility, and op-
erational advice. The United States would also be in a position to
pressure the assisted government, if necessary, to limit the abuse of
civilians and to provide a peaceful alternative to insurgency. If, de-
spite that assistance, the local government appears too weak to stave
off a guerrilla challenge, then the United States could invite the mili-
tary participation of friendly regional states or, where politically
appropriate, of the former colonial power.7
Table 1 summarizes the argument so far. Clearly, the table does
not prove that U.S. indirect aid was the determining factor in the
cases in which the United States achieved its major aims. All of those
conflicts might conceivably have turned out more or less the same
without U.S. involvement. But the summary provided in the table
certainly illustrates that from the 1940s through the 1980s, outcomes
greatly desired by the United States have not required the participa-
tion of American combat forces. It further suggests that the outcome
in South Vietnam might have been profoundly different had the
United States employed a more conservative strategy there.
If what has been said so far is true, or mainly true, then it is
reasonable to conclude that when top U.S. government and military
decision makers consider possible U.S. involvement in a future guer-
rilla insurgency, the presumption should be against committing U.S.
ground forces: the burden of proof must be on the advocates of such
a course of action. Serious answers need to be provided to very ba-
sic questions. First, major guerrilla insurgencies do not usually arise
in countries with reasonably efficient, reasonably decent govern-
ments. Is that why the local government cannot handle the guerril-
las without U.S. troops? Second, what, precisely, is the U.S. national
interest in the conflict? Can the supposed U.S. national interest be
convincingly presented to the American electorate, especially given
Implications and Provocations • 327
Table I. Relationship of U.S. Combat Role to U.S. Policy Attainment
U.S. Achieves
Major Objectives
U.S. Does Not
Achieve Major
Objectives
Primary U.S. Combat Role
Philippines (post-1898)
Nicaragua
Vietnam
No Primary U.S. Combat Role
Greece
Philippines (Huks)
El Salvador
Afghanistan
Note: There is no instance in which the U.S. played a supportive noncombat role in an
insurgency and failed to attain major objectives.
the disappearance of the Soviet Union? And not least, what evidence
is there that U.S. combat intervention will solve or even alleviate the
problem?
If, nonetheless, an American administration casts the die and
commits U.S. combat forces against a foreign insurgency, the most
important battle becomes the battle for American opinion. Most
guerrilla conflicts in the Third World (but not only there) will ex-
hibit extreme political and moral ambiguities that will disturb the
U.S. electorate; even the very low-key, low-casualty Nicaraguan
episode aroused much controversy in the United States, before the
television age. Guerrillas can protract the conflict, furthermore, by
avoiding contact with U.S. and local forces, and the guerrillas can
then choose to make contact in spectacular ways. The U.S. polity
remains vulnerable to the "Tet Offensive effect," as in Vietnam in
1968 and El Salvador in 1989. hi the terminology of Clausewitz, the
U.S. foreign policy "center of gravity" lies in a usually inchoate public
opinion bombarded by sensational television images. For its own
protection, and perhaps survival—not to speak of the national in-
terest—any U.S. administration making a commitment to combat in
a guerrilla war will have to insist that U.S. foreign policy, especially
military intervention, is not conducted to provide the news media
with pictures. That caution should be in place even if the agents of
the media were familiar with guerrilla tactics and the culture of the
country at risk. Hence, a first order of business should be to estab-
lish firm control of any large cities, and especially the capital, as
soon as possible, with painstaking attention to security in those places
and complete determination to prevent a "Tet." In that way the U.S.
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government will have more influence over the kind of news stories
reaching Americans at home.8
Real Victory
Even where it is attainable, military victory is ephemeral. That is
especially true for counterinsurgency. A guerrilla war is not over
merely because the guerrillas disappear. Disappearance is a basic
tactic of those who wage guerrilla war effectively. Real victory means
an enduring peace. Such a peace cannot derive from the mere physi-
cal cowing of the enemy. If a government, even one apparently suc-
cessful in its counterinsurgency, does not eventually achieve a
measure of conciliation with important strata (at least) among those
elements of society that supported the insurgency, then the insur-
gency can recur and require that the government undertake another
costly struggle, perhaps unsuccessfully. "If historical experience
teaches us anything about revolutionary guerrilla war," wrote
Samuel Griffith, "it is that military measures alone will not suffice."9
An enduring victory, an enduring peace in a guerrilla insurgency,
requires a political settlement resting on broad foundations.
The possibility of a lasting settlement will be deeply affected by
the way counterinsurgent forces approach the question of how to
combat the guerrillas. With an eye on the peace to follow, the
counterinsurgent forces need to limit to the greatest degree possible
the amount of blood that is spilled.
Limiting Bloodshed
Historically proven methods exist for seriously weakening a guer-
rilla movement without creating great numbers of casualties on ei-
ther side. To begin, if the guerrillas can be pushed into undesirable
areas of a country and confined there, then even without one single
shot being fired, they have been strategically defeated. One of the
best-known methods of forcing guerrillas to abandon a given area
without fighting is to saturate it with troops and police (this is the
initial phase of the "clearing and holding" strategy). Lines of fences
or chains of blockhouses, or both, can reduce the insurgents' access
to the more desirable or strategic regions of the country; they can
also serve to disrupt the flow of outside assistance.10 Diplomatic pres-
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sure can further prevent or at least limit help to the insurgents from
foreign countries. Once significant areas of the country have been
cleared of guerrillas, responsible authorities can address civilian
grievances.11 Intelligence activities should focus on the arrest of guer-
rilla leaders. Providing large cash rewards for help in capturing guer-
rilla leaders sows distrust among the insurgents. Well-timed
amnesties decrease the numbers and the morale of the guerrillas.
Trading cash or, where appropriate, the release of a prisoner, for
handed-in weapons, no questions asked, can denude whole areas of
firearms, especially if the guerrillas are not receiving significant out-
side help. Another tactic, potentially quite effective, is to deprive
the guerrillas of sufficient food by controlling sales from civilian
sources and by hunting out the guerrillas' food-growing areas.
But of all the options in a low-casualty strategy for defeating
guerrillas, the two most fundamental are undoubtedly (1) the pro-
vision of a peaceful alternative to insurgency and (2) the display of
rectitude.
A Peaceful Road to Change
A peaceful alternative to violence means peaceful methods of effect-
ing or pursuing change. That means methods for resolving clashes
of interest, methods that are widely viewed as legitimate, often but
not necessarily including free elections. They might also involve in-
corporating or reincorporating estranged elements of the popula-
tion into the political process. It is important to understand the people
at whom the peaceful alternative is directed. That is, one should not
expect the availability of a peaceful alternative to dampen the ardor
of ideological fanatics, religious zealots, or those whose main inter-
est in insurgency is to taste the delights of power. Such persons,
however, are relatively rare. A peaceful alternative has time and again
satisfied those who supported insurgency because they perceived
no other path to the redress of grievances. Examples of peaceful al-
ternatives helping to end internal conflict are easy to find: Lincoln's
generous reconstruction plan; the American policy of attraction in
the Philippines; the continuous functioning of Parliament in war-
torn Greece; and the restoration of free elections in Nicaragua in the
1920s, in the Philippines in the 1950s, and in El Salvador in the 1980s.
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The Centrality of Rectitude
Finally, lasting victory based on conciliation requires the counter-
insurgent forces to display rectitude: that is, right conduct toward
the civilian population. In the words of the distinguished British
theorist of counterinsurgency Sir Robert Thompson, that means act-
ing "in accordance with the law of the land, and in accordance with
the highest civilized standards."12
There is impressive testimony to the importance of rectitude for
those who would defeat guerrilla insurgency. Clausewitz observed
that "war is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will": that
is, "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means." Surely
it cannot be "our will," our "policy," to galvanize the opponent's
population into outraged resistance, but that is the predictable re-
sult of violating rectitude. The British Royal Commission investi-
gating the 1919 massacre of Indian civilians at Amritsar expressed
this idea succinctly: "The employment of excessive measures is as
likely as not to produce the opposite result to that desired." The
Philippine insurgent leader Luis Taruc wrote that the principal force
generating the Huk rebellion was government provocations and
outrages against hapless civilians. In his study of contemporary
French counterinsurgency, Pierre Boyer de Latour insisted that "the
army exists to protect the safety and the possessions of civilians."
During the height of the American effort in Vietnam, Nathan Leites
wrote that when "competing with a vigorous rebellion, a precarious
authority should be . . . concerned with respect for the people's dig-
nity at least as much as with [raising] the level of their income."
Certainly the destructiveness of the U.S. effort in Vietnam—the suf-
ferings inflicted upon civilians and the natural environment, in-
tended or not—troubled the consciences of many Americans. The
Salvadoran Army's reputation for systematic human rights abuses
became a serious issue in the United States. And in the 1980s the
Soviet experience in Afghanistan shows clearly what can happen to
an army when it tramples down the basic tenets of civilization.13
Habitual or systematic abuse of civilians has been the Achilles' heel
of more than one counterinsurgency effort.
Rectitude of course does not mean that the guilty are not pun-
ished. On the contrary, rectitude requires that the guilty be distin-
guished from the innocent and pay an exemplary penalty.
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To behave correctly toward civilians is not usually the overrid-
ing disposition of armed young soldiers who find themselves in a
strange country filled with people who want to kill them; this is
especially so because by definition guerrillas seek to look like and
hide among the civilian population. But however difficult and against
the grain, right conduct is essential to the maintenance of good mo-
rale and good discipline. Furthermore, unchecked cruelty and in-
justice create recruits and sympathizers for the guerrillas and thus
increase casualties among the counterinsurgent forces. A sustained
display of rectitude, in contrast, will make it incomparably easier to
gather intelligence from civilians. And certainly, all lapses from good
conduct by American or U.S.-backed forces will be splashed again
and again across every television screen in the world, undermining
support for involvement within the American electorate.
One needs to display rectitude not only toward the civilians but
toward the enemy as well. In contrast to the obvious costs entailed
by a neglect or repudiation of rectitude, government forces that gain
a reputation for right conduct can take advantage of a very impor-
tant but sometimes overlooked fact about guerrillas: some find them-
selves among the ranks of the guerrillas through outright coercion,
and others who joined voluntarily come to repent of it. If guerrillas
like those understand that upon capture or acceptance of amnesty,
they will be dealt with decently, they will have all the more reason
to abandon the struggle and no reason at all to fight to the death
when trapped. Captured or surrendered guerrillas who receive de-
cent treatment often provide a gold mine of information to their cap-
tors. And soldiers who display rectitude toward the enemy will find
it all the easier to do the same toward civilians.14
To those ends, one of the best methods is to deploy counterin-
surgent troops in their home areas—yet another serious argument
against the use of U.S. troops in overseas insurgencies. If U.S. com-
bat forces are nevertheless to confront guerrillas, it is essential to
indoctrinate junior officers with the overwhelming importance of
right conduct. At least some officers need training not only in the
language but also in the culture—most especially including the reli-
gious sensibilities and sexual mores—of the civilians among whom
they will be operating. Individual U.S. units should also remain in
the same place for an extended period, so that they become familiar
with and to the inhabitants.
332 • America and Guerrilla Warfare
Ensuring proper physical care of the troops is essential. And
clearly, the forces committed against the guerrillas must be numeri-
cally sufficient for accomplishing their assigned mission; from the
Carolinas to Afghanistan, there is an unmistakable link between in-
adequate numbers and bad behavior. Counterinsurgency on the
cheap is a delusion heading for disaster.15 Finally, but assuredly not
least, there must be absolute prohibition against the setting of mini-
mum quotas for dead guerrillas—no "body counts"!
The road of guerrilla war is littered with the wreckage of those
who forgot about or sneered at rectitude, from the comparatively
limited failings of the British in the Carolinas to the egregious and
self-destructive tactics of the Soviets in Afghanistan and including
the French in Spain, the Spanish in Cuba, the Japanese in China, and
the Germans in Yugoslavia (as well as the Greek and the Philippine
Communists).16 In the end, right conduct is right strategy. Rectitude
is worth many battalions.
Notes
Note: Complete publication information for abbreviated citations
may be found in the bibliography.
Introduction: The Americans and Guerrilla Insurgency
1. The term guerrilla insurgency refers to that form of conflict in which op-
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8. Clausewitz, On War, book 8, chap. 4. Of course there are sound military
reasons for choosing such a procedure as well.
9. Griffith, introduction to Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare, p. 34.
10. The best-known example of this method is the Morice Line between
Algeria and Tunisia; the Moroccan "Hassan Line" also worked against insur-
gents in the former Spanish Sahara. Blockhouses served the British well against
the Boers, and they served Chiang Kai-shek against the Maoists in the 1930s.
11. Some would include the resettlement of civilians in this list of nonvio-
lent measures. That process worked effectively in British Malaya, but in many
other conflicts it backfired in politically catastrophic ways. See Marston, "Re-
settlement."
12. Thompson, "Regular Armies and Insurgency," p. 10.
13. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 75,87. The British Royal Commission is quoted
in Thomas R. Mockaitis, "Low Intensity Conflict: The British Experience," Con-
flict Quarterly 13, no. 1 (1993), p. 10. Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger. Latour, he
martyre de L'Armee francaise, p. 321. Leites, Viet Cong Style, p. 17. During the
Algerian insurgency, the torture of prisoners by some elements of the French
Army, for what seemed to some at the time the most compelling and justifying
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of reasons, eventually contributed to the disruption of the officer corps and the
granting of independence to Algeria. See Joes, From the Barrel of a Gun, chap. 7.
14. Sun Tzu said in The Art of War: "Treat captives well, and care for them."
Mao Tse-tung insisted that his troops abstain from abusing prisoners.
15. See Joes, Modern Guerrilla Insurgenq/, pp. 26-27. In the words of Sun
Tzu, "Pay heed to nourishing the troops" (The Art of War). During their Ma-
layan conflict, the British commitment at its peak counted 40,000 regular troops
(British, Commonwealth, Gurkha, and Malayan), plus 24,000 Federation Po-
lice, 37,000 Special Constables, and 250,000 Home Guards, for a grand total of
351,000, of whom 512 British and Commonwealth soldiers were killed. Edgar
O'Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War (Hamden, Conn.: Archon,
1966), pp. 164,177.
16. The appalling behavior of Chinese troops in Tibet in the 1950s pro-
voked a long and difficult guerrilla war there. And many decades later, the
future of that unhappy land is still in question.
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